David Zaring links to the abstract of an interesting study that suggests judges who have daughters rule differently in cases involving “women’s issues.” Here’s the abstract:
Social scientists have long maintained that women judges might behave different than their male colleagues (e.g., Boyd et al. (2010)). This is particularly true when it comes to highly charged social issues such as gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and the status of gender as a suspect classification under federal law. Less studied has been the role that a judge’s family might have on judicial decision making. For example, we may think that a male judge with daughters might have different views of gender discrimination and sexual harassment than a male judge without any daughters. This paper takes a look at the question causally by leveraging the hypothesis that, conditional on the number of total number of children, the probability of a judge having a boy or a girl is independent of any covariates (Washington 2008). Looking at data from the U.S. Courts of Appeals, we find that conditional on the number of children, judges with daughters consistently vote in a more liberal fashion on gender issues than judges without daughters. This effect is particularly strong among Republican appointed judges and is robust and persists even once we control for a wide variety of factors. Our results more broadly suggest that personal experiences — as distinct from partisanship — may influence how elite actors make decisions, but only in the context of substantively salient issues.
Laura(southernxyl) says:
Let’s not forget this which y’all pointed out sometime back:
January 27, 2011, 2:39 pmLTEC says:
Not true.
For example, consider couples with a single child. In those cases where the child is a girl, the couple is less likely to say that it is important to them to have a son than in those cases where the child is a boy. (Since those that want a boy are more likely to keep trying.) That is, those couples with a single boy are more likely to favor boys (before having children) than those couples with a single girl.
I think.
January 27, 2011, 2:59 pmSteve says:
There was a recent study that found a similar effect with respect to legislators who have daughters. Of course, the flip side of “having a daughter (or being a woman) makes you more liberal” is “not having a daughter (or being a man) makes you less liberal.” You have to make a normative judgment in order to declare that either side represents the “default” position. Some fail to understand this and will say things like “we should be suspicious of minority judges because they are more likely to favor minority litigants” without saying “we should be suspicious of non-minority judges because they are less likely to favor majority litigants.”
I wonder how many of the Justices who decided Bradwell v. Illinois had daughters. Then again, I don’t particularly want my daughter to be a lawyer either.
January 27, 2011, 3:24 pmMike says:
Does this mean those judges are JUDICIAL ACTIVISTS?
Or are conservatives going to grow up, and start recognizing that one’s personal life experiences shape one’s interpretation of the law?
January 27, 2011, 3:27 pmCJColucci says:
It’s all that damned empathy.
January 27, 2011, 3:36 pmEMB says:
I think the writing was a little bad here (“leveraging the hypothesis that”? really?): it’s saying that the purpose of the study was to decide whether to reject this hypothesis, but where the covariates in question relate to decisions in certain sorts of cases rather than gender preference for future children.
January 27, 2011, 3:37 pmKenB says:
I regard myself as a conservative, though that applies more to economic issues than social ones. There is no doubt my attitudes toward “women’s issues” is colored by my being the father of two daughters. Not being a judge, I can’t say how it might affect my rulings.
January 27, 2011, 3:45 pmgooners says:
Actually, its a lack of empathy. The judges are showing they are unable (or, at least, find it difficult) to sympathize with an issue without direct experience with it.
January 27, 2011, 3:54 pmqgvr2t3vbg3ewsvf says:
“Social scientists have long maintained that women judges might behave different than their male colleagues (e.g., Boyd et al. (2010)). This is particularly true when it comes to highly charged social issues such as gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and the status of gender as a suspect classification under federal law.”
Or cases in involving alimony, divorce settlements, paternity, and child support. But no one is worried about female judges discriminating against men, they are only worried about male judges discriminating against women.
January 27, 2011, 3:54 pmJay says:
Or, the study is about federal judges, who rarely decide issues of alimony or paternity.
January 27, 2011, 4:07 pmlgm says:
Hear, hear! That “balls and strikes” metaphor was silly when Justice Roberts gave it, silly when Justice Sotomayor repeated it, and will be silly forever. Diversity on the court is good.
January 27, 2011, 4:18 pmAnthony says:
Le shock. I would certainly never have expected something of the sort.
January 27, 2011, 4:22 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
January 27, 2011, 4:29 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
qgvr2t3vbg3ewsvf, do you worry about it? If so, then “no one” isn’t strictly true, is it? If not, why bring it up?
January 27, 2011, 4:30 pmcaptcrisis says:
As a liberal, I don’t have to have a member of a discriminated-against group in my immediate family to be tolerant or understanding of their situation.
January 27, 2011, 4:39 pmJay says:
It is an interesting question why simply being married to a woman (as the vast majority of male federal judges presumably are) doesn’t have the same effect.
January 27, 2011, 4:43 pmAJK says:
How can that possibly be the conclusion you draw from the study? Diversity, in this context, would mean having a mix of judges with and without daughters. But the study tells us that one kind of judge is systematically less correct than the other. Surely we should have a preference judges with the background that leads to correct results — which means less diversity.
January 27, 2011, 4:45 pmgooners says:
Sorry, I can’t find a reference to “correct” or “incorrect”. Quote?
January 27, 2011, 4:54 pmFloridan says:
Demonstrably untrue . . . just visit any number of social conservatives’ sites, such as “Dr. Helen,” and you’ll see all sorts of griping about the raw deal men supposedly get in court.
January 27, 2011, 5:04 pmplutosdad says:
So what happens when more and more studies like this come out, showing that judges rule based on their backgrounds more than they rule based on … anything else. Will we end up with a stricter process for choosing judges?
Of course it seems trial lawyers already know this, but us laypeople don’t know, at least not until we date lawyers and hear the horror stories. As my S.O. puts it, her main job in trial is to “figure out what that particular judge is using in place of the law, and use that”. It just fills me with confidence.
January 27, 2011, 5:15 pmCJColucci says:
It is an interesting question why simply being married to a woman (as the vast majority of male federal judges presumably are) doesn’t have the same effect.
If you think I’m touching that one, you’re insane.
January 27, 2011, 5:35 pmthirdeblue says:
That does suggest some uncomfortable conclusions.
January 27, 2011, 5:43 pmarch1 says:
“Our results more broadly suggest that personal experiences — as distinct from partisanship — may influence how elite actors make decisions, but only in the context of substantively salient issues.”
That thesis also appears to be supported by “Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?”.
I can’t help wondering how good a predictive model one could build of appellate case outcomes generally, based on only the coarsest of inputs (in particular, no inputs relating to the merits of the cases).
January 27, 2011, 6:34 pmfrankcross says:
The abstract indicates a statistically significant relationship, but I will wage that the effect size is pretty small.
January 27, 2011, 6:34 pmJay says:
I’m also a little curious how they went about determining what children federal circuit judges had.
January 27, 2011, 6:54 pmThe Curmudgeonly Ex-Clerk says:
AJK wrote:
Assuming the authors merely tallied whether a decision came out in favor of liability or not, how do you determine which is the correct result without knowing anything about the law or the facts of a given case? Just assume that one result — liability or not — is the correct result in any given case based on general policy preferences?
January 27, 2011, 7:30 pmtheobromophile says:
Silly question: what do they consider to be “liberal”? If it’s sexual harassment, wherein a woman is suing a company, it’s pretty clear that most people would consider that finding in favour of the woman would be the liberal result. However, if the issue is rape, what is the “liberal” result? Throwing the book at the SOB – which favours the woman, but disfavours the defendant? Republicans/conservatives are stereotypically tough on crime (leaving it up to you to quantify this, just pointing it out), so siding with the rape victim (as any other crime victim) would also be the conservative result.
January 27, 2011, 7:52 pmtheobromophile says:
[Dons bulletproof vest and battle gear]
Starting with two (hopefully) non-controversial ideas: (1) most judges are older – 50s, 60s, or 70s – and (2) most judges were very successful lawyers, with high-stress, high-profile jobs, before running for office or being elected to office.
I’m guessing, then, that most judges are married to women who grew up in a different era, either on the forefront of getting women into work, or just before it. Add into that the high-stress nature of what these men were doing (or are doing), and their wives probably all stayed at home with the kids, which is just what the wives of lawyers usually did back then. (Not endorsing, just stating a fact.)
That a man who is married to a SAHM, who grew up in the Eisenhower era, doesn’t necessarily “get” the hurdles that women face(d) doesn’t surprise me.
What I would be interested in seeing is how this pertains to younger judges, those with wives (and sisters) in the workforce and in high-profile, high-education jobs, rule on gender issues.
January 27, 2011, 8:00 pmLarryA says:
I have a bit of experience with this; a wife of 42 years and two grown daughters.
For a healthy husband-v-father relationship wives are women; daughters, even long out of the nest, are little girls. Evolution frowns on males getting the two confused.
January 27, 2011, 8:23 pmPerseus says:
Only if you think that a more “liberal” result is better irrespective of the law and the facts.
January 27, 2011, 8:31 pmAnatid says:
Is this actually the case? Does anyone have any data indicating a correlation between political position and tendency to side with rape victims specifically (rather than victims of other crimes)? Do these data change based on the gender of the victim and the gender of the accused aggressor? Or on the gender of the conservative/liberal doing the siding? I wouldn’t be surprised to see a few interaction effects.
January 27, 2011, 8:44 pmlucia says:
it’s interesting that the answer isn’t obvious to those asking it!
January 27, 2011, 9:45 pmJuliandroms says:
There is another word for the effect discussed in the article – it’s called a conflict of interest.
January 27, 2011, 10:30 pmOrenWithAnE says:
That’s a good point. In a suit involving both genders, we’ll have to find a eunuch judge.
January 27, 2011, 11:42 pmGuy says:
I’m not sure if this is intended to be ironic. Objectivity is one of several excellent attributes the law should strive for (and, in my opinion, to be balanced against other virtues), but to say that the law is completely objective – i.e. that there exists a universally accepted algorithm that could be programmed into a computer to achieve the “correct” result – is simply false (the inability for many people to understand this is, I suspect, the second most frequent cause of accusations of “judicial activism” when it is used in the sense of a bad faith decision or a decision which willfully disregarded the law, the first most frequent being political hackery).
In any event, I’m inclined to think that a diversity of viewpoints would typically result in better results than having everyone be exactly the same. Being exposed to contrary beliefs held by others in good faith tends to moderate people’s views and improve their reasoning and judgment, whereas being surrounded by like-minded people leads to exaggerated positions and intellectual laziness.
January 28, 2011, 1:53 amJust a Thought says:
This point (as Curmudgeon indicates) may be stated alternately:
The study seems to indicate having daughters shifts one’s disposition in favour of female litigants, but does not indicate whether the result is fair or reasonable. In other words, do judges without daughters unfairly favour males, or do judges with daughters unfairly favour females?
January 28, 2011, 6:06 amdee nile says:
Another possibility is that both groups unfairly favor the same sex, but to markedly different degrees.
January 28, 2011, 7:57 amMike says:
Or both! All we have is a relative value shift — there is no data as to where these two points fall on the gender fairness axis.
January 28, 2011, 9:10 amWhadonna More says:
But traditional old guys infantilize adult women MORE than young guys do, so their views of “women’s issues” should vary less – the married ones have a “little lady” in their lives with or without a daughter. So it can’t be about old judges not “getting” the hurdles women face – they would seem to be inclined to exaggerate them.
I bet the daughter influence is caused a softening of the “just desserts” attitude. SAHMs aren’t well represented as litigants, so old judges without daughters don’t see their SAHM-ish spouses represented in the litigants, and are biased toward a little victim blaming. Daughters are much more likely to break the SAHM mold and give litigants a sympathetic reference.
January 28, 2011, 9:40 amKenB says:
The balls-and-strikes metaphor made sense to me at the time and still does. Even though your view of whether a pitch is a ball or a strike is colored by your experiences in life, you’re still calling them as you see them.
January 28, 2011, 9:46 amCJColucci says:
The last word on balls-and-strikes was said many years ago by Hall of Fame umpire Bill Klem. He was out drinking with two fellow umpires.
January 28, 2011, 10:49 amUmpire 1: “I calls ‘em as I sees ‘em.”
Umpire 2: “I calls them as they are.”
Klem: “They ain’t nuthin’ ’til I calls ‘em.”
Ted says:
So whether a law applies objectively should “be balanced against other virtues?” Doesn’t this strike you as bit dangerous? For instance, a current case of mine turns on whether certain evidence was submitted/admitted timely. If so, result A; if not, result B. The law is quite clear: no evidence after X happens, unless party give good reason. X happened; no reason at all given by party.
Judge still lets evidence in; result A. Judge explains that my client was not prejudiced or surprised by evidence (evidence had been discovered by both parties long before X, and we had opportunity to respond to X).
The judge obviously decided to weigh objective application of the law with other competing interests; maybe truth, justice, full disclosure, etc. But is that really just result? Should my client lose the case because of such subjective balancing, even though an objective application of the law would result in a win? I find that a bit hard to swallow; wtf are laws for, guidance?
January 28, 2011, 4:36 pmGuy says:
Well, this is kind of related to the old standards vs rules debate. They both have their advantages. Suppose a legislature explicitly says there shall be equitable tolling under a statute of limitations, or expressly decides to have a standard-based scheme for some question rather than a rule-based scheme. I don’t think a judge should substitute their personal preference for bright-line rules for the will of the legislature.
If the law is as clear as you say it is that a reason must be given and no reason at all was given, that would sound like a misapplication of the law to me. I’m not talking about disregarding the law, I’m talking about what factors judges need to consider when shaping and applying the law (as they must inevitably occasionally do as a result of their role in the system).
But the very fact that there has to be a “good reason” is itself inherently subjective. Maybe the courthouse was swept away by a tornado. I think that’s a good reason, but that’s an ultimately subjective judgment, and the subjectivity becomes increasingly obvious as the reason becomes decreasingly good. You can set aside all exceptions to deadlines (including tornado-based exceptions, or the-opposing-counsel-kidnapped-me-and-had-me-tied-up-based exceptions) to achieve objectivity, but only at the cost of justice, and by applying the rule in a case that is obviously not addressed to the reason why the rule exists, just because you’re terrified that permitting some exceptions will permit judges to abuse them. That’s the kind of balancing I’m talking about.
January 28, 2011, 5:52 pmGuy says:
In other words, your example is question-begging, because you provide, as a premise, that the law says the evidence should not be admitted. If that’s true, then obviously your client should win. “Correct” and “objective” are not synonyms.
January 28, 2011, 6:00 pmTed says:
It seems to me that there are two parts to the law in question. An objective part: “thou shalt submit evidence before X.” And a subjective part: “Later submitted evidence is cool if you provide a “good” reason that it’s late.”
So, objective application of the law requires application of an objective rule, with consideration of a subjective “exception.” Fine, I’m cool with that.
The problem is, the subjective exception was “objectively” not met. Not giving a reason cannot, even subjectively, be a “good” reason, right?
In my example, the judge was able to subjectively insert an additional subjective standard, “prejudice,” into the law where none was provided for by the legislature (actually agency in this case).
Yes, I realize that. I’m not griping about the fact that the judge got it wrong; I deal with that all the time. I’m griping about why the judge got it wrong. He balanced the objective application of a law — which had been reduced a purely objective bright-line rule due to the lack of an explanation by opposing counsel — with other subjective considerations, such as prejudice, harm, and substantial justice.
Is that cool with you? Because it’s not what the language of the law allows. Although the evidence admitted was highly relevant, and wasn’t subject to exclusion otherwise, shouldn’t a party be beholden to the laws as written? Admittedly, our position rests on the mistake of opposing counsel, but so what? Does that make my position less “just?”
January 28, 2011, 6:39 pmGuy says:
Like I said, if the law requires a good reason, and no reason was provided, then that’s the end of it. If the law were ambiguous about whether prejudice can be considered, then saying prejudice cannot be considered would be the more objective rule, and although that objectivity is a point in favor of that interpretation, it does not necessarily imply that must be the interpretation which is adopted.
When you go on to discuss what the language allows, you’re talking about something other than objectivity, and more related to textualism. If courts have a long tradition of implying, say, a necessity defense, into criminal statutes, then I don’t think the legislature has to explicitly write that defense into the law. More generally, although I would not describe myself as a textualist (I think ambiguity in statutory language can properly be clarified by looking to the intent and purpose of the statute), I would ordinarily say that statutes must be interpreted in a way that is fairly permitted by the language of the statute. That is, interpretation begins with the text, and must ultimately be consistent with the text.
But I think that’s largely a separate issue. You seem to be okay with the fact that the law is occasionally subjective, your complaint relies on the judge being wrong. If the judge misunderstood the nature of the exception – if he or she believed that “prejudice, harm, and substantial justice” were factors to be considered when they are not, then that was an error. If the law was unclear about whether “prejudice, harm and substantial justice” were factors to be considered, then we’re debating which is the better interpretation, which is not the same issue you are discussing. And if the judge believed the law flatly denied all exceptions, but made an exception anyway, that’s not very good judging, to say the least.
January 28, 2011, 7:08 pmTed says:
Fair enough.
January 28, 2011, 7:31 pmJulian Droms says:
Do we not agree though that where there is [mild] bias / conflict of interest at work, it is better that it should favor the defendant?
January 28, 2011, 9:10 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
Julian – why?
The way you word that it looks like you accept the idea that there will be a mild bias. If the bias is better when it favors the defendant, you’re saying that people trying to get justice through the legal system ought to have an uphill fight. I’m not sure that’s what we want.
January 28, 2011, 10:34 pmJulian Droms says:
The paper already states that there is a mild bias against defendants in certain cases of gender-based litigation.
If the paper had concluded that judges with male children ruled more favorablly towards defendants in cases of gender-based litigation, would this have been spun as a wonderful and great thing?
Why do you assume that justice is served by favoring plaintiffs? One of our current Congressmen, Dennis Kucinich, a former presidential candidate, just sued the operators of a cafeteria for the House of Representatives for $150,000 because of an olive pit he found in his sandwich wrap.
I hear they now settled out of court for an “undisclosed amount.” Need I say more?
January 29, 2011, 12:41 amLaura(southernxyl) says:
Julian, every case is not Kucinich biting into an olive pit.
Some cases involve people having legitimate grievances. The system already requires that their grievance be something actually against the law and that they prove their case. That’s cool, but the bias you are talking about is over and above all of that.
Your saying that bias generally should favor the defendent is itself a bias. If a person brings a complaint before a judge, the judge should listen to it initially with an open mind, not already thinking “here comes another whiner” or whatever before he opens his mouth.
In other words, I think justice is served by not favoring either side, but rather, the law and the truth.
January 29, 2011, 7:49 amLaura(southernxyl) says:
Also:
Where does it state that? Copy-and-paste please? Maybe I missed something, because surely you don’t think liberal = bias in a way that conservative doesn’t, or that there must be bias any time a woman wins.
January 29, 2011, 7:53 amJulian Droms says:
I didn’t say prejudice, I said bias. “Bias is an inclination to present or hold a partial perspective at the expense of (possibly equally valid) alternatives.” Stating that there is bias for judges with female children to find in favor of female defendants in gender based cases is the same thing as stating there is a bias for judges with female children to find against those defendants. One person wins, means someone else loses. Bias. Is there any information in the abstract to suggest that one type of actor is more law abiding than the other?
January 29, 2011, 1:47 pmJulian Droms says:
The system does not require that plaintiffs prove their case. I’m pretty sure that the “preponderance of evidence” standard is applicable in most of these cases, not the “clear and convincing evidence” standard. The law thus requires judges to hold both the plaintiff and defendant in equal regard as to their claims. Logically, if this theory is to be followed, there will be a significant proportion of cases where the evidence cannot prove the grievance either true or false either way, and just as many (or nearly as many) of those cases will find against the defendant as would find for the defendant.
I may be legally incorrect when I state that it would be preferable for judges to have mild biases that favor defendants than visa-versa. However, I think most reasonable and thoughtful people would still agree with me.
There is no way to ascertain the truth in cases where the evidence is non-conclusive in either direction; yet, the law requires the courts to take action with near balance to plaintiffs and defendants in such circumstances anyhow.
January 29, 2011, 2:09 pmChrisTS says:
EMB:
I’m still gagging over the claim that women judges might be expected “to behave different.” Do social scientists not use adverbs?
January 29, 2011, 4:29 pmAJK says:
Objectivity has nothing to do with it. The study found that two sets of judges come to systematically different conclusions. I am assuming that you think one set of conclusions is superior to the other. If that is so, then I really don’t see how diversity can be your goal. Diversity would, I suppose, be superior to a bench completely staffed by judges of the wrong type, but it seems to me that it would be markedly inferior to a bench staffed entirely by judges of the right type.
That’s a perfectly reasonable position, but really has very little to do with the findings of the study.
January 29, 2011, 5:21 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
I am at a loss to understand how that is different from what I said.
The study didn’t say “find in favor of females”, it said “more liberal”.
I can’t really understand your point, especially this:
Insert the obvious quote from “The Princess Bride”.
January 29, 2011, 8:17 pmJulian Droms says:
It isn’t. I said, “The [abstract] already states that there is a mild bias against defendants in certain cases of gender-based litigation.” .. to which you responded, “Where does it state that?” My response was to provide a definition of bias. And yes indeed, what the abstract is talking about is a form of bias according to this definition.
Actually the abstract said that judges with daughters “vote in a more liberal fashion on gender issues”, which in this day and age, is saying basically the same thing.
You still haven’t responded the point I raised as follows, “The system does not require that plaintiffs prove their case. I’m pretty sure that the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard is applicable in most of these cases, not the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. The law thus requires judges to hold both the plaintiff and defendant [nearly] in equal regard as to their claims. Logically, if this theory is to be followed, there will be a significant proportion of cases where the evidence cannot prove the grievance either true or false either way, and just as many (or nearly as many) of those cases will find against the defendant as would find for the defendant.”
You say, “The way you word that it looks like you accept the idea that there will be a mild bias. If the bias is better when it favors the defendant, you’re saying that people trying to get justice through the legal system ought to have an uphill fight.”
From your lack of response to the above, should I infer that you accept the idea that many people who have not promulgated gender discrimination will be held accountable in court and will be penalized. Do you care?
January 29, 2011, 9:09 pmJulian Droms says:
Anybody have a link to the actual presentation or data? Here is a basically similar study w.r.t. legislators:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/faculty1/washington/genderpap10.pdf
January 29, 2011, 9:21 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
No. You just said that previous to their liberalization, judges were biased toward the defendant. If a man were to bring a sexual harassment suit against another man, or against a woman, then the liberal bias if any would be for the plaintiff.
For pete’s sake, Julian. “Do you care?”, forsooth. You are determined that I am some kind of feminazi.
Suppose I brought suit saying, “Julian was irritating to me on the internet.” Well, that would get nowhere because being irritating on the internet is not illegal, a fact I rejoice in, myself.
Suppose that you and I were coworkers, and I brought suit saying, “Julian is creating a hostile work environment for me and my boss won’t do anything.” That might have legs, except that I have to show that whatever you were doing met the definition of “hostile work environment” AND that you really were doing it, and that I tried to get relief through my company’s anti-harassment policies and got nowhere.
Nobody is going to take my word for any of this. I have to show it, and you get to refute it. And that’s as it should be.
In addition to all of this, you think the judge should be biased on your behalf. I don’t agree.
And you’re translating all of this into me wanting innocent people to be penalized? I could just as easily say that you want innocent people to go around being harassed because no matter what, half or more than half of them shouldn’t get relief in the courts. Is that right?
January 30, 2011, 10:23 amDesiderius says:
“This effect is particularly strong among Republican appointed judges”
The first hint that stacking the deck against men isn’t particularly liberal…
The family law courts are where the most egregious damage is done.
January 30, 2011, 3:45 pmJulian Droms says:
True. The real enemy of men is chivalry. This result is not surprising.
January 30, 2011, 4:50 pmJulian Droms says:
(1) Not that the abstract says much about conservative or liberal bias (quite the opposite, it suggests that the bias is non-partisan though one wonders how they could know).
(2) The liberal bias is always with the plaintiff. That’s the problem.
(3) Rarely does a case of sexual harassment conducted by a woman against a man ever get serious consideration by anyone, liberal or conservative. As for the [likely homosexual] male plaintiff, his interests generally dovetail with those of the matriarchal system, so I wouldn’t consider yours a very robust or relevant counter-example even if it were relevant.
January 30, 2011, 5:00 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
Here we go.
Nobody cares about the poor, poor menz.
Julian, do you care? Of course you do. I do too. All kinds of people care, but nothing can be done if you sit in the corner with your thumb in your mouth and don’t speak up. It’s like all that crap about men not calling the police when they’re abused – well, call them already. Do you have statistics that show that men’s accusations are passed over and not taken seriously? Where are they?
“Matriarchal system” – uh huh.
You realize that worm-eating is spectacularly unattractive, right?
January 30, 2011, 5:39 pmJulian Droms says:
I don’t expect the government to try to solve my personal problems. How could they, if they aren’t there on a day to day basis? And who would want them there even if they could?
January 30, 2011, 8:02 pmJulian Droms says:
If you look you’ll find them. I’ve seen them. I’m not about to dig them up again for your benefit.
But when it comes down to it, I don’t favor the extension of courts to adjudicate things in people’s private lives when the courts have no capability to definitively adjudicate. And as much as I would benefit personally from doing so, I am not non-chalant the inevitable result of such schemes, that courts will come to the wrong decisions and penalize the wrong people in their zeal to assuage moral panic.
January 30, 2011, 9:42 pmTrying to fit a leftish analysis in a libertarianish frame « Entitled to an Opinion says:
[...] evidence for this idea regarding judges here. LikeBe the first to like this [...]
January 30, 2011, 10:22 pmJulian Droms says:
You still haven’t responded the point I raised as follows, “The system does not require that plaintiffs prove their case. I’m pretty sure that the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard is applicable in most of these cases, not the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. The law thus requires judges to hold both the plaintiff and defendant [nearly] in equal regard as to their claims. Logically, if this theory is to be followed, there will be a significant proportion of cases where the evidence cannot [definitively] prove the grievance either true or false either way, [yet] just as many (or nearly as many) of those cases will find against the defendant as would find for the defendant.”
From your lack of response to the above, should I infer that you accept the idea that many people who have not promulgated gender discrimination will be he penalized for this offense in court nonetheless? Do you care?
January 31, 2011, 4:53 amLaura(southernxyl) says:
Julian, if a feminist told me “rarely does a case of sexual harassment conducted by a man against a woman ever get serious consideration by anyone, liberal or conservative.” and then when I asked for stats told me she was not about to show me any – she had seen them – I would assume that she was making that up. She couldn’t show me stats because she didn’t have any or because what she’d seen came from the same place where she found “the patriarchy” meaning that it would have no credibility outside the feminist set.
So I assume the same thing about what you’ve said. You’ve used enough MRA buzzwords for me to reach that conclusion.
As to your “should I infer” question I don’t know how you want me to answer it. You keep repeating the same boilerplate like you think you’re going to bully me into seeing things your way. Ain’t gonna work. I’ve told you what I think. You can infer that I don’t care in the very face of me telling you, quote, “I care,” as I did yesterday at 5:39 PM, if that floats your boat. Some people need to see themselves as victims. Need to, have to, and they’ll make stuff up so they can do it. Feminists do it, MRAs do it. The worms just taste that good, I reckon.
January 31, 2011, 1:37 pmJulian Droms says:
You didn’t ask me for stats about sexual harassment. You asked me for stats about domestic violence where men are victims, which isn’t particularly relevant to the discussion.
And you still haven’t responded to meat of the point I made, regardless of whether you say you care about it, or not.
January 31, 2011, 3:24 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
You:
Me:
January 31, 2011, 4:16 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
And let me turn around and ask you – if justice is not served, then either people are penalized who shouldn’t be, OR people who should get relief in the legal system don’t get it. Do you care about that second group of people?
January 31, 2011, 5:03 pmJulian Droms says:
Oh, it sounds here like you are asking for statistics on what happens when men call the police in instances of domestic violence, which is the question I answered — FYI not particularly relevant to the original abstract.
Now it sounds more like you are asking for statistics on men who make allegations of sexual harassment.
I think it’s probably true that there is some bias against male litigants alleging sexual harassment, though I’m not sure I find it that problematic if many though not all defendants in civil sexual harassment suits are found not liable for lack of proof or for other reason. In such a case, is it really that big a deal that a litigant doesn’t get payola? As with most things related to the legal profession these days, the process is usually the punishment, so in that case the defendant usually learns his or her lesson whether found liable or not.
You still haven’t responded the point I raised as follows, “The system does not require that plaintiffs prove their case. I’m pretty sure that the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard is applicable in most of these cases, not the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. The law thus requires judges to hold both the plaintiff and defendant [nearly] in equal regard as to their claims. Logically, if this theory is to be followed, there will be a significant proportion of cases where the evidence cannot [definitively] prove the grievance either true or false either way, [yet] just as many (or nearly as many) of those cases will find against the defendant as would find for the defendant.”
From your lack of response to the above, should I infer that you accept the idea that many people who have not promulgated gender discrimination will be penalized for this offense in court nonetheless?
January 31, 2011, 5:18 pmLaura(southernxyl) says:
And there it is.
BTW, congratulations on mastering the very difficult and intricate task of copy-and-paste. I’m sure not more than 999,999 people in a million can do it.
January 31, 2011, 5:26 pmJulian Droms says:
The abstract in question makes an observation that judges with daughters are more sympathetic towards certain individuals in gender-based cases. The tendency by the authors or many readers, is to put a positive spin on this, as if being more sympathetic to certain individuals in gender-based cases would tend to be more just. However, I find it hard to believe that this interpretation is provably true, and I would argue, all other things being equal, it would be more just for systemic biases to favor defendants rather than litigants.
January 31, 2011, 5:57 pmJulian Droms says:
You still haven’t answered the question.
January 31, 2011, 6:00 pmJulian Droms says:
>> I’m not sure I find it that problematic if many
>> though not all defendants in civil sexual
>> harassment suits are found not liable for lack
>> of proof or for other reason. In such a case, is
>> it really that big a deal that a litigant doesn’t get payola?
>
> And there it is.
Yup. I don’t think it’s necessary for the government to insure that everyday society is adequately policed, so that every single case of sexual harassment can be prosecuted and result in a big payola for the litigant, regardless of whether enough evidence can be produced to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt so to insure that defendants aren’t routinely being punished for activities they did not commit.
So once again, you still haven’t responded the point I raised as follows, “The system does not require that plaintiffs prove their case. I’m pretty sure that the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard is applicable in most of these cases, not the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. The law thus requires judges to hold both the plaintiff and defendant [nearly] in equal regard as to their claims. Logically, if this theory is to be followed, there will be a significant proportion of cases where the evidence cannot [definitively] prove the grievance either true or false either way, [yet] just as many (or nearly as many) of those cases will find against the defendant as would find for the defendant.”
From your lack of response to the above, should I infer that you accept the idea that many people who have not promulgated gender discrimination will be penalized for this offense in court nonetheless?
January 31, 2011, 7:04 pm