That’s the scenario in a 6-1 decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (which comes out in plaintiff’s favor, on the question of whether his case can proceed) in Blackhouse v. Doe (decided last Thursday), which deals with two legal issues: (1) When may a complaint be dismissed at the outset on the grounds that it appears “bizarre, vexatious and frivolous”? (For more details on the circumstances of the complaint, see the dissent, which certainly doesn’t rely just on the ages of the plaintiff and the defendant.) (2) May a defendant be entitled to an accommodation of his alleged disability — here, post-tramautic stress disorder — when the accommodation he seeks is to have the case decided without his having to even appear in court? The opinions are hard to summarize, but here are some excerpts from the majority, followed by some excerpts from the dissent:
[UPDATE: Commenter Hans Bader notes that plaintiff was represented on appeal by a University of Maine School of Law legal aid clinic, but the defendant did not file a brief on appeal, likely because she didn't have the money to hire a lawyer, and couldn't find one who would take the case for free. My guess, incidentally, is that if a state supreme court wanted to appoint a lawyer to brief and argue this sort of case pro bono (see, e.g.,
A final hearing on Blackhouse’s complaint for protection from abuse was scheduled for May 24, 2010. The clerk’s office mailed notice of the final hearing to Blackhouse. Blackhouse failed to appear for the hearing, and the court ( Soucy, J.) dismissed his complaint. There is no indication that Blackhouse’s request for reasonable accommodation was called to the court’s attention or that the court otherwise reviewed it before dismissing the complaint.
Blackhouse subsequently brought this appeal, arguing that the court should have considered his request for reasonable accommodation, and that, by failing to do so, the court violated article I, section 6–A of the Maine Constitution; the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551–4634 (2010); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12101–12213 (LexisNexis 2009)….
In this case, the record contains no indication that any judicial officer even considered Blackhouse’s request for accommodation. Despite this gap in the appropriate process, the dissent suggests that we should nonetheless affirm the dismissal of Blackhouse’s complaint because it is not plausible on its face, as his allegations against Doe are bizarre, vexatious, and frivolous.
Blackhouse filed a complaint for protection from abuse in accordance with 19–A M.R.S. § 4005(1) (2010), alleging a course of conduct by Doe that, if proved, could allow a court to grant Blackhouse a protection from abuse order. Although, as the dissent notes, Doe is eighty-six years old, neither her age nor Blackhouse’s disability allows us to prejudge the veracity of Blackhouse’s allegations…..
In this case, Blackhouse’s request that he be permitted to litigate his complaint in a way that would accommodate his claimed disabilities was never considered by the court. Therefore, we vacate the dismissal of his complaint. Whether Blackhouse is entitled to a protection from abuse order against Doe is an issue that should be decided only after a judge has considered Blackhouse’s request for reasonable accommodation, the court has notified Blackhouse and Doe of its decision on Blackhouse’s request, and both parties have been notified of the date of the hearing on Blackhouse’s complaint….
ALEXANDER, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In his protection from abuse filing, Eli Blackhouse makes bizarre, vexatious, and facially incredible claims against many individuals in his community. A particular focus of his allegations is a vulnerable and likely destitute eighty-six-year-old woman against whom Blackhouse seeks to invoke our judicial processes to evict her from her home and seize some or all of her money. As a reasonable accommodation for his unsupported claim of a disability, Blackhouse asks that the Court deprive the targets of his allegations of due process of law by accrediting his claims, vacating the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint, and ordering that the action proceed without his being present to be confronted by those against whom he seeks relief.
This Court holds that Blackhouse’s request for reasonable accommodation of his alleged disability requires that we accept as true all allegations, no matter how bizarre, and gives a plaintiff license to maintain a bizarre, vexatious, or incredible claim that a trial court would — as it did here — dismiss were it not brought by one claiming a disability. I do not agree that our laws providing protections for individuals with disabilities go so far as to require courts to accredit claims brought by persons claiming a disability, when those same claims would be dismissed, and perhaps sanctions imposed, if asserted by an individual not claiming a disability. That is not equal treatment; it is preferential treatment. And such preferential treatment poses significant risk that, in the name of reasonable accommodation, court processes may be abused to the detriment of vulnerable individuals who are the targets of bizarre, vexatious, or incredible claims that a court accredits and allows to proceed.
The dilemma presented by this Court’s holding is well illustrated by the facts of this appeal. The District Court, perhaps with knowledge of Blackhouse’s history, saw this complaint for what it is — a frivolous, vexatious, and implausible action by a thirty-nine-year-old man seeking to exclude an eighty-six-year-old woman from her home and force her to pay him money. To support his efforts, Blackhouse asserted many bizarre allegations against his neighbor, his landlord, other tenants, and people in the community. With no documentation except for his own words, he then claimed a disability and demanded, as an accommodation, that he be permitted to avoid being confronted in court by the targets of his accusations. The District Court, seeing the bizarre and incredible allegations in Blackhouse’s complaint at the temporary order stage, could have properly dismissed it without reaching Blackhouse’s request for accommodation.
Let us take a closer look at the facts and history behind this case. Blackhouse is a resident of a twelve-unit apartment building in Gardiner. The defendant, Jane Doe, is a resident of another apartment in the same building. Blackhouse’s pleadings indicate that he has grievances against many individuals arising from his residence at that apartment building.
In a previous action, Blackhouse had filed a protection from harassment claim, see 5 M.R.S. §§ 4651–4660–A (2010), against the landlord of that building, see Blackhouse v. Connelly, Mem–10–102 (Aug. 12, 2010). In that action, Blackhouse asserted:
Plaintiff Eli Blackhouse is a housing fraud victim who can neither remain safely within nor relocate outside of the premises of 235 Water Street — where he currently dwells — because Ms. Connelly and her property management company, d/b/a “TLC Properties,” require him to pay an amount of rent that is illegal according to Federal Law. Fully disabled with post-traumatic stress disorder requiring careful management in most public settings, Mr. Blackhouse is presently imperiled by: a) conditions created by the extortion of excessive rent, which violate the apartment’s warranty of habitability (14 MRSA § 6021); and, b) his inability to relocate outside of the thrall of Ms. Connelly, who acquired the building from a previous owner after said owner had extorted over $8000 from his monthly SSDI disbursement check (in a manner both identical to and enabling the continuation of the extortion that would—subsequent to the illegal sale—then go on to be conducted by the Defendant).
In documents filed in support of his prior request for an order of protection from harassment, Blackhouse had contended that he was the victim of a widespread criminal conspiracy that included, among others, the Augusta Housing Authority, who had caused his relocation from Augusta to Gardiner, and the Maine Medical Center in Portland. Blackhouse also asserted that he was a witness for the “FBI” investigating various criminal conspiracies within the State.
The District Court ( Westcott, J.) dismissed Blackhouse’s prior action, and, on appeal, we affirmed the dismissal. Blackhouse, Mem–10–102.
On May 6, 2010, the Augusta District Court received from Blackhouse an envelope marked “Urgent/Confidential” containing his protection from abuse complaint against Doe that initiated this action. The complaint indicated that Doe was a resident of a different unit in the same building. It also asserted that Doe “is likely tied in to the racketeering/abetment activity being conducted by” a Gardiner police officer and another individual whose name was indicated….
Regarding Doe, the attached document indicated that she was among a group of other individuals whom the landlord illegally permitted to inhabit the other eleven units in the apartment building. Blackhouse also asserted that Doe had “repeatedly” assailed him with abusive dialogue, that she “loiters in common areas” that he could not avoid without confronting her, and that these actions had occurred during a period of his “indoor confinement” which he attributed, not to Doe, but to an “illegal requirement” that he pay rent to his landlord.
Blackhouse further asserted that Doe appears in common areas of the apartment building, such as the laundry area, which, he contended, should not be occupied by any other tenants in the building. He also objected to her being near the entranceway to the building, which he found offensive. Blackhouse complained of some statements that he asserts Doe made to him, including, for example, “Don’t you run up those stairs,” and asserted that she has at times snickered at him because of some of his actions, such as his closing the fire door on an upper floor of the building.
For relief, Blackhouse asked that Doe be prevented from contacting him and “any minor children in my charge,” that she be excluded from his residence, and that she be excluded from being, repeatedly and without reasonable cause, at or in the vicinity of his home, school, business, or place of employment. He also asked that he be given possession of, and that Doe be ordered to leave immediately, the entire twelve-unit apartment building.
Blackhouse further requested that he be given possession of “any money being delivered to [the landlord] as alleged ‘rent’ given the building’s illegal financing via SSDI extortion.” He also requested that Doe be ordered to pay him support, damages, and attorney fees, and that he be given “the right to initiate eviction proceedings against occupants of [the apartment building].” He also suggested that the owner of the building should not be attempting to sell the building during the pendency of the litigation and requested that he be exempted from paying rent….
Upon review of the merits of Blackhouse’s complaint, the court (Mullen, J.) denied the request for a temporary order, correctly concluding that “the allegations in the sworn complaint are insufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff and/or minor child(ren) is/are in immediate and present danger of abuse from the defendant.” Because the court acted based on its proper finding that the totality of the facts as alleged were insufficient to support granting an ex parte temporary order of protection, the court would have had no need to review Blackhouse’s request for reasonable accommodation. However, it must be noted that in accordance with the accommodation that Blackhouse had requested, the court acted on his pleadings without requiring that he be present at the courthouse. Thus, although the court may not have reviewed his request for accommodation, Blackhouse received the accommodation he requested at the temporary order stage. The court scheduled the matter for a final hearing on the complaint for protection from abuse on May 24, 2010….
A person’s right to quiet enjoyment of her residence is a fundamental right to which Doe was entitled, absent some strong proof of impropriety relating to her actions regarding the residence. Further, in any action to exclude Doe from her residence, and in any protection from abuse action, Doe had a right to confront and counter the evidence against her, as we recently held in Jusseaume v. Ducatt, 2011 ME 43, ¶¶ 11–15, 15 A.3d 714, 717–18.
Considering the allegations in this case, the court could not have, and should not have, granted Blackhouse’s request to exclude his elderly neighbor from her residence without first hearing from Doe and affording her far more process than Blackhouse wanted the court to give her by considering his request for relief without his needing to be present.
Before consideration of what accommodation, if any, to allow Blackhouse for his alleged disability, the court had a responsibility to evaluate the merits of his protection from abuse claim. There is no right to maintain, and force a named defendant to defend, an incredible, frivolous, or bizarre claim. A person claiming a disability has no greater right than any other person to circumvent the court’s essential gatekeeping function on these issues.
Addressing a court’s gatekeeping function, the United States Supreme Court, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), has held that a complaint, to avoid dismissal, must be “plausible on its face”:
[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.
The complaint here, not being plausible on its face, was appropriately dismissed….
On the face of the pleadings filed by Blackhouse, and considering the history of his prior action, the wide ranging and severe relief Blackhouse was seeking against Doe and many others, the deprivation of due process for Doe that Blackhouse was requesting as an accommodation, and the apparent incredibility of many of Blackhouse’s claims, the trial court properly dismissed Blackhouse’s action. The finding of insufficiency of the evidence on the merits, made at the temporary order stage, can be affirmed when there is no suggestion that at the final hearing stage any evidence would have been presented that was not before the court when it denied the request for a temporary order.
Reasonable accommodation of anyone with a disability who must be before the court, or who seeks to bring a proper action before the court, is appropriate and is part of our obligation to provide access to justice. But that obligation to provide reasonable accommodation does not extend to lending a hand to promote a facially frivolous, vexatious, or incredible claim, and doing so, as Blackhouse requests, by depriving the targets of his accusations of the right to confront their accuser who seeks to take their money and jeopardize their fundamental right to quiet enjoyment of their homes.
Jason says:
The majority isn’t asserting that the court had to seriously entertain this obviously frivolous case.
They are simply saying that the defendant’s request for accommodation had to be considered before disposing of the matter.
This seems reasonable, and not terribly burdensome.
August 9, 2011, 3:22 pmM. Gross says:
I’m kind of torn on this one. The plaintiff is obviously insane, on the other hand, the court should have considered (and subsequently refused to grant) their request to not have to appear.
…and thusly a fair amount of court time and effort was wasted…
August 9, 2011, 3:30 pmGreg Q says:
The dissent appears to be saying that the lower court did consider his request for accommodation, and in fact let him have the accommodation, before ruling against him anyway.
The dissent looks correct to me, and the majority looks like almost as lunatic as the plaintiff.
August 9, 2011, 3:40 pmHans Bader says:
How on Earth can one square this ruling with the fact that the disabilities-rights statutes are not, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, “affirmative action” statutes, and are not a warrant to demand radical or fundamental changes to the underlying regulated activity. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (which said that the Rehabilitation Act is not an affirmative-action statute, and does not require a fundamental alteration in a school’s standards to accommodate the disabled).
How on Earth can one square this ruling with the right to due process on the part of the accused? Cf. Tyree v. Evans (D.C. Court of Appeals).
Note that PTSD diagnoses are liberally, and abusively, fabricated by some psychologists-for-hire in court cases, so this opens up a huge can of worms:
http://www.openmarket.org/2011/08/03/egregious-abuses-by-expert-witnesses-and-family-courts/
August 9, 2011, 3:43 pmGreg Q says:
More importantly, the “right to confront one’s accusers” is not only a fundamental right, it’s one that’s had it’s merit proved over and over again. See the fake “child molestation” cases where the “psychologists” manufacturing the claims out of nothing then turned around and argued that the “victims” shouldn’t have to be in the same room as the “perpetrators.”
IMHO this is a horrible ruling.
August 9, 2011, 3:44 pmDavid M. Nieporent says:
Even assuming that’s true as a general matter, in this case, it’s facially obvious that he isn’t entitled to this accommodation, so why do they need to vacate and remand? It can never be a “reasonable accommodation” to allow someone to deny his adversary due process. Moreover, as the dissent pointed out, since the case is frivolous (*), any denial of his accommodation request was harmless.
(*) And the refusal of judges to label frivolous cases as frivolous is part of the problem.
August 9, 2011, 3:50 pmHouston Lawyer says:
He should have sent his dog to testify.
August 9, 2011, 3:50 pmHans Bader says:
Depressingly, and predictably, the bringer of this bizarre complaint was represented by a legal aid clinic, while the defendant did not even file a brief, presumably because she was unrepresented and of modest means.
This is what legal aid groups sometimes do in family law cases: bring bizarre or unjustified claims using taxpayer subsidies that no paying client would ever actually pay for, destroying the lives of innocent people. (These groups are either subsidized by the taxpayers, or supported by law schools, which themselves benefit from taxpayer subsidies.)
If this is so, then it is outrageous that the Maine Supreme Court did not appoint a lawyer to represent the defendant, the way the New Jersey Supreme Court did in Sacharow v. Sacharow, which resulted in the New Jersey Supreme Court properly ruling that the accused person had a right to challenge the accusations against him. (Here, by contrast, the defendant may wind up being denied the right to confront her accuser, even though in some credibility disputes in civil proceedings affecting fundamental constitutional liberty interests, that can be a requirement of due process).
August 9, 2011, 3:55 pmMichael Masinter says:
The court is merely enforcing this provision of Maine’s Judicial Policy:
IV GENERAL ACCOMMODATION REQUEST PROCEDURE
***
4. Any denial of a requested accommodation by a judge or duly authorized court official will be accompanied by a written statement of the reason for denial.
http://www.courts.state.me.us/court_info/ada/policy.html
That’s a pretty straightforward rule; all the remand does is require compliance with it. The remand does not require granting the request; it just requires a written disposition.
As for why a court would vacate rather than affirm on the basis of harmless error, state supreme courts have supervisory responsibility over inferior state courts, and vacating for failure to comply with a rule that by its terms admits of no exceptions is one way to exercise that power.
August 9, 2011, 4:17 pmHans Bader says:
This is simply not a reasonable accommodation, since it could lead to the defendant being denied the opportunity to cross-examine her accuser, which is routine, customary, and deeply rooted in tradition in civil cases. Cross-examination has justly been called “the most powerful engine for the discovery of truth ever devised by man” by Wigmore and other evidence experts.
This kind of fundamental change to legal norms is not required by the disabilities-rights statutes, which are not, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, “affirmative action” statutes, and are not a mandate for radical or fundamental changes to basic requirements. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (which said that the Rehabilitation Act is not an affirmative-action statute, and does not require a fundamental alteration in a school’s standards to accommodate the disabled).
People often defeat civil claims of harassment or abuse through cross-examination, which enables them to prove that a weak claim is in fact weak. See, e.g., Newman v. Federal Express Corp., 266 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2001) (dismissing racial harassment claim based on complainant’s admission on cross-examination that the alleged harassment was no big deal, and thus, did not show an actionably hostile work environment, from a subjective perspective).
People have the due-process right to defend themselves even in domestic violence cases. See, e.g., Tyree v. Evans (D.C. Court of Appeals); Sacharow v. Sacharow (N.J. Supreme Court).
August 9, 2011, 4:19 pmloki13 says:
I’m torn.
My German heritage part and lawyerly part wants to get behind Michael Masinter’s analysis and applaud the legal application of the rule, and note that this will allow the trial court to bitch slap the plaintiff with a new, written statement of the reason for the denial of his request.
But the rest of me agrees with the dissent. It’s all lizard-like and “stoopid idiot wasting people’s time.”
Shrug.
August 9, 2011, 4:28 pmAnderson says:
given that a state supreme court argument is usually seen as interesting and prestigious
That must depend on the state.
August 9, 2011, 5:28 pmEugene Volokh says:
Anderson: I considered that, but I doubt it. My guess is that in any state, lawyers who are practicing in that state would find such arguments pretty interesting and prestigious, and some such lawyers could be found who would it do it pro bono, especially if the issue is interesting and the record is small.
August 9, 2011, 5:50 pmSoronel Haetir says:
Umm, for a civil matter of this sort I fail to see how not appearing at the court house deprives the opposing part of the opportunity to examine his claims. Aren’t depositions and such usually held away from the court? I would certainly expect that if this accommodation were to be granted he would still have to submit to examination. And because of that it wouldn’t even necessarily seem to run into hearsay problems. The witness is unavailable at the time of the court proceeding, and the opposing part would have had their chance to examine.
If this were a criminal matter I could see it coming out quite differently, but for civil, assuming he can prove the disability, I see no problem with such a request.
August 9, 2011, 6:28 pmU.Va. Grad says:
Rather easily: the ruling doesn’t require that Blackstone’s request be accommodated; it merely requires that his request for accommodation be ruled upon before the trial court reaches the merits of his complaint. The trial court is perfectly free to deny it.
August 9, 2011, 7:29 pmAnatid says:
Ironically, this guy’s claims are fairly consistent with what you might expect to hear from someone with severe PTSD. And probably not just PTSD; severe stress can activate all kinds of low-grade complicating conditions. Even your sanest human will still do strange or antisocial things when pushed to their breaking point.
Which is to say, the guy is mentally unsound, and our legal system ought not exist as a device to enable the unstable. This guy needs to see a shrink and work through his problems, not continue avoiding anything that reminds him of them. And certainly not to the detriment of those around him.
August 9, 2011, 11:19 pmAugust 10 roundup says:
[...] Maine Supreme Court agrees that not having to show up in court might be reasonable accommodation for plaintiff claiming PTSD disability [Volokh] [...]
August 10, 2011, 1:36 amloki13 says:
On remand, a written statement:
The most reasonable accommodation for your request would be a dismissal of your complaint, as this court would not want to exacerbate your PTSD to your detriment. As this reasonable accommodation is not within the court’s power, and the reasonable accommodation plaintiff seeks is not reasonable in light of the defendant’s rights, your request for a reasonable accommodation is DENIED.
The complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. ALL-CAPS are just a bonus.
August 10, 2011, 9:37 amArthur Kirkland says:
On one hand, the disdain expressed by some for reasonable accommodations, (certain) public interest groups, and experts is as overwrought as it is predictable.
On the other hand, does anyone know enough about this case to report whether the “abduction and medical torture” relevant to this case was asserted to have been the work of terrestrial or extraterrestrial beings?
August 10, 2011, 10:22 amloki13 says:
Arthur,
I’m with you on this. I think society is a better place when we make reasonable accommodations that allow people to partake fully in our society, instead of applying inflexible rules to exclude them.
OTOH, as a practicing attorney, I fully realize how darn difficult it is to dismiss vexatious, frivolous, and (yes) batshit crazy litigation. Exhibit A is above. In an abstract way, I understand that the Maine S. Ct. needed to reinforce that the judge was required to write the reasons for his denial. It will have an impact for future cases when the claim isn’t frivolous. And that may be why the legal aid attorney took the case (I sure hope it wasn’t the merits!). But it shows how hard it is for trial courts to be gatekeepers.
August 10, 2011, 10:51 amwolfefan says:
Hi Hans – do you disagree with Michael Masinter’s analysis above? If so, why?
Thanks in advance…
August 10, 2011, 11:21 amcb says:
Well I sure hope that other lawyer loses his appeal stating dogs should not be used to help rape victims with their PTSD in court, which is the same thing: accommodating someone with PTSD and still allowing the accused to confront the witness. If this Blackhouse wins and that girl loses, well, I don’t know what to think.
August 10, 2011, 12:07 pmr gould-saltman says:
Am I missing something, or is all that would have been necessary for the trial court to do to “bomb-proof” the ruling was to issue a minute order (or the Maine equivalent) saying, in writing, something like:
“The Court has considered Plaintiff’s request for accommodation, and based upon the admissible evidence presented, determines that Plaintiff has neither presented adequate proof of the asserted disability, nor has proposed any sort of reasonable accommodation. The only “accommodation” which Plaintiff proposes is one which would vitiate the defendant’s rights of due process. Plaintiff cannot demand the intervention of this court, and then assert that the only acceptable “accommodation” of his “disability” is for the court to grant the relief he demands without his participation in the proceedings. Trial date to stand”.
August 10, 2011, 1:54 pmHans Bader says:
I am not sure what the answer is to Wolfefan’s question:
August 10, 2011, 5:15 pmwolfefan says:
Hi again Hans – thanks for both your reply and your honesty.
August 11, 2011, 7:33 ammarkm says:
Or a court-ordered psych exam?
August 11, 2011, 7:34 amArthur Kirkland says:
I was sued, within a few weeks of becoming a lawyer, by a plaintiff who alleged that I, by filing an appearance on behalf of a public defender — who had been sued for conspiring with the judge, the jurors, the prosecutors, every prosecution witness and (nice touch) the court reporter to arrange the conviction of the plaintiff for murder — had joined the conspiracy, with my firm and the insurer that engaged us.
Even when a pleading constitutes hundreds of pages (onionskin from the prison commissary), featuring entire and irrelevant appellate opinions (including West key classifications) typed in as authority, paragraphs if not pages expressed in capital letters, lines of exclamation points, tangential ramblings about perceived playground slights stale by 20 years, and the like, it is worthwhile for professionals to follow the rules in responding to the tripe.
It may be frustrating, but it is worth the effort, and usually works.
August 11, 2011, 10:04 amloki13 says:
Hell, I agree, but that’s because I’m an attorney.
On the other hand, in this case, the person hurt by the snafu isn’t an attorney, or even the TC judge, but the 86 year-old pro se litigant who has to deal with this. So I have a little sympathy.
To extend your analogy, it would be the same as if the prisoner had sued the family of his victim who were too poor to retain counsel.
August 11, 2011, 12:55 pmmarkm says:
IANAL, but it seems to me to be pretty simple to accommodate this disability without violating the defendant’s rights. If he cannot be cross-examined, he cannot be a witness. Any other witnesses to the alleged harassment or other evidence? No? Case dismissed.
And it doesn’t deprive him of due process, either. If the whole case rests on his testimony, there is no case. The record clearly shows that he is a loon, and not to be believed.
Finally, I strongly suspect that the “abduction and medical torture” he alludes to was observation in a psych ward, ordered the last time he was in front of a judge. My question is, how did he get out?
August 11, 2011, 6:01 pm