From U.S. v. Skoien, decided today:

A grand jury indicted Steven Skoien for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)…. Skoien pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal [on Second Amendment grounds] the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment….

The government has approached this case as though all it had to do to defend the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) is invoke D.C. v. Heller’s language about certain “presumptively lawful” gun regulations — notably, felon-dispossession laws. Not so. Heller held that the Second Amendment secures an individual natural right to possess firearms for self-defense; the opinion’s reference to exceptions cannot be read to relieve the government of its burden of justifying laws that restrict Second Amendment rights. Although Heller did not settle on a standard of review, it plainly ruled out the deferential rationalbasis test; this leaves either strict scrutiny or some form of “intermediate” review. On the facts of this case, we hold that intermediate scrutiny applies. In its usual formulation, this standard of review requires the government to establish that the challenged statute serves an important governmental interest and the means it employs are substantially related to the achievement of that interest.

Skoien was convicted in state court of misdemeanor domestic battery and was placed on probation. About a year later his probation agent found a hunting shotgun in a truck parked outside his home. Skoien admitted he had gone deer hunting that morning and used the shotgun to kill a deer. He argued below and maintains here that prosecuting him under § 922(g)(9) for possessing the shotgun violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms for hunting. He has not, however, asserted a right to possess the gun for self-defense.

As such, the government’s application of § 922(g)(9) in this case requires less rigorous justification than strict scrutiny because the core right of self-defense identified in Heller is not implicated. Applying intermediate scrutiny, we ask whether the government has established that the statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest. No one questions the importance of the government’s interest in protecting against domestic-violence gun injury and death. The dispute here is about the fit between this important objective and § 922(g)(9)’s blanket ban on firearms possession by persons who have been convicted of a domestic-violence misdemeanor. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government need not establish a close fit between the statute’s means and its end, but it must at least establish a reasonable fit. The government has done almost nothing to discharge this burden. Instead, it has premised its argument almost entirely on Heller’s reference to the presumptive validity of felon-dispossession laws and reasoned by analogy that § 922(g)(9) therefore passes constitutional muster. That’s not enough. Accordingly, we vacate Skoien’s conviction and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

More thoughts on this, I hope, later today. Thanks to Miguel Larios for the pointer.

Categories: Guns    

    48 Comments

    1. Tim says:

      If anything, this is precisely what I feared most. I wrote a paper this spring, entitled, “Holdings versus Dicta: D.C. v. Heller and the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence.” The basic question asked (and really not yet answered) is whether Heller‘s value in perpetuity will be for its holdings or dicta.

      I personally think that much of that dicta came from trying to win Justice Kennedy’s vote. Nelson Lund, the Patrick Henry Professor of Constitutional Law and the Second Amendment at George Mason University’s school of law also published a paper last spring (together with the Heritage Foundation) that seems to suggest that Scalia’s extensive dicta in Heller may come back to bite us.

      Future Second Amendment cases (and hopefully, McDonald v. City of Chicago, which has been covered extensively here as of late) will certainly clarify the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection, and, presumably, rely more on Heller’s holdings rather than Justice Scalia’s dicta in the opinion.

      Given the Court’s history of turning dicta into holdings in future cases, it remains to be seen as to how this will pan out. Lund expressed numerous examples of this in his speech given at the University of Illinois’ College of Law this past spring, just days after publishing the Heritage article.

      I will definitely be staying tuned. Thanks for sharing this, Professor.

    2. krs says:

      Doug Berman will appreciate this.

    3. Brett says:

      There is a real interesting problem on the felon dispossession side, I think, caused by development of the concept of felony. Is it really clear, as an historical matter, that possession of a short lobster (to pick my favorite example) is the kind of thing that would disqualify someone for gun possession? Not really. Should it? You can cover over the problem with the linguistic similarity of the term “felon” over time, but that’s ducking the interesting issue of the principle by which states can use felonies to justify dispossession.

    4. Brett Bellmore says:

      Short version: The presumptive validity of prohibitions on felons possessing firearms does nothing to establish the validity of prohibitions on misdemeanants posessing firearms.

    5. Brett says:

      The analogy makes more sense if felon dispossession is justified in cases of violent felonies. But that leaves the problem of justifying dispossession for non-violent felonies, which is a little harder. You need to either have an historical justification or rely on some other subdivision of felonies, or rely on the concept of felony itself. The first and last don’t make much sense to me.

    6. cboldt says:

      No one questions the importance of the government’s interest in protecting against domestic-violence gun injury and death. The dispute here is about the fit between this important objective and § 922(g)(9)’s blanket ban on firearms possession by persons who have been convicted of a domestic-violence misdemeanor. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government need not establish a close fit between the statute’s means and its end, but it must at least establish a reasonable fit.

      Without looking at the government’s argument below, it seems to me that the 7th Circuit is telling the government exactly what it must assert in order to obtain and sustain a conviction. Namely, the government must recite in its argument, something that resembles “A ban on firearms possession by persons who have been convicted of a domestic-violence misdemeanor serves the government’s interest in protecting against domestic-violence gun injury and death.”
      In light of the 7th Circuit asserting that there is no question about the government’s interest in protecting against domestic-violence gun injury and death, I don’t see how the 7th Circuit fails to see a reasonable fit (not a close fit) between the government interest and the means to accomplish it.

    7. cboldt says:

      I should have read the case before commenting. My question is answered therein. The 7th Circuit is demanding an evidentiary showing, coupled with argument. It suggests a few sources for evidence, and appears to be of a mind that the government can meet its burden, at least as the statute is applied in this case.

    8. PersonFromPorlock says:

      Out of curiousity, and knowing full well I’m wasting my time, what is “the [federal] government’s interest in protecting against domestic-violence gun injury and death?”

    9. Alaska says:

      The court spends a great deal of its time differentiating the rights at stake. The Court read Heller to protect the right to own a firearm for self defense. in this case, the defendant owned a firearm for hunting. Since this is a legitimate purpose, but not the core of the right recognized in Heller, only intermediate scrutiny was used.

      Here is an interesting twist, though. In my state, with roughly 20% of the population being Alaska Natives, we have a number of Alaska Natives who have been convicted of crimes involving domestic violence. They absolutely use firearms to hunt. In fact, much of Alaska’s land is governed by federal fish and wildlife regulations and management because the federal government recognizes that Alaska Natives, as part of Indian tribes, have a fundamental right to hunt and fish on their native lands. (This right is recognized in numerous federal regulations and treaties between the U.S. government and various Indian tribes.) When the State refuses to recognize that right (It’s a very long story), the feds then step in to manage federal land to protect such a right. This right is based upon the history and tradition of the Indian tribes in general, and, in my state, Alaska Natives in particular.

      Given that background, would the possession of firearms by an Alaska Native or a member of an Indian tribe for the purpose of subsistence hunting then be a fundamental right that would require strict scrutiny? I don’t know the answer, but I think it’s a fascinating question. If I wind up representing a client charged with this offense in federal court here, I may raise that issue.

    10. CDU says:

      Tim: I personally think that much of that dicta came from trying to win Justice Kennedy’s vote.

      I’m pretty skeptical of that. If you look at the oral argument, Kennedy seems to be very much in favor of gun rights and the individual rights interpretation of the 2A. I think Scalia already had Kennedy’s vote, he didn’t need to do anything to win it.

    11. Tim says:

      CDU:
      I’m pretty skeptical of that.If you look at the oral argument, Kennedy seems to be very much in favor of gun rights and the individual rights interpretation of the 2A.I think Scalia already had Kennedy’s vote, he didn’t need to do anything to win it.

      If that’s true, it’s an awful shame that some of those comments are in there. They are a detriment to our cause, did nothing to help Dick Heller and his fellow litigants, and stand to legitimize trial determinations like the one in this case.

      I am from the perspective that all that dicta may severely narrow Second Amendment protections if the Court doesn’t choose to hear more of these cases and clarify its position. And, obviously, as a support of the 2A, that scares me quite a bit.

      By that logic, bad dicta becomes bad holdings, and if appealed and affirmed, bad precedent.

    12. Phatty says:

      If you look at the oral argument, Kennedy seems to be very much in favor of gun rights and the individual rights interpretation of the 2A.

      I completely agree. It frustrates me when I see commenters repeatedly blame Kennedy for the bad dicta based on nothing more than his reputation as a swing vote. What most people don’t realize is that he is often a swing vote because he is more likely than other conservative judges to protect individual’s rights. I highly encourage anyone who wonders where that dicta came from to read the oral arguments. Scalia didn’t put that language in the opinion to win anyone’s vote; it’s in there because he wanted it in there.

    13. Phatty says:

      Every person is now on notice in the 7th Circuit that if you challenge a gun law, you absolutely should claim you possessed the gun for self-defense. No fool would now say they have the gun simply for hunting (and get an intermediate standard of review) when they can say they have the gun for self-defense (and get strict scrutiny review).

    14. Phatty says:

      I don’t get why the government gets a second shot at proving its case. In any other criminal appeal, if the court finds that the government failed to prove its case, the conviction is tossed and that’s the end of the case.

      I guess in order to justify the second chance, the 7th Circuit said “in fairness, because Heller did not establish a standard of review the government did not know what its burden would be.” But, the government and the district court proceeded under the assumption that it had to meet the strict scrutiny standard. Is the 7th Circuit really arguing that if the government had known the standard it needed to meet was intermediate, rather than strict, it would have presented more evidence? That makes no sense.

      If an individual fails to meet their burden or makes the slightest procedural error, the appellate court will rule against them in a heart beat. On the other hand, if the government screws up, the court will hold its hand and give it as many chances as necessary to fix the problem.

    15. dcperson says:

      Tim: If that’s true, it’s an awful shame that some of those comments are in there. They are a detriment to our cause, did nothing to help Dick Heller and his fellow litigants, and stand to legitimize trial determinations like the one in this case.I am from the perspective that all that dicta may severely narrow Second Amendment protections if the Court doesn’t choose to hear more of these cases and clarify its position. And, obviously, as a support of the 2A, that scares me quite a bit.By that logic, bad dicta becomes bad holdings, and if appealed and affirmed, bad precedent.

      I don’t know enough about second amendment law to say what’s the accurate interpretation…but Heller has in many cases translated to “right to bear arms necessary for self-defense in a home.” Step outside the home, and you apparently need a new case to handle it. Change the rationale (i.e. not self-defense), and you need a whole new body of law. Or at least that’s how it seems from some of the lower court cases.

    16. Railroad Gin says:

      The idea that a person owns a gun for just one purpose is silly. A person who owns only one shotgun and uses it for hunting or skeet shooting can also keep that same gun loaded in the closet for self-defense.

      And what if a person owns a .357 handgun for self-defense and a 12-gauge for duck hunting? If I’m reading the 7th Circuit correctly, on the right set of facts, he could be prosecuted for owning the shotgun but not the handgun. This is absurd. If in fact the person truly should not have a gun, then it makes no sense to say he can have one but not the other. Alternatively, if there’s no real reason to keep him from having a gun, he should be able to have both guns.

    17. Phatty says:

      The idea that a person owns a gun for just one purpose is silly.

      It’s not a silly idea if that’s exactly what the defendant is asserting. The 7th Circuit has no problem with the concept of owning a gun for multiple purposes, but, if the defendant does not claim to need the gun for self-defense, it’s hard for the 7th Circuit to argue that self-defense interests are implicated.

      If I had to guess, the defendant here thought he was doing himself a favor by claiming that he only had the gun in his possession to hunt. To him, it probably seemed less wrong to claim that the gun was only for hunting.

    18. straightarrow says:

      It appears that the 7th Circuit was doing the same thing the Heller decision did. Supplying the government with a road map on how to deny 2A rights without fear of reversal in the courts. Else they would have vacated the verdict, they did not, they gave the prosecution another bite of the apple with directions on how to prevail.

      Which basically is what Heller did.

    19. Oren says:

      StraightArrow, it’s a bedrock principle that a court of limited jurisdiction (vis, say, the Star Chamber) cannot decide matters not properly before it. Nor can an appellate court rule on facts not in the record.

    20. Soronel Haetir says:

      Alaska: The court spends a great deal of its time differentiating the rights at stake. The Court read Heller to protect the right to own a firearm for self defense. in this case, the defendant owned a firearm for hunting. Since this is a legitimate purpose, but not the core of the right recognized in Heller, only intermediate scrutiny was used.Here is an interesting twist, though. In my state, with roughly 20% of the population being Alaska Natives, we have a number of Alaska Natives who have been convicted of crimes involving domestic violence. They absolutely use firearms to hunt. In fact, much of Alaska’s land is governed by federal fish and wildlife regulations and management because the federal government recognizes that Alaska Natives, as part of Indian tribes, have a fundamental right to hunt and fish on their native lands. (This right is recognized in numerous federal regulations and treaties between the U.S. government and various Indian tribes.) When the State refuses to recognize that right (It’s a very long story), the feds then step in to manage federal land to protect such a right. This right is based upon the history and tradition of the Indian tribes in general, and, in my state, Alaska Natives in particular.Given that background, would the possession of firearms by an Alaska Native or a member of an Indian tribe for the purpose of subsistence hunting then be a fundamental right that would require strict scrutiny? I don’t know the answer, but I think it’s a fascinating question. If I wind up representing a client charged with this offense in federal court here, I may raise that issue.

      Just as a question, how if at all has this been changed by the disbandment of nearly all the tribes? CJ Roberts argued and won the case that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act destroyed any claim to the land being Indian Territory.

      (I am aware of one remaining reservation, having lived there in the 1980s.)

    21. Disintelligentsia says:

      I disagree in a fundamental level with the Court’s holding for much the same reason as Railroad Gin states – guns have multiple purposes – self defense, hunting, target and skeet shooting, collecting, etc. and tying the right to the defendant’s stated purpose as opposed to the right itself and the object of that right is an invitation to confusion in the lower courts and uncertainty as to that right. The court’s reasoning would lead every defendant to state he was using it for self-defense in his home if that would lead to a higher scrutiny level. The Court DID NOT state the defendant did not use the gun for self-defense purposes, only that he did not raise that issue below. Why would he? How would he be aware, prior to this decision, that the Court would bifurcate the right to bear arms according to the primary purpose the defendant stated on the record the gun was used for? Now the defendant knows, will they give credence to any claim he might raise that he uses the firearm for his own self-defense? The Court’s version of intermediate scrutiny comes awfully close in substance to the balancing of interests test that the Court in Heller expressly rejected.

      However, the Court didn’t get everything wrong – they cited EV’s Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
      Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda
      . :-)

    22. tomhynes says:

      In California, temporary civil harassment restraining orders almost always (or always) include a gun prohibition. No notice, no hearing, frequently no violence or threat of violence. Allegations of multiple rude text messages will pull your 2nd Amendment rights.

    23. readery says:

      The opinion strongly suggests that if Skoien had merely claimed he also used the rifle for home self-defense, he standard would move from intermediate to strict.

      I don’t personally see this as a valid application of Heller. I don’t think Heller created two rights to keep and bear arms, one for self-defense with strict scrutiny and another for other matters with lesser scrutiny. I believe Heller resulted in a single unitary right to keep and bear arms with a single uniform standard applicable to every purpose and circumstance where the right exists.

    24. Gene Hoffman says:

      tomhynes: In California, temporary civil harassment restraining orders almost always (or always) include a gun prohibition. No notice, no hearing, frequently no violence or threat of violence. Allegations of multiple rude text messages will pull your 2nd Amendment rights.

      That is in a “Nordyke may not be cited in this circuit” California. This problem will not last much longer in a post McDonald world.

      -Gene

    25. Soronel Haetir says:

      Trying to make a self-defense in the home argument isn’t likely to go very far when the firearm is found in a vehicle.

    26. Brett Bellmore says:

      “I was bringing it home so I could use it for self defense there. Can’t defend yourself in the home with a gun if you aren’t permitted to bring one to your home.”

    27. cboldt says:

      FN 1 The probation search also turned up two firearms in Skoien’s home, a Winchester .308-caliber rifle and a Paramount .25caliber handgun. Skoien was indicted for possessing all three guns, but the prosecutor conceded at Skoien’s change-of-plea hearing that he could not prove the handgun and the rifle found in the home were Skoien’s. Some evidence apparently suggested that the handgun belonged to Skoien’s wife, Gidget, and the rifle belonged to Darin Rudolph, their roommate. Accordingly, Skoien’s conditional guilty plea was based only on his possession of the Winchester hunting shotgun found in the truck. At sentencing, however, Skoien did not contest “constructive possession” of the two additional guns for purposes of increasing his base offense level by two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A).

      The shotgun was not his either. The offense is possession, not ownership. At any rate, he had an incentive to disclaim the guns in the house, given the prosecutor’s penchant for locking him up and throwing away the key.
      The 7th Circuit is inviting the fabrication of a sliding scale for an “as applied” test, or at least leaving the possession in the home for another case. But that doesn’t mean it will eventually rule and enact a sliding scale. The 7th Circuit needs new caselaw on its books, to overturn its “922 (g)(9) is constitutional under a collective-rights view of the Second Amendment.” A new coat of paint over the rule, if you will.
      I’ll be surprised if the Circuit Court actually crafts a sliding scale that results in a different outcome for “in the home” vs. “out hunting.” I don’t see any real risk (from the federal Courts) to the federal law banning possession to domestic violence misdemeanants.
      I believe the Courts are corrupt on 2nd amendment jurisprudence (see misconstruction of Presser, Miller, etc.), and will cherry-pick history, if need be, to uphold the statute.

    28. Bill Twist says:

      Soronel Haetir: Trying to make a self-defense in the home argument isn’t likely to go very far when the firearm is found in a vehicle.

      It most certainly could if you own the gun for multiple purposes.

      Since this is a shotgun, it could be used for deer, duck, goose, turkey, and various small game hunting, certainly it would be appropriate for sports like skeet and sporting clays, and it would also be entirely appropriate as a self-defense firearm at home.

      Just because it happened to be in use in one possible mode of use doesn’t invalidate the others. That would be like arguing that someone couldn’t claim they use their car for driving to work, just because they also happen to take it down to the track on Sunday to drag race it.

    29. Conviction Vacated on Lautenberg | Snowflakes in Hell says:

      [...] Very good news for the Second Amendment. The problem would seem to be the government made a really bad case for the constitutionality of Lautenberg, basically taking the line of “Of course, it’s constitutional!” which the Circuit Court in this case didn’t seem to appreciate. [...]

    30. Nobody Special says:

      The 7th Circuit is saying that since the appellant didn’t make a “fundamental-self-preservation-its-my-right” argument, the strict scrutiny standard didn’t apply. So, then, if the next appellant DOES make a fundamental second amendment self preservation argument, they will hold (it seems most likely from this decision) that strict scrutiny DOES apply and Lautenberg will go by by.

      I would use this argument about disarming those convicted of misdemeanors: If the presumption is that all felons SHOULD be denied their fundamental constitutionally secured right to arms, because, of course, ALL felons are a danger to themselves and others, why did Congress exclude those convicted of financial crimes from firearm disability under the Gun Control Act of 1968? Would possession of a undersized lobster, which might be a felony, be more weighty than a conviction for insider trading on Wall Street? Why then is there a disability for misdemeanors at all?

      Will someone who IS a lawyer, please pick up this ball and run with it?

    31. patrick smith says:

      What would be the outcome if this amendment was ruled unconstitutional in the long run, for those that have been already convicted for violating it. Would there convictions also be tossed out.

    32. Stuart Friedman says:

      What people are forgetting is the fact that Congress created a procedure where ATF could restore a former offender’s right to keep and bear arms, but then defunded it was put out of business. My problem with the ban on felon ownership comes from the fact that it is not individualized or restricted by some temporal limitation (e.g. ten years from the date of discharge from your sentence). I think that the strict scrutiny would be met if Congress created a restoration mechanism.

      In the Seventh Circuit’s case, they certainly did imply that strict scrutiny would apply if the weapon was owned for self-defense purposes, but the post-Heller Second Amendment does not have self-defense limitation. It starts with the militia stuff we all know and goes on to say that the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. It does not say the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense purposes.

      The approach which Scalia seems to be advocating seems to be similar to the view he rejected in a Sixth Amendment case called Ohio v Roberts. In Ohio v Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that to satisfy the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment the state had to either give the accused: (a) face to face confrontation; (b) admit the evidence under a historically recognized and reliable hearsay exception; or, (c) prove individualized reliability. In Crawford v Washington, Justice Scalia (writing for the majority) overruled Roberts and said that the Constitution guaranteed the right to face-to-face confrontation and if the evidence is “testimonial” (a term subject to a ton of litigation), the evidence was inadmissible.

      In Heller, the Court adopted a viewpoint of the Second Amendment that had been previously rejected by the Court. In order to temper it, Justice Scalia attempted to take on some of the “chicken little” arguments in dicta, but that was not holding. The Court is going to have to take it on.

      There is a great Harvard Law article entitled “Should Martha Stewart Be Allowed to Own a Gun?” which questions many of the historical arguments made and argues that the ban on felon gun ownership is really a 20th century invention and questions the analogies that are drawn to older and different civil disabilities. The article also argues that in this regulatory world where things like insider trading are felonies, the Government has a much tougher road to haul justifying the restriction. I agree with these sentiments.

      If the ban on felon ownership is tossed, it will probably be replaced with something where a person can earn back the right to own a weapon. Congress could do this by simply refunding the ATF program and allow ATF to charge $500 or $1000 to investigate such an application. I have to imagine that they would break even at such a point and people would probably do a bit of self-reflection before applying (e.g. ask themselves do “I have a chance” of convincing someone of my rehabilitation).

      After Willie Horton issue in the first George Bush’s run for governor, pardons have become much harder to get in many states. Back in 1968, former offenders who were clean for a number of years routinely had requests for rehabilitative pardons granted. That is no longer the case and if you look at states like Florida, you’ll see that for years they were even asking whether the restored individual was likely to vote for the other party.

      Stu

      PS: I am an appellate attorney of twenty years, but that does not give me any special wisdom in determining what the U.S. Supreme Court is going to do. McDonald v Chicago is going to be the hottest case of this term. I’m going to guess that they will incorporate the Second Amendment to the States, but there is a huge debate whether the U.S. Supreme Court will have to overrule an old case called the “Slaughterhouse Cases” to do it. The NRA’s brief in McDonald is making that argument.

    33. larry says:

      US v Larry W.Cmapbell I think I have stated this before, federal judge
      william Shubb stated on the records ” all movant needs to do to get one of these order is say she is sacred of her husband or boyfriend
      which tells me federal judges support gender pro filing or Congress wanted gender pro filing per 18 USC 922 G8, per my pardon request, I guess I will say I am sorry I am a Male,

      I could use a copy on the ruling from the 7 circuit or citation

      Sac federal court case no CR S 03 – 483 wbs US v Larry W.Campbell

    34. larry says:

      tomhynes says: we need to speak to each other

    35. Stuart Friedman says:

      Larry, there is a live link at the time of the article in green to the ruling, but the case is at:

      http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=08-3770_002.pdf

    36. Stuart Friedman says:

      Larry, there is a live link at the time of the article in green to the ruling, but the case is at:

      http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=08-3770_002.pdf

    37. larry says:

      Alaska: The court spends a great deal of its time differentiating the rights at stake. The Court read Heller to protect the right to own a firearm for self defense. in this case, the defendant owned a firearm for hunting. Since this is a legitimate purpose, but not the core of the right recognized in Heller, only intermediate scrutiny was used.Here is an interesting twist, though. In my state, with roughly 20% of the population being Alaska Natives, we have a number of Alaska Natives who have been convicted of crimes involving domestic violence. They absolutely use firearms to hunt. In fact, much of Alaska’s land is governed by federal fish and wildlife regulations and management because the federal government recognizes that Alaska Natives, as part of Indian tribes, have a fundamental right to hunt and fish on their native lands. (This right is recognized in numerous federal regulations and treaties between the U.S. government and various Indian tribes.) When the State refuses to recognize that right (It’s a very long story), the feds then step in to manage federal land to protect such a right. This right is based upon the history and tradition of the Indian tribes in general, and, in my state, Alaska Natives in particular.Given that background, would the possession of firearms by an Alaska Native or a member of an Indian tribe for the purpose of subsistence hunting then be a fundamental right that would require strict scrutiny? I don’t know the answer, but I think it’s a fascinating question. If I wind up representing a client charged with this offense in federal court here, I may raise that issue.

      geat question wish i had the answer

    38. larry says:

      After five years of going through the Congressional records, see 18 USC 922G8 both houses and the president sanctioned state court to deprive a father of all his legal right state and/ or federal and than be charged in federal court using the Unconstitutional state court order as the predicate and federal judge should support state agent Judges use of gender pro filing in the federal criminal matter

      In addition both house of Congress and the President , Clinton, support father going to federal jail when their only crime is their gender

      I thought I was in combat to protect the bill of rights, rights that fall below basic human rights, batter to learn the truth about this county at age 62 years than to continue to believe in a lie.

      Final Point, the above feel all felon are evil and only good people should have aright to protect themselves and their family members

      It is hard to leave my birth Nation , yet harder to live under oppression

    39. Doc says:

      is lewis still good law Lewis v US 1980
      The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since Congress could rationally conclude that any felony conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. And use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for imposing a civil firearms disability, enforceable by criminal sanction, is not inconsistent with Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109; United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443; and Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473. Pp. 445 U. S. 65-67.

      591 F.2d 978, affirmed.

    40. Doc says:

      Stuart Friedman thank you for the information, I am still vexing after two years in federal prison per a protection order issued based on my gender no contact with the ex since 1996, how cause I cause any harm without some form of contact

      Federal courts ruled Congress does not require proof of harm per 18 USC 922 g8 the only duty the state judge has is to make sure the respondent is a male

    41. Doc says:

      check this blog
      Notable exceptions to date have been a Utah district court that authorized a jury instruction that the defendant may argue the he poses no future danger as an affirmative defense in a prosecution based upon a prior misdemeanor DV conviction, but the Tenth Circuit granted the Government’s petition for mandamus and remanded directing the court to not give the instruction. See In re U.S., 578 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2009

    42. Doc says:

      this might be needed per blog
      Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho Blog

    43. The Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » Eleventh Circuit Upholds Ban on Gun Possession by Misdemeants Convicted of Domestic Violence says:

      [...] also surprised that the panel opinion doesn’t discuss the Seventh Circuit’s United States v. Skoien decision, which is considerably more thorough in its reasoning, and which remanded the case to the district [...]

    44. Doc says:

      I now have a visional aid and can read the record in US v Larry W.Campbell Sacramento, cal court Cr S 03 – 483 WBS E D .cal

      I had thought I had a good argument per a lack of notice from the state court I had to sell my guns, not true, per settled federal law

      The Male does not need to know the state court order was issued,
      Per 18 USC 922 G8 notice per that federal law does not require actual notice to sell his guns,

      A Judge could without notice and the male would and will be charged with a federal crime even when such notice is required by state law

      This feel like Judge law rather than the Work of Congress

      Call you member of Congress and confirmed case law cited by federal judge US V Napier 233 F.3d. 394, 399 ) 6th cir, 2000. and US v Coccia , 249, F supp, 2d 79, 81, D Mass, 2003

    45. The Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » Seventh Circuit Will Rehear U.S. v. Skoien En Banc says:

      [...] the case in which a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel vacated — on Second Amendment grounds — a conviction for gun possession by a misdemeanant [...]

    46. The Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » The Second Amendment and Domestic Violence Misdemeanors says:

      [...] day after the Seventh Circuit agrees to rehear en banc a panel’s earlier decision in U.S. v. Skoien on this subject, the Fourth Circuit has decided to follow Skoien, in U.S. v. Chester (4th Cir. Feb. [...]

    47. Doc says:

      I am blind , help please , us v campell state judge committed perjury, learned after direct appeal, out of prison, want my gun rghs back, any options per 18 USC 922 G 8

      lwc95661@comcase.net

    48. Chris says:

      I was charged with a DV back in 1999 for grabbing my ex-girlfriend’s arm and telling her to pull over because she was driving very erratic. Since my convection I have really excelled in everything that I do. For example, I have maintained the same job with excellent job performance, I went back to college and graduated with a BS in management.

      Furthermore, I went through the hiring process for major law enforcement agency and passed everything. The testing process includes backgrounds, QAP, Psychological testing, and a lie detector test; and I owned up and explained my past entirely. I expunged my record per 1203.4 as well as 12021 (c) thinking that it would grant my gun rights back, I was wrong.

      I have done everything that I could possibly do to prove that I am a productive citizen (job for 10 years, BS degree, married with a baby girl, and a new home owner). I would be even willing to join military branch and fight for my country in order to prove my patriotism and worth as a United States citizen.

      When I was charged with the DV I was under the assumption that I would be able to own a gun after a 10 year ban, I was never told that I would lose my rights forever. My ex-girlfriend even wrote a character letter where she expressed her confidence in me obtaining my Second Amendment right back. My last court appearance was to try and petition for a Corum Nobis and that failed; and I had the backing of my ex girlfriend and my background officer from the agency that I applied with come in my support.

      I am the type of person that will never give up because I know that I am worthy of a second chance at a dream. In conclusion, I take responsibility for my past wrongs and I do believe in punishing people that commit DV but there should not be a life sentence on a fundamental right, especially if a person shows that he/she has learned and has grown from the mistake’s that he/she committed in the past.

      Thanks, Chris