Can a virus-maker get the statute’s protection simply by blocking one objectionable site and linking to a server, with immunity to block access to whatever it wants

Congress plainly intended to give computer users the tools to filter the Internet

But by expressly declining to do this, and leaving the meaning of “objectionable” to reflect whatever the filterer objects to, the case appears to open up the prospect of unexpected kinds of objections leading to filtering being used for offensive as distinct from purely defensive purposes — perhaps even protecting kinds of filtering that consumers find so offensive that they might consider the filtering itself to be malicious.

(a) an update feature on its products (involving multiple users accessing a server) amd (b) a token filter that restricted access to a single pornographic website),

would it then have complete immunity to block access to whatever it wanted, e.g. websites on competitors products or consumer websites containing negative reviews of its products?

The opinion appears to leave the definition of “objectionable” completely undefined and equally within the discretion of the consumer and the provider? It’s a broad term. What does it mean? What happens if the provider’s concept of what it considers “objectionable” turns completely different from the consumer’s? Does the provider have to even consider consumer’s interests or Congressional purposes in making such a determination or is its discretion absolute under the safe harbor? What happens if the provider’s concept of “objectionable” is so so different from the ideas Congress appeared to have had in mind or from consumers’ perception of their interests, indeed so self-serving, that consumers might think its blocking behavior against their interests and malicious?

Does the safe harbor, with these critical terms left undefined, open the door for companies to block access to each other’s products as a competitive tool?

Can a virus-maker get the statute’s protection simply by blocking one objectionable site and linking to a server, with immunity to block access to whatever it wants — the entire internet if the virus-maker has Luddite-type objections to the internet as a whole?

After all, a key difficulty this case illustrates is that one person’s “filtering” may be another’s “service disruption”. Perhaps all that perveyors of service disruption have to do is get a little legal advice and jump through a few simple hoops to get their disruptions to fit into the definition of “filtering” and into the protection of the safe harbor.

Zango entered into a consent decree with the Federal Trade Commission in November 2006 following an FTC investigation into Zango