Noah Sachs, over at PrafsBlawg, is kind enough to respond to my post on the Copenhagen meetings and collective action problems.  It is worth reading the whole thing, but here is a chunk of it.  (If you comment, please remember that Professor Sachs is my guest here, so be courteous.  And my thanks to him for weighing in.)

My question – directed to international law experts in these kinds of negotiations – is how this round of talks is supposed to get past the usual collective action problems.  It takes climate change by assumption, so the issue here is not the leaked memos, Climategate, etc., but a question not of climate science but instead of international law, institutions, negotiations, and collective action.  Professor Sachs’ response in part:

Anderson is too pessimistic.  After all, over 180 countries have already agreed to two prior climate treaties (The UN Framework Convention in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997), as well detailed rules for implementation (Marrakech Accords in 2001), all of which are currently being implemented.  The UN Framework Convention remains the organizing document for continued international efforts to address climate change, and the majority of industrialized parties to Kyoto are expected to comply with their Kyoto commitments by the end of the first commitment period, in 2012 (with some notable exceptions, such as Canada).  The EU-15 are on track to exceedtheir Kyoto commitments by 2012.   Reports of the death of Kyoto are greatly exaggerated.

So why would any country agree to, let alone comply with, obligations that impose near-term national costs but bring longer-term benefits to the globe as a whole?  Let me count the ways:

  • Self-interest in avoiding drought, sea-level rise, and hundred-degree summers
  • A recognition that this particular prisoners dilemma calls for global cooperation rather than defection, coupled with the recognition that emissions monitoring can detect violators.
  • A recognition of the historic responsibility of industrialized nations for the underlying problem
  • Domestic political pressure not to tank a climate deal
  • Reputational costs for major emitting countries for tanking a climate deal
  • A recognition that a national commitment to energy efficiency and a low-carbon economy benefits national security and international competitiveness.
  • The opportunity to participate in lucrative global carbon trading markets as a party to a post-Kyoto treaty.
  • Translation of commitments made internationally into binding domestic legislation, as occurred in the EU.

I’m not saying that negotiations at Copenhagen will be easy, and few expect a final treaty to emerge from the conference — just that the underlying collective action problems here are not insurmountable.  I do expect a new international treaty to be concluded by the time the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends in 2012.  The price of every nation going-it-alone here is very, very high.

19 Comments

  1. Joe says:

    Since when does “could”, “might”, “possibly” mean “on track”? The report is nonsense spin by member states to make themselves look good. Like everyone else, they are just making crap up.

  2. PeteP says:

    “It takes climate change by assumption,”

    No, no, no. It does no such thing. And no amount of the gW’rs braying about ‘the science is settled, tehre can be no debate, hang the deniers’ is going to stifle the debate.

  3. PeteP says:

    “A recognition that this particular prisoners dilemma calls for global cooperation rather than defection, coupled with the recognition that emissions monitoring can detect violators. ”

    Non-sequitor based on a false assumption, followed by giving up sovreignity to the UN.

    “A recognition of the historic responsibility of industrialized nations for the underlying problem ”

    Again, based on your false assumption of the basic facts.

    “Domestic political pressure not to tank a climate deal ”

    The leftists, the one-worlders, will not give up this potential gravy train lightly, I agree.

    “Reputational costs for major emitting countries for tanking a climate deal”

    Screw ‘reputational costs’. I’m about sick and damn tired of hearing ‘the rest of the world will think kind thoughts about you if you simply give them all your money, and kneep-cap your own economy’.

    “A recognition that a national commitment to energy efficiency and a low-carbon economy benefits national security and international competitiveness. ”

    Not if it bankrupts us in the process.

    “The opportunity to participate in lucrative global carbon trading markets as a party to a post-Kyoto treaty.”

    Oh, goody – just what we need, another speculative futures market based on a currently non-existent pretend medium, which will be invented, so the government can skim their ten percent.

    “Translation of commitments made internationally into binding domestic legislation, as occurred in the EU.”

    There will BE no ‘commitments made’ at COP15. Nothing of substance, that is.

  4. Bruce Hayden says:

    I’m not saying that negotiations at Copenhagen will be easy, and few expect a final treaty to emerge from the conference — just that the underlying collective action problems here are not insurmountable. I do expect a new international treaty to be concluded by the time the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends in 2012. The price of every nation going-it-alone here is very, very high.

    This shall be interesting, seeing how much momentum the AGW movement has. There may be enough that this is possible in 2012, but I sure wouldn’t think it would work ten years from now. The basic problem, I will submit, is that the science behind all this is falling apart right now, and I don’t see that ending.

    We shall see.

  5. PatHMV says:

    I don’t think you can overlook Climategate in this context, because I think the existence of the scandal, and the new questions about the AGW science being raised, even by supporters of AGW like Monbiot, changes the dynamics of the prisoners’ dilemma faced by the nations in considering whether to make (and, more importantly, thereafter comply with) agreements to deeply reduce carbon emissions.

    Up until about a week ago, the science was “settled,” at least among the elite class, and a sufficient number of European thought leaders, with sufficiently adequate popular support to give some cover to politicians wanting to enact drastic economic controls. With the scandal, however, all of that is weakened, a bit, which increases the odds that one or more nations will decide to opt for economic growth rather than economic regulation of carbon, because the politicians think that that the monetary benefits of the growth will outweigh any negative political consequences stemming from the disapproval of other nations, etc. And the mere increased possibility of such defections from the “consensus” itself alters the mental calculus of all the other “prisoners” in this particular dilemma. And that then results in all the players fundamentally reexamining what choice they should make, and whether it might not be better for them to let others shoulder the burdens, while they reap benefits.

    So Prof. Sachs analysis might be correct, that in theory the collective action problems could be resolved, but the Climategate scandal fundamentally alters how the different countries analyze their best interests and the likelihood of full (or nearly full) compliance by other countries with any agreement that might be made.

  6. Bruce Hayden says:

    * Self-interest in avoiding drought, sea-level rise, and hundred-degree summers

    I frankly think this silly, from the science I have seen, and, in particular, history.

    * A recognition that this particular prisoners dilemma calls for global cooperation rather than defection, coupled with the recognition that emissions monitoring can detect violators.

    Not sure if you will really be able to detect CO2 emissions all that well. After all, that is something that we all do with some regularity.

    * A recognition of the historic responsibility of industrialized nations for the underlying problem

    So, the industrial nations have to pay for this, while those in the midst of industrialization, such as China and India get off scott free?

    * Domestic political pressure not to tank a climate deal

    I think that you overestimate the likelyhood that the Democrats here will be able to maintain their Congressional majorities, and Europe has swung right over the last couple of years (with the UK slated to follow at their next election).

    * Reputational costs for major emitting countries for tanking a climate deal

    I would put the reputational loss there above the reputational loss we have seen here since the inauguration of President Obama. Besides, how much are you willing to spend for that reputation? And who are you trying to impress?

    * A recognition that a national commitment to energy efficiency and a low-carbon economy benefits national security and international competitiveness.

    I find that extremely hard to believe.

    * The opportunity to participate in lucrative global carbon trading markets as a party to a post-Kyoto treaty.

    I too find that to be unappealing. Besides, who is making the money? Al Gore? To the extent that our government sells indulgences, in the form of carbon offsets, it is removing money from the private sector that could be better spent on job creation. Sorry, this sort of economics doesn’t work. Never has. Never will.

    * Translation of commitments made internationally into binding domestic legislation, as occurred in the EU.

    While I understand your goal of destroying a lot of American jobs and costing our children a lot of money, I fail to see how that is in the interest of our country.

  7. Bruce Hayden says:

    PatHMV: So Prof. Sachs analysis might be correct, that in theory the collective action problems could be resolved, but the Climategate scandal fundamentally alters how the different countries analyze their best interests and the likelihood of full (or nearly full) compliance by other countries with any agreement that might be made.

    I think that ClimateGate will have a big effect here, but not sure how quickly (which is why I made the remarks about momentum above). To a decent extent, a lot of us have learned a lot of stuff about the “science” behind AGW, and it looks weaker and weaker. Sure, there are still a lot of papers out there supporting it. But the Wizard’s curtain has been pulled back by Toto, and we have seen the smoke and mirrors. There are now a lot more people who know enough to ask intelligent questions about AGW research, and they have been significantly emboldened. No more “leave it to the experts because it is so complex that only they can understand the science” or “none of the critical research is peer reviewed“.

  8. Mike Daly says:

    My (limited) understanding is that a ratified treaty ranks pretty high in the priority of US law (below the Constitution, somewhere above regulation). Which other countries treat treaty obligations as seriously?

    What can we expect from countries where the rule of law is less scrupulously honored?

    What behavior would we expect of the 180+ other signatories?

  9. mga2 says:

    I hope this comment will be polite. The publication of the East Anglia University e-mails has demonstrated conclusively that true science on this issue is far from settled. The widely-trumpeted Chinese proposals are simply that China will reduce the percentage increase in its emissions – not that it will reduce emissions. As Bjorn Lomberg has documented, global warming is not exactly at the top of the list of concerns of people with no electricity or running water or sewers. It is silly to expect India or China or other third world countries to subordinate their ability to remove people from poverty to a manufactured global warming crisis.

  10. John Moore says:

    Self-interest in avoiding drought, sea-level rise, and hundred-degree summers

    Too long term if it requires sacrifices, and you have to really strongly believe the very shaky science for this stuff.

    A recognition that this particular prisoners dilemma calls for global cooperation rather than defection, coupled with the recognition that emissions monitoring can detect violators.

    Try selling that to your voters (or if you’re China, try keeping you populace in line when your GDP fails to grow fast enough due to this).

    A recognition of the historic responsibility of industrialized nations for the underlying problem

    Oh, please.

    Domestic political pressure not to tank a climate deal

    Which will evaporate in a flash (along with the government that agreed to it) the second that the changes start to pinch, which they will have to in order to have any effect.

    Reputational costs for major emitting countries for tanking a climate deal

    Obama and his Europhile allies in the US may fall for this. Everyone else will laugh at them.

    A recognition that a national commitment to energy efficiency and a low-carbon economy benefits national security and international competitiveness.

    Somebody needs to learn about both how economies work and a bit of energy physics and engineering.

    The opportunity to participate in lucrative global carbon trading markets as a party to a post-Kyoto treaty.

    Finally something that corrupt governments will go for – China and the Obama Administration, for example.

    Translation of commitments made internationally into binding domestic legislation, as occurred in the EU.

    Like that much milder Kyoto treaty, which failed 98-0 in the US under a Democratic president.

    Frankly, the above set of reasons is pretty pathetic, and could only be believed by the mosts starry-eyed transnational idealist.

  11. Soronel Haetir says:

    I fail to see how the translation of treaty obligations into domestic law gets around CAP. Such an action only occurs after the decision to both participate and comply is made, not before.

    I also don’t get the reputation point(s), only a few Western democracies seem to care about such reputation, most of the world however is well to the authoritarian side of any such divide.

    I find the claim that the EU is actually going to meet their Kyoto obligations interesting. I have seen numerous claims that they haven’t and won’t. I have absolutely no ability to determine who is right on that issue. However if the folks most eager for binding international agreements of this sort aren’t willing or able to comply that does not bode well for the overall exercise.

  12. wws says:

    I think his analysis fails right from the start, at the point where he claims that Kyoto was worthwhile. These has been *nothing* of any kind achieved from that agreement save for 12 years of political posturing. The much heralded “cuts” in gases in fact came almost completely from the shutdown of obsolete coal-fired industrial plants in Eastern Europe. Nothing happened that would not have happened anyways, and even coming from an AGW pov, the worldwide rise in C02 continues unabated.

    How could anything have possibly happened in real terms when China, India, and the US were not parties to the deal? The idea is laughable.

    And now – how is he proposing to keep China and India from hijacking the entire conference to their own ends?

    Here’s a story out about the Copenhagen conference which I think is the most significant so far, and which applies directly to the posts about collective action which you have made:

    BEIJING: In an unprecedented move, India on Saturday joined China and two other developing countries to prepare for a major offensive on rich nations at the Copenhagen conference on climate change next month.

    The four countries, which include Brazil and South Africa, agreed to a strategy that involves jointly walking out of the conference if the developed nations try to force their own terms on the developing world, Jairam Ramesh, the Indian minister for environment and forests said.

    “We will not exit in isolation. We will co-ordinate our exit if any of our non-negotiable terms is violated. Our entry and exit will be collective,” Ramesh told reporters in Beijing.

    The move comes after reports suggested that rich nations led by Denmark are trying to set the agenda of the conference by presenting a draft containing a set of specific proposals.

    The BASIC countries-Brazil, South Africa, India and China- decided to throw the gauntlet at rich nations by coming up with a counter-draft that will be presented at the conference. They agreed to let China, which initiated the exercise, to present the draft of the developing nations at Copenhagen.”

    “This joint front forged on Saturday is a major political initiative — the first major India-China accord on international affairs–that is likely to impact not just the dimension of the talks on climate change but international diplomacy as a whole.”

    http://tinyurl.com/yjby8os

  13. Dan Weber says:

    (I am continuing to respect the message from Kenneth Anderson’s previous post by not bringing up the science.)

    If Europe can be united and agree with the United States and Japan, would that not be a large stick to use against India and China? Those countries are very dependent upon trade for growing their economies.

  14. PatHMV says:

    While the most populous countries (US, Europe, Russia, China, India) may be amenable to pressures like goodwill and the like, what’s to keep all the smaller countries in line? Let’s take an extreme example and assume that the developed nations and India and China all cut their use of oil by 20%. That would increase the amount of surplus oil available in the world for consumption by others, and thus most likely result in a lower cost for the oil. That would then potentially make the benefits of violating any agreement by the myriad smaller countries in Africa and South America and the Middle and Far East much more economically advantageous, perhaps enough so to risk whatever sanctions the rest of the world might impose (noting, by the way, that the U.N. is generally quite ineffective at enforcing sanctions) against member states.

  15. Morgan Price says:

    “Reputational costs for major emitting countries for tanking a climate deal” — More bluntly, if (say) EU, Japan, and the US could agree on a deal, and couldn’t get (say) China to go along, then China would probably face a carbon import tax or other trade sanctions.

  16. Dan Weber says:

    While the most populous countries (US, Europe, Russia, China, India) may be amenable to pressures like goodwill and the like, what’s to keep all the smaller countries in line?

    Given that the problem we’re asking is how to reduce total emissions, the biggest issue is getting the biggest players to agree. If, say, Chad decides it’s going to go 100% towards burning coal, that will be a rounding error compared to a 20% reduction by the major economies.

  17. PatHMV says:

    Chad by itself, yes, Dan. But there’s a billion people in Africa, 856 million of them in sub-Saharan Africa. If Chad and all of its poor neighbors increase their carbon output by a substantial percentage, that’s going to add up pretty quickly.

    All told, there’s 4.2 billion people in the “less developed” nations (excluding China from that category), and another 1.2 billion living in the “least developed” countries… see here. Take India out of that equation (and I don’t really know why they wouldn’t be very susceptible to incentives to avoid compliance or to cheat), and you’re still left with 3.1 billion people in really, REALLY poor countries, who would really enjoy some cheaper oil.

    When you look at the numbers more closely (there’s carbon usage data in that publication), if you reduced the More Developed countries’ emissions, and China’s, by 20%, but increased the Least Developed countries’ (excl. China) emissions from where they are now (about 1.8 tons CO2 per capita) to where China is (about 4.3 tons CO2 per capita), then you’d end up with a net increase of just over 1 billion metric tons of CO2 in emissions. Given the low levels of technology available in those poorer countries, I suspect that even just a 20% increase in their oil consumption (sparked by a 20% reduction in oil costs) could quickly lead to substantial increases in CO2 emissions.

  18. Dan Weber says:

    Energy usage, and therefore carbon output, maps more to economic activity than population count.

    At some point Africa may be an economic powerhouse — in fact, I would hope that day comes sooner rather than later. And as those countries get richer, they will be more likely to submit to trade agreements.

    America, Europe, China, and Japan are about 60% of the world economy, according to numbers at la Wiki. Add in Canada, Australia, and South Korea and we’re up to 2/3.

  19. PatHMV says:

    Dan… my basic point is that if rich countries voluntarily increase their energy costs by, say, 20%, that most likely will result in a freeing up cheaper oil for poorer countries. Their problems are a LOT more immediate than hypothetical warming which may occur 50 or 100 years from now, so they would: (1) be able to afford more oil, thus increasing their economic productivity, and (2) have a significant incentive to use that cheap energy to immediately improve the quality of life for their citizens.