More Airport Security Tradeoffs

Last week, I wrote about several underappreciated tradeoffs in airport security policy. Here’s another one: TSA screeners, like the rest of us, have only limited time and attention span. The more these finite resources are devoted to “security theater” procedures that have little or no value, the less of it there is available to focus on genuine potential threats. Jonathan Adler recounts that the TSA failed to check some liquids that he brought on board on a recent flight. This doesn’t surprise me. Both anecdotal and systematic evidence show that TSA personnel often miss much more dangerous prohibited items such as knives and boxcutters, even in cases where the passenger in question was not deliberately trying to hide them. This is at least in part a result of the diversion of time and effort to security theater tasks, such as ensuring that every passenger takes off their shoes and the like. A screener who is checking up on people’s shoes can’t simultaneously focus on genuine dangers, or at least can’t do it as effectively as he could if his attention were undivided. Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem that the TSA is giving such tradeoffs the attention they deserve or that its political masters in Congress and the administration are putting much pressure on the agency to do so. I suspect that perverse political incentives are at least a part of the reason for these failures.

On a tangentially related note, I thought I’d point out that Hollywood screenwriter David Steinberg, whose op ed on airport security Jonathan links, is a former clerk for Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith – the same judge that co-blogger Todd Zywicki and I clerked for (as did guest-blogger Hanah Volokh). No other blog gives you as much Smith clerk-authored material as the VC! It’s also interesting to note that Judge Smith has at least eight former clerks who have become lawprofs (counting Colorado Supreme Court Justice Allison Eid, who is the former Dean of the University of Colorado Law School [correction: actually just a former professor]), which is a high number for a right of center judge who is not an academic himself.

Categories: War on Terror    

    27 Comments

    1. Craig says:

      Great points Ilya. With the hardened cockpit doors, are boxcutters and knives a serious threat for which the TSA was established? In order to maximize the effort, I believe that screeners should be looking for means to breach the integrity of the aircraft – this means bombs and guns. Knives can be dangerous, but in a criminal way. Someone with a knife will not turn an airplane into a cruise missile or into debris showering the city of Detroit. Passengers will not allow a knife-wielding individual to take over an aircraft – this is the best counter-terrorism measure available, that is, that people refuse to be terrorized. If a search is focused on the singular issue of terror, then it is easier not to be distracted, but screeners have suffered from mission creep, that is, they now look for excess sums of money, drugs, Megan’s Law issues, and more. Although it is an opportune time to conduct a search since the government has a “captive” audience, 4th Amendment questions would be eased should TSA decide that its true purpose is to prevent terrorism.

    2. Soronel Haetir says:

      I would argue now that knives aren’t a particularly dangerous item on airplanes. They were only dangerous on 9-11 due to assumptions about terrorist motives that no longer apply.

      A stabbing on a plane is a tragedy but does not risk any greater consequences.

    3. sk says:

      “pocketknives, matches from hotels in Beirut and Peshawar, dust masks, lengths of rope, cigarette lighters, nail clippers, eight-ounce tubes of toothpaste (in my front pocket), bottles of Fiji Water (which is foreign), and, of course, box cutters [the weapons used by the 9/11 hijackers]”

      If you change your perspective, and treat the above items as not especially dangerous (I think, post 9/11, one guy with a swiss army knife is no longer a threat), is your argument still valid?

      Because, frankly, an argument based on the premise that swiss army knives, cigarette lighters, and nail clippers are ‘dangerous’ seems specious to me.

      Sk

    4. SW says:

      I think you have to consider that people who are trying to hide something look suspicious and make more mistakes, while people who are not, don’t.

      In addition, as Craig says, general public knowledge is the best weapon, if others know the items terrorists use, they can report them or watch more carefully and they reinforced this knowledge by just going through the line themselves.

      And while, Soronel makes a good point, multiple knives by multiple assailants could be a problem: wouldn’t it be somewhat terrorizing, to open the cabin door to find everyone (or allot of people) stabbed to death.

    5. common_sense says:

      If knives are no longer an issue, then I should be allowed to take the pocket knife on my key chain on the plane. TSA can either allow knives and ignore them, or prohibit them and confiscate them. If TSA says we cannot take knives on planes because they are dangerous, then it is a security failure to allow them on the plane.

    6. CheckEnclosed says:

      The first posters have basically nailed it: If it isn’t something that can cause an airplane to crash, killing all on board, then it should not be a focus of TSA searches. That means, essentially, bombs and guns (or really sophisticated electronic jamming gear or poison gas deliver systems.)

      So long as airline crews know that they should never open the cockpit door in response to activity by bad guys, we don’t need to worry about any less lethal weapons. This is why it is a bad idea to let pilots carry firearms — it can give them the idea that it is proper to open the door & go shoot it out.

      This is not to say that TSA should never ban other dangerous items, like edged weapons, but that it doesn’t have to get eye-strain looking for knitting needles and corkscrews.

    7. Rogersp says:

      …the primary occupation of TSA “screeners” is searching the person and property of millions of innocent travelers– in direct violation of the 4th Amendment. Perhaps a sharp reduction in that activity might free some TSA manpower for more efficient and legal pursuits.

      What could ever constitute an ‘unreasonable’ 4th Amendment passenger search under current de facto Federal rules at airports ??

    8. jccamp says:

      This may be off-point, but I’m would not agree that edged weapons are no longer a deadly threat. In practice, terrorists would seize, say, females and/or minor children and cut their throats, murdering them in full view of the passengers and crew. They would threaten to kill more if they did not receive immediate full compliance. At the same time, they might loudly promise safety for all and a quick landing if they receive no resistance. It would take a hard crew and mentally tough passengers to continue fighting at this point, even if there was a suspicion the plane was intended as a cruise missile.

      Box cutters and the like remain terribly effective terrorist tools on aircraft. Their use takes advantage of the human psychological desire not to believe the worst.

      Sorry for diverging, but I didn’t want the assumption to remain unchallenged that only explosives or incendiaries represent a significant threat.

    9. pc says:

      In practice, terrorists would seize, say, females and/or minor children and cut their throats, murdering them in full view of the passengers and crew. They would threaten to kill more if they did not receive immediate full compliance.

      The terrorist would (maybe) get to kill one person. After that he would be ripped apart by passengers. The default assumption prior to 9/11 was that terrorists would let people live if the people acquiesced to the terrorist’s demands. The default assumption now is that *everyone* on the plane is dead if they listen to the terrorist.

      Knives or box cutters won’t work anymore.

    10. jccamp says:

      That’s a dangerous assumption.

    11. lgm says:

      Two points:

      1. What you call “security theater” seems to work. Air travelers are not killed by terrorists, despite the hordes of evil doers who want to kill us because they hate our freedoms. Even the theatrical parts of screening can deter would be terrorists, who don’t seem to be very bright — unable to light fuses.

      2. The “perverse incentives”, as pointed out by Yglesias, fall mainly on conservatives. Successful terrorism helps them politically and hurts Democrats.

    12. Sara says:

      The terrorist would (maybe) get to kill one person.

      But with sharp blades, the MO is multiple terrorists not one.

    13. Buddy Hinton says:

      As far as planes as cruise missiles go, security should be focussed on:

      (i) quickly detecting a hijacking;

      (ii) taking remote control of the plane when one happens;

      and

      (iii) publicizing that this has indeed happened so the terrorists and potential terrorists know it.

      After this happens, focus can be put on bomb detection, and more specifically on bombs that really can bring down the plane. Or, even better yet than spending money on anti-bombs, just don’t worry about low frequency, high consequence events at all and just buy the poor people of the USA some decent healthcare or lower taxes or pay down the deficit or whatevs. The TSA is just a giant class-upwards transfer payment anyway (which may explain why certain people favor it). If the people who fly a lot crave security, then let them pay for it.

      Remember, with bombs, the FAA can always deny it was a terrorist attack anyway and chalk it up to turbulence or improperly packed cargo or or the pilot reacting improperly to a stall or whatever so that nobody stops flying.

    14. jccamp says:

      “Even the theatrical parts of screening can deter some would be terrorists, who sometimes don’t seem to be very bright…”

      Now I would agree completely.

    15. sbron says:

      I think Libertarians, with their belief that the entire world has a right to enter the US are as much to blame for this idiocy as anyone. Wasn’t Abdul Mutallab just trying to be a willing worker for a willing employer (to the Libertarians), and wasn’t he just trying to bring the gift of diversity to the US (to the multicultis)? Mutallab could not have boarded the plane if he had not been issued a multi-entry visa during the Bush administration in the first place.

    16. Chem_geek says:

      Perfect is the enemy of good enough.

      However, I would rather like to see Libertarian Air, where the people who’ve been whining about “security theater” get to run their own security program. It’d be interesting to see a.) how many pax it actually gets with the apparent slogan of “No screening, just profiling!” and b.) how rapidly its aircraft turn into smoking craters in the ground.

    17. John Moore says:

      Remember, with bombs, the FAA can always deny it was a terrorist attack anyway and chalk it up to turbulence or improperly packed cargo or or the pilot reacting improperly to a stall or whatever so that nobody stops flying.

      Nonsense. The FAA is not the investigating agency for plane crashes – NTSB is. Furthermore, you can be sure the FBI will also be investigating until they are convinced it was not a terrorist attack.

    18. Pine_Tree says:

      I’ve always thought that a knife in each seatback – you know, where they used to have the pay-per-minute phones – would be a great security measure.

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    20. Buddy Hinton says:

      NTSB, FBI, FAA, ATFI (Any Three or Four Initials) — it just doesn’t matter. If it is not in the best interest of the government to say that a downed plane was a terrorist attack, then they will ascribe another cause and write up the paperwork accordingly.

      This is actually a good thing because the public is a lot more rational about air travel safety as long as it is not terrorists — which means that the government can (and probably already has) lied to us for the greater good. It is win-win: government looks less incompetent, and we, the public, don’t panic when we should not panic.

      I guess what I am saying is don’t be naive.

    21. ShelbyC says:

      jccamp: Box cutters and the like remain terribly effective terrorist tools on aircraft. Their use takes advantage of the human psychological desire not to believe the worst.

      They’re not very effective, simply because it’s not that much harder to kill someone without a box-cutter than it is with one.

    22. John C says:

      Oh come on – my recent flight from Phoenix to O’Hare was SO much safer…

      After TSA spent 15 minutes digging a Mini-Leatherman out of the depths of my wife’s backpack.

      As she ranted about the complete idiocy of it all (thankfully, after we left the screening area), I just smiled and said “welcome to the revolution.”

      Two months later and she still gets pissed off thinking it about it. (30 second time-out to remind wife…all in the interest of comment accuracy, of course…)

      Oh yeah – still pissed.

    23. ColoComment says:

      “A screener who is checking up on people’s shoes can’t simultaneously focus on genuine dangers, or at least can’t do it as effectively as he could if his attention were undivided.”

      So, when have you ever seen fewer than 3-5 TSA personnel clustered around each security conveyer belt? With 6 to 10 eyeballs looking at backpacks, shoes and the traveling public, it seems to me that someone among them ought to catch just about any contraband or suspicious-looking passenger that flows by….

      /…and just think about how much sharper they’ll be if they’re unionized. /sarcasm off

    24. jccamp says:

      “They’re not very effective, simply because it’s not that much harder to kill someone without a box-cutter than it is with one.:

      That’s only true for a very small number of people (an ability to kill or maim without a weapon), and even then, hands-free is not nearly as reliable (or intimidating) as a razor blade.

      John C –

      Agreed, your wife and her mini-leatherman tool probably represented a minimal risk to the flying public, but then, for the rest of us to recognize that – not knowing your wife and all – we’d have to have an effective screening and profiling package. But we don’t. So the only policy that makes sense is zero tolerance for edged weapons.

    25. peter says:

      “personnel often miss much more dangerous prohibited items such as knives and boxcutters, even in cases where the passenger in question was not deliberately trying to hide them”

      Last year was the story of the passenger who smelt petrol. He found a chainsaw in the overhead locker. The passenger who brought it on the aircraft said tha security had let it through because a chainsaw is not on the prohibited items list.

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