The United States did not join the International Criminal Court, despite Bill Clinton’s 11th hour signature (followed by the Bush administration’s controversial 1st hour “de-signing”).  The ICC now reaches the moment, as is usual in treaties of this kind, to convene a ten year review conference, with an eye to making changes and seeing how things have gone until now.  The US under the Obama administration has indicated that although, as Secretary of State Clinton said in a recent speech, that it would be a long time before the US joined the ICC, there were ways in which it could get closer to it.

These ways apparently include attending the ICC review conference as an “observer” (a status that in this kind of diplomatic conferences, would give the US the ability to make statements and diplomatic interventions).   As we get closer to the review conference on the ICC, many international law experts have been watching and sometimes commenting on, ways in which the US might or might not “engage” with the conference and, more broadly, “engage” with the ICC.  Brookings scholar (and now ambassador to Poland) Lee Feinstein and the Hoover Institution’s Tod Lindberg recently came out with a well-regarded Brookings Press book on the subject, and the American Society of International Law has done a report; others, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, are poised to weigh in.

The primary issue on the table for the conference is the crime of aggression – an attempt to define it and incorporate it into the ICC statute.  This has seemed an entirely natural move to some.  (Nuremberg, after all, not only dealt with the crime of aggression, in its own architects’ views, it was the central matter, and the things for which Nuremberg is principally celebrated today – war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide – were seen by the Americans particularly as lesser issues, left to the primary national victims of these crimes to prosecute at Nuremberg.)

Others have found the link-up altogether unnatural.  These objections can come from an awareness of the profound moral and legal gulf traditionally maintained between the lawfulness of the resort to war and the lawfulness of how a war, lawful or not, is conducted by each party’s forces.  Objections can also come from an awareness that these matters cannot be de-politicized and judicialized.  Paul Kennedy’s history of the United Nations, The Parliament of Man (upon which, true, I have heaped many criticisms), is persuasive that the most important achievement of the 1945 UN over the League of Nations was the recognition that the League had been far too idealistic, and that like it or not, the Great Powers needed their own chamber.  Questions of the use of force would be determined by political decision and it was crucial, even at the risk of nasty realpolitik, that they be kept inside the tent rather than without.

My own view lies with the skeptics, on both counts, and so I see this whole effort both to define aggression as an act and a crime as a mistake.  In this regard, I yield pride of place to Tufts professor Michael Glennon, who  lays out the argument against in his fine new Yale International Law Journal article, The Blank Prose Crime of Aggression.

(Update:  Over at OJ, where I have posted a version of this, we will be holding in March an online symposium with YJIL, including Professor Glennon and several guest commenters on this article, which has aroused some comment and criticism, in the comments below and over at OJ – I am going to hold off making further comments on the Blank Prose article until the March symposium.  But I don’t think any of that affects my basic point, which is about the different idea of “contracting around” the Security Council, in this case by actors purporting to be an exercise in “private ordering,” but which are really looking to bmake a bid for a new public “regulatory ordering.”  Extra note to the extra alert.  What do we call it when a private order seeks to replace a public regulatory order …?)

As I remark at the end of this post, however, whatever one’s prescriptive views, descriptively the effort appears to raise questions about “contracting around” the Security Council in a changing world but un-amendable UN.  I am no fan of the ICC, to be sure,  a student but not an enthusiast of the UN, and only a luke-warm fan of the Security Council.  On the other hand, occasionally someone not part of the church can see problems not visible to believers, and it sure looks to me that even from the standpoint of those convinced about these institutions, this is the kind of bridge too far that, in my estimation, is likely to do damage to both the ICC and the Security Council.

That is approximately Professor Glennon’s conclusion though he is as ever much more measured than I, and I recommend his article strongly, particularly to US diplomats trying to figure out what to do.  My view of the review conference is simple.  Given that aggression is the primary review conference item, and further given that there is no way the US could actually go along with the ICC as a venue for making such determinations, irrespective of Security Council “triggers” and all that, this is one of those areas in which the Obama administration’s “always-engage” UN diplomacy is a mistake.  The US cannot really “negotiate” even as an “observer” because at the end of the day it will not go along.  Yet showing up to “negotiate” even under the rubric of “observation” is as though to say it can.  Things predictably end, if not in this case in tears, then at least irritation, and accusation – not undeserved – of US bad faith, on the quite reasonable view that the US showed up for the PR benefits even though it couldn’t do anything real and knew in advance that it couldn’t do anything real.

So, in my estimation, everyone would be better off if the US expressed its views on why this, even if attempting to judicialize an inherently political process were a good idea, is in any case a bridge too far – in a polite, detailed, serious letter to the review conference and left it at that.  That, in my purely speculative estimation, is the private view of leading states at the ICC review conference and, I would also speculatively guess, human rights NGOs who recognize that, although they have lashed themselves to the ICC-mast of the internationalist ship and have publicly committed themselves to IO human rights processes no matter what, somewhere deep in their hearts they would actually prefer not to go down with the ship and carry important parts of the substantive human rights agenda with it, as these various international organs perhaps head into serious, institution-weakening conflicts of legitimacy and jurisdiction.

Let me go beyond prescription to a descriptive point, however.  One of the questions raised by the crime of aggression discussions among a group of states formed as a treaty-club is whether, and to what extent, the whole effort is a mechanism for “contracting around” the Security Council.  Or, more precisely, contracting around the legitimacy of the Security Council.  Ostensibly an exercise in private voluntary ordering … but simultaneously presenting a serious challenge, at least potentially, to the public regulatory ordering of the Security Council and its authority.  As speculation, I’d suggest that this kind of private ordering challenge represents one of several emerging efforts by which real conditions in the world, such as the rise of the BRICs and the inability of the UN generally, and the Security Council in particular, to reform itself internally to adjust to a changing world.  The public order of the Security Council seems both outdated but also unamendable; new private forms contract around it in venues such as the ICC.

It is all more complicated than that, of course, because the ICC purports to carefully interlink with the Security Council in important ways.  But when it comes to defining aggression, then the private ordering process that was in an important way always seeking to alter the public process looks headed for many more conflicts of interest.  That is, of course, unless it confines itself to a particular subclass of civil wars in geopolitically not so important places in Africa where, frankly, no one much cares outside the region.

Partly this might be accounted for by the rise of a multipolar world, but that is not all of it.  When we say a multipolar world, at this point, after all, what we mean at bottom is the rise of China, and China is already a member of the Platinum Club of the P5.  China is perhaps not opposed to a reform of the Security Council that left it untouched but perhaps incorporated some of the BRICS – Brazil, for example – although why it would want some special status for India on the Council is not evident from a geopolitical standpoint.  In some ways, China is served by a Security Council P5 dominated by European states on the way down in the world.  But the contracting around question is not just a matter of geopolitics – general legitimacy issues that go to the UN, and things not captured necessarily by narrow declarations of state interest matter too.  (David Pilling has a very good piece in the FT, Thursday, January 28, 2009, “China will not be the world’s deputy sheriff,” on the question of how China sees its role in international order and the provision of public goods in international order, behind sub wall.)

13 Comments

  1. Crunchy Frog says:

    What’s to keep the ICC from going the way of the Human Rights Commission and ending up with the world’s biggest violators sitting in membership?

  2. Jodi says:

    I dont think it will escelate that far

  3. Martinned says:

    Crunchy Frog: What’s to keep the ICC from going the way of the Human Rights Commission and ending up with the world’s biggest violators sitting in membership?

    Membership of what?

  4. Martinned says:

    BTW, this is what I commented on Opinio Juris earlier, under the related but not identical post by prof. Anderson there:

    Is it just me or is the Glennon article one enormous attack against a straw man? He first explains the setup of the Special Working Group proposal, with an extraordinarily broad definition of “act of agression”, one that may well be broader than the definition of that same concept in the UN Charter, and one that is subsequently narrowed in the defintion of “crime of agression”, which requires that the act of agression in question be – by its character, gravity and scale – a manifest violation of the UN Charter. This seems like a perfectly satisfactory definition to me, although you can quibble over the structure. Complaining that it is vague smacks of the Yoo-style argument that the definition of torture in the CAT is vague.

    But the strange thing is that Glennon then continues by listing past events that would qualify as “acts of agression” under the proposed definition, even though that definition is only relevant as an element of the definition of “crime of agression”. Is that list really worth 10 whole pages (p. 86-96)? Of course he is going to conclude that pretty much everything the US army has done in the last couple of decades qualifies as an act of agression: the definition deliberately excludes the question of justification/self-defence, which is left for the definition of “crime of agression”. Why doesn’t he spend those 10 pages considering which past presidents could have been accused of crimes of agression under the proposed definition?

    So I’m calling straw man on at least those 10 pages (out of 44), and quite possibly indirectly on the whole thing.

  5. Kenneth Anderson says:

    Martinned: I’m going to hold off commenting on any of this as Professor Glennon just let me know that he will be commenting on the article at OJ in March as part of the regular OJ-YJIL article discussion.

  6. rjbiii says:

    Martinned’s is a very strong critique. Do something with the “planning [and] preparation” language (e.g. make it clear that it only applies to those who aided in the preparation of a committed, not hypothetical, act of aggression in the knowledge that it would be a manifest violation) and give some clarity to the “manifest violation” language (e.g. no reasonable man could debate the existence of the violation) from the definition of the crime and really what would be left of Glennon’s objection here? There definitely appears to be a lot of empty words in pages 86-96.

  7. Martinned says:

    On Opinio Juris, Kevin John Heller, who is an expert in this area, posted a more detailed critique of the Glennon article.

    Conclusion:

    I agree with Ken that Glennon’s article is interesting and well worth a read. But readers would be well advised to take his conclusions with a very large grain of salt.

  8. [insert here] delenda est says:

    I can certainly think of geopolitical reasons for China wanting India in. After all why was China included in the first place?

  9. Anonsters says:

    From KJH’s post over at OJ:

    The second thought concerns Glennon’s claim that customary international law does not criminalize aggression (p. 74). That is a truly bizarre position — and perhaps not surprisingly, Glennon cites only himself in defense of it. (The footnote on p. 74 refers to footnote 129, which mentions Glennon’s book Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power, and to footnote 165, which mentions the same book and Glennon’s article “How International Rules Die.”)

    Perhaps my favoritest thing EVAR: when people cite themselves and only themselves.

    At least law “scholarship” (I use the term advisedly) hasn’t yet gone down the path of psychological research writing, in which people refer to their work in the third person, as though they themselves didn’t write or argue for a certain claim. “Researchers have begun to concentrate on XYZ. Anonsters (2010a), for example, reported ABC, which supports XYZ. See Anonsters (2009a, 2009b). Additional research on facet f was reported by Anonsters (2010b). Anonsters (2010c) bolsters this claim.”

  10. Mikee says:

    The primary problem of this ICC activity, as with essentially all UN and international legal issues, is that the international legal community, and the UN in particular, do not recognize that there exist individual, inherent human rights that limit government actions. In fact, UN programs are antithetical to the idea of individual human rights, and emphasize that “human rights” are held by governments, not people.

    Until this changes, there will be no reason to participate in the ICC.

  11. Anonsters says:

    Mikee: The primary problem of this ICC activity, as with essentially all UN and international legal issues, is that the international legal community, and the UN in particular, do not recognize that there exist individual, inherent human rights that limit government actions. In fact, UN programs are antithetical to the idea of individual human rights, and emphasize that “human rights” are held by governments, not people.

    Ummm….

    http://www.un.org/en/rights/

    Yeah.

    (Not to mention that the ICC doesn’t fall under the auspices of the U.N.)

  12. Martinned says:

    Anonsters:
    Ummm….
    http://www.un.org/en/rights/Yeah.(Not to mention that the ICC doesn’t fall under the auspices of the U.N.)

    Not to mention also that the Statute of Rome itself lists all the rights relevant to criminal proceedings. For example, article 22:

    Article 22
    Nullum crimen sine lege
    1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
    2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.

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