The NYT reports on new security measures adopted in the wake of the attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack on a Northwest flight.
The government was vague about the steps it was taking, saying that it wanted the security experience to be “unpredictable” and that passengers would not find the same measures at every airport — a prospect that may upset airlines and travelers alike.
But several airlines released detailed information about the restrictions, saying that passengers on international flights coming to the United States will apparently have to remain in their seats for the last hour of a flight without any personal items on their laps. It was not clear how often the rule would affect domestic flights.
Overseas passengers will be restricted to only one carry-on item, and domestic passengers will probably face longer security lines. That was already the case in some airports Saturday, in the United States and overseas.
The restrictions will again change the routine of air travel, which has undergone an upheaval since the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 and three later attempts at air terrorism. . . .
Airline industry executives said the new steps would complicate travel as vacationers return home from holiday trips and could also cause travelers to cancel plans for flights in 2010.
But the government seemed to discount those concerns. The homeland security secretary, Janet Napolitano, said in a statement Saturday that new measures were “designed to be unpredictable, so passengers should not expect to see the same thing everywhere.” She said passengers should proceed with their holiday plans and “as always, be observant and aware of their surroundings and report any suspicious behavior or activity to law enforcement officials.”
Whether or not “unpredictable” security measures may keep would-be terrorists on their toes, they will be a supreme annoyance for frequent travelers, and I’m unconvinced they will do much to enhance the safety of air travel. Forcing people to sit for an hour or more with nothing on their laps? Are they serious? And if travelers are supposed to expect “unpredictable” security measures, how will they distinguish between legitimate security measures and arbitrary commands from TSA personnel?
Airport security is already more show than substance. It’s an exercise of political theater that is supposed to make travelers feel more secure. I am unconvinced it even does that very well anymore, and from what I’ve heard thus far, the new measures are only going to make things worse.
UPDATE: More from Professor Bainbridge: TSA: The Stupid Agency. This comment by Radley Balko is particualrly apt:
For all the crap they put us through, this guy still got some sort of explosive material on the plane from Amsterdam. He was stopped by law-abiding passengers. So TSA responds to all of this by . . . announcing plans to hassle law-abiding U.S. passengers even more.
Passengers — not the TSA — apprehended this guy, so by all means lets keep pesky passengers in their seats.
SECOND UPDATE: According to the Secretary of Homeland Security: “the system worked.”
THIRD UPDATE: Secretary Napolitano now says “Our system did not work in this instance” and promises a full review.
Soronel Haetir says:
I am going to be pissed if they apply the one carry on rule to domestic flights. It has been years since I needed to check bags on an outbound flight and only check stuff coming home so that I can avoid having to ship it. Due to my frequent flier status I don’t have to pay for the first checked bag but the time dealing with it, especially baggage claim is just a huge hassle when it can be avoided.
As for the no stuff on lap bit, that seems absolutely ludicrous. I’m surprised they didn’t institute pat-downs on everyone since this guy had the material sewn into his underwear.
I hate when the screening procedure seems random, would rather have a more intrusive search and know what is coming than have to guess.
Unfortunately due to living on an island in south east Alaska there are no viable travel alternatives so if I need to go somewhere I shall continue to fly regardless of how unpleasant they make it.
December 27, 2009, 11:18 amtom says:
I’m assuming that these “rules” are distributed to the airlines in the form of a circular (49 CFR 1544.305 “Security Directives and Information Circulars”. It also appears that us peons don’t get to actually know what they say. The last paragraph of the rule states that aircraft operators must:
As someone who gets on an airplane at least 6 times each month, it would be nice to be able to actually read these things. But that seems unlikely to happen.
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2008/octqtr/pdf/49cfr1544.305.pdf
December 27, 2009, 11:28 amSoronel Haetir says:
Tom,
I feel for you, and I thought a round trip about every three weeks was bad.
December 27, 2009, 11:39 amPersonFromPorlock says:
For all the crap they put us through, this guy still got some sort of explosive material on the plane from Amsterdam.
Nonetheless, the system worked: no federal employee missed a paycheck.
December 27, 2009, 11:51 amHans says:
The TSA is much worse at detecting fake bombs than the private security firms it replaced, in tests, as USA Today and other publications have reported.
It’s much worse at catching explosives and detecting security threats than the private firms that still operate.
And the Obama Administration is taking steps to make the situation even worse, by making the TSA even more bureaucratic and hidebound.
December 27, 2009, 11:54 amSean M. says:
This is especially a problem for U.S. travelers coming home from holiday vacations. Say you checked two bags — the limit on most airlines — and had a carry-on bag and a purse, as you were allowed under the previous rules. Then U.S. airlines pull this switcher-oo and you’re left without that extra carry-on that you took with you. What do you do then? Complain to DHS?
December 27, 2009, 11:56 amArthurKirkland says:
Professor Bainbridge’s observations are a curious and poor choice to highlight. The would-be bomber left his seat for an extended period, visiting the restroom, then placed a blanket over himself when he returned to his seat. The final-hour rules ostensibly would have interfered with both actions. I’m going by early reports, which appears to be more than Professor Bainbridge is working with.
None of this means the most recent TSA actions are sensible.
December 27, 2009, 12:02 pmgeokstr says:
I had thought that the new procedures might be more window dressing, but now I can see that they are deadly serious.
Instead of, as in the past, just randomly selecting from these well-known suspect groups, they have announced a 100% strip-and-body cavity search of all passengers under the age of 13, all blonde haired Swedes, all Catholic nuns and any wheel-chair bound geriatrics. That will stop these threats in their tracks.
In order to make up for the additional delays due to all this, they’ve also announced that all swarthy looking males of any age, anyone in a burka, all those named Muhammed (or variants), and anyone from our honored allies like Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Syria, Algeria and others will be waved through the security process without checking anything whatsoever.
These new procedures have been approved in advance by the ACLU and CAIR, so you can be assured that your safety is paramount.
December 27, 2009, 12:02 pmmike s. says:
Did anyone notice the absurdity of the rule that international passengers can’t get out of their seats in the last 60-90 minutes of the flight (forget, for a moment, the further absurdity that they must be without anything in their laps). 1) What does this have to do with the recent attack, and 2) even if this latest guy had some deep motivation to light his fuse in the last 90 minutes, why wouldn’t a terrorist just set off his explosives earlier? Is Johnny Terrorist going to say “gee, since I can’t blow up the plane in the last 90 minutes, I guess I won’t bother.” It makes no sense.
December 27, 2009, 12:04 pmSara says:
I would guess that most frequent fliers take almost no luggage and fly short distances.
December 27, 2009, 12:06 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
The final-hour rules would have interfered with these actions only because he undertook them in the final hour. The 9/11 terrorists didn’t wait till the final hour, did they?
I don’t think it’s too much to ask for people to sit for an hour with nothing on their laps, although they surely should be allowed bathroom breaks. I’m just not convinced that this particular rule does anything. It sounds like asking what the color of the aircraft was and making a rule that they all have to be a different color.
Had a TSA person apologize to me once for going through my purse b/c something looked funny to him. Don’t apologize, I told him. Keep me safe. I want you to keep me safe. Of course, this presupposes that the things they do make sense.
December 27, 2009, 12:08 pmChris Travers says:
Amateurs! What a horrid mis-implementation of defence in depth.
That’s all I can say.
There is an easy mistake to make, that more unpredictable security measures will thwart attacks, but this almost never works. The experience in the IT field is that unpredictability breeds insecurity. Indeed transparency, to a point, actually INCREASES security. This doesn’t mean you want all your security measures published and publically viewable, but it does mean that the public experience should be consistent with reasonable expectations, and that the broad outlines should be public.
The problem is that this sort of thing has the strong potential of providing terrorists with an ability to pick the security measure they want to go through.
This is a big mistake.
December 27, 2009, 12:10 pmSagar says:
ArthurKirkland,
I think that is the point – rules put in place to deal with the last incident will simply inconvenience all of us without much benefit in stopping the next incident.
Assuming the ‘no getting up 60 minutes before landing’ rule will be useful, what if the next perp tries something 90 minutes before landing, or 1 hour after takeoff …
December 27, 2009, 12:11 pmSara says:
Did anyone notice the absurdity . . .
I would surmise that these rules are temporary rules and are aimed at the copycat or coordinated MO. Because the concern is not the isolated incident but coordinated attack.
December 27, 2009, 12:12 pmChris Travers says:
From the reports I have read, it’s worse than that. I suspect a blanket is not a personal item under the rule and could very easily be used to conceal a similar attack.
It’s really, really stupid and suggests there are no security professionals calling the shots.
December 27, 2009, 12:18 pmArthurKirkland says:
Adjusting to the “last incident” seems more sensible while it remains the “current incident.” If the last-hour rule is still being enforced in six months, the questions will become more apt, in my judgment.
Look at the bright side. I doubt our government has responded to this incident by ramping up plans to invade Iran.
December 27, 2009, 12:19 pmSoronel Haetir says:
I do find it pretty pathetic that the screening folks will catch things like makeup cases and water bottles but not the fake bomb parts from actual security tests.
December 27, 2009, 12:23 pmChris Travers says:
Well, let’s consider this issue here. I don’t even think the 60 min. rule would have any effect on a copycat.
According to reports he tried to use a syringe to inject a liquid into a bomb which didn’t detonate properly and became incindiary rather than explosive.
Assuming diabetics are still allowed insulin, and could still put the syringes into the airline seat pocket (not on lap), and assuming they aren’t going to confiscate blankets from travellers (asleep or awake) since they aren’t personal items (but rather standard issue by airlines), the syringe could be placed in the front pocket before the 60 min. period. It could then be retrieved, and the motion concealed by the airline blanket.
In other words, this rule does ABSOLUTELY nothing to interfere with a copycat attack.
Question on the carry on restriction: Is this the same as domestic: One carry on plus one personal item like a laptop or a purse? Or are travellers now expected to have EITHER a carry-on or a personal item?
December 27, 2009, 12:24 pmSoronel Haetir says:
One thing to note about blankets, at least on Alaska Air, they are now all personally owned. The airline removed them (along with the crappy airline pillows) ostensibly due to swine flu.
December 27, 2009, 12:28 pmSara says:
I agree, Chris, that airline flight security would be stupid to interpret the personal item rule to not include blankets, since that is the MO, but I don’t think they are necessarily that stupid.
December 27, 2009, 12:30 pmChris Travers says:
The one thing I will say about the TSA is that they seem to be better generally at preventing theft of carry-on items, though maybe once we can no longer take anything with us onto a plane, that issue will disappear by itself ;-)
Given current trends, though, let’s see where this is heading. Folks want airline travel to be 100% guaranteed free of risk of terrorist attack. Therefore….
Soon enough, all air travelers will be required to sit naked, and handcuffed to their seats, which will be a severe inconvenience to anyone expect those who are into kinkier stuff. All trips to the restrooms will require the doors be left open and escort required by an air marshall.
All luggage will be hand searched, x-rayed, etc. and on shorter flights shipped by train……
I think we need to get through people’s mind the concept of “acceptable risk.”
December 27, 2009, 12:30 pmSagar says:
Well, I will be making the same trip (Amsterdam to Detroit on Northwest) next month. Will let you know how it goes:)
December 27, 2009, 12:32 pmBruce Hayden says:
Yeh, I think that the reality is that it was just to save themselves money. Apparently, a lot of those items walked off the plane, though I cannot figure out why anyone would want airline blankets or pillows. Plus the cost of picking up the pillows and blankets after a flight.
December 27, 2009, 12:34 pmSagar says:
Please see the ‘shoe-bomber’ rule – still in effect. Rules don’t sunset often.
And why would our government attack Iran – aren’t they sort of our buddies that we should engage in talks without preconditions?
December 27, 2009, 12:38 pmChris Travers says:
What “airline flight security?” What are their other duties?
Or do you mean “airline flight customer service?”
December 27, 2009, 12:42 pmSk says:
“Airport security is already more show than substance.”
How do you know?
I’m not being flippant. I also hate TSA procedures (so much that I fly less that I could). But if you are approaching this issue rationally (and not just from the perspective ‘bureaucracies are dumb. TSA is irritating. Therefore, they must be wrong”). How do you know?
One (scientific) method would be to compare the numbers of successful airline attacks pre-9/11 to post 9/11. I think (but don’t know) that they are down. Another would be to compare the efficacy of those attacks. Pre 9/11, successful. Post 9/11, (Reid, and the latest attempt), unsuccessful.
Feel free to come up with some other measurable metric. These two, above, aren’t very good (though they are the best I can think of). But ‘TSA is dumb because X’ (where X = ‘outlaws makeup kits,’ or X = ‘someone could attack before 90 minutes from the end of the flight,’ etc).
You all seem to think that real world data on successful/unsuccessful attacks is irrelevant, while hypothetical blog comments represent an actual argument.
Sk
December 27, 2009, 12:42 pmDesiderius says:
Ah, the wonders of single-payer flight security!
December 27, 2009, 12:42 pmSara says:
What “airline flight security?”
Every airline gives directives to its employees on their responsibilities re airline flight security. Flight security is, in fact, the primary duty of the cockpit and cabin crew, not bringing you soda.
December 27, 2009, 12:46 pmTSA says:
Every time I travel, I hope the next terrorist strike destroys TSA and leaves the rest of us alone.
December 27, 2009, 12:48 pmrpt says:
Iran is last year’s proposed war. Lieberman and the other neo-cons are moving on to Yemen. Surprised that we haven’t heard either of the Cheneys or Bolton speak yet. We can also expect Hoekstra and King to disclose everything told to them in their classified briefings.
December 27, 2009, 12:50 pmAlan says:
Napolitano should be fired and her salary given to the passengers. If the government isn’t keeping us safe, then, at the very least, our taxes should go to people who actually did something to protect us.
December 27, 2009, 12:53 pmArkady says:
Well, I dunno. The flight originated in Lagos, stop-over in Amsterdam, then direct to Detroit. How do you propose we deal with these foreign countries, sovereign foreign countries? I’m serious in the question. What would you suggest we do?
December 27, 2009, 1:04 pmMalvolio says:
It’s famously specious reasoning to argue that since X has not occurred, purported preventative practice Y must be effective.
We don’t know how many attacks have been deterred or thwarted by contemporary airport security measures and we certainly don’t know how well other measures, or no measures, would have fared, but there’s no shortage of real-world data that tends to show that the TSA doesn’t know its ass from the a smoking hole in the ground, one lined with shards of fuselage and body parts.
December 27, 2009, 1:15 pmThe Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » A Cautious Take on “Security Theater” in Airline Security Measures says:
[...] Archives « Enhanced Security or Just Increased Annoyance? [...]
December 27, 2009, 1:20 pmSara says:
Re your real-world data. The data you provided showed that the more each airport’s system was randomly tested by TSA the better the screeners were.
December 27, 2009, 1:20 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
How about take charge of security for all flights coming into this country?
December 27, 2009, 1:20 pmChris Travers says:
I think that is the wrong way to look at it. Bear in mind that security is security, and even IT security (one of the fields I offer professional services in) is directly analogous to building and airline security.
There are a large number of problems with your approach in that temporary security measures in response to past attacks offer no real security at all since terrorists can simply outwait them.
In a case like this we have to ask ourselves a number of questions (and some of these are rather hard and have no clear-cut answers):
1) How likely is it we could see successful attacks carried out with the same technique? Is there a fundamental problem here with the approach the would-be bomber took?
2) What could we look for to prevent similar classes of attacks? What kinds of restrictions are reasonable in this case? Do we want to require all syringes to require accompanying prescriptions?
3) What other measures can be done to prevent similar attacks from being successful?
I would humbly suggest that there are no easy solutions to this sort of thing that don’t either severely infringe upon reasonable expectations of privacy (such as strip or backscatter searches for all passengers) or would be extremely easy to circumvent (such as forging prescriptions).
In the past airports have looked for detonators, rather than explosives, because the metal is comparatively easy to detect. Use of a liquid detonator raises a number of serous issues with current approaches to security and we simply do not have a mechanism in place to address it.
One option might be to require travellers who must carry insulin or other injectable drugs on their person to seek pre-clearance for the medication ahead of time. Prescribing doctor and fax number could also be required, and hence the airline might then be responsible for verifying the validity of the prescription. This is assuming we don’t want to start nationally tracking every prescription out there (which I would be opposed to anyway).
Another option might be to pay a cash reward to those who wrestled with the guy to encourage future similar actions.
December 27, 2009, 1:22 pmSara says:
Chris, see Orin’s new post. It makes sense. Moreover, given an incident like this, security needs to be able to respond to flights already in the air, to the very next flight, and in each flight over the next weeks, because the alternative is shutting down the system.
December 27, 2009, 1:34 pmChris Travers says:
Let’s see. I can’t think of any domestic airline attacks inside the US in the ten years preceeding 9/11. So 0 to 0….. Comparing failure rates presupposes we have accurate numbers both pre- and post- and I wouldn’t make that assumption.
Honestly, though, I think the TSA has been more friendly and better at preventing casual theft of carry-on items than the security firms it replaced. Note that doesn’t necessarily translate into better protection against terrorist attacks. However, it does suggest that the operation may be a bit more professional in many ways.
December 27, 2009, 1:38 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
Nothing against cash rewards, but I would get all the encouragement I needed from the desire to not find myself part of a fiery missile.
December 27, 2009, 1:43 pmSara says:
Agreed, Laura!
December 27, 2009, 1:47 pmBT says:
This flight originated overseas not in the US. I am not a frequent flyer so I may be showing my ignorance here, but how much control do we have over the screening of passengers and baggage coming into the US? If a flight originates in Berlin and its final destination is Washington, D. C, those passengers are screened in Germany by German personnel and so on if there are any additional stops. Are they required by international law to screen passengers according to American standards? If so, then those standards certainly failed. I realize that he was put on a watch list but allowed to fly anyway. Also, if he is in fact an AQ operative, it is reasonable to assume the he may have had help in getting through screening. That is a weakness in any system either here or overseas.
December 27, 2009, 1:56 pmAnother question to ask is would he have been caught if he boarded a plane in Detroit? Can we detect such devises with current standards and equipment in place?
Chris Travers says:
The point is publicity, not the cash encouragement. If you publicly give the guy a cash reward, it makes it more likely that after reading about it, people THINK about it when the time comes.
Most people, faced with a situation like this, will panic and do nothing. If there is a cash reward, there is a slight chance that the publicity will change people’s approach.
December 27, 2009, 2:21 pmChris Travers says:
BT:
We don’t have to let an flights into our airspace that are not screened to our standards.
December 27, 2009, 2:22 pmChris Travers says:
Not unless you have actual actionable intelligence that replays are imminent.
These attacks take time to plan and implement. A week is not outrageous for a response time for a single-person attack, especially if it is a failed one.
In the shoebomber case, there were obvious measures that were acceptable that could be taken. In this case, I am not sure there are. It is better to get the RIGHT measure a week later than get the wrong measures which we use for the next several years.
Also our system SHOULD be able to respond to flights in the air, but our definitions of security perimeters tend to hamper that. Airports were not really designed with that in mind, unfortunately.
December 27, 2009, 2:26 pmChris Travers says:
Probably a counterexample would be helpful:
When the liquid bomb plot was discovered, a temporary ban on liquids in carry-on luggage was helpful. The issue there is that it was (apparently, trusting the gov’t press releases as the literal truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth) known that it was an organized attack, and you can’t be absolutely sure you got everyone. Once the arrests are mentioned, there is a very real possibility that anyone else involved might make a desperate, off-the-cuff attempt at the plan. While it is unlikely that such an attack would be successful in those circumstances, the risk is not acceptable.
The problem in this case is that there doesn’t seem to be a single thing that can be done. If the measure was going to be effective it would be put in place at every airport. Since it is either not effective, or not acceptable to travellers, it is not. This suggests that this measure, unlike most post-911 measures, is almost certainly more show than substance.
(I say this as someone who voted AGAINST Bush both times and voted FOR Obama.)
December 27, 2009, 3:05 pmAleks311 says:
Re: As for the no stuff on lap bit, that seems absolutely ludicrous.
How is this a new rule? During takeoff and landing passgeners are already required to stow any loose items, either under their seat or in the overhead bins. This is a general safety measure, as loose items can become projectiles if the aircraft expriences any sudden movement jerk. The only exceptions passengers are allowed to hold on their laps are infants and (I think) pets in pet carriers.
December 27, 2009, 3:32 pmSoronel Haetir says:
One of the major problems I see with airport security is that the entire system is only as good as the weakest security checkpoint since once past a domestic security checkpoint passengers are generally not screened again.
This comes to mind due to reports like the single security line at Phoenix SkyHarbor airport that had the x-ray machine turned off at predictable hours each day for months in a row. If you have the time you need only find the incompetent or bribable screener at some out of the way location and you then have your contraband wherever it is that you’re going.
One change I do think was a good idea was the removal of the coin operated rent-a-locker units from inside the secure area.
December 27, 2009, 3:44 pmSoronel Haetir says:
At least prior to this incident you only needed your lap clear during the final landing approach, not 1 hour prior. And even then blankets were fine.
December 27, 2009, 3:46 pmChris Travers says:
That is exactly why different security measures at different airports constitute a real problem.
December 27, 2009, 4:51 pmTweets that mention The Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » Enhanced Security or Just Increased Annoyance? -- Topsy.com says:
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Eugene Volokh, Eugene Volokh. Eugene Volokh said: Enhanced Security or Just Increased Annoyance?: The NYT reports on new security measures adopted in the wake of.. http://bit.ly/5FTWav [...]
December 27, 2009, 4:55 pmBob Koss says:
Muslim religious fanatics thinking of being perceived as heroic and getting rewarded in heaven aren’t easily deterred.
Might I suggest some deterrence might be achieved by instituting a policy that buries whatever body parts can be found in a pig-skin sack soaked with bacon grease. If they fail and survive, a lifetime of weekly dunking in bacon grease upon conviction.
That might at least cut down on the number of volunteers.
December 27, 2009, 5:02 pmSoronel Haetir says:
As the Secret Service has concluded about attacks on the President it is basically impossible to stop a determined opponent, especially one willing to die in order to achieve the goal.
December 27, 2009, 5:59 pmVisitor Again says:
The system worked? This would-be terrorist’s own father alerted U.S.A. authorities of concerns about his son’s connections six months ago, and yet he wound up on a passenger plane landing in the U.S.A. Apparently he was on lists of people with suspected terrorist ties but not on the no-fly list. See this interesting report on the above and on his background in The Independent, the English newspaper.
December 27, 2009, 6:11 pmcommon_sense says:
As far as the restriction on needles, is there any reason a similar system couldn’t be constructed with a pen?
December 27, 2009, 6:13 pmAbdul Abulbul Amir says:
A flight in from Japan takes all night. Many, sometimes most folks are asleep. The last hour often sees the aisles filled with people waiting to empty the bladder in the few restrooms.
It seems much of the purpose of the last hour stay seated directive is to prevent people from going to the restroom.
If thats the case, will they pass out baggies or empty bottles for those with a very full tank and weak bladder control? I would probably pee in the barf bag before wetting myself.
December 27, 2009, 6:30 pmAbdul Abulbul Amir says:
Ugh!
December 27, 2009, 6:30 pmChris Travers says:
That’s actually something that any security professional in any field will tell you too.
Your goal is NOT to stop every possible attack. Your goal is to make it hard enough that law enforcement has a fighting chance of the attack before it gets to you.
December 27, 2009, 7:18 pmSammy Finkelman says:
You are forgetting the principle basis used by the TSA in developing rules:
What plausible rule, if it had existed, would, in HINDSIGHT, have prevented this event from occurring? (I say plausible because they are not yet ready to mandate serachng of underwear or a mandatory change of clothing into fresh underwear and a hospital gown.
This terrorist apparently had specific instructions to detonate his bomb only when he was over the United States. So that actually might have precluded this particular attack.
But of course even then, then the rule should be 15 minutes before entering the United States or its terrortorial waters.
December 27, 2009, 7:35 pmSammy Finkelman says:
It might be more difficult to build one using off-the-shelf components.
December 27, 2009, 7:42 pmSammy Finkelman says:
WRT that thought, this is one place I think where the TSA got it right.
Differeent (and varying in an unpredictable way) security measures are an advantage when it comes to preventing simultanoeus attacks as Al Qaeda likes to do.
December 27, 2009, 7:46 pmJames says:
Even after he was one fire, the guy was still seated. Also the news articles don’t specify that he returned to his seat less than 1 hour before the plane landed, only that he tried to make his attack (< 1 hr before landing).
The restrictions seems pretty pointless to me.
December 27, 2009, 8:08 pmThe Big Lebowski says:
Address the fact that the guy was witnessed being escorted on the plane in Amsterdam without a passport and obviously without going through the regular security procedures:
While Mutallab was poorly dressed, his friend was dressed in an expensive suit, Haskell said. He says the suited man asked ticket agents whether Mutallab could board without a passport. “The guy said, ‘He’s from Sudan and we do this all the time.’”
http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2009/12/flight_253_passenger_says_at_l.html
December 27, 2009, 8:38 pmbbbeard says:
WTF? How about giving people on the “broad” terrorism watch list a strip search and a full-body scan before they can fly?
I’ve about had it with the TSA. We need a new approach — or at least some new leadership. I fly as little as possible these days. I haven’t flown on business for nearly three years. I vacation within driving distance. The last straw is the idiots in the current administration who deny we’ve got a conflict with Muslims, won’t admit we’ve got a global war on terror on our hands, call terrorist acts “man-caused disasters”, and claim “the system worked” when it allowed someone suspicious enough to wind up on a terrorism watch list aboard a US-bound flight, leaving it to the passengers to deal with.
Arrgh.
BBB
December 27, 2009, 8:42 pmThe Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » Assessing Airport Security Measures says:
[...] intrusive to the average traveler. That leads me to suspect that the TSA has adopted them for “security theater” reasons, so as to make it seem that they are making a great effort to combat terrorism, and make [...]
December 27, 2009, 8:58 pmDavid Sucher says:
What puzzles me is the lack of any sort of holistic view of transportation security.
Surely there would be less pressure on airports, airlines etc etc in terms of security if we had really great railroad train service for cities under, say, 500 miles apart, which covers a great many cities in the USA.
Of course that is probably too much “social engineering” for some people.
December 27, 2009, 11:16 pmSoronel Haetir says:
Trains seem like they would be even more vulnerable because you don’t even need to be on the train to cause a problem and the route is set, though not the timing. High speed passenger rail on that scale would likely be just as bad body count wise, though perhaps not as dramatic as a jet liner.
There are also a huge number of ligistical issues to overcome if you were to lay new rail for such trains which is the only feasible way to make them high speed.
That would actually be something interesting to look at, what is an airport’s land footprint in relation to passenger miles or some other metric. Car trains would take car of some of that, not needing quite as huge parking lots on each end but still there are lots of problems to overcome.
December 28, 2009, 12:58 amThe Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » Tradeoffs in Airport Security says:
[...] measures. Some of the proposed new measures may be justified, though others are likely to be “security theater.” But even security measures that do increase safety create difficult tradeoffs that we don’t think [...]
December 28, 2009, 8:14 pmThe Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » Public Ignorance and the Political Economy of Airport Security: Why Governments Don’t Take Enough Precautions Before Attacks and Engage in “Security Theater” Afterwards says:
[...] both fail to take proper precautions before an attack occurs and respond with unnecessary “security theater” measures [...]
December 29, 2009, 7:26 pmExcellent posts about airline security « Belligerati says:
[...] intrusive to the average traveler. That leads me to suspect that the TSA has adopted them for “security theater” reasons, so as to make it seem that they are making a great effort to combat terrorism, and make [...]
January 7, 2010, 8:30 pm