Julian Sanchez recently offered up this very interesting post on ways to figure out what the redacted parts of released government documents may say — at least when there are enough documents to reveal patterns.
Orin Kerr • December 22, 2009 1:50 am
Julian Sanchez recently offered up this very interesting post on ways to figure out what the redacted parts of released government documents may say — at least when there are enough documents to reveal patterns.
Soronel Haetir says:
Don’t forget the fun of people who don’t understand the tools they use and distribute electronic copies that simply have the redacted portions as black-on-black.
December 22, 2009, 3:08 amThe Redactor’s Dilemma | Liberal Whoppers says:
[...] rest is here: The Redactor’s Dilemma Share this [...]
December 22, 2009, 6:17 amCMH says:
Just select-all, copy, paste into Word or Notepad, and read away. There’s a decent chance the redactor screwed it up and this will work (e.g., the recent TSA manual).
December 22, 2009, 9:01 amChris Travers says:
Soronel: or simply placing a black square OVER the electronic text without removing it (not quite functionally the same thing, but the effect is the same).
However, I am with the original blogger: What kind of bonehead would redact parts of the USC from a document? The problem here seems obvious: By redacting a portion of law incorporated by reference (and hence EASY to look up) one is giving away plenty of information.
December 22, 2009, 10:55 amChris Travers says:
(I.e., one is ADDING information by redacting it which seems kinda counterproductive.)
December 22, 2009, 12:17 pmDavid Schwartz says:
Actually, redacting part of the USC can actually be part of a logical strategy. Because what a redactor chooses to redact conveys information, it makes sense to add some noise into the signal. This way, someone trying to analyze redactions can’t assume that every redaction protects something of value. This will result in people analyzing the redaction having to make their conclusions more speculative, since they’ll never be sure they aren’t basing some lengthy analysis on a meaningless redaction.
Similar techniques were used by the Allies in World War II to hide the fact that the Allies had certain information sources. This could be roughly the strategic equivalent of making sure an enemy convoy sees and reports a spotter plane.
(Though in this case, I think it was simply incompetent. It just is not obvious that it couldn’t possibly serve any purpose.)
December 22, 2009, 2:28 pmcorneille1640 says:
The most interesting thing about this is the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX XXXXX XX. However, I tend to XXXXXXXX with the claim that it XXXX XXX XXXXXXXXX XX.
But I’m not a lawyer, so I stand to be corrected.
December 22, 2009, 3:58 pmChris Travers says:
David Schwartz:
Does the FOIA allow redactions which are solely designed to confuse people who are looking at redactions, i.e. where the content redacted has no immediate impact on national security or other exceptions?
December 22, 2009, 4:36 pmCrunchy Frog says:
I’d rather sit.
December 22, 2009, 5:32 pmJohn Moore says:
Intelligence analysts get the equivalent of this stuff all the time: partial information from multiple open sources. From that, they deduce secret information.
This sort of thing is why security officials try to prevent lots of innocuous looking information from becoming declassified (or they classify it in the first place). It’s why many of us object strenuously to leaks of classified information (such as “torture” memos) – because more information is conveyed than one might think from a casual read.
Adversaries (white or black hat) gain information from all sorts of unintentional signaling.
BTW, the TSA understands at least a little bit about this (as does comment David Schwartz, above). The (sigh) leaked TSA manual discusses the use of randomness to confuse adversaries.
December 22, 2009, 9:20 pmDouglas2 says:
After redacting what is important to redact, just give them to Yossarian to censor.
December 22, 2009, 10:27 pmcorneille1640 says:
Just give ‘em to John, Milton.
December 23, 2009, 7:29 amAnthony says:
Organizations seeking fast, reliable and proven redaction software to securely remove sensitive information should visit http://www.rapidredact.com
RapidRedact is a redaction tool which offers the power and flexibility that organizations need to ensure that redaction projects are finished on time and with complete confidence that redacted information is permanently removed.
January 4, 2010, 7:34 pmJACK says:
Your idea is very good
February 16, 2010, 12:49 pm