Ireland has recently enacted a law banning “blasphemy,” which has in turn attracted plenty of justified criticism:

Secular campaigners in the Irish Republic defied a strict new blasphemy law which came into force today by publishing a series of anti-religious quotations online and promising to fight the legislation in court.

The new law, which was passed in July, means that blasphemy in Ireland is now a crime punishable with a fine of up to €25,000 (£22,000).

It defines blasphemy as “publishing or uttering matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters sacred by any religion, thereby intentionally causing outrage among a substantial number of adherents of that religion, with some defences permitted”....

But Atheist Ireland, a group that claims to represent the rights of atheists, responded to the new law by publishing 25 anti-religious quotations on its website, from figures including Richard Dawkins, Björk, Frank Zappa and the former Observer editor and Irish ex-minister Conor Cruise O’Brien.

Michael Nugent, the group’s chair, said that it would challenge the law through the courts if it were charged with blasphemy.

Nugent said: “This new law is both silly and dangerous. It is silly because medieval religious laws have no place in a modern secular republic, where the criminal law should protect people and not ideas. And it is dangerous because it incentives religious outrage, and because Islamic states led by Pakistan are already using the wording of this Irish law to promote new blasphemy laws at UN level.

There are many strong objections to the new Irish law, including the ones noted by the Atheist Ireland leader quoted above. I want to criticize the implicit assumption that it is somehow more justifiable to forbid criticism of religion than of secular political or moral views. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I don’t see why it is more objectionable to criticize Christianity or Judaism as opposed to conservatism or Kantianism. One possible answer is that many people are deeply attached to their religious views and are more likely to be offended by harsh criticism than believers in secular ideologies. But that is far from universally true. Some people care deeply about their secular political and moral commitments, as well, and may be just as offended by criticism as religious believers. Think of the reaction of strongly committed environmentalists to harsh criticism of recycling, for example. An alternative defense is that criticisms of religion are particularly likely to be inaccurate or based on unfair prejudices. But there are certainly many examples of inaccurate and unfair attacks on secular ideologies. Just look at the public debate over almost any contentious political issue.

Perhaps the most common argument for treating religion differently is the long history of persecution based on religion. But there is also a long history of persecution targeting advocates of dissenting secular political ideologies. In the last 100 years, it is likely that more people have been killed or imprisoned because of secular political beliefs than because of religious ones. Think of all the people repressed for such reasons under communist, Nazi, and fascist dictatorships. It’s also worth noting that in many countries, there is a long history of persecution of atheists. Arguing for atheism often involves “publishing or uttering matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters sacred by [a] religion.” For example, atheists often forcefully argue that God doesn’t exist, which can certainly be perceived as “insulting in relation” to a “matter” held “sacred” by most of the world’s major religions. Even if anti-blasphemy laws don’t impose a complete ban on pro-atheist speech, they surely have a chilling effect on it. Ironically, the effort to protect religion from persecution has the effect of facilitating prosecution of a group that has been persecuted at least as much as any religion. Note also the asymmetry in allowing unlimited criticism of atheism by religious believers, while the atheists have to carefully calibrate their responses lest they say something that runs afoul of the anti-blasphemy law. 

Obviously, the law could potentially be amended to forbid all speech that is “grossly abusive or insulting” to any moral or political views, whether religious in nature or not. However, no liberal society would even consider that approach, since it would have the effect of chilling public debate across the board. 

UPDATE: I have made a few changes to the post to eliminate awkward phrasing.

161 Comments

  1. Jon Rowe says:

    Check the typo in the title.

    As to the question, there’s something about religion that riles people up — that they get especially touchy about. This history of fighting wars on the basis of religion and all that.

    Even blasphemy laws were justified (by some), post the American Founding, on secular grounds. That is, the purpose of them under the “Novus Ordo Seclorum” was no longer to protect the integrity of the religion itself but to protect from breaches of the peace.

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  2. Atlanta says:

    I don’t think there’s a principled basis for defending these laws, but I assume they’re mostly practically motivated. Some folks take their religion seriously, which makes the criticism of it a risky thing. And by definition, religion is about faith, meaning there’s no basis for those who believe to respond to those who don’t, other than ... faith. As a result, we probably all know that criticizing a religion is not a dialog that can lead to resolution or even one that can be conducted on neutral terms, lowering the benefit of raising the critique in the first place. Those would be the reasons I see. But at core, it’s illiberal and dangerous to limit the expression of ideas. And most religions market themselves, anyhow. If you’re going to seek converts, you should be able to deal with those who don’t think your brand of salvation is the best that can be had.

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  3. GMUSOL05 says:

    Religion demands that it be treated with kid gloves. It always has, and it always will. As more scrutiny — rational, scientific and otherwise — is brought to bear upon religions, they will continue to demand these sort of protections.

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  4. Orin Kerr says:

    I look at this a bit differently, Ilya.

    In the examples you suggest, the alleged persecution for political beliefs was really persecution by totalitarian governments for being a perceived threat to its dominance. The totalitarian governments responded out of perceived self-protection. That persecution wasn’t really for having the different political beliefs, but rather because of being a perceived threat as evidence by a person’s willingness to speak out and act on their beliefs and their disagreement with the government. 

    Historical persecution of religious groups seems different. The tradition is of persecution because of the person’s beliefs per se, apart from what they do about or how they manifest them. The discrimination is also often or usually by private parties, not just by the government.

    As for persecution for atheism, I see that as a form of persecution for the victim’s religious beliefs. Persecution for religious beliefs is really persecution for not having the persecutor’s religious beliefs: It is the absence of the correct view that counts, and that seems to include atheism as it does having any other specific religion.

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  5. Ilya Somin says:

    As to the question, there’s something about religion that riles people up — that they get especially touchy about. This history of fighting wars on the basis of religion and all that.

    There is an even longer — and much bloodier — history of fighting wars on the basis of secular ideology, and all that. Think of the bloodiest wars of the last century (World War I, World War II, etc.), all of them fought for secular ideological reasons.

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  6. Ilya Somin says:

    In the examples you suggest, the alleged persecution for political beliefs was really persecution for being a perceived threat to a totalitarian government — the totalitarian governments then responded by trying to eliminate the danger. That persecution wasn’t really for having the different political beliefs, but rather because of being a perceived threat as evidence by a person’s willingness to speak out and act on their beliefs and their disagreement with the government.

    Persecution of religious minorities is also often motivated by perceptions that the minority is a threat to the dominant religion in society. As for totalitarian persecution of political beliefs, it was often pursued far beyond the point necessary to eliminate a “danger.” Moreover, the Nazis, Communists, and other totalitarians explicitly stated that it was important for them to get as much of the population as possible to adhere to the regime’s views. This was not just a matter of eliminating threats, but also of building the new society and new people (e.g. — “New Soviet Man”) that was required by their ideology.

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  7. Eric Rasmusen says:

    Blasphemy laws are usually efficient, so it is not surprising how common they are in space and time. The best design punishes malicious offensiveness without punishing expression of ideas, and that design is as easy to implement as a law against physical assault. (I pick that example on purpose because assault laws are abusable too– just claim somebody touched you without leaving any mark.) 

    See this paper of mine: 

    “The Economics of Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities.” Journal of Legal Studies (June 1998) 27(2): 245– 270 (lead article). When a symbol is desecrated, the desecrator obtains benefits while those who venerate the symbol incur costs. The approach to policy used in this paper is to ask whether the benefits are likely to exceed the costs. I conclude that they usually do not. Desecration is often motivated by a desire to reduce the utility of others, which generally is inefficient. Also, if desecration occurs, people have less incentive to create and maintain symbols. Symbols, like other produced goods, need property– rights protection if the outcome is to be efficient. Laws against desecration are a good way to provide this protection, given the likely failure of the Coase Theorem and the possibility of efficient breaking of the laws. In tex or pdf ( http://rasmusen.org/published/Rasmusen_98JLS.flag.pdf).

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  8. Lior says:

    As to the question, there’s something about religion that riles people up — that they get especially touchy about.

    So because some religious people are uncivilized, and react inappropriately to ideas they object to, we needs laws restricting the freedom of speech of the non-religious?

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  9. Ilya Somin says:

    The approach to policy used in this paper is to ask whether the benefits are likely to exceed the costs. I conclude that they usually do not. Desecration is often motivated by a desire to reduce the utility of others, which generally is inefficient. Also, if desecration occurs, people have less incentive to create and maintain symbols. Symbols, like other produced goods, need property– rights protection if the outcome is to be efficient. Laws against desecration are a good way to provide this protection, given the likely failure of the Coase Theorem and the possibility of efficient breaking of the laws.

    I doubt this is even remotely close to being true, especially once we consider public choice factors (i.e. — that anti-desecration laws won’t be enforced by perfect “benevolent despot” governments but by real-world governments subject to interest group pressure, tyranny of the majority, political ignorance, and the like). In any event, notice that the argument applies equally to religious and secular symbols, and is therefore actually consistent with the main point of the post.

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  10. Orin Kerr says:

    Ilya,

    There’s a big difference between (a) a form of discrimination being entirely motivated by something and (b) a form of discrimination that is sometimes motivated in part by something.

    Also, I think you’re downplaying the difference between (a) attitudes nearly universally held by members of a society and (b) theories of preferred views announced at a particular time by a particular ruling government. 

    I think these differences between (a) and (b) explain the differences you’re wondering about.

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  11. Ilya Somin says:

    There’s a big difference between (a) a form of discrimination being entirely motivated by something and (b) a form of discrimination that is sometimes motivated in part by something.

    As I pointed out in my original response to you, religious persecution is also “sometimes motivated in part by something” (the desire to prevent a threat to the dominant religion), and is certainly not “entirely” motivated solely by a desire to suppress the targeted belief for its own sake.

    Also, I think you’re downplaying the difference between (a) attitudes nearly universally held by members of a society and (b) theories of preferred views announced at a particular time by a particular ruling government. 

    I downplay it because I don’t think this is a morally relevant difference with respect to the issue at hand. Also, much political persecution is in fact based on attitudes held by the vast majority of the people in the society in question. There are many obvious historical examples. They may not be “nearly universally held,” but neither are the religious views that often motivate religious persecution. For example, Catholic persecution of Protestants and vice versa occurred in societies where the minority faith had many supporters, and was in part motivated by their very numerousness.

    I think these differences between (a) and (b) explain the differences you’re wondering about.

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  12. Soronel Haetir says:

    <blockquote
    However, no liberal society would even consider that approach, since it would have the effect of chilling public debate across the board. 

    I honestly wouldn’t be so certain of this. There are plenty of forces currently trying to quell all manner of speech, even in liberal Western democracies. That the result would then be some other form of society doesn’t really seem to matter.

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  13. Jon Rowe says:

    So because some religious people are uncivilized, and react inappropriately to ideas they object to, we needs laws restricting the freedom of speech of the non-religious?

    No I am actually against blasphemy laws. Rather I was noting why it might be a good idea to respectfully defer to an individual’s (or a group of individuals’) religious beliefs — not criticize them in polite society — provided their religion doesn’t harm you.

    And yes, I know, sometimes folks’ religion does harm or otherwise affect you. In that instance, instead of turning your metaphorical shotgun on the religion, I think it helps to work out an intellectual construct where people can have their religion, and feel not insulted, but still not be permitted to use their religion to harm. That’s in part, one reason why I am a political libertarian. 

    So I am all for free speech and the “right” to insult religion. But I’ll take a pass (usually) when it comes to mocking others’ religion.

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  14. ArthurKirkland says:

    A salute to Professor Somin for wading into this thicket.

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  15. Orin Kerr says:

    Ilya,

    I think the key difficulty may be in your explanation, “I downplay it because I don’t think this is a morally relevant difference with respect to the issue at hand.” You have a theory of moral relevance at work here, which is of course fine, but I think that theory is getting in the way of understanding the historical explanation. The nature of a historical explanation is that it is based on what happened, and the cultural resonance that has been left behind. Whether we see relevant distinctions based on our own theories of morality in that history is a different question from whether that history exists and is influencing common attitudes.

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  16. Arkady says:

    Actually, the link to this posting puts the question more pointedly:

    why-is-it-more-wrong-to-insult-a-persons-religion-than-their-secular-moral-or-political-views

    Because we consider to be in very poor taste to do so. And I think it’s a mistake to go searching for some rational foundation for this attitude. We’re raised in this country, for the most part, to respect the religious views of others–we’re trained this way. In much the same way we’re trained to respect the free speech rights of others. These are part of the foundation of our civil religion as Americans, if you want. We don’t arrive at these attitudes syllogistically.

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  17. LarryA says:

    Perhaps the most common argument for treating religion differently is the long history of persecution based on religion.

    The irony being that the vast majority of such attacks are perpetrated by members of competing religions. Around where I live there are Christian denominations that can’t hold a meeting without getting into a theological foodfight.

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  18. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    I agree with Jon Rowe.

    But I think the timing here is kind of weird. Has not religion-based terrorism in Ireland pretty well run its course? Would this rule have not been put to better use some time ago?

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  19. Michelle Dulak Thomson says:

    The timing’s especially weird given that (IIRC) Britain finally repealed its own longstanding blasphemy ban a couple of years ago.

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  20. Ilya Somin says:

    I think the key difficulty may be in your explanation, “I downplay it because I don’t think this is a morally relevant difference with respect to the issue at hand.” You have a theory of moral relevance at work here, which is of course fine, but I think that theory is getting in the way of understanding the historical explanation. The nature of a historical explanation is that it is based on what happened, and the cultural resonance that has been left behind.

    The post is specifically directed at a normative question, not an empirical one. However, for reasons I mentioned in my previous responses to you, I think your argument fails to explain the empirical reality too. The empirical distinctions between religious and secular persecution that you noted don’t withstand scrutiny once we consider the actual histories of the 2 types of persecution.

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  21. S says:

    Can anyone tell us, what prompted this law?

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  22. byomtov says:

    I think there may be an inherent understanding that religious beliefs, often based on revelation, are not easy to defend on pure rational grounds. There’s really not much way to debate the Resurrection, or the parting of the Red Sea, for example. So criticism is not a basis for discussion, but rather almost nothing but insult. The implied message is not, “That seems wrong to me,” but “How can you believe such nonsense?”

    I don’t defend the Irish law on that basis. I’m just suggesting that it is the nature of religious beliefs that they are often deeply held and not much amenable to analysis. Criticism, therefore, stings worse, and accomplishes less, than criticism of other sorts of ideas.

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  23. Orin Kerr says:

    Ilya,

    Fair enough — I supose we’ll just have to agree to disagree. 

    Just as an aside, I wonder how often our disagreements are based on our different theoretical approaches. I have an Oakeshottian instinct to root ideas as much as possible in experience and empirical evidence, and I’m skeptical of how much broad theories and first principles can really tell us about the world. In contrast, you tend to reason first from broad theories and first principles, and you seem somewhat more skeptical about what experience and empirical evidence tells us. 

    I’m reminded of this in part because our exchange on the political airport security struck some similar themes. I approached the problem based on experience working in the field and (at times) working with and for politicians. In contrast, you approached the problem based on theories of political science and what they should tell us about how politicians operate. Similarly, I approach this problem today by trying to explain instincts based on history, attuned to how matters of degree can alter perceptions. In contrast, you approach this problem more from the standpoint of looking for a conceptual explanation that normatively should justify the distinction in treatment.

    I don’t know if that explains all of our occasional differences, but I suspect it does explain a lot of them.

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  24. resh says:

    It’s no small detail to note that atheism, largely, is an absence of belief (in god(s), and little more. Hence a-theism. While some atheists do indeed argue against the presence or existence of god(s), a persuasion commonly called strong atheism, doing so belies the definition of atheism. 

    Thus, atheism is no more a belief system than saying that not believing in pink grass or phlogiston or the butterfly effect is a belief system. Please. 

    That being so, blasphemy laws would have no true application to atheism-as opposed to theism-except to say that the offender would be guilty of defiling that which is not. 

    It would be a strange blasphemy law that grounds guilt on the basis of offending a non-believer and one who decouples himself from the very beliefs that engender a sacred context.

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  25. DNJ says:

    I entirely agree with Ilya. 

    The problem here is that Ireland is emphatically not a secular state. Its Constitution makes it a Christian state and requires the criminalization of blasphemy. As the Guardian article notes, the Constitution also requires the President and judges to take a religious oath. I suspect that the European Court of Human Rights would find this to be a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. It would also be very interesting to see how the Court would rule on the blasphemy law. It has upheld similar laws in the past, but these decisions have attracted heavy scholarly criticism.

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  26. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Resh, is absence of a belief in God not more properly termed agnosticism? Atheism, as you point out, a-theism, looks to me more like a positive assertion that there is no god.

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  27. Angus Lander says:

    Here’s a possible explanation for why it is worse to criticize someone’s religious beliefs than it is to criticize his moral beliefs: moral beliefs present themselves as answerable to reason and evidence, religious beliefs (in the main) do not. So, when you criticize someone’s moral beliefs, you call upon him to perform a task he (in the main) regards himself as epistemically required to perform (that is: providing reasons in favor of his moral conclusions). When you criticize someone’s religious beliefs, on the other hand, you demand from him justification he (in the main) doesn’t think he is epistemically obligated to supply (you demand from him, in other words, something to which (by his lights) you aren’t entitled).

    Whether this justifies a law against blasphemy is a separate question. I think it does suggest (or, more accurately, goes some way towards suggesting) that, as a moral matter, there should be a presumption against criticizing another’s religious (but not moral) beliefs.

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  28. Orin Kerr says:

    Resh,

    I’m with Laura on that. Via online dictionaries:

    a·the·ism (ā‘thē-ĭz’əm)
    n. Disbelief in or denial of the existence of God or gods; The doctrine that there is no God or gods.

    [French athéisme, from athée, atheist, from Greek atheos, godless : a-, without; see a-1 + theos, god; see dhēs– in Indo-European roots.]

    agnostic n.
    1 : a person who holds the view that any ultimate reality (as God) is unknown and probably unknowable; broadly : one who is not committed to believing in either the existence or the nonexistence of God or a god
    2 : a person unwilling to commit to an opinion about something 

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  29. resh says:

    Hi Laura,

    Agnosticism attaches to (an uncertainty of) knowledge, not belief on matters god. One could be an agnostic theist-that is, believe in god while being agnostic about his existence. One can also be an agnostic atheist-that is, have no belief in god while being uncertain in knowledge about his existence.

    In short, agnosticism is compatible with theism or atheism. Most atheists are agnostic atheists, i.e., claim to not know whether a god exists, while simply having no belief in god. You were exactly that when you were born, as we all were.

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  30. resh says:

    OK–

    Please see post to Laura. Regrets.

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  31. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    One could be an agnostic theist-that is, believe in god while being agnostic about his existence.

    Okay, I have read that upside down and sideways, and can’t make heads nor tails of it.

    How can you believe in god while taking no stand as to his existence?

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  32. Ilya Somin says:

    Just as an aside, I wonder how often our disagreements are based on our different theoretical approaches. I have an Oakeshottian instinct to root ideas as much as possible in experience and empirical evidence, and I’m skeptical of how much broad theories and first principles can really tell us about the world. In contrast, you tend to reason first from broad theories and first principles, and you seem somewhat more skeptical about what experience and empirical evidence tells us. 

    There may be some truth to this. However, I think that we need theories and principles to interpret experience and empirical evidence. They tell us which evidence is relevant, how it fits in with other evidence, and so on. 

    I’m reminded of this in part because our exchange on the political airport security struck some similar themes. I approached the problem based on experience working in the field and (at times) working with and for politicians. In contrast, you approached the problem based on theories of political science and what they should tell us about how politicians operate. Similarly, I approach this problem today by trying to explain instincts based on history, attuned to how matters of degree can alter perceptions. In contrast, you approach this problem more from the standpoint of looking for a conceptual explanation that normatively should justify the distinction in treatment.

    I would put the matter differently. I approached the airport security issue based on a combination of theory and empirical evidence that cuts across a wide swath of government policy and that took account of the systematic impact of incentives even on people who have good intentions (i.e. — even politicians who have good intentions must focus on political survival if they want to stay in power for long). I think you overstated the importance of the good intentions of the particular politicians you were familiar with. Note that I never denied that they had such good intentions. Rather, I argued that those good intentions were not sufficient to produce good policy and gave various reasons why that was so.

    Regarding the current dispute, I was addressing a normative question. The empirical question of why people think what they do is relevant to that issue only to the extent that their reasons for thinking it are logically compelling.

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  33. orca says:

    resh: One can also be an agnostic atheist-that is, have no belief in god while being uncertain in knowledge about his existence.In short, agnosticism is compatible with theism or atheism. 

    I’m an atheist, but my next choice after random chaos would be this whole thing’s an experiment being run by a sadistic super-being.

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  34. Ilya Somin says:

    Here’s a possible explanation for why it is worse to criticize someone’s religious beliefs than it is to criticize his moral beliefs: moral beliefs present themselves as answerable to reason and evidence, religious beliefs (in the main) do not. So, when you criticize someone’s moral beliefs, you call upon him to perform a task he (in the main) regards himself as epistemically required to perform (that is: providing reasons in favor of his moral conclusions). When you criticize someone’s religious beliefs, on the other hand, you demand from him justification he (in the main) doesn’t think he is epistemically obligated to supply (you demand from him, in other words, something to which (by his lights) you aren’t entitled).

    Not all religious believers think this. To the contrary, many have all sorts of reasons why they think their religion is true, and alternative beliefs (other religions, atheism, etc.) are false. For example, Christians, Jews, and Muslims cite scripture as justification for their beliefs. 

    Secondly, even when a religious believer does claim that his beliefs are not subject to testing by reason and evidence, that claim itself is subject to rational questioning. Why should religious beliefs be exempt from the scrutiny that we would normally to give as a matter of course to other important beliefs?

    Finally, some secular ideologies also claim they are based on emotion and intuition rather than logic and evidence, and are therefore not open to challenge. Yet few who do not already share these ideologies accept these claims. I think similar skepticism is justified with respect to comparable religious claims.

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  35. Orin Kerr says:

    Ilya,

    Let’s put it this way: In approaching problems we both try to combine theory and data, but you emphasize the role of theory more than I do and I emphasize the data more than you do.

    Resh,

    I’m with Laura. Perhaps you are using a somewhat specialized meaning of what it means to “believe” in God?

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  36. Angus Lander says:

    I have an Oakeshottian instinct to root ideas as much as possible in experience and empirical evidence, and I’m skeptical of how much broad theories and first principles can really tell us about the world. In contrast, you tend to reason first from broad theories and first principles, and you seem somewhat more skeptical about what experience and empirical evidence tells us. 

    I’m reminded of this in part because our exchange on the political airport security struck some similar themes.

    Orin, I think this is spot on. Not only do you prefer observation to theory (and Ilya vice versa), but those who prefer observation to theory (i.e. who have the “Oakshottian instinct”) tend to eschew the moral reasoning with which those possessing more theoretical minds are comfortable. 

    That said, there is probably an optimal middle-ground on which both you and Ilya could converge. You are too much of an empiricist(witness your unwillingness to focus on the question whether one is justified in treating moral beliefs and religious beliefs differently, as opposed to the question why moral beliefs and religious beliefs are in fact treated differently); Ilya is too much of a rationalist (witness his dismissing your observations regarding politicians’ incentives vis-a-vis airport security because they conflicted with his pet (non-normative) theory). 

    Ilya’s ultra-rationalism leads him to construct unrealistic models of how the world works; your ultra-empiricism results in your (churlishly) declining to tackle ethical questions — questions that must be tackled in order to evaluate a policy — head on.

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  37. Arkady says:

    I think that we need theories and principles to interpret experience and empirical evidence. They tell us which evidence is relevant, how it fits in with other evidence, and so on. 

    Actually, I think this is misleading as far as the hard sciences go (and even moreso for the social sciences). Theories don’t so much tell us what evidence is relevant as tell us what we are to count as evidence. This would take us far afield though. See, Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, discussion of “paradigms.”

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  38. Ilya Somin says:

    Let’s put it this way: In approaching problems we both try to combine theory and data, but you emphasize the role of theory more than I do and I emphasize the data more than you do.

    Possibly. Though I think we also disagree on what counts as good data supporting a particular conclusion, and that such disagreements were a big part of several of our recent debates.

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  39. Orin Kerr says:

    Ilya,

    Yes, exactly. I think that is consistent with my assessment, not a counter to it.

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  40. Angus Lander says:

    Ilya

    Not all religious believers think this. To the contrary, many have all sorts of reasons why they think their religion is true, and alternative beliefs (other religions, atheism, etc.) are false. For example, Christians, Jews, and Muslims cite scripture as justification for their beliefs. 

    True, not all religious believers think this — I said religious believers “in the main” think that their beliefs aren’t susceptible to rational criticism. (And notice there’s uncontroversially nothing wrong with calling into question the religious beliefs of someone who thinks his are susceptible to rational criticism — nobody will fault you for debating Alvin Plantinga on the existence of God, though you’ll probably lose.) And by “rational criticism” I mean criticism on the basis of generally accessible reasons; those who cite scripture as justification cite something that only one who antecedently has faith will regard as authoritative.

    [E]ven when a religious believer does claim that his beliefs are not subject to testing by reason and evidence, that claim itself is subject to rational questioning. Why should religious beliefs be exempt from the scrutiny that we would normally to give as a matter of course to other important beliefs?

    You have elided a distinction. I agree with you that religious beliefs as such can (and should) be subjected to rational scrutiny (and they fair rather poorly). But there’s something, at the very least impolite, about rationally criticizing to someone beliefs he does not regard as open to rational criticism. (That, at least, is why I indulge my new age loon of an aunt at weddings, but vigorously debate my uncle on policy.) Further, I think (would hope) the Irish law against blasphemy is grounded in a concern about harming the devout, not safeguarding religious truth.

    Finally, some secular ideologies also claim they are based on emotion and intuition rather than logic and evidence, and are therefore not open to challenge. Yet few who do not already share these ideologies accept these claims. I think similar skepticism is justified with respect to comparable religious claims.

    Which ones?

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  41. resh says:

    “Okay, I have read that upside down and sideways, and can’t make heads nor tails of it.

    How can you believe in god while taking no stand as to his existence?”

    Surely you’ve met believers who have the intellectual integrity to admit they have no actual knowledge of their god’s existence? (Hence agnosticism.) Indeed, the essence of theism is faith-belief absent actual knowledge or proof.

    Since I have not seen or been presented with any objective proof or knowledge of god’s existence, I simply have no belief in god. Therefore, I’m an atheist. However, I do not claim to be so smart that I hold the knowledge necessary to disprove or prove god’s existence-thus, I’m agnostic on the matter, also.

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  42. Mark Field says:

    I don’t know if that explains all of our occasional differences, but I suspect it does explain a lot of them.

    FWIW, I agree with you on the different approaches you each bring to bear on issues.

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  43. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Surely you’ve met believers who have the intellectual integrity to admit they have no actual knowledge of their god’s existence? (Hence agnosticism.) 

    I think you’re stretching the term “agnosticism” too far there. An agnostic says, “I don’t know whether there is a god or not.” A believer says, “I believe there is a god.” Now, it’s true that believing and knowing are two different things. But when people say, for instance, “I know that my redeemer liveth”, they mean “believe”. By your definition, we’re all agnostics.

    And I don’t think that only being able to believe, and say you know, is that big a deal. I had a discussion about this one time with an atheist who pretty much thought anybody who believed in God was an idiot. His god was science. I asked him if he believed in the existence of oxygen — he said he did, of course — and I asked him why. Had he seen little atoms with eight protons in their nuclei? No, but Priestley’s experiments, blah blah. Had he performed those experiments himself? No, but he’d read about them ... and then he saw the trap and shut up.

    We believe all kinds of things that we can’t know. There’s not enough time to prove every cottonpickin thing you say you know.

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  44. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    ... I don’t make a practice of arguing with atheists, by the way. Only the ones who initiate the conversation and tell me that I’m stupid.

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  45. Orin Kerr says:

    Angus,

    You are incorrectly assuming that my avoiding certain topics on the blog means I do not have any views of these topics. I have lots and lots of such views. I generally don’t blog on them because I find such issues too personal, however; I prefer to share those views among friends rather than in front of 30,000 daily readers. Maybe that’s quirky or irrational, but that’s the line I tend to draw.

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  46. Curt Fischer says:

    I have been reading this thread only surfacially, but kudos to Prof. Somin and Kerr for the civility and grace on display here.

    Their concise, focused dialog zoomed in quite quickly towards the kernel of their disagreement, and all without recourse to ad hominem.

    The VC commentariat, myself included, might do well to imbue our own commentary with the same civility and grace.

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  47. Angus Lander says:

    Orin,

    I guess one strategy for avoiding committing yourself, online, to a moral position is to publish non sequiturs on blog post explicitly addressed to an ethical question. Another approach would be to decline to comment at all. 

    In other words, nothing wrong with preferring not to commit yourself publicly to moral points of view. Something a little weird about debating ethics while cleaving to that preference.

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  48. GCA says:

    I rather cynically suspect, without any knowledge of its legislative history, that the blasphemy law passed in Ireland was enacted at the behset of EU political elites to placate Muslims. The law appears to make publishing the cartoons published by Jyllands Posten in Denmark illegal in Ireland. 

    Ilya Somin: It defines blasphemy as “publishing or uttering matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters sacred by any religion, thereby intentionally causing outrage among a substantial number of adherents of that religion, with some defences permitted”.... 

    Based more on my observations of Europe than theory, this law looks to me like nothing more than an attack on free speech consistent with the special rights Muslims seek worldwide, cloaked in general terms. Radical Muslims consider any discussion of their religion (other than their own orthodoxy) to be blasphemy, far more so than any other religion.

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  49. Cornellian says:

    Resh, is absence of a belief in God not more properly termed agnosticism? Atheism, as you point out, a-theism, looks to me more like a positive assertion that there is no god.

    It gets a bit blurry on the margins. If someone does not believe that a God exists, while recognizing that the question is not provable, one way or the other, is that agnostic or atheist?

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  50. ptt says:

    I don’t know that it’s more “wrong” to attack (I hate that word) a person’s religion, but, from the point of view of the authorities, it might be worse because it is a greater irritation to the “victim” and, in fact, involves more “victims” because fellow believers also feel themselves “attacked”.

    In most cases, religious beliefs are more central to a person’s identity. More is at stake when it is “attacked”. Also, religions tend to be more delineated than philosophies or political beliefs. I can be a liberal Democrat in favor of fiscal restraint or a pro-life, conservative Republican (this particular combo seems to be increasingly difficult to hold), but I can’t be a Baptist who recognizes the divinity of Rama.

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  51. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Conellian, my guess is that it matters how you phrase it.

    I don’t believe in God v. I believe there is no God.

    The first is agnostic, (not that this defines agnostic thought, which may be more neutral,) whereas the second is atheist.

    So I think your hypothetical is agnostic.

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  52. Chem_geek says:

    orca: I’m an atheist, but my next choice after random chaos would be this whole thing’s an experiment being run by a sadistic super-being. 

    Orca, the Fourth Law of thermodynamics states that the perversity of the Universe strongly tends to the maximum. ;-)

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  53. GCA says:

    By the way, where does it say anything about “attacking” religion? In defining blasphemy, the law seems to be focused on the perceptions of the listener/viewer/reader rather than on the acts of the speaker/videographer/writer.

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  54. Orin Kerr says:

    Angus writes:

    I guess one strategy for avoiding committing yourself, online, to a moral position is to publish non sequiturs on blog post explicitly addressed to an ethical question. Another approach would be to decline to comment at all.
    In other words, nothing wrong with preferring not to commit yourself publicly to moral points of view. Something a little weird about debating ethics while cleaving to that preference.

    I get the critical vibe here, but it seems to miss the mark. My comments weren’t debating ethics: I was merely addressing the historical explanation that Ilya had offered. Ilya made clear in his comments that the historical question wasn’t his primary interest, but it was the part of his post that I was responding to. I don’t think it’s “weird” or a “non-sequitur” to address the part of an argument that you personally find most interesting. Also, as you might know, I comment here a lot; I hope that is okay with you.

    Finally, if you think I am to be faulted for not posting publicly about these issues, I would hope you at least credit me a little bit for engaging in all of these debates with my real name rather than hiding behind a pseudonym.

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  55. ptt says:

    ... and then he saw the trap and shut up.

    I wouldn’t assume that’s the reason he chose to end the discussion.

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  56. arch1 says:

    In contexts where the correctness and implications of beliefs are at issue, it should be entirely appropriate to critique beliefs on their merits (or lack therof), regardless whether or not they are labelled “religious” by the believer.

    The only remotely respectable consideration against this perspective of which I’m aware is the pragmatic desire to avoid violent reprisals by people who can’t handle criticism of their beliefs.

    But this is a concession to the forces of darkness. Those who enact anti-blasphemy laws in an effort to appease the violently irrational are clearly punishing the wrong parties, and have basically admitted that they haven’t yet figured out how to run a civil society.

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  57. ptt says:

    kudos to Prof. Somin and Kerr for the civility and grace on display here

    And super-kudos for keeping their discussion within a single thread!

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  58. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    ptt: I wouldn’t assume that’s the reason he chose to end the discussion. 

    What assumption would you make about the fact that he started it in the first place?

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  59. ptt says:

    Laura,

    Insufficient data to speculate. He might have been an opinionated oaf. He might have thought you shared his POV and been surprised you didn’t. He might have been hitting on you and it all went horribly wrong.

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  60. Bill says:

    One of the biggest problems with blasphemy laws is where one religion’s beliefs contradict another religion’s beliefs. It is possible that a court will be asked to judge, via these blasphemy laws, on which religion is ‘right’. Something that courts (at least in my country) are rightly hesitant to provide judgement in matters of theology. For example, Islam denies the divinity of Jesus: an issue central to the theology of the Christian religion. Should a court decide that if publishers of the Qur’an (where the denial is made) have blasphemed against the Christian beliefs? Do muslims have the right to bring the publishers of various editions of the Bible to court for having printed on paper that Jesus is the son of God? If a court should ever make a decision for the Christians, could it itself be brought up on charges of Blasphemy for having insulted the Muslims belief that the Qur’an is perfect and a verbatim copy of Allah’s word.

    Another problem is that the standards are based on how the aggrieved party perceives the insult, instead of there being single objective standard consistent across all religions. As we have seen in the last two days, the attempt on the life of Kurt Westergaad, one of the Danish cartoonists, leaves no doubt that a huge number of Muslims feel deeply insulted. Yet think of all the similar depictions of Jesus and the Christian religion in the Western world. In defining injury as being ‘insulted’, you allow those whose religion defines a the largest set of possible insults to them to dominate such standards. It is as if you bring in a law that says you must not encroach on a person’s Personal Space on the threat of being charged with assault by the state. Most people may define their Personal Space as being somewhere within an arms length in most cases. What do you do with people who define their Personal Space as being a kilometer or a mile around their person?

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  61. Angus Lander says:

    Orin,

    While we’re on the subject of misplaced snark: yes, I’d be a hypocrite for posting under a pseudonym and then faulting you for declining to make public your moral beliefs. Less so if I acknowledged (just for example) that there is “nothing wrong with preferring not to commit yourself publicly to moral points of view” (swear I read that somewhere), and then focused my criticism on your holding this preference while engaging in a moral debate.

    As to whether my snark is misplaced, the point of Ilya’s historical account of persecution was to show that many different types of believer — religious, ideological, atheist — have had their liberty infringed because of what they think. Your response — that ideological thinkers have had their liberty infringed only derivatively because of what they think — doesn’t change the fact that religious believers are not distinct in having been persecuted. So it doesn’t confute any premise in Ilya’s argument at hand and, as a consequence, is a non sequitur.

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  62. Linus says:

    I wouldn’t assume that’s the reason he chose to end the discussion.

    Laura,
    Insufficient data to speculate. He might have been an opinionated oaf. He might have thought you shared his POV and been surprised you didn’t. He might have been hitting on you and it all went horribly wrong.

    This was awesome. Jumping in to correct someone’s interpretation of a conversation that you weren’t a part of, then, when pressed, claiming “insufficient data to speculate”. Come on, don’t chicken out, Kreskin. Tell us what that guy was really thinking.

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  63. resh says:

    “It gets a bit blurry on the margins. If someone does not believe that a God exists, while recognizing that the question is not provable, one way or the other, is that agnostic or atheist?”

    Both.

    This is not to disguise that an atheist can have a position of advocacy toward his non belief in god. But the advocacy itself doesn’t define the atheism; the absence of belief in god(s) defines it. Nothing more is required.

    Agnostism in the god sense is simply not being certain in knowledge about god’s existence. I am an agnostic believer, for example, in black holes.

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  64. readery says:

    Ilya,

    The U.S. Constitution chose to treat religion differently from simple philosophies. Are you arguing that it had no justification for doing so? 

    Obviously the way the U.S. Constitution chooses to treat religion differently from other philosophies is itself different from the way Ireland has chosen, but both countries treat the two differently. 

    You’ve chosen not to make a narrow argument focusing on objections to blasphemy laws or arguments in favor of special protection for speech and similar forms of expression. You’ve instead chosen to make what appears to be a much broader argument which seem to go well beyond free speech concerns and seems to implicate the many special protections the U.S. has for religion which it doesn’t have for general philosophies.

    Under the U.S. Consittution, Religious organizations and institutions get internal organizational and institutional rights which philosophical organizations and institutions don’t. Heads of religious intstituions may choose theology professors (or music directors or thrift shop managers or kosher supervisors — there’s a case on each) without regard to discrimination laws, but heads of secular universities have to obey discrimination laws when they choose philosphy teachers. Religions get numerous exemptions from practice requirements — Jews get various waivers and special rules permitting kosher meat to be exempt from certain USDA requirements and meet others in specially accommodating ways (for example, kosher inspectors are made USDA inspectors). Quakers get exemptions from the draft. Muslims get breaks for prayer. Religious practices have to be accommodated (within some limits), but general philosophical beliefs don’t. U.S. courts can’t intervene in many disputes among members of a church, e.g. disputes implicating theological matters or rights to religious leadership, but they have no similar problem intervening in disputes among members of a philosophical society even when the disputes involve interpretations of the secular philosophy involved. 

    Are you arguing the U.S. Constitution and centuries of American legal practice are wrong in making all these distinctions?

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  65. Jon Rowe says:

    Bill,

    I think you make a great point. I was a guest on the “Infidel” Guy’s popular Internet radio program, discussing my meticulous research on America’s Founding & Religion (scroll down to episode 498) and he noted everyone is an “infidel” according to someone else’s religion.

    I noted, for late 18th Cen. America’s Founding purposes, “infidel” as a term of art, meant someone to one’s religious left. That is, Thomas Paine was an “infidel” according to Ben Franklin’s standards (and yes, Franklin, not a strict Deist like Paine, did use “infidelity” as a term of disapprobation). 

    But to the “orthodox,” Franklin (and most other “key Founders”) were “infidels” because they were to the religious left of (prominent orthodox figures) Timothy Dwight, Jedidiah Morse, et al.

    Here is John Adams, in a private letter, mocking the Incarnation of Christ in a way that certainly would have gotten him executed if said publicly in colonial Massachusetts under their blasphemy law:

    “An incarnate God!!! An eternal, self-existent, omnipresent omniscient Author of this stupendous Universe, suffering on a Cross!!! My Soul starts with horror, at the Idea, and it has stupified the Christian World. It has been the Source of almost all of the Corruptions of Christianity.”

    – John Adams to John Quincy Adams, March 28, 1816

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  66. Tweets that mention The Volokh Conspiracy » Blog Archive » Why is it More Wrong to Attack a Person’s Religion than their Secular Moral or Political Views? -- Topsy.com says:

    [...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Regina Mullen, Regina Mullen. Regina Mullen said: RT @VolokhConspirac: http://bit.ly/8iNNu1 > Blasphemy is a NATIONAL SPORT in Ireland, what gives!?! Oh well. [...]

  67. Jon Rowe says:

    Reader Y:

    Religious practices have to be accommodated (within some limits), but general philosophical beliefs don’t.

    Not necessarily. According to Civil Rights Era private anti-discrimination law, yes (and that’s probably not a good thing in my opinion). But 1) according to current Supreme Court caselaw (see Smith) and 2) the original meaning of the First Amendment, religious groups are NOT constitutionally entitled to exemptions from the civil law. They are given at the behest of the government. This is exactly how the Quakers were dealt with. According to the Founding era American political philosophy, secular law trumps religious conviction. Though as classical liberals, the idea was to give religious believers of all stripes as much room under the civil law as possible to freely practice their religion.

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  68. Orin Kerr says:

    Angus, I didn’t suggest you were being a hypocrite, so there is no need to defend yourself against such a claim. I did want to respond to this, though:

    As to whether my snark is misplaced, the point of Ilya’s historical account of persecution was to show that many different types of believer — religious, ideological, atheist — have had their liberty infringed because of what they think. Your response — that ideological thinkers have had their liberty infringed only derivatively because of what they think — doesn’t change the fact that religious believers are not distinct in having been persecuted. So it doesn’t confute any premise in Ilya’s argument at hand and, as a consequence, is a non sequitur.

    No, I don’t think that’s right. I took Ilya to be arguing that there was no reason to treat religion differently because there was no difference in the history. I responded that there was a critical difference in degree, even if not in kind, and that there was also an overlooked difference in who was doing the infringing. You might be of the view that on the whole such differences shouldn’t matter, but I think they were fairly responsive to the post. 

    And if they weren’t responsive, my apologies: Perhaps I just misread the post, which of course sometimes happens.

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  69. Twirip says:

    There are many strong objections to the new Irish law, including the ones noted by the Atheist Ireland leader quoted above.

    Not being Irish, I have no objections to their laws. But in general I support the right of the Irish people, or any people, to make whatever laws they deem best.

    This new law is both silly and dangerous. It is silly because medieval religious laws have no place in a modern secular republic, where the criminal law should protect people and not ideas.

    That is a very mindless argument. Modern secular republics are as dependent on ideas as any medieval kingdom, probably more so.

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  70. ~FR says:

    Obviously, the law could potentially be amended to forbid all speech that is “grossly abusive or insulting” to any moral or political views, whether religious in nature or not. However, no liberal society would even consider that approach, since it would have the effect of chilling public debate across the board. 

    Surely you jest, Prof. Somin! Although that society might lose the appellation ‘liberal’ in the eyes of others, aren’t they just ‘not as advanced,’ or ‘clinging to guns and religion(s)?’ 

    What better way to produce a more ordered society than “to cut the cackle, to damn the heretics and to exterminate the unwanted.” (Gallie– on a related topic.)

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  71. NI says:

    Laura, and Orin, I think the atheist/agnostic distinction depends on whether we are discussing theory or practice.

    I can’t, to an absolute certainty, prove that there is no Santa Claus, no munchkins (the Wizard of Oz variety, not the Dunkin Donuts variety), no unicorns and no Goldilocks and the three bears, so in theory, I am agnostic as to all of them. If pressed, I must acknowledge the possibility that any of them might exist.

    But in practice, I disbelieve things for which there’s no evidence. That, plus belief in Santa, munchkins, etc. would require me to believe things that are directly in conflict with what is known about the physical universe. So in actual practice, I affirmatively disbelieve the existence of all those things.

    That’s my approach to belief in gods too (and the Judeo-Christian one does not get special billing by having his name capitalized). In theory, I can’t dispute the possiblity that any or all of the 10,000 or so deities one religion or another has posited over the years exists. But in practice, there’s no real evidence for it, so I’m no more inclined to believe in deities than I am in unicorns or Goldilocks.

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  72. geokstr says:

    GCA says:
    I rather cynically suspect, without any knowledge of its legislative history, that the blasphemy law passed in Ireland was enacted at the behset of EU political elites to placate Muslims.

    Bingo.

    I suspect we’ll see that, somehow, no doubt possibly more or less totally by coincidence (probably), that the only “blasphemy” that will be prosecuted under this law will be to punish anyone who “offends” the hyper-sensitivities of the practitioners of the Religion of Perpetual Outrage. That’s the way such “crimes” are prosecuted in the UK, and most of Europe, and exactly the same process followed by the kangaroo Human Rights Commissions in Canada. All complaints against Muslims are routinely dismissed despite the hatred of Jews, infidels, gays, Xtianists and anyone else who won’t bow to Allah that pours from the mosques on a daily basis.

    I have a friend who goes to Ireland every year, and has taken Gaelic lessons for 4 years. He confirms that political correctness in favor of Muslims is rampant in that country.

    One only needs to compare the off-the-charts violent reaction of Xtians to “Piss Christ” and the dung-covered statue of Mary to the gentle, rationale rebukes from Muslims for a few mild cartoons to see exactly who it is that would demand such a law as this.

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  73. NI says:

    Going back to the topic of this thread, I think the reason religion gets special treatment is that a person’s religion is, for better or worse, a central part of his essence almost like race or gender, so that in a real sense insulting someone’s religion isn’t that much different than insuling his wife. And I don’t have a problem with that, even as an atheist, so long as the religious don’t start making laws about it.

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  74. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    NI, I suppose that any reduction of a belief system to a verbal description is going to be an oversimplification.

    But I think if we have three words:

    theist
    atheist
    agnostic

    then we can have three general definitions:

    I assert the existence of God
    I assert that there is no God
    I don’t know whether there is a God or not

    and while an individual can and probably will lean one way and then another, at a given point in time it ought to be possible to say that one describes his or her POV better than the other two.

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  75. Twirip says:

    I rather cynically suspect, without any knowledge of its legislative history, that the blasphemy law passed in Ireland was enacted at the behset of EU political elites to placate Muslims.

    I was wondering about that myself. I suspect the aim of this law is to outlaw criticism of all religions beginning with the letter I.

    But that does not alter my view. The Irish have the right to pass whatever dumb laws they like, including this one.

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  76. Angus Lander says:

    Orin,

    I see. I took Ilya’s focusing on the maltreatment suffered by religious and ideological thinkers as evidence that he was making the weaker claim that there is no morally relevant difference in the history. 

    Interpretive quibble aside: I agree (am not quite stuffy enough to deny) that, on a blog post addressing an aspect of the history of thought-persecution, it is perfectly legitimate to comment on the general history of thought-persecution. I think you commit a non sequitur because (as I read it) you couch your historical comments as criticisms of Ilya’s argument. For example, you object to Ilya’s “downplaying the difference between (a) attitudes nearly universally held by members of a society and (b) theories of preferred views announced at a particular time by a particular ruling government,” which would be a sound criticism if Ilya aimed to give a history of how and by whom the relevant groups have been persecuted. In fact, it misses the mark because Ilya aims only to establish that the relevant groups have been persecuted. (Ilya noticed this, incidentally, when he remarked that his post addresses a specifically normative question.)

    This is, in addition, why I thought it odd you have a policy of declining to address moral questions in public; you were booking your (albeit non-moral) comments as criticisms of an ethical post. That you were doing so also suggested to me that your “Oakshottian instinct” had led you to reinterpret Ilya’s post as standing or falling on the basis of empirical considerations alone; hence my recommendation (from a while back) that you temper your empiricism. (The empiricists I know have a tendency to think that most questions — and all legitimate ones — can be answered without recourse to ethics.)

    No doubt tmi.

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  77. ptt says:

    This was awesome. Jumping in to correct someone’s interpretation of a conversation that you weren’t a part of, then, when pressed, claiming “insufficient data to speculate”. Come on, don’t chicken out, Kreskin. Tell us what that guy was really thinking.

    Why don’t you tell us what you think I thought the man was thinking? That would make you a sort of meta-Kreskin. Pretty cool.

    I hope Laura isn’t as pissed as you are. I’ve obviously hit a nerve. If so, it was unintentional. My initial point was that people stop talking about stuff for a variety of reasons, not just because they think they’ve been “trapped” or bested. 

    If I had to chose between the three suggestions I made as to why the man initiated the conversation, I’d pick #1. In my experience, most people who — in the course of a casual conversation with someone they don’t know — resort to saying that other people are “stupid” for having different beliefs or ideas tend to be opinionated oafs. I’ve also run into the second option on this very topic. Sometimes people assume that they’re speaking with a fellow spirit and say what they really think and find themselves in a pickle when the other person turns out to not share the same beliefs. It can be quite awkward. I was kidding with the third possibility, though — again from my experience — attraction to someone seems to increase the likelihood of a conversational misstep.

    Now, back to bending spoons...

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  78. NI says:

    Well, Laura, take those three words and apply them to Santa Claus. You can say:

    1. I believe in SC;
    2. I disbelieve in SC;
    3. I don’t know if SC exists or not.

    Now, as a practical matter, you probably believe 2. However, if pressed, could you say to an absolute 100% certainty that there is no — zero — chance that Santa exists anywhere in the universe?

    The problem with a strict disbelief viewpoint regarding anything is that it’s difficult when not impossible to prove the negative. It’s always possible that maybe Santa really does exist somewhere out there and our frail science just hasn’t picked up on it yet.

    I don’t think the probability for the existence of the Judeo-Christian god is zero, but I think it approaches zero, and is close enough to zero that for all practical purposes it may as well be zero. So in theory, does that make me an atheist or an agnostic?

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  79. Angus Lander says:

    Orin,

    You updated your comment while I was replying to it. Re: whether I was defending myself against a phantom charge of hypocrisy, “if you think I am to be faulted for not posting publicly about these issues, I would hope you at least credit me a little bit for engaging in all of these debates with my real name rather than hiding behind a pseudonym” seems pretty close calling me a hypocrite. the antecedent-clause suggests you have reason to believe I do fault you for not posting publicly (else why raise the prospect?), and it would be pretty (shamelessly) hypocritical for me to do so while hiding behind a pseudonym.

    / tedious casuistry

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  80. Dilan Esper says:

    My attitude about blasphemy is that if you want to believe in stuff that is unsupported by evidence, then you’ve earned the right to hear occasionally that your beliefs are unsupported by evidence. And if you are willing to still believe in it having heard that, more power to you.

    There’s no reason criticizing religion should be any more off limits than criticizing astrology or numerology or fortune telling or homeopathy.

    I think religious believers might be less offended if they realized that they are believing things without evidence and that there’s nothing wrong with other people pointing that out. I hardly think that people who are into astrology get all ticked off at people who point out that it isn’t supported by evidence. They just go on reading their horoscope.

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  81. Orin Kerr says:

    Angus,

    Thanks for your clarification. Your comments make me realize how lucky I am to be a law professor and not a philosophy professor (beyond 3x the salary and no teaching undergrads, that is).

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  82. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Now, as a practical matter, you probably believe 2. However, if pressed, could you say to an absolute 100% certainty that there is no — zero — chance that Santa exists anywhere in the universe?

    If there is a Santa, he lives at the North Pole with a bunch of elves and reindeer. And flies all over the world on Christmas Eve, popping down chimneys to leave gifts for children. I can say with 100% certainty that Santa does not exist in the space/time continuum that I inhabit.

    I don’t think the probability for the existence of the Judeo-Christian god is zero, but I think it approaches zero, and is close enough to zero that for all practical purposes it may as well be zero. So in theory, does that make me an atheist or an agnostic?

    It appears to me that you are coming as close as you can to asserting that there is no J-C god. For the purpose of such a god, that makes you an atheist. IMO.

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  83. pmorem says:

    I am Discordian by faith.

    Among other things, blasphemy is a religious observation.

    Does this mean my religion has been banned in Ireland?

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  84. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    pmorem, your religion should probably be banned everywhere people are trying to have a civilization.

    At least among people over 14 years of age.

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  85. lessinsf says:

    Religion should be questioned with greater scrutiny. People who are religious should be distrusted because they admit their irrationality and lack of reason.

    By definition, religion is faith, i.e. belief without proof. i.e. insanity. People don’t like to be thought insane, though, so they protect and institutionalize their undefendable beliefs by elevating their rediculous notions to some sort of unchallengable status. Modern phrenologists, claiming victim status.

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  86. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    At least we can spell “ridiculous”.

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  87. reic says:

    we should show respect to those religious people, no doubt

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  88. Linus says:

    I hope Laura isn’t as pissed as you are. I’ve obviously hit a nerve.

    Wow, you ARE bad at guessing what other people are thinking. Insufficient data to speculate indeed.

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  89. ptt says:

    Guess so. You’ll have to explain the attitude, then, cuz I certainly can’t imagine why someone who would like Paddington would engage with me in this way.

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  90. Atlanta says:

    Lior:
    So because some religious people are uncivilized, and react inappropriately to ideas they object to, we needs laws restricting the freedom of speech of the non-religious?

    No, we don’t need them, in my view. But we have them in many places. I was pretty clear that I don’t endorse their appropriateness. Personally, I think there are a great many laws we have and could do better without.

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  91. Craig R. Harmon says:

    The law isn’t about being more wrong to attack a person’s religion than to attack one’s secular moral or political views, in my estimation. It is, rather, I think, passed out of fear of one thing and one thing only: Muslim extremists. Not necessarily terrorists but the sort of Muslim who thinks that a fatwa against Salmon Rushdie, saying that killing an author whose work is deemed to blaspheme against Allah or Islam, is both justified by the Koran and so forth and is a call to execute the offending author/speaker as well as to avoid the sort of protests that we saw following the publishing of the cartoons of Mohammad. It is, in short, in my opinion, to keep the peace by providing such people with a legal remedy as an alternative to violence.

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  92. Roger the Shrubber says:

    Think of the bloodiest wars of the last century (World War I, World War II, etc.), all of them fought for secular ideological reasons.

    Not quite. I think WWII is your best case for this claim, and it isn’t a very good case at all.

    As a preliminary matter, non-German fascism leading up to WWII (think Italy, Spain, Croatia, Slovakia) essentially was the political activity of the Catholic Right. 

    In Germany, National Socialism drew heavily upon Nordic and Pagan blood myths. That was somewhat ironic, since Hitler of course was a Roman Catholic, he never repudiated his Catholicism, and indeed prayers were said on his birthday every year, until the very end, upon the order of the Vatican. (Unlike Hitler, who killed millions and millions of innocents while remaining a darling of the Catholic church, Joseph Goebbels was excommunicated from the Catholic church for.... wait for it.... marrying a Protestant.) Fifty percent of the Waffen SS were confessing Catholics. Say what you will about German aggression, but it’s awfully hard to call it secular.

    I take it you don’t actually believe that the Japanese state, with a purportedly divine emperor no less, was motivated in WWII solely or even primarily by “secular ideological reasons.” Did you forget Japan? They played a large role in the war.

    Joseph Stalin (a seminarian, by the way) headed an overtly atheistic state, it is true — but he nevertheless exploited centuries of Russian indoctrination teaching that the head of state was divinely ordained. His power was accordingly buoyed by a Kim Jong Il-ish “cult of personality” that can, in the end, only be considered religious in nature, in that it sought to replace rational thought with faith. 

    No, religion was all over WWII. It emphatically was not fought because people sought to displace faith with rational thought and evidence. On the contrary, it was largely fought for just the opposite reason. Sorry.

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  93. gwinje says:

    Prof. Kerr,

    I ran out of reading time at your 8:28 post, so if this has been covered, sorry.

    I think the point that you (may) have missed in Prof. Somin’s post and comments was that when a given religion has been persecuted, atheists and other secular “enemies” were also persecuted. I can’t think of any large scale atrocity that only targeted members of one religion and not atheists or holders of other unpopular secular ideas. I think his question was why the commonly held view of history as especially vicious to unpopular religions obscures the above stated reality.

    I suspect that the reason is, until the last fifty or sixty years, a large majority of people could be fairly easily classified as “friendly” or “dangerous” based on religion (if only because most everybody had one), and so (as you noted) the “seculars” were more of collateral damage.

    Regarding a 21st century blasphemy law in a western democracy, though, I think Prof. Somin is asking a question you haven’t engaged on its own terms.

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  94. IrishReader says:

    Craig R. Harmon says:

    The law isn’t about being more wrong to attack a person’s religion than to attack one’s secular moral or political views, in my estimation. It is, rather, I think, passed out of fear of one thing and one thing only: Muslim extremists.

    This is simply incorrect. From a theoretical point of view, the new law is constitutionally mandated by Article 40.6.1(i) which states:
    The publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance with law.

    In Corway v Independent Newspapers the Supreme Court found that this was too vague to ground a private prosecution and stated that further legislation was needed to make the constitutional provision operative. The Irish Government therefore claimed that they were under a constitutional obligation with regard to blasphemy when they passed the new Defamation Act. It is open to question why such an Act was not passed previously, and whether the Government intends to enact legislation dealing with other provisions of the Constitution which require enabling legislation, but this is the principle they have claimed to ground it.

    If one were interested in speculation about the practical politics which inspired the provision then the most likely reason is domestic. The current Minister for Justice, Dermot Ahern, is widely regarded as a potential successor to the present Taoiseach (Prime Minister). There is a sizeable section of his party (Fianna Fail) which is based in the west of the country. This section, colloquially referred to as the “country and western” branch, has a strong preference for Catholicism. Enacting a section dealing with blasphemy bolsters Ahern’s credentials with this branch of the party for a potential leadership bid. It has nothing to do with Islam.

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  95. public_defender says:

    I just don’t understand how any thoughtful person can support blasphemy laws. I understand the venal reasons behind them, but they just make no logical sense in a free society. Part of the price of the freedom to practice and preach your own religious bleliefs is that others have the right to explain why you are wrong. Yes, people sometimes get unnecessary hostile and bigoted, but the remedy is twofold: Explaining why they are wrong and socially sanctioning the jerks(you can pick others to interact with).

    And as one of the first posts shows, these laws lead to blasphemy creep. The commentator wants to treat the secular flag of the United States as a religious symbol. The weird thing is that the side of liberty won that battle by only a 5–4 vote. If the nation’s flag is a “sacred” symbol, what other symbols can the government ban us from “desecrating”?

    Conservatives who support such laws should consider how they would be enforced by liberals who strongly support same sex marriage. Also, could the statements of conservative Catholic leaders and lay people about the beliefs of liberal Catholics count as blasphemy? Would it be “insulting” for an American bishop to say that Catholics for Free Choice aren’t relyy Catholic or that supporitng abortion rights is a grave sin? What about the comments of conservative Episcopalians about the liberal leadership? 

    Defend your faith verbally. Take your verbal lumps. That’s the trade off.

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  96. public_defender says:

    And on the other side, liberals should be concerned about whether criticisms of thugs like Akinola and his many American Episcopal followers would be considered “blasphemy” under the “insulting” prong. Sometimes religious people act in a way that deserves to be insulted.

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  97. Sara says:

    Thank you, Irish Reader, very much for the info. I was curious about. 

    Do you care to share your thoughts on the advisability of blasphemy laws, in your country or other western nations?

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  98. Ricardo says:

    Jon Rowe: And yes, I know, sometimes folks’ religion does harm or otherwise affect you. In that instance, instead of turning your metaphorical shotgun on the religion, I think it helps to work out an intellectual construct where people can have their religion, and feel not insulted, but still not be permitted to use their religion to harm. 

    How does this work in practice? If a devout Muslim believes his faith leads him to the conclusion that there ought to be a worldwide Caliphate under Islamic law, those religious beliefs at their very core do harm to me. And as a religious outsider, it’s hardly my place to “work out an intellectual construct” so that this person can have his faith while not subjecting me to Shariah. In this case, that person’s faith is itself a problem for me and it’s not clear how to have a dialogue with such a person without challenging the core tenets of that person’s faith and therefore causing offense. Being offensive isn’t always a bad thing.

    The issue as I see it is that religions are deserving of criticism to the degree to which they attempt to interfere with the rights of those outside the faith, with the rights of children or (in the case of certain cults) with the rights of those in the faith who wish to leave.

    There is more than a bit of hypocrisy involved in simultaneously asserting that religious faith should play a prominent role in politics and occupy a space in the “public sphere” while also trying to exempt it from criticism. That strikes me as a rather cynical ploy. If your religion limits most of its application to members then no problem. But if you use religion to advance a certain political agenda, expect a response that won’t necessarily be completely inoffensive to everyone of that faith.

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  99. sardonic_sob says:

    Laura(southernxyl):
    If there is a Santa, he lives at the North Pole with a bunch of elves and reindeer.And flies all over the world on Christmas Eve, popping down chimneys to leave gifts for children.I can say with 100% certainty that Santa does not exist in the space/time continuum that I inhabit.

    A point of order: You cannot in fact make this assertion, or at least not with any logical or empirical justification. The Santa described in this quotation obviously uses either “magic” or a technology so advanced as to be indistinguishable from “magic.” Once you can introduce the phrase, to borrow from a far more creative prankster than myself, “A wizard did it,” then the discussion is over, because once you allow for the idea that someone can do things which you are per se incapable of understanding, you are not logically justified in assuming that they have to comply with any of your understandings. Santa’s home could be made invisible and intangible to anyone he did not wish to observe or interact with it. He might not be subject to the normal flow of time — or in fact to the laws of causality at all. Etc, etc.

    Essentially, in this case Santa and God collapse to the same problem. 

    S

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  100. Jon Rowe says:

    And as a religious outsider, it’s hardly my place to “work out an intellectual construct” so that this person can have his faith while not subjecting me to Shariah.

    I tried to do it and got positive links from Andrew Sullivan and of all folks religion mocker PZ Meyers for it.

    My Positive Liberty site where I was linked is going through some maintenence. If you want to read a copy of the post, see it here.

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  101. Mark Field says:

    If a devout Muslim believes his faith leads him to the conclusion that there ought to be a worldwide Caliphate under Islamic law, those religious beliefs at their very core do harm to me.

    Those beliefs, to coin a phrase, neither pick your pocket nor break your leg. Now if the devout believer acts upon those beliefs in some harmful way, then, and then only, is it time for you to complain.

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  102. Ricardo says:

    Mark Field: Those beliefs, to coin a phrase, neither pick your pocket nor break your leg. Now if the devout believer acts upon those beliefs in some harmful way, then, and then only, is it time for you to complain. 

    What I meant, which I hope was clear from the context, is that those beliefs are harmful in the same sense that racism or anti-Semitism are harmful. That is, if actually acted upon, those beliefs would indeed cause real harm to people. Now, someone can hold beliefs and not act on them but first, experience shows people do eventually tend to act on their beliefs and second, even if they don’t act on them personally, someone else probably will.

    I’m not sure where you get this principle that the rest of us are supposed to keep quiet about someone’s publicly expressed beliefs until the exact moment they act on them. At least that’s how I interpret your phrase about when “it is time for you to complain.” My point is simply that religion and religious beliefs that implicate the rights of others ought to be subject to the same robust debate that surrounds non-religious beliefs.

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  103. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    sardonic_sob: A point of order: You cannot in fact make this assertion, or at least not with any logical or empirical justification. The Santa described in this quotation obviously uses either “magic” or a technology so advanced as to be indistinguishable from “magic.” Once you can introduce the phrase, to borrow from a far more creative prankster than myself, “A wizard did it,” then the discussion is over, because once you allow for the idea that someone can do things which you are per se incapable of understanding, you are not logically justified in assuming that they have to comply with any of your understandings. Santa’s home could be made invisible and intangible to anyone he did not wish to observe or interact with it. He might not be subject to the normal flow of time — or in fact to the laws of causality at all. Etc, etc.Essentially, in this case Santa and God collapse to the same problem. S 

    SOB, can you point to any documented cases of unexplained gifts appearing under Christmas trees on Christmas Eve?

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  104. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    ptt: Guess so. You’ll have to explain the attitude, then, cuz I certainly can’t imagine why someone who would like Paddington would engage with me in this way. 

    Here’s an explanation.

    When you said that you would not assume that seeing a trap is why that man disengaged, the implication is that he stopped talking to me because I was either unpleasantly aggressive or too stupid to bother having a conversation with.

    This is bolstered by the fact that when I mentioned that that person had initiated the conversation, you backed off, b/c that doesn’t comport with those two possibilities.

    So either you didn’t express yourself well, or your initial comment to me was intentionally rude. There are still a few people around who are offended by gratuitous rudeness.

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  105. resh says:

    “Essentially, in this case Santa and God collapse to the same problem.”

    As evidenced by a few minor parenthetical edits to Sarah’s example:

    “If there is a Santa, (god) he lives at the North Pole (in the skies) with a bunch of elves and reindeer (angels and spirits). And flies all over the world on Christmas Eve, popping down chimneys to leave gifts for children (and all the world).I can say with 100% certainty that Santa (god) does not exist in the space/time continuum that I inhabit.”

    But, I’ll believe nonetheless, just not in Santa.

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  106. IrishReader says:

    Sara says:

    Thank you, Irish Reader, very much for the info. I was curious about. 

    Do you care to share your thoughts on the advisability of blasphemy laws, in your country or other western nations?

    I think the Government are under a constitutional obligation to pass the law but I would support an amendment to remove the reference from the Constitution.

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  107. Ricardo says:

    If I say that Mormonism as originally conceived was a transparent fraud and that Joseph Smith showed all the signs of a successful con man, probably many people would find that an offensive and “blasphemous” statement that perhaps could be illegal in Ireland now. The other thing about that statement though is that it is a perfectly defensible reading of the history of Mormonism and the documentary evidence we have about the founding of that religion.

    Then again, if I said the same thing about Scientology and L. Ron Hubbard, far fewer people would take offense. Why is that? Is it because Mormons make such good neighbors and can be such nice people? Does it come down to certain objectionable practices of the Church of Scientology such as charging large amounts of money for religious reading materials or suing its critics? I’m genuinely curious what people see as the relevant distinction here. I have seen some proposed blasphemy laws that do indeed try to exempt “cults” from being covered by the law but I wonder exactly which “cult-like” characteristic is the one people care about.

    The other point is that there is a very odd asymmetry when the law or the rules of civil discourse allow people to canvass door-to-door advocating a belief system that some people believe is a fraud but does not allow non-believers to say this in public. If people want to convert others to their view of the world, they ought to be able to tolerate criticism of that worldview.

    As John Stuart Mill pointed out, there is a lot of both logic and tradition behind the idea that the truth best emerges through vigorous public debate and the Anglo-American legal system and even the Catholic Church’s procedure for canonizing a saint are based on this principle.

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  108. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    And flies all over the world on Christmas Eve, popping down chimneys to leave gifts for children (and all the world).

    Resh, in whose religion does God do that?

    Are you even aware that lots of people live in homes with no chimneys?

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  109. resh says:

    Hi Laura,

    Popping down chimneys is, of course, a metaphor. Is it so different than popping into souls, or the hearth of men? Parting seas? Walking on water? Intercourse with spiritual virgins? Rising from the dead or reincarnating as a cow?

    Sardonic’s point is compelling: you can’t logically dismiss Santa belief yet accept a god belief if, as is the case, your belief threshold is based on the metaphysical.

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  110. celticdragon says:

    Orca, the Fourth Law of thermodynamics states that the perversity of the Universe strongly tends to the maximum. ;-)

    FTW.

    Well done :)

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  111. liamascorcaigh says:

    This may clarify matters only to make them more obscure:

    Here’s the background. The Irish Constitution (1937) says that blasphemy is an offence that shall be punishable by law. That law currently resides in the 1961 Defamation Act. Because he was repealing this Act, [The Minister for Justice, Dermot] Ahern said he had to pass a new blasphemy law to avoid leaving “a void”.

    But this “void” was already there. In 1999, the Supreme Court found that the 1961 law was unenforceable because it did not define blasphemy. In effect, we have never had an enforceable blasphemy law under the 1937 Constitution. [No blasphemy cases were ever brought before the courts. The Constitutional clause was merely pious window-dressing.]

    After several retreats, Ahern claimed both that he had to propose this law in order to respect the Constitution, and also that he was amending it to “make it virtually impossible to get a successful prosecution”. How is that respecting the Constitution?

    This farrago sounds so Irish that it could have sprung from the fertile mind of Flann O’Brien. Let no one be mistaken: this is NOT about protecting the sanctity of religion. The old Ireland of religious fervor is, to adapt Yeats, “dead and gone, it’s with De Valera in the grave”. Modern Ireland is politically correct to its back teeth and devoid of any contrarian discourse. Apart from Dermot Ahern being a nincompoop — a distinct possibility — the only other reason I can hazard for his idiocy is to pander to the increasing Islamic presence in the Island of Saints and Scholars. As Kevin Myers, the lone voice of sanity in the Irish MSM, said today in the Irish Independent:

    Baptists and Presbyterians, Methodists and Catholics, Jews and Buddhists do not call for blasphemy laws these days. Only Muslims do

    (He left out Anglicans but that’s because they’re so discreet they simply slipped his mind.)

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  112. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Popping down chimneys is, of course, a metaphor.

    That depends on your definition of Santa. If it’s a metaphor, then Santa is simply the spirit of giving, especially to one’s children. How can I not believe in that, having experienced the pleasure of giving to my own child? If it’s not a metaphor, no adult in her right mind believes in Santa. So, no, Sardonic’s point is not compelling.

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  113. TruePath says:

    Well I think the reason it is perceived as more wrong is that people view religion as part of their identify not a view they happen to hold.

    I mean there are plenty of people who call themselves catholics because their parents were catholics even though they. neither go to church nor have ever really thought about religion. It’s not much different in other religions.

    Since people don’t really separate in their own mind the cultural aspects of being raised in a certain religious tradition from belief in the theological postulates it’s not surprising that they confuse criticism of their faith’s beliefs with an attack on their cultural heritage/identify.

    More broadly there are some categories which people feel are part of their identifies and others that aren’t. Religion is such a category moral or philosophical views are not.

    Ohh and the fact that a evolutionary process has ensured that most surviving religions view perpetuation of the faith as an obligation tends to make people take challenges more emotionally.

    Also religion perpetuates an idea of the sacred which is basically a sort of mental purity notion so of course criticism which might be seen as profaning this is taken harshly.

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  114. resh says:

    Laura,

    I enjoyed the exchange. Thanks for your insights.

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  115. Hey Skipper says:

    Laura:

    But I think if we have three words:

    theist
    
atheist
    
agnostic

    then we can have three general definitions:

    I assert the existence of God

    I assert that there is no God

    I don’t know whether there is a God or not

    The problem here is the word you left out: deist Unfortunately (IMHO) English is deficient in its use of the term “atheist”.

    A deist is one who believes in the existence of some supreme being.

    A theist is one who believes a specific theology correctly describes that supreme being.

    An adeist is one who believes there is no such thing as any supreme being.

    An atheist is one who believes all theisms are wrong. (That also means that all theists differ from atheists by precisely one theism.)

    An agnostic is one who considers a question unanswerable.

    Therefore, it is consistent to be both atheist and agnostic: all religions are made up from whole cloth, and all possible assertions about the existence of a supreme being end up being internally contradictory.

    Mark Field:

    Those beliefs, to coin a phrase, neither pick your pocket nor break your leg. Now if the devout believer acts upon those beliefs in some harmful way, then, and then only, is it time for you to complain.

    Hardly. If a religion makes an absolutist claim, it makes that claim upon everyone, believer or not. What you have done is to carve out a space for a particular type of belief system that gets to make unchallenged claims upon all other beliefs. So long as religions make material claims from immaterial bases, then they deserve critical inspection from everyone upon whom those claims are invoked, regardless of whether the claimants have had a chance to impose them.

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  116. Bill Poser says:

    I suspect that the reason that people tend to be so sensitive about their religious views is that, to anyone not indoctrinated as a child, most religions require belief in things that no rational person would give much credence. Since people can’t defend their religious views on rational, empirical grounds, they try to prevent criticism from being aired in the first place.

    While people’s political views may also contain irrational elements, the premises are generally not as crazy as the fantasies that underlie most religions. For example, while generally agreeing with libertarian views on civil liberties, I consider libertarians naive in underestimating the danger of non-governmental power. However, this foolish (in my estimation) belief of libertarians is not nearly as crazy as the belief that 2000 years ago a virgin gave birth to a child or that there is a benevolent personal god. Most libertarians will probably return the compliment: that is, they will probably agree that my view that corporate power is a danger that needs to be controlled, while (in their estimation) foolish, is not nearly as nutty as many religious beliefs such as those mentioned above.

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  117. Brian says:

    My understanding is that in the US, one can get conscientious objector status on the basis of religious views, but not on the basis of non-religious moral views about the evil of violence or war or whatever. Why isn’t that a violation of the Establishment Clause?

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  118. ptt says:

    Laura(southernxyl):
    Here’s an explanation. When you said that you would not assume that seeing a trap is why that man disengaged, the implication is that he stopped talking to me because I was either unpleasantly aggressive or too stupid to bother having a conversation with.

    I realize that my single-sentence comment could be interpreted that way, but that was not my intent. My subsequent posts list possible reasons for the disengagement, none of which reflect poorly on you.

    This is bolstered by the fact that when I mentioned that that person had initiated the conversation, you backed off, b/c that doesn’t comport with those two possibilities. 

    Unless you are also posting as “Linus”, you haven’t responded to anything I posted until this last post of yours. The detail about who initiated the conversation was part of your initial post on the conversation and, frankly, lead me to put my “oaf” possibility first. In my experience, people who start conversations about religion with strangers and hold views that their opponents are “stupid” or “sinful” are opinionated oafs. 

    I did not and, in fact, cannot “back-off” an implication I did not intentionally make.

    So either you didn’t express yourself well, or your initial comment to me was intentionally rude.

    If, at this point, you still think there’s an either/or question here, I’m sorry.

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  119. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    I realize that my single-sentence comment could be interpreted that way, but that was not my intent.

    OK, I will take that at face value.

    Unless you are also posting as “Linus”

    I have never posted as anyone but myself.

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  120. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    He wasn’t a stranger, by the way, he was a coworker. I became his supervisor, but I don’t remember whether that was before or after this conversation. He blurted out that he couldn’t understand how an intelligent person could believe in something whose existence she couldn’t perceive with the five senses, which is what led me to ask if he believed in the existence of oxygen.

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  121. Mark Field says:

    I’m not sure where you get this principle that the rest of us are supposed to keep quiet about someone’s publicly expressed beliefs until the exact moment they act on them.

    I got it from Thomas Jefferson. However, I completely agree with you that religion ought to be the subject of robust debate and in no way immune from the same standards which apply to other beliefs.

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  122. readery says:

    Brian says:
    My understanding is that in the US, one can get conscientious objector status on the basis of religious views, but not on the basis of non-religious moral views about the evil of violence or war or whatever. Why isn’t that a violation of the Establishment Clause?

    Because the Establishment Clause — which prohibits the establishment of religious beliefs, but not moral or philosophical beliefs — does not violate the Establishment Clause.

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  123. readery says:

    Plus, there’s a Free Exercise Clause which also treats religious beliefs differently from non-religious philosophies, but doesn’t violate the Establishment Clause either, just as the Establishment Clause doesn’t violate it.

    If you interpret one clause of the Constitution in a manner that would make the other clause unconstitutional, something is wrong with your interpretation. The two have to be harmonized in some fashion.

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  124. yankee says:

    I haven’t read the whole thread above, but one thing I would point to is that there’s a lot more to religion than ideology. Religion is tied in with ethnicity, customs, tradition, and a sense of group identity to a much greater extent than secular ideologies are. You cannot be born a neoconservative, but it is hard to become a Jew other than by being born one.

    Even with more ideological religions like Christianity or Islam, people refer to (and think of) small children as Christians or Muslims merely because their parents are Christians or Muslims and take them to services. The fact that the children are too young to understand any religious ideology doesn’t keep people from thinking of them as members of the religion. Ceasing to be a member of the religion, after having been born one, takes an affirmative act of renunciation.

    It also doesn’t take a high degree of belief in religious ideology to be an active member of a religion. People who attend services regularly, sing in the choir, organize auctions and bake sales, and otherwise participate in the life of the church (or other religious institution) often do so for social/community/cultural reasons, rather than due to a strong level of belief in the religion’s ideology. 

    In other words, there is much more to religion than ideology.

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  125. Brian says:

    First, I used the locution “my understanding” because I have not studied the matter, so for all I know some individual(s) with firmly grounded yet non-religious beliefs contra war have been granted conscientious objector status. But under the assumption that that’s not the case, I don’t think readery’s 2 answers advance above the ball.

    First, the Supreme Court, rightly or wrongly, has interpreted the Establishment Clause broadly, significantly beyond prohibiting any literal state establishment of a church, or favoring concrete religious v. secular institutions. E.g., School prayer & school funding cases, which bar the State from privileging religious over secular people, ideas or institutions. In the present matter, we have two individuals, both identical with regard to their firmly grounded moral objection to participation in war. The one bases this objection on religion, the other based upon a secular philosophy. The former get conscious objector status because of the religious basis; the later fails to get objector status, precisely for the lack of such a religious basis. This seems to be “respecting an establishment of religion” within the meaning of the Establishment Clause, under current jurisprudence. (I think your 1st post in reply to mine was cryptic or nonsensical.)

    Second, privileging religion — by allowing only religious individuals objector status — is not required by

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  126. Brian says:

    First, I used the locution “my understanding” because I have not studied the matter, so for all I know some individual(s) with firmly grounded yet non-religious beliefs contra war have been granted conscientious objector status. But under the assumption that that’s not the case, I don’t think readery’s 2 answers advance above the ball.

    First, the Supreme Court, rightly or wrongly, has interpreted the Establishment Clause broadly, significantly beyond prohibiting any literal State establishment of a church, or State favoring of concrete religious v. secular institutions. E.g., School prayer & school funding cases, which bar the State from privileging religious over secular people, ideas or institutions. 

    In the present matter, we have two individuals, both identical with regard to their firmly grounded moral objection to participation in war. The one bases this objection on religion, the other bases it upon a secular philosophy. The former gets conscious objector status because of the religious basis; the later fails to get objector status, precisely for the lack of such a religious basis. This seems to be “respecting an establishment of religion” within the meaning of the Establishment Clause, under current jurisprudence. (I think your 1st post in reply to mine was cryptic or nonsensical.)

    Second, privileging religion — by allowing only religious individuals to get objector status — is not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Employment Division of Oregon v Smith (1990), held (in the context of criminal law) that generally applicable laws, which incidentally burden religious people or institutions, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. A law requiring certain individuals to serve in the military “burdens” the morally objecting theist or secularist alike, and present Supreme Court jurisprudence does not mandate a carve-out from that burden favoring only religious objectors.

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  127. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Brian, but that’s not how the free exercise clause is generally applied here.

    For instance, in a school system that prohibits headgear, Muslim girls must be allowed to wear the hijab.

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  128. Craig R. Harmon says:

    I, too, thank IrishReader, for straightening me out. Far from the first time I’ve been wrong.

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  129. SW says:

    That’s not true in the military, Laura. 

    And I believe you’re not a lawyer but I would like to see a case re the hajib being exempted from a school dress code under the Constitution (ie., not a statute).

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  130. geokstr says:

    Laura and Craig: 

    We’ll see if IrishReader or those who believe that this law was passed out of PC to mollify Muslims was correct once the first prosecutions occur under this law. I think we will discover that IrishReader is mistaken, but will be happy to admit I’m wrong if this law is applied evenhandedly to all blasphemers.

    I’ve closely followed the remorseless, implaccable march of Islam all over the world for the last several years, through violence, intimidation and lawfare, and I doubt very much I’ll have to admit to being wrong about this.

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  131. Ricardo says:

    SW: That’s not true in the military, Laura. 

    And I believe you’re not a lawyer but I would like to see a case re the hajib being exempted from a school dress code under the Constitution (ie., not a statute). 

    Indeed, I am also not a lawyer but I believe Employment Division v. Smith pretty much did away with the idea that there is a constitutional obligation to give religions special exemptions from neutral, secular laws. Legislatures are free to provide for religious exemptions within the statute but there is no constitutional obligation to do so.

    I doubt a French-style law banning all religious imagery in public schools would survive a First Amendment challenge since such a law specifically targets religious expression. On the other hand, my understanding is that if the government can meet a certain burden in showing it has a legitimate interest in banning hats and other head coverings, it could well be constitutional.

    My googling shows that the 3rd circuit did indeed rule that a female Muslim police officer was not entitled to a constitutional exemption from the Philadelphia Police Department’s uniform requirements because she wanted to wear a headscarf while on duty.

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  132. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    The thing about public school that is different from the military, police departments, and a whole lot of other stuff, is that most or all states make people satisfy them that their kids are being educated. You may homeschool, you may private school, but the default if you are not doing those things is public school. Since the state is making the kids be there, IMO it can’t make them not express their religions. (But IANAL.) Whereas no one has to join the military or take a particular job.

    Here is the case I was thinking of.

    The case was settled. Here is the consent order.

    Nashala Hearn shall be permitted to wear a hijab while a student in Muskogee Public Schools effective immediately. Such hijab shall cover the hair, neck and ears of the student, but not her face.
    Nashala Hearn shall otherwise comply with the School District’s dress codes, including the uniform requirements at the Muskogee Seventh and Eighth Grade Center, as they exist at the time of the execution of this agreement.

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  133. Randy says:

    “I rather cynically suspect, without any knowledge of its legislative history, that the blasphemy law passed in Ireland was enacted at the behset of EU political elites to placate Muslims.”

    Possibly. Or it could be a ploy by the Catholic Church to stop people from looking into it’s abuse of boys in the orphanages over the last five or so decades.

    But I think it’s neither. Rather, it is an attempt to regain a sense of the Victorian in daily life. “When I think that our parents can prevent us from ever marrying, my sweet, I think that it can only be an evil God who would keep us apart.” “Don’t say that, my darling! That’s, that’s .... blasphemy!”

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  134. Aultimer says:

    Laura(southernxyl): It appears to me that you are coming as close as you can to asserting that there is no J-C god. For the purpose of such a god, that makes you an atheist. IMO. 

    Of course, this is the mischief with discussing athiesm and agnosticism with Christians (“Judeo-Christian” is meaningless in this context, as Jews don’t condemn non-believers). 

    Most non-thiests don’t consider the trinitarian deity to be a special case, but Christians do. Christians (excluding the non-creedal micro-minority) also fail to realize that their belief system is most like the conservative Muslims, and very different from the Jews, Buddhists, Hindus and essentially everyone else in terms of required “belief”.

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  135. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Aultimer, you’re reading a bunch into what I said that I didn’t put there.

    When I said “for the purpose of the judeo-christian god” I meant “not for the purpose of pantheism or something like that” since when NI said

    I don’t think the probability for the existence of the Judeo-Christian god is zero, but I think it approaches zero, and is close enough to zero that for all practical purposes it may as well be zero. So in theory, does that make me an atheist or an agnostic?

    that is the only god he was discussing.

    Also, three nits:

    It’s atheist, not athiest; the etymology of the word was gone into on this thread.

    Your assertion that Jews don’t condemn non-believers is not really relevant. To call someone an atheist is not a condemnation; if he says he is of the opinion that there is no god, it is a statement of fact.

    And I don’t appreciate people who don’t know me telling me what I don’t know. “Christians fail to realize...”. Christians realize all kinds of things.

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  136. readery says:

    Indeed, I am also not a lawyer but I believe Employment Division v. Smith pretty much did away with the idea that there is a constitutional obligation to give religions special exemptions from neutral, secular laws.

    But the 3rd Circuit case Police v. City of Newark (written by then-Judge, now-Justice Alito) suggests that genuinely neutral secular laws are hard to come by. In that case, the City of Newark exempted police offers with medical conditions from a prohibition on wearing beards, but did not exempt people on religious grounds. The 3rd Circuit held the law was not genuinely general — if a law permits exceptions for medical conditions (or for essentially anything else), then the law is not ‘general’, Smith doesn’t apply, and the Free Exercise requires also exempting religious belief.

    Laws that don’t contain exemptions for medical conditions, emergencies, and similar are few.

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  137. readery says:

    It’s worth noting that the 7th Circuit has joined the Police v. Newark framework;

    As we explained in Saints Constantine & Helen Greek
    Orthodox Church v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 897
    (7th Cir. 2005), that section of the Act “codifies Sherbert v.
    Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),” which Boerne v. Flores “reaffirmed
    . . . insofar as [Sherbert] holds that a state that has a
    system for granting individual exemptions from a general
    rule must have a compelling reason to deny a religious
    group an exemption that is sought on the basis of hardship
    or, in the language of the present Act, of ‘a substantial
    burden on . . . religious exercise.’

    If you’re in the business of granting exceptions to anyone, you’ve got to also grant exceptions to religion. World Outreach Conference Center v. City of Chicago, No. 08–4167 (7th Cir. C.A., Dec. 30, 2009), The case held that since zoning boards are empowered to grant waivers, Chicago’s zoning laws are not laws of general applicability — so Smith doesn’t apply.

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  138. Dilan Esper says:

    It appears to me that you are coming as close as you can to asserting that there is no J-C god. For the purpose of such a god, that makes you an atheist. IMO. 

    This is interesting because this is a point that atheists and agnostics often make. Believers are atheists too– they reject every other religion but their own. Everyone is in the business of denying that gods exist, including believers, so they shouldn’t get their panties in a wad when other people deny that their gods exist.

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  139. Aultimer says:

    Laura(southernxyl): And I don’t appreciate people who don’t know me telling me what I don’t know. “Christians fail to realize...”. Christians realize all kinds of things. 

    No offense intended. You seem to be missing the problem in stating that one can be atheist in relation to ONE conception of deity. Atheism, by definition, requires rejection of Buddhist theism AND rejection of Christian theism. I took NI to be making a similar point with his question — other conceptions of deity don’t fit the definitions being used above very well.

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  140. Aultimer says:

    Dilan Esper: It appears to me that you are coming as close as you can to asserting that there is no J-C god. For the purpose of such a god, that makes you an atheist. IMO. This is interesting because this is a point that atheists and agnostics often make. Believers are atheists too– they reject every other religion but their own. Everyone is in the business of denying that gods exist, including believers, so they shouldn’t get their panties in a wad when other people deny that their gods exist. 

    You’re confusing creed and religion. Some religions don’t claim to be solely correct, and it isn’t just the small Quaker and Unitarian-Universalist groups. Non-dogmatic Buddhists fall into that camp. In addition, not everyone in a pew is 100% in agreement with the dogma.

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  141. Dilan Esper says:

    You’re confusing creed and religion. Some religions don’t claim to be solely correct, and it isn’t just the small Quaker and Unitarian-Universalist groups. Non-dogmatic Buddhists fall into that camp. In addition, not everyone in a pew is 100% in agreement with the dogma.

    I suspect, however, that just about every Christian, for instance, denies the existence of the Roman or Greek pantheon of Gods.

    I don’t think there’s anyone who doesn’t deny the existence of SOME gods. So why is denying the existence of ANY god any different in terms of causing offense?

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  142. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Look back at the Irish law as quoted above.

    It defines blasphemy as “publishing or uttering matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters sacred by any religion...”

    Statement 1: “I believe in the Trinity and therefore I do not worship Ganesh and Kali, etc.”

    Not illegal.

    Statement 2: “X belief is stupid and immoral, and you are an idiot for believing it”.

    Illegal.

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  143. Dilan Esper says:

    Laura:

    How about the following statements:

    “Jews are damned to hell because they rejected their Savior”

    “Mormonism is an un-Christian fraud perpetrated by a false prophet”

    “Islam is a violent, murderous cult which sponsors and encourages suicide bombings”

    “Scientology isn’t a religion, it’s a tax dodge”

    “Atheists are by their very nature immoral, because it is impossible to have moral guidance if you do not worship God”

    “Orthodox Judaism imposes medieval rules that oppress women”

    “Theism is wishful thinking and a fantasy that is outdated and has been overtaken by scientific discovery, and only uncritical simpletons still adhere to it”

    Which of the foregoing statements, if any, violate this law?

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  144. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Dilan, do you think I am defending the Irish law?

    I’m merely pointing out that disagreeing with another person’s religion does not violate it.

    You can express atheism all day long without triggering this law.

    If your problem is that people can be nasty about atheism without triggering it, I’m not disagreeing with you.

    I wish people in general did not feel the need to slam each other. Isn’t it enough to speak for yourself?

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  145. Dilan Esper says:

    Laura, I come at this from the other perspective. I want to maximize people’s ability to “slam” each other. Not because I think pure insults do much good, but because (1) the right to insult people is an important freedom, especially since regulations on insults can chill legitimate speech, and (2) because there’s no reason, as Prof. Somin says, to give religion a free pass when it comes to the marketplace of ideas.

    I merely gave the examples I did because I don’t think the limitation to abuse or insult actually narrows the statute in a concrete manner. All of those statements could be construed as insults, or as factual charges.

    The bottom line is we would all be better off if religious ideas were subjected to exactly the same scrutiny as any other ideas. And I might add that I don’t think this would necessarily result in a world of non-believers either– plenty of people, for instance, believe in astrology, ghosts, past lives, etc., despite the fact that those ideas are unsupported by evidence and are, unlike at least traditionally accepted religions, not immune from criticism in polite society.

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  146. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    (1) the right to insult people is an important freedom

    We will have to agree to disagree on this one.

    Tell me about a time when somebody irritated you by being rude and insulting, and it accomplished anything at all worthwhile (besides alerting you that that person was a jerk).

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  147. Forrest Gump says:

    Laura(southernxyl): We will have to agree to disagree on this one.Tell me about a time when somebody irritated you by being rude and insulting, and it accomplished anything at all worthwhile (besides alerting you that that person was a jerk). 

    There was the time the (hippies/clinic protesters) called me a “baby-killer” and spat on me. That accomplished the worthwhile end of saving the life of the (Vietnamese soldier / baby in my girlfriend’s womb) that I didn’t kill, upon reconsidering my course of action.

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  148. Dilan Esper says:

    Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, written by Rehnquist of all people, contains a pretty good defense of the importance of protecting insults. Political cartoonists, for instance, basically trade frequently in the realm of insult.

    Bottom line, insult can be a particularly effective form of expression in certain circumstances, even if it hurts the feelings of the person being insulted.

    I would add one other thing– in the grand scheme of things, avoiding hurt feelings isn’t very important. The best cure for hurt feelings is a thicker skin. Certainly better than the government telling other people that they can’t say things.

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  149. readery says:

    This is interesting because this is a point that atheists and agnostics often make. Believers are atheists too– they reject every other religion but their own. Everyone is in the business of denying that gods exist, including believers, so they shouldn’t get their panties in a wad when other people deny that their gods exist.

    Are people who reject the theory of phlostigon or aether — that is, who reject every scientific theory except the ones not rejected — thereby anti-science or ascientific? 

    If so, then it would follow that all scientists are ascientific.

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  150. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Bottom line, insult can be a particularly effective form of expression in certain circumstances, even if it hurts the feelings of the person being insulted.

    Can you give me an example?

    Here are some things that insult can achieve.

    1 — The perpetrator gets some kind of catharsis.
    2 — The person on the receiving end will now be damned if she’ll consider the perp’s point of view, whereas she might have if he’d been more courteous in his expression.
    3 — Onlookers will probably conclude that the perp is a jerk, except his friends, who will encourage him with “I guess you told her!” and things of that nature. But may secretly think he’s a jerk anyway.

    What am I missing?

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  151. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Also, regarding thick skin:

    Thick skin is not sensitive.

    So if, for instance, you have a friend or spouse who you want to have tender feelings toward you, you have to protect that by not being ugly all the time and forcing that person to become thick-skinned. Even among people who are not your friend or spouse, if you keep hurting their feelings, they’ll be forced to adopt a cold and uncaring attitude toward you out of self-defense. When do you see that as being an advantage?

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  152. Dilan Esper says:

    Are people who reject the theory of phlostigon or aether — that is, who reject every scientific theory except the ones not rejected — thereby anti-science or ascientific? 

    No, because they reject those theories on the basis of scientific reasoning.

    That said, you miss the point. The point is that everyone denies the existence of Gods, but lots of religious people don’t want to hear anyone deny the existence of their own God while retaining the right to deny the existence of other Gods. It’s pure special pleading.

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  153. Dilan Esper says:

    What am I missing?

    Read Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. Essentially, that JUSTIFIED insult can be a very persuasive means of expression, and can expose people DESERVING of ridicule to ridicule.

    So if, for instance, you have a friend or spouse who you want to have tender feelings toward you, you have to protect that by not being ugly all the time and forcing that person to become thick-skinned.

    But that’s the difference between the moral duties one has in interpersonal communication, and public discourse.

    For instance, certainly, there’s no reason for anyone to, say, call Bill Clinton a no-good philanderer at a social dinner with the Clintons. But I have no problem with anyone saying it on MSNBC or Fos News.

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  154. Baz says:

    A short film detailing the history and context of the Irish Blasphemy Legislation. http://blasphemy-law-ireland.blogspot.com/2010/01/everybody-knows-what-blasphemy-is-short.html

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  155. Dilan Esper says:

    Laura:

    A nice example of insult that had great value as political expression:

    “Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.”

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  156. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Dilan, I would put that in the category of an ugly putdown that had nothing of value to communicate.

    Quayle: Three times that I’ve had this question — and I will try to answer it again for you, as clearly as I can, because the question you’re asking is, “What kind of qualifications does Dan Quayle have to be president,” “What kind of qualifications do I have,” and “What would I do in this kind of a situation?” And what would I do in this situation? [...] I have far more experience than many others that sought the office of vice president of this country. I have as much experience in the Congress as Jack Kennedy did when he sought the presidency. I will be prepared to deal with the people in the Bush administration, if that unfortunate event would ever occur.
    Judy Woodruff: Senator [Bentsen]?
    Bentsen: Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy, I knew Jack Kennedy, Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy. 

    How nasty that was. What did Bentsen accomplish, except to reveal himself to be a jackass? He certainly didn’t win the election.

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  157. Dilan Esper says:

    How nasty that was. What did Bentsen accomplish, except to reveal himself to be a jackass?

    Bentsen served a distinguished career in the Senate, and then went on to be Treasury Secretary in the Clinton Administration. He died with bipartisan acclaim that he had a great record of public service. Nobody, to my knowledge, called him a jackass.

    Dan Quayle became a national joke and served four totally undistinguished years as Vice President. After leaving that office, he has been completely unable to restart his political career (despite being liked by many conservatives) because he proved himself to be manifestly intellectually underequipped for office. He has faded into obscurity.

    So just on that level alone, I think Bentsen had the last laugh.

    But more generally, you are just wrong. Quayle WAS unqualified and not up to the job, and Bentsen’s put-down– and Quayle’s blubbering response– became the perfect symbol of this. Indeed, one of the amazing things about the unreality that conservatives live in is they are making the same mistake again with Sarah Palin.

    Bentsen’s put-down is one of the greatest and most devastatingly effective political arguments made in my lifetime– and it had the additional aspect of being absolutely true and justified. That insult made the case against Dan Quayle better than any speech could have, and it will (thankfully) ensure that Mr. Quayle will never hold a position of power again.

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  158. Laura(southernxyl) says:

    Nobody, to my knowledge, called him a jackass.

    Dan Quayle became a national joke 

    You are revealing your political bias here. Plenty of people called Bentsen a jackass. You approve of Bentsen’s churlishness because it confirms your bias. 

    Not everybody thinks JFK was all that, anyway.

    Once again, this was said in the context of a vice presidential debate and Bentsen and his running mate lost that election. So it was not effective, except for people who enjoy seeing other people talked to rudely.

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  159. Dilan Esper says:

    Laura:

    Political bias? We are talking about the vast majority of Americans who believed Quayle was a joke.

    For your information, the majority of Americans are not conservatives. They don’t like Quayle, and they don’t like Palin. For some reason a certain anti-intellectual streak in conservative politics works in these folks’ favor, but they are, in fact, national jokes.

    And by the way, I believe if you go back and look, you will find that Pat Buchanan and a number of other right-wing pundits admitted in 1988 that Bentsen’s insult was a political masterstroke.

    As for JFK, I don’t think he was all that. I think he was tremendously overrated. I wouldn’t deny, however, that the polls show that lots of people think he was, in fact, all that.

    As for Dukakis losing the election, every political analyst in America, including conservative ones, said that was due to problems at the top of the ticket.

    Bottom line– Dan Quayle was one of the biggest imbeciles to ever run for national office. And Bentsen, by pointed that out, offended a few extremist wingnut conservatives who think imbeciles are really the brilliant ones, while pointing out what the vast majority of Americans felt about Quayle anyway.

    And it was just a great insult. If it hurt Quayle’s feelings, all the better.

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