http://bit.ly/2Gd05Y

Thanks,

Bob
TSA Blog Team

The “fairly advanced” Aug 2006 plot in England to blow up a dozen airliners over US cities planned to use liquid explosives and triggered the liquids ban.

One fear is the creation of explosives onboard (TATP?) by mixing liquids carried on.

You’re spot on about the attempt to reach zero-risk. My largest complaint, on this and many other risk-involved policy issues, is that, rather than standing up and informing and educating the public and politicians that perfect safety is an impossible goal and contradictory to true efficiency and realistic safety measures, the professionals involved simply kow-tow to the nonsense and then create spurious justifications for activities that are palpably unable to achieve their stated goals of prevention and deterrence of even half-witted, semi-determined threats.

Absolutely agreed there. As I say I see Bush and his administration as responsible for this mess, and the Obama administration as being an accomplice after the fact.

1. I do not believe the ‘3oz each in a baggie’ rule is based on any genuine analysis. I could be wrong, but it strikes me as something cooked up in a committee meeting.

It is probably based on an analysis of a specific threat scenario, not a general rule of threats. Based on the circumstances surrounding the ban, I would suggest that it has to do with the amount of concentrated hydrogen peroxide necessary to make carbon/oxidiser explosives sufficient to down an airplane. Higher grade explosives might fall under different scenarios.

2. Given that any one person could endanger a plane with what can be brought onboard under the current rule, I don’t think any c/b analysis would lead us to say, “Oh, well, let’s just take our chances so we don’t excessively irritate the womenfolk.’

One actually DOES do something close to that. One defines a level of risk that is acceptable, and takes measures which are designed to reduce risk to that level with a minimum of cost (inconvenience to passengers, etc). Are there ways this rule could be easily circumvented? Absolutely. On the other hand circumventing them requires effort which provides more opportunities for detection.

3. We could certainly achieve a higher level of security by requiring that travelers carry no liquids/creams/ointments on board (all must be in checked luggage). This is an inconvenience for those who do not want to check any luggage, but not a terrible hardship as compared with being blown up in flight.

You seem to be arguing against the whole notion of acceptable risk. This notion is exactly the reason we have no-fly lists, etc.

4. Currently, any individual agent’s determination of what counts as ‘medicine’ can completely undercut the rule.

Maybe but I am not convinced. I have actually had infant formula (another exception) tested at these checkpoints. I guess they run some sort of chemical scan on at least some of the exempt products. I would bet it is looking for H2O2.

In other words (I suspect it’s clear), I think this is just a not-well-considered response.

Given time frames involved, etc. I think it probably was well considered. Whether or not it has been undercut by exceptions, etc. is a different question. Furthermore, the question of whether the whole system of controls (some of which we rarely see) works to ensure that this is a helpful measure is an area I am not really qualified to comment on simply because I don’t know what they are doing.

However, the goal of this is clear: to ensure that oxidising liquids cannot be brought through in sufficiently high quantities to improvise dangerous quantities of certain types of explosives on an airplane without making several trips through the security checkpoint. As soon as we move away from that scenario, the rule looks useless.

However, consider the following issue regarding higher-grade plastic explosives: They could be in anything. You could stuff cassette tapes for a portable cassette player with the stuff. For these types of explosives, however, detonation is more difficult, so typically security folk look for detonators. Consequently, you can’t JUST look at the quantity of explosives. The view of the whole device and what parts are easiest to detect is really what is necessary. The more complex the requirements for getting something through security simply means that the better chance law enforcement and airport security have of catching it before there is a disaster.

It hasn’t been mentioned yet, but it should be.
Anyone who thinks that 4-year-olds aren’t terrorists hasn’t spent much time around 4-year-olds.

But they have no cause[s]. Perhaps that makes them the most terroristic of all: destructiveness for no end whatsoever?

I take your point. Nonetheless, in this case I think whatever cost/benefit (where these include individual freedom) does not support that apparent compromise.

1. I do not believe the ‘3oz each in a baggie’ rule is based on any genuine analysis. I could be wrong, but it strikes me as something cooked up in a committee meeting.

2. Given that any one person could endanger a plane with what can be brought onboard under the current rule, I don’t think any c/b analysis would lead us to say, “Oh, well, let’s just take our chances so we don’t excessively irritate the womenfolk.’

3. We could certainly achieve a higher level of security by requiring that travelers carry no liquids/creams/ointments on board (all must be in checked luggage). This is an inconvenience for those who do not want to check any luggage, but not a terrible hardship as compared with being blown up in flight.

4. Currently, any individual agent’s determination of what counts as ‘medicine’ can completely undercut the rule.

In other words (I suspect it’s clear), I think this is just a not-well-considered response.

I do appreciate the difficulty of the task before the TSA. Still, I would like to see policies that really improve security rather than ones that appear to improve it while seriously inconveniencing people to no real end.

Based on personal experience I can’t agree that the security check personnel have gotten more courteous and professional, though I would agree most do make a good effort considering the nonsense they are responsible for enforcing, but that is definitely an airport and region specific issue.

You’re spot on about the attempt to reach zero-risk. My largest complaint, on this and many other risk-involved policy issues, is that, rather than standing up and informing and educating the public and politicians that perfect safety is an impossible goal and contradictory to true efficiency and realistic safety measures, the professionals involved simply kow-tow to the nonsense and then create spurious justifications for activities that are palpably unable to achieve their stated goals of prevention and deterrence of even half-witted, semi-determined threats.

I don’t mind so much them lying to me about why they do what they do and what they can actually achieve with it, but do they have to insult my intelligence in the process?

Anyone who thinks that 4-year-olds aren’t terrorists hasn’t spent much time around 4-year-olds.

As I recall, the ban on fluids was prompted by the risk that several people would each bring on components of a two-part explosive (e.g. Kinepak). The limitation to 3 oz is based on the rationale that a single person operating alone couldn’t create sufficient damage to take down an airplane with only 3 oz of explosive.

And now I’m probably going to end up on a watch list for searching for Semtex, explosive decompression, two-part explosives, and the effect of a small explosion on an aircraft. Thanks blog comments!

I think though your criticism is part of the problem rather than the rule. The fundamental question isn’t whether the rules conceivably allow the possibility of enough material to be dangerous, but rather the question of whether letting these through constitutes an unacceptable risk.

Certainly, anyone who thinks that two or three people working together (possibly booked on different flights, even) couldn’t collaborate to bring in dangerous quantities of explosives isn’t thinking like a security professional. Heck even if you think the quantities are absolutely safe you aren’t thinking like a security professional.

The rule in place is not designed to be absolutely safe. It is designed to keep the level of risk within acceptable bounds. There is a tremendous difference there. Absolute safety is incompatible with a free society.

Typically in checked baggage you look for detonation devices, not explosives themselves. This is because the detonation devices are much easier to detect on x-rays and without access to the baggage compartment, things can’t be assembled after check-in.

In carry-on luggage, the issues are different.

Most of TSA’s (visible) efforts are pure security theatre with no documented effectiveness at doing anything, for example catching forbidden objects at screening, better than the private system existing prior to 9/11. I’m sure there are some things they do well, but the security checkpoints and “no-fly list” are not among them.

Matthew:

I think measures have varying degrees of success. It is also extremely difficult to measure effectiveness of security measures when terrorists may take years (or even decades) to plan terrorist attacks. However let me provide two points of view here.

The first is that the pressure to make America “safe” has not been built up or channelled in a rational way. Any security professional knows that the important concept is “acceptable risk.” Yet we have been pushed towards a hysteria where that acceptable risk is 0. That doesn’t work and it opens up the way for all sorts of abuses such as the no fly list (keeping us safe from the likes of Cat Stephens and Ted Kennedy). The no fly list also breaks down entirely when dealing with Muslim names because of how these names are structured. Thus the signal to noise ratio here is very, very weak. If we are to avoid this we have to establish what level of risk is acceptable and start pushing back.

The second is that the TSA has done a good job in some areas. Airport security checkpoints are run in a more courteous and professional way since they took those areas over, and personal liberty in this area has not been unduly compromised (unticketed passengers can’t go through the checkpoints, but I think this is reasonable). The risks of theft at security checkpoints have been reduced by carefully handling who can walk through the metal detectors and when, and I have found the manners of the security personnel have improved.

Really, the blame for the no-fly list and a number of other attempts to reach 0-risk without considering the impacts on citizens properly rests squarely on the Bush administration, with secondary blame resting on the Obama administration for not dismantling some of these programs (this makes Obama, IMO, Bush’s accomplice after the fact).

I seem to have been in a snit last night. Sorry.

My original ‘question’ was rhetorical. Of course anyone could figure out that a baggie full of 3oz containers of liquids and creams would easily hold enough material to be dangerous.

That was my point: the rule does not serve security interests.

No, Chris. I am suggesting a way in which you (or anyone) could make a crude but serviceable calculation that lets you answer the question yourself, instead of relying on an expert opinion.

I think you mistake the origin of my prolixity. I was not being cute; I meant what I said in my follow-up. I believe we worship expertise too much, these days, and wish to strike small blows against this aspect of the zeitgeist. There’s no reason any average intelligence adult should blindly accept the word of the TSA on whether 3 ounces of liquid are dangerous, nor that of any other person. Not when a few basic science and math tools allow you to cross-check expert opinions for yourself.

Lawyers probably think every citizen should at least read the Bill of Rights, so as not to be bamboozled by politicians, and the legal scholar may take the occasional opportunity to point out how even neophytes can at least crudely reason out the constitutionality of the deeds both actual and proposed of government. I tend to feel similarly about thermodynamics.

OrenYou have confused the right to travel (which exists) with the right to travel by airplane (which does not exist).

Just as freedom of speech does not include every conceivable act of expression (bullhorns on a crowded street, e.g.), so too does the right to travel not include every conceivable mode of travel. See, e.g. Gilmore v. Gonzales: . . .

I’m not so sure I like that logic. I see it as being the same logic tossed in Loving v. Virginia — “You can marry who you want, as long as they’re the same race”. By that logic, I’m free to travel to Alaska and Hawaii, as long as I feel like walking. Rights must be expansively defined, or they are not rights at all.

Gilmore v. Gonzales was wrongly decided. The judge was obviously trying very hard to come to a pre-ordained conclusion. By speaking of the “burden” of the search, he is applying a weighing test where it is not appropriate. It implies that burden is constant and determinable, when it is neither. The judge in Gilmore was working under the impression that the only burden was an extra search. It is not — the burden can be missing a flight, missing an event. Being put on the no-fly list can be (and is) entirely arbitrary, and may be the result of being a member of a disfavored group (see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/24/usa.comment number 6 or http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/what-professor-murphys-story-tells-us.html).

Even if, arguendo, a no-fly list is constitutional, the lack of due process for being put on it is troubling. Even if the right to travel does not extend to airplanes, we are still at liberty to travel by planes. Being deprived of that liberty without due process is unconstitutional. In the end, there is no justice (how can there ever be justice for the family of a murder victim?), there can only be due process. Let’s not throw that away.

I have an avocational interest in reviving the moribund skill of quantitative estimation, to reduce the amount of arrant nonsense decent but nonexpert folks swallow from soi disant experts or Chicken Littles bent on infantilizing free men out of their freedom.

Well, good! Are you telling me that a baggie* full of 3oz containers of liquids and creams [I assume 'creams' includes 'ointments'] is insufficent to do damage to an airplane?

Look, I made a complaint about TSA regulations. If you think I am mistaken in the premises of said complaint, say so. I do not get the point of snarkily responding to others’ honest comments/queries. Does it make one feel important to do so? Perhaps one could feel equally important by informing others of what one thinks one knows.

*cleverly packed.

Splunge: I could concoct something dangerous with that amount of fluids and creams

No, Splunge, I said :

I could concoct something dangerous with that amount of fluids and creams

Is this really important?

I hope our enemies hire you as their IED consultant.

Good idea.

In any event, if I have a point other than the numerical result, interesting in its own right, it’s that you need not rely on intuition or impressions from Hollywood when wondering how dangerous 3-ounce tubes of liquid are. With ordinary high-school chemistry and math, you can calculate reasonable estimates. I have an avocational interest in reviving the moribund skill of quantitative estimation, to reduce the amount of arrant nonsense decent but nonexpert folks swallow from soi disant experts or Chicken Littles bent on infantilizing free men out of their freedom.

Oren, the standard soda can has a volume of 355 mL and Semtex does not float. Can you handle the math from here? Thanks.

I cannot say how many times I have stood in line with sympathetic fellow tavelers and agents trying to help me pack as much as possible into the dreaded baggie.

It’s stupid. I’m sorry; that’s all there is to it.

Don’t even get me going on the barefoot humiliation.

Also, I see no reason why willing adult females can’t be given handguns as well. Not sure I’m keen on hearing your explanation either, although I bet I’ll know soon enough.

but we have to restrict ourselves to liquids.

!) Why? They count my ‘creams’ and ‘ointments’ in the baggie – indeed, they let me carry creams and ointments if the particular checker regards them as ‘medicines.’*
2) Don’t forget, I have a baggie full of 3-ounce stuff. So, I can carry 3X whatever-a-baggie-cleverly-packed can hold of nitro.

* This really makes me crazy, by the way. One person treats my Cortaid as a medicine and waves me on; another says it is not a medicine and has to be scrunched into the baggie or tossed if it is more than 3 oz.

Uh huh. Where? In your pocket? Kind of a noticeable lump. Up your ass? Maybe. But then, leaving aside the question of where you put the detonator and so forth, this is why they have the “suspected bad-guy” list — so they have some idea of who to swab.

No system is perfect, except for the politically untouchable system wherein each adult male passenger is offered a loaded .45 on boarding (to be returned on landing), but the Israelis have found from long experience that the best security comes from taking the measure of the man, the passenger, rather than the American fetish of pursuing technical means of detecting “dangerous” things and substances. Frankly, a coat hanger in the right hands is a weapon of mass destruction.

But that way lies “profiling” and related non-PC no-nos.

You’ve confused the freedom of speech from a soapbox, which exists, with the freedom of speech in an amphitheater, which does not exist.”

In fact you have neither. The government may regulate the means (but never the message) of expressive speech provided that it does so in a content neutral fashion and in a manner narrowly tailored to a government interest. See, e.g. Ward v. Rock Against Racism. Ward is particularly on point to your rhetorical jab since it specifically shoots down the claim of the right to speech in the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell contrary to the content-neutral rules (regarding maximum amplification).

Just as freedom of speech does not include every conceivable act of expression (bullhorns on a crowded street, e.g.), so too does the right to travel not include every conceivable mode of travel. See, e.g. Gilmore v. Gonzales:

Like the plaintiff in Miller, Gilmore does not possess a fundamental right to travel by airplane even though it is the most convenient mode of travel for him. Moreover, the identification policy’s “burden” is not unreasonable. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (noting the right of all citizens to be “free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement”), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The identification policy requires that airline passengers either present identification or be subjected to a more extensive search. The more extensive search is similar to searches that we have determined were reasonable and “consistent with a full recognition of appellant’s constitutional right to travel.” United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912-13 (9th Cir.1973).

You could do better with RDX, but we have to restrict ourselves to liquids.

This seems like a good idea until you realize you can walk through the metal detector with 100g of RDX (more than enough to ensure a kill) with virtually no chance of detection unless they swab/puff you.

Seems like if you have a freedom to do something, the method you use to go about it is generally protected as well, unless the government can show an extremely good reason to hinder it. While I believe they can show a need to provide for security screening for weapons and bombs, I don’t believe they can show the need to block people from flying without due process.

An interesting assertion. Let’s get numerate and see. Suppose you had 3 ounces of nitroglycerin. (You could do better with RDX, but we have to restrict ourselves to liquids.) Nitro has a heat of combustion about 1.5 MJ/mol, and a molar mass of 227 g/mol, which means your 3 ounces of nitro gets you an energy release of 560 kJ, roughly. For comparison, a round from a .45 handgun has about 0.5 kJ of energy.

It would seem the nitro will do a lot more damage than a .45, but then again, the energy of the .45 slug is concentrated in one direction, whereas the energy from the nitro detonation spreads out spherically. Let’s assume the initial explosion occurs within a volume of radius = 3 cm. Then by the time the explosive front has reached a radius of about 16 cm the energy in any one direction has fallen to roughly the energy of a .45 slug.

Let’s assume a .45 slug can penetrate the skin of an airliner, but things with significantly less energy can’t. In that case, if you detonate your 3 ounces of nitro right next to the skin of the airliner, you’ll make a hole with a diameter of roughly 1 foot (32 cm). If you explode your nitro further away, the hole will be smaller.

A one-foot hole seems fairly survivable, unless conditions are unusual. Of course, you could use your nitro to blast your way into the control cabin instead, I guess. Or tamper with the smoke detector in the lavatory.

Why? Well, let’s start with the right to travel, implicit in the freedom of assembly clause in the first amendment.

You have confused the right to travel (which exists) with the right to travel by airplane (which does not exist).

Nick

Steve: Medicare costs are growing faster than the cost of private insurance.This is pretty much the opposite of true. “Medicare’s per enrollee spending has grown at a rate that is 1 percentage point lower than that for private insurance over the 1970 to 2006 period.”

Even the study you quote doesn’t suggest that it’s the “opposite of true.” It merely says (to paraphrase) that there may be good reason to think that per capita Medicare expenses are growing faster than private expenses, but the one particular CBO study cited isn’t sufficent to make that conclusion. Other studies do support that conclusion.

Here’s one (overall cost, not per capita): http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHE_Fact_Sheet.asp
Here’s another (per capita admin costs): http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/wm2505.cfm

And that ignores the fact that Medicare shifts a good portion of it’s true costs off to the private sector, and that one way Medicare holds it’s administrative costs down is by skimping on fraud prevention and investigation.

Surely I could concoct something dangerous with that amount of fluids and creams if I knew how and wanted to. The restrictions do nothing. That I can also carry any amount of ‘medicine’ along with my baggie of cosmetics makes it obvious that there is no security rationale.

richard: Well the government has been handling Medicare for several decades so far and has been doing a pretty good job of it – as evidence by polls showing that 90% of the elderly are very satisfied with Medicare

“The government who robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of Paul.”
– George Bernard Shaw

Are TSA security measures something enforced when Airlines publically sell flights on a per-ticket basis? or is it something airlines or Airports themselves were imposed upon?

I believe it is based on the size of the plane. A couple of years ago a local entrepreneur was trying to start passenger service between Seattle and Portland, limiting his planes to smaller turboprops specifically in order to prevent the delays of screening (which make driving a lot more attractive for that short a trip).