The Volokh Conspiracy

That’s the title of an article that I have co-authored with the Cato Institute’s Trevor Burrus, in a symposium issue of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. The symposium is “Law in an Age of Austerity,” and includes contributions from Charles Cooper (Treasury Dept.’s authority to index capital gains for inflation), John Eastman (state authority to enforce immigration laws), and others.

The major part of the Article details some recently-enacted criminal law and sentencing reforms in Colorado, which mitigate the fiscal damage of the drug war. The second part of the Article summarizes the fiscal benefits of ending prohibition. Finally, the Article looks at some of the legal history of alcohol prohibition, and suggests that current federal drug prohibition policies are inconsistent with the spirit of the Tenth Amendment, including  state tax powers.

Two recent studies find that state licensing regimes for small businesses impose severe burdens on consumers and entrepreneurs alike. The first, by the libertarian Institute for Justice, finds that licensing is ubiquitous for a wide range of professions, and that it often has little or no public interest justification:

License to Work details licensing requirements for 102 low- and moderate-income occupations in all 50 states and D.C. It is the first national study of licensing to focus on lower-income occupations and to measure the burdens licensing imposes on aspiring workers….

All of the 102 occupations studied in License to Work are licensed in at least one state. On average, these government-mandated licenses force aspiring workers to spend nine months in education or training, pass one exam and pay more than $200 in fees. One third of the licenses take more than one year to earn. At least one exam is required for 79 of the occupations….

Noted licensure expert Morris Kleiner found that in the 1950s, only one in 20 U.S. workers needed government permission to pursue their chosen occupation. Today, it is closer to one in three. Yet research to date provides little evidence that licensing protects public health and safety or improves products and services. Instead, it increases consumer costs and reduces opportunities for workers….

the difficulty of entering an occupation often has little to do with the health or safety risk it poses. Of the 102 occupations studied, the most difficult to enter is interior designer, a harmless occupation licensed in only three states and D.C. By contrast, EMTs hold lives in their hands, yet 66 other occupations face greater average licensure burdens, including barbers and cosmetologists, manicurists and a host of contractor designations. States consider an average of 33 days of training and two exams enough preparation for EMTs, but demand 10 times the training—372 days, on average—for cosmetologists. “The data cast serious doubt on the need for such high barriers, or any barriers, to many occupations,” said Lisa Knepper, IJ director of strategic research and report co-author. “Unnecessary and needlessly high licensing hurdles don’t protect public health and safety—they protect those who already have licenses from competition, keeping newcomers out and prices high.”

The second new study – by Thumbtack.com and the Kauffman Foundation reinforces some of IJ’s conclusions. It consists of a nationwide survey of several thousand small business owners, and finds that, in their view, the ease of obtaining a license is the biggest public policy determinant of a state’s level of friendliness to small businesses – far more important even than tax rates:

Although taxes are a dominant topic in many discussions of a location’s attractiveness to business, our analysis indicates that small businesses tend to care more deeply about the friendliness of a region’s licensing regime by a factor of nearly two. Similarly, being subject to special regulatory requirements had a negative effect on overall small business friendliness, and among those small businesses subject to special regulations, the ease of complying with these requirements was by far the most important factor.

These results are not entirely surprising. Licensing regulations are often “captured” by interest groups seeking to keep out their competitors. Most voters are unaware of these laws and often lack the knowledge needed to assess their quality even when they do happen to know about them. As a result, licensing regimes are often heavily influenced by lobbying from politically connected businesses. Both consumers and potential new entrants into the market get the short end of the regulatory stick. It’s yet another example of the harm caused by political ignorance.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST WATCH: I have done pro bono work for the Institute for Justice on unrelated projects.

UPDATE: Economist Tim Taylor has additional commentary here.

UPDATE #2: I have revised this post slightly to eliminate some minor stylistic flaws.

I posted a draft of this article a few months ago, and I thank VC readers for some helpful comments in improving it. The final version has been published by the Charleston Law Review, and is available on SSRN. Here’s the abstract:

This Article chronologically reviews the British gun control which precipitated the American Revolution: the 1774 import ban on firearms and gun powder; the 1774-75 confiscations of firearms and gun powder, from individuals and from local governments; and the use of violence to effectuate the confiscations. It was these events which changed a situation of rising political tension into a shooting war. Each of these British abuses provides insights into the scope of the modern Second Amendment.

From the events of 1774-75, we can discern that import restrictions or bans on firearms or ammunition are constitutionally suspect — at least if their purpose is to disarm the public, rather than for the normal purposes of import controls (e.g., raising tax revenue, or protecting domestic industry). We can discern that broad attempts to disarm the people of a town, or to render them defenseless, are anathema to the Second Amendment; such disarmament is what the British tried to impose, and what the Americans fought a war to ensure could never again happen in America. Similarly, gun licensing laws which have the purpose or effect of only allowing a minority of the people to keep and bear arms would be unconstitutional. Finally, we see that government violence, which should always be carefully constrained and controlled, should be especially discouraged when it is used to take firearms away from peaceable citizens. Use of the military for law enforcement is particularly odious to the principles upon which the American Revolution was based.

Readers interested in more detail on the role of gun rights and gun control in period leading up to the Revolution, and in the remainder of 18th century America, are encouraged to read Stephen Halbrook’s excellent book The Founders’ Second Amendment, which is the result of decades of work by Halbrook in finding primary sources of the period, including newspapers, correspondence, and diaries.

On a related topic, some readers might also be interested in my 2005 article The Religious Roots of the American Revolution and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, detailing the role of Congregationalist and other ministers in inciting the Revolution, by explaining collective self-defense of natural and civil rights as a moral and religious obligation.

The Wisconsin State Journal reports:

A Dane County judge on Thursday denied a motion to dismiss charges against a Black Earth pastor convicted of conspiracy to commit child abuse for advocating the use of wooden rods to spank children as young as 2 months old.

Philip Caminiti, 55, pastor of the Aleitheia Bible Church, was convicted in March of eight counts of conspiracy to commit child abuse for instructing church members to punish children by hitting them on the bare buttocks with wooden dowels to teach them to behave correctly, in keeping with the church’s literal interpretation of the Bible.

The motion to dismiss the charges alleged Caminiti had been deprived of his constitutional right to religious freedom.

Circuit Judge Maryann Sumi found that Caminiti had “a sincerely held religious belief” as a Christian fundamentalist that requires using a rod to discipline children beginning at a young age. But Sumi said Caminiti failed to show the state’s child abuse statute “places a burden on his sincerely held religious belief.”

“Scripture doesn’t specify how and when the rod should be used,” Sumi said, adding that Caminiti also was willing to modify the church’s practices to comply with the law….

If Caminiti had simply preached the propriety of such behavior in the abstract, I think such a conviction would likely be unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause without regard to any special religious freedom claim, given Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), even if the hitting of the children would indeed be a crime. (It probably would be; note that, according to the sheriff’s department, “the dowels were described as being 12-18 inches long with a diameter about the size of a quarter.”)

Teaching that it’s proper or even obligatory to commit a crime is generally constitutionally protected unless it’s intended to and likely to yield imminent crime, which is to say crime some time in the immediate future, likely within a few hours or at most days, and not “at some indefinite future time.” That’s why it’s not a crime to teach that it’s proper or even religiously obligatory to use marijuana, or to refuse to register for the draft, or to engage in jihad. And it sounds from news accounts that the minister’s teachings were not intended to yield such imminent conduct, but instead were meant as guidance for “some indefinite future time.”

But if Caminiti had specifically counseled particular parents about what to do with their particular children in particular contexts — “minister, my child did this-as-such; should I beat him tonight for it?” — this might qualify as either incitement of imminent criminal conduct, or as constitutionally unprotected solicitation of crime (see United States v. Williams (2008)). The line between solicitation, which is unprotected even when it calls for action in the indefinite future (e.g., “please send me some child pornography, whenever you happen to have some”) and incitement, which is protected unless it calls for imminent action, is unclear. Urging people that some general course of action is morally obligatory, without reference to a particular proposed action dealing with a particular person or a particular item, would be a classic example of material covered under Brandenburg (general advocacy) rather than Williams (solicitation). But the more specific the advocacy, the more likely it is to be seen as unprotected solicitation (or as unprotected incitement, if it’s advocacy of what the parent is to do right away).

Note that Wisconsin courts have interpreted the Wisconsin Constitution to require, in some situations, religious exemptions from generally applicable laws, under the Sherbert/Yoder regime. But it’s not clear to me that, even so, the best argument for the minister is a religious freedom argument. The protection offered by free speech law in such cases should, I think, be rather greater than the protect offered by religious exemptions law. And if the pastor’s speech is unprotected by the Free Speech Clause, I doubt that courts would find it protected even under the state constitution’s religious freedom guarantee, even using the Sherbert/Yoder test.

If anyone can point me to any reasoned opinions on the judge’s part in this case — or to more facts on the subject — I’d love to see them. All I could find myself online is the docket sheet, which doesn’t have the documents. Note that “Caminiti was not charged with having committed any abuse himself.” Thanks to Prof. Howard Friedman (Religion Clause) for the pointer.

Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided Electronic Information Privacy Center v. National Security Agency. Here’s the summary from the beginning of Judge Brown’s opinion for the court.

Plaintiff-appellant Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) filed a Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) request with the National Security Agency (“NSA”) seeking disclosure of any communications between NSA and Google, Inc regarding encryption and cyber security. NSA issued a Glomar response pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3, indicating that it could neither confirm nor deny the existence of any responsive records. EPIC challenged NSA’s Glomar response in the district court, and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment for NSA, and EPIC appealed. We affirm.

UPDATE: BLT reports on the case here.

The Guardian (UK) reports (see also MSNBC Cartoon Blog and other sources):

Mahmoud Shokraye was put on trial after an Iranian MP, Ahmad Lotfi Ashtiani, took offence to a cartoon he drew of the parliamentarian in Nameye Amir, a city newspaper in Arak, the capital of Iran’s central province of Markazi….

In the cartoon, Ashtiani is depicted in a football stadium, dressed as a footballer, with a congratulatory letter in one hand and his foot resting on the ball. The MP’s forehead has a dark mark, said to be the sign of a pious Shia Muslim, caused (supposedly) by frequent prostration during prayer. The cartoon contains little exaggeration and Ashtiani’s forehead has a prayer mark in reality.

Shokraye drew Ashtiani following widespread criticism in Iranian society towards a number of politicians who have been accused of interfering in the country’s sports….

Speaking to an Iranian journalist, Esmail Kowsari, a member of the parliamentary committee on national security, defended the sentence: “[A cartoonist] should be persecuted if the cartoon is not ordinary and ridicules someone … Any crime has its own punishment, including lashing, imprisonment or being fined.”

Note that “persecuted” might (or might not) be a mistranslation. Thanks to Opher Banarie for the pointer.

The Chronicle of Higher Education has an interesting article on responses to a forthcoming book I recently blogged about, Brian Tamanaha’s Failing Law Schools. The Chronicle article is behind a paywall, so to read it you need to click here and then click on the link.

The article includes this defense of the status quo from law prof Michael Olivas:

Michael A. Olivas, a professor of law at the University of Houston and a past president of the Association of American Law Schools, says relaxing accreditation standards to allow more-diverse education models, which Mr. Tamanaha calls for, could lead law schools in the direction of for-profit institutions like the University of Phoenix, which critics contend shortchange students.

As Mr. Olivas puts it, the result could be “the Phoenix-ation of law schools, churning students through, having a contingent and transient faculty, and none of the institutional investment in the broad roles of legal education.”

If so, what is wrong with that? Some law schools may follow that approach, but others won’t. And students ultimately will be the ones to decide which balance of approaches is best, as their decisions where to enroll will determine which schools remain viable. I don’t see why we wouldn’t want students to have that choice. “Institutional investment in the broad roles of legal education” is expensive. If students can get a good legal education without it, I don’t know why they shouldn’t be able to choose to do that.

Thanks to Brian Leiter for the link; Brian has his own thoughts here.

A pleasant story of the law being fixed as a result of public criticism — much of it online — just as in Arizona last month:

Last year, the Tennessee Legislature enacted a statute that essentially banned the online posting of images that cause “emotional distress” “without legitimate purpose.” As I blogged on June 6, the law made it a crime to

(4) Communicate[] with another person or transmits or displays an image in a manner in which there is a reasonable expectation that the image will be viewed by the victim by [by telephone, in writing or by electronic communication] without legitimate purpose:

(A) (i) With the malicious intent to frighten, intimidate or cause emotional distress; or

(ii) In a manner the defendant knows, or reasonably should know, would frighten, intimidate or cause emotional distress to a similarly situated person of reasonable sensibilities; and

(B) As the result of the communication, the person is frightened, intimidated or emotionally distressed.

The law therefore applied not just to one-to-one communication, but to people’s posting images on their own Facebook pages, on their Web sites, and in other places if (1) they were acting “without legitimate purpose,” (2) they caused emotional distress, and (3) they intended to cause emotional distress or knew or reasonably should have known that their action would cause emotional distress to a similarly situated person of reasonable sensibilities. So,

1. If you had posted a picture of someone in an embarrassing situation — not at all limited to, say, sexually themed pictures or illegally taken pictures — you’d likely have been a criminal unless the prosecutor, judge, or jury concludes that you had a “legitimate purpose.”
2. Likewise, if you had posted an image intended to distress some religious, political, ethnic, racial, etc. group, you too could have been sent to jail if a government decisionmaker thought thinks your purpose wasn’t “legitimate.” Nothing in the law required that the picture be of the “victim,” only that it be distressing to the “victim.”
3. The same would have been true even if you hadn’t intend to distress those people, but reasonably should have known that the material — say, pictures of Mohammed, or blasphemous jokes about Jesus Christ, or harsh cartoon insults of some political group — would have “cause[d] emotional distress to a similarly situated person of reasonable sensibilities.”
4. And of course the same would have applied if a newspaper or TV station had posted embarrassing pictures or blasphemous images on its site.

After — I can’t say whether because of — the June 6 post, there was a good deal of criticism of the new law, and it looks like the Tennessee Legislature listened. Last week, it passed (unanimously in the Senate, 76-14 in the House) and sent to the Governor a bill that basically limited the statute to threats; if the Governor signs the bill, then the law would be limited to making it a crime to

(4) Communicate[] with another person or transmits or displays an image without legitimate purpose with the intent that that the image is viewed by the victim … [when the communicator]:

(A) Maliciously intends the communication to be a threat of harm to the victim; and

(B) A reasonable person would perceive the communication to be a threat of harm.

This seems to be limited to speech that fits within the “true threats” exception to First Amendment protection (at least if “harm” is reasonably interpreted as a threat of illegal physical harm or vandalism, rather than a threat of, say, boycott or social ostracism, which are generally constitutionally protected).

So it looks like public criticism of speech restrictions, even ones that seem to target supposed “bullying” or “harassment,” has worked in this instance; I’m very glad to see that. For more on the change in the law, see this TN Report article posted yesterday.

Yesterday the President told ABC News that he believes same-sex couples should be able to get married. So far so good. He further told ABC that he believes this is an issue that should be left to the states which are “arriving at different conclusions at different times.” I have nothing to complain about here, as this is my position as well. I believe in recognition of same-sex marriage, but also believe that this is the sort of question entrusted to state governments under our constitutional system, and that, as with many questions of social policy about which I have strong preferences, different states are and should be free to come to different conclusions on the matter. I also believe that as more states elect to recognize gay marriage (particularly insofar as this is done by legislatures and ballot initiatives, rather than by courts) many of those who are currently uneasy with the idea of gay marriage will learn they have nothing to fear and opposition to gay marriage will slowly melt away.

The problem with the President’s position is that it cannot be reconciled with the Administration’s stance on the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act. According to Attorney General Eric Holder, he and the President concluded that the constitutionality of legal distinctions based upon sexual preference cannot be defended. In their view, because DOMA precludes federal recognition of same-sex marriages, it violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Further, according to Holder’s statement, they concluded that no “reasonable” constitutional argument could be made in DOMA’s defense. Yet if DOMA is unconstitutional under equal protection, which applies to the state and federal governments equally, then how could any state law barring recognition of same-sex marriages survive constitutional scrutiny? In other words, while the President says he believes that states should be allowed to reach “different conclusions at different times” on the question of same-sex marriage, the administration’s legal position is that a state’s refusal to treat opposite-sex and same-sex couples alike is unconstitutional. So while the President may say he’d like to leave this question to the states, that’s an option his administration has already taken off the table.

[NOTE: Edited the post to make clear that equal protectioon is guaranteed as against the federal government through the Fifth Amendment and as against the states through the 14th Amendment, but the standard is the same.]

UPDATE: Here’s the full ABC transcript, in which the President suggests he was also influenced by a concern that DOMA federalizes a traditional state concern. Lyle Denniston comments here, suggesting the President’s legal position does not threaten state laws. Calvin Massey disagrees here. Massey is right.

The official statements from the Justice Department do not raise any federalism concerns and rest the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional (and that no reasonable arguments may be made in its defense) on the basis that distinctions based on sexual preference are subject to intermediate scrutiny, that there are no important government interests in maintaining a traditional definition of marriage, and that animus may have contributed to DOMA’s passage. While there are other arguments that could challenge DOMA without threatening state laws (such as those suggested by Will Baude), the Adminsitration’s arguments, were they to prevail against DOMA, would be the death knell for state laws as well. If a federal law supported by Senators Biden, Dodd, Reid and Wellstone — and signed into law by President Clinton — were impermissibly tainted by anti-gay animus, it’s hard to see how state laws barring same-sex marriage would not be as well.

NASA’s James Hansen can be a bit unhinged when he talks about climate change. Although one of the world’s more prominent climate scientists, he has a penchant for selectively presenting only the most apocalyptic global warming scenarios and adopting unduly inflammatory rhetoric, as when he compared coal-laden trains, aka “death trains,” to the railcars carrying Jews to Nazi concentration camps or suggested that energy company CEOs are guilty of “crimes against humanity.”

Yet whatever his faults, James Hansen’s central climate policy recommendation is a sound one. For years he has called for a simple and straightforward approach: A revenue-neutral carbon tax and an end to fossil energy subsidies. As he writes in today’s NT:

We need to start reducing emissions significantly, not create new ways to increase them. We should impose a gradually rising carbon fee, collected from fossil fuel companies, then distribute 100 percent of the collections to all Americans on a per-capita basis every month. The government would not get a penny. This market-based approach would stimulate innovation, jobs and economic growth, avoid enlarging government or having it pick winners or losers. Most Americans, except the heaviest energy users, would get more back than they paid in increased prices. Not only that, the reduction in oil use resulting from the carbon price would be nearly six times as great as the oil supply from the proposed pipeline from Canada, rendering the pipeline superfluous, according to economic models driven by a slowly rising carbon price.

But instead of placing a rising fee on carbon emissions to make fossil fuels pay their true costs, leveling the energy playing field, the world’s governments are forcing the public to subsidize fossil fuels with hundreds of billions of dollars per year. This encourages a frantic stampede to extract every fossil fuel through mountaintop removal, longwall mining, hydraulic fracturing, tar sands and tar shale extraction, and deep ocean and Arctic drilling.

This is the sort of policy that could reduce greenhouse gas emissions and provide incentives for innovation (particularly if combined with things like prizes) without requiring the erection of a vast new bureaucracy or imposing substantial new burdens on the economy.

Conservatives have called for shifting the tax burden from labor and wealth creation to consumption, and that is precisely what Hansen’s proposal would do. Further, as shown by the experience of other jurisdictions, implementing a carbon tax of this sort is far less complicated than trying to erect a Waxman-Markey-type cap-and-trade scheme. A basic carbon tax would also be less susceptible (on the margin) to special interest rent-seeking than a cap-and-trade scheme, particularly if emissions allowances are to be doled out to reduce the economic impact of the regime. For a variety of reasons, excise taxes tend not to be carved up by interest groups the way income tax schemes are.

I’ve also argued that a revenue-neutral carbon tax would be easier — or at least no less difficult — to enact than a cap-and-trade scheme. Both involve increasing the cost of energy, but the revenue-neutral carbon tax would do so in a simpler, less-regressive, more transparent, and less economically burdensome way, and could not be characterized (a la Waxman-Markey) as implementing expansive government control over the energy sector for the benefit of special interests. Of course, we won’t know whether this is true until political leaders have the guts to push for this sort of policy.

I wish that environmental activists would follow Hansen’s lead (rather than, say, Krugman’s) and embrace this approach as a superior alternative to increased regulation or Waxman-Markey-style cap-and-trade. Alas, many Greens seem more interested in expanding government power than reducing greenhouse gas emissions. I also wish more forward-looking Republican leaders would embrace this sort of policy and recognize how it’s consistent with limited government principles. Alas, few on the right take environmental policy seriously enough to do more than bash bureaucrats. So I guess I’ll be wishing for awhile.

For those who lack the interest or patience to read my forthcoming full-blown law review article in the Washington & Lee law review, I have a shorter adapted version in latest issue of the Federalist Society’s journal Engage on the economics and regulation of bank overdraft protection.  Thanks to Nick Tuszynski of the Mercatus Center for his help with this.

President Obama’s recent announcement that he supports gay marriage is yet another addition to the short but distinguished list of issues on which the President and I agree.

Previous entries include creating a playoff system for college football, allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military, ending the home mortgage interest deduction for high-income taxpayers (though I would go further and abolish the deduction for everyone), the president’s authority to forego defending federal statutes he believes to be unconstitutional, the legality of the targeted killing of Osama Bin Laden, the end of the NBA lockout, and that the Obama health care plan’s individual mandate is not a tax. Based on the above, it seems that the biggest areas of overlap between our worldviews are gay rights and sports. But the list is not completely exhaustive, since there are a few other issues where we also agree, but I don’t blog about them because they are too far outside my areas of interest and expertise.

UPDATE: A somewhat overwrought critique of this post takes me to task for supposedly being unaware of numerous largely noncontroversial things that Obama and I agree on, such as that genocide is evil or that Hitler and Stalin were great villains. I’m well aware of these areas of agreement, thank you. But this post was about issues on which Obama and I agree, which means questions that are controversial in modern American politics. The fact that Obama and I agree on many things on which there is an overwhelming national consensus isn’t relevant to that. We also agree that the Earth is round, and that the Sun rises in the East.

Today the President of the United States explicitly endorsed the idea that gay couples and their families should have the freedom to marry.  He had already done so as a practical matter by refusing to defend the constitutionality of what he carefully mislabelled the “Defense Against Marriage Act” and by publicly opposing state constitutional amendments against marriage.  But in the past he had said he personally opposed gay marriage because “God is in the mix.”  Jon Rauch has some thoughts about the Obama evolution toward support:

What happened? Harry Truman was fond of quoting Mark Twain: “When in doubt, do right. This will gratify some people and astonish the rest.” Now and then, politicians have a “goddammit” moment. Obama’s position had clearly shifted on the issue (who was he kidding with his talk of having “evolved” but being unwilling to make news?), and there was never going to be a better time to make the switch than now–at least not while he is certain to be a non-lame-duck president.

So Obama decided it’s worth a roll of the dice to make history. Which is what he has done.

As of his announcement, favoring gay marriage is now fully, indisputably, and permanently a mainstream political position. All hint of weirdness or stigma is gone. It is also now the stated position of one of the two major political parties (only 16 years after President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, signed the anti-gay-marriage Defense of Marriage Act). Precisely because the issue is unlikely to decide the election this year, November’s result will not revoke the issue’s promotion in status even if Obama loses. Though gay couples have not achieved full legal equality, gay marriage, as an issue, has achieved full political equality. That is a landmark in the ongoing marriage debate.

Rauch goes on to speculate that Obama’s statement might influence the Justices should the Prop 8 case or DOMA litigation reach them.  That’s possible, but I’m dubious. This Supreme Court has not been shy about disagreeing with the Executive Branch.  For goodness’ sake, Justice Alito delivered a visual advisory opinion to him during the State of the Union speech days after the Citizens United decision. I think they’ll decide the issue independently of what President Obama, or President Romney, personally thinks about it. The bigger constitutional landmark was the Obama Justice Department’s conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional because it cannot meet the heightened scrutiny that the DOJ argued is applicable to discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The rest of what Rauch says, however, seems spot on to me.  It’s easy to be cynical about everything politicians do, and I yield to few people in my skepticism of officeholders.  I spoke to many Minnesota lawmakers last year who voted to place an anti-gay marriage limitation on the ballot, yet privately expressed their misgivings about it. President Obama himself has a tortured public history on the issue, moving from support when he ran for state office in 1996, to opposition when he ran for U.S. Senate in 2004 and president in 2008, to support now.  It’s obvious that he privately supported gay marriage for years, so his evolution was for public consumption.

Nevertheless, watching him closely on TV, I had a hard time mustering cynicism about the president’s words.  He must know his public support is not obviously a net political plus for him in November.  And his description today of his discussions with his family, his experience of talking to young adults (including young Republicans) for whom opposition to gay marriage is baffling, and his understanding of the hardships faced by gay families, including those headed by openly gay servicemembers, seemed genuine.  His words echoed the conclusions now reached by about half of the American people.  On this issue, as on others, the president may be leading from behind.  But it matters when presidents lead, as when Lyndon Johnson declared civil rights a “moral issue” and announced on national television, “We shall overcome.”  The president’s endorsement won’t matter to people who’ve made up their minds to oppose marriage for gay couples, but many others are listening.

An article by Will Tuell (who apparently is or was a local town selectman) in the Downeast Coastal Press reports that State Senator Cynthia Dill — seemingly the leader in the Democratic primary, though not necessarily a strong competitor to Independent candidate and former Governor Angus King — endorses Court-packing:

On the issue of whether the Supreme Court needs to be reformed, Dill, a civil rights lawyer with experience in the federal court system, called for major changes reminiscent of those sought by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. …

Dill said she approves of President Obama’s picks and would consider expanding the number of justices on the Court if decisions she sees as unfavorable continue to be passed down. “I think there’s promise, but if we continue to get these poor decisions, I’m not opposed to adding justices. The Constitution doesn’t say we have to have nine justices, and if these nine can’t figure it out and keep producing 5-4 decisions that are crippling our country, let’s throw a few more good justices on the Court and straighten things out.”

I should note that I see nothing inherently wrong in the political branches pushing back against the Court, whether through ordinary nominations, through constitutional amendments, or possibly even through proposals to limit the Court’s jurisdiction (though I’m skeptical about the latter). But Court-packing strikes me as a pretty poor idea: It’s nearly certain to lead to partisan tit-for-tat should this be done by one party, and the consequences of such tit-for-tat are likely to hurt the judicial system with little compensating benefit, either for Democrats or Republicans. In any case, I thought I wanted to note that such a proposal was being discussed, though of course I realize that it’s politically very unlikely to succeed.

The full article, reprinted with the editor’s permission, is below:

Continue reading ‘Leading Democratic Primary Candidate for Senator from Maine Calls for Court-Packing’ »

That is, with respect to his support for same-sex marriage, telling ABC’s Robin Roberts:

Over the course of several years as I have talked to friends and family and neighbors when I think about members of my own staff who are in incredibly committed monogamous relationships, same-sex relationships, who are raising kids together, when I think about those soldiers or airmen or marines or sailors who are out there fighting on my behalf and yet feel constrained, even now that Don’t Ask Don’t Tell is gone, because they are not able to commit themselves in a marriage, at a certain point I’ve just concluded that for me personally it is important for me to go ahead and affirm that I think same sex couples should be able to get married.

Having recently married — albeit in the legally boring kind of wedding that raises no constitutional issues — I suspect that Obama sees this as an excellent way to jumpstart the economy.

The news is here, announcing that Ward Farnsworth is the new Dean. Congrats to Ward. Although if guestblogging at the VC leads to Deanships, we may start to have a hard time attracting guest bloggers in the future.

The trouble is that it appears that he does indeed have a criminal record. The complaint, in Richey v. Walker (Ga. Super. Ct. May 3, 2012) is based on these statements on the Georgia Politics Unfiltered blog:

1. “Rashad Richey, the person in charge of making political decisions for Georgia Democratic Party, has a history of making poor personal decisions.”
2. “The money raised from this event will help keep Rashad Richey the Recidivist on the Democratic payroll for a long time.”
3. “We now know what Ali Rashad Richie used all that cash for … Bail money.”
4. “So, a criminal is in charge of directing Democratic politics across Georgia.”
5. “Ali Rashad Richie, political director for Georgia’s Democratic Party is a jail bird. Rashad Richie is a recidivist.”

The complaint seems to be arguing that this is false because “recidivist” means someone who has committed more than one felony, and “Plaintiff is not a convicted Felon.”

But WSB-TV reports that, “Richey had a series of misdemeanor convictions for criminal trespass and simple battery. Channel 2 Action News has now learned Richey also had a felony conviction for aggravated assault in 1998 but was sentenced as a first-time offender. When he completed his sentence, the felony was wiped from his record.” GPB News reports that Richey’s “attorneys confirm that Richey has been arrested for a variety of misdemeanor charges, including driving with a revoked license, battery, obstructing an officer and family violence.” (Note that this is confirmation of the arrest record, and not of a conviction record, but the WSB-TV story states there was a conviction record, and nothing in the GPB News story denies that.) A quick criminal history search of my own revealed Richey’s aggravated assault conviction, and another site posts a 2007 arrest report based on a separate incident. Nor have I seen any indication that WSB-TV is mistaken about the series of misdemeanor convictions.

So Richey’s only argument seems to be that calling someone with several misdemeanor conviction and one felony conviction that was expunged (just because it was a first offense, and not on the grounds that Richey had been exonerated) a “recidivist” is recklessly or knowingly false because “recidivist” is reserved for people with multiple felony convictions. But I don’t think that the term is limited to felonies in ordinary language, and I don’t think reasonable readers of the blog would have so understood the word; rather, a typical lay reader would likely see it as simply accusation of multiple criminal offenses — an accusation that appears to be true.

I should note that if the statement “[w]e now know what Ali Rashad Richie used all that cash for … Bail money” would have reasonably been seen as a charge of embezzlement of funds, that might be libelous. But I didn’t see any reference to that in the Complaint, which suggests that in context it was likely seen just as a dig at his criminal record, rather than a serious accusation of misappropriation of funds.

Oh, and according to WSB-TV, “Richey’s attorneys believe the series of blogs are borderline harassment and constitute a form of cyberbullying.”

From an editorial in the Greene County Republican Committee newsletter:

The ultimate task for the people is to remain vigilant and aware ~ that the government, their government is out of control, and this moment, this opportunity, must not be forsaken, must not escape us, for we shall not have any coarse but armed revolution should we fail with the power of the vote in November ~ This Republic cannot survive for 4 more years underneath this political socialist ideologue.

A truly appalling call for violence, and a truly appalling repudiation of basic American democratic principles. The author seems willing to start a bloody war with his fellow Americans, a war that he’s certain to lose — since by hypothesis he’d be fighting against the majority who reelect the President, coupled with the armed forces who would doubtless follow the lawful orders to suppress any such revolution — and that, if seriously prosecuted, would costs the lives of a vast number of his fellow citizens.

And why? Because, by hypothesis, President Obama has been reelected? If you don’t like who gets elected, persuade your fellow Americans so they elect your party instead of the other (as in fact they have in most elections over the past 35 years). Or persuade them to elect your party to one or both Houses of Congress, to counteract the President’s power (which in fact happened just two years before). That’s the American way.

Yes, I agree that in some circumstances armed revolution can be justified. But the likely costs of such revolution in a country such as the modern U.S. range from the horrific to the catastrophic. Partly because of this, it is very rare for armed revolution to be justifiable — even under circumstances that are much more extreme than the ones we face now — in a democracy where peaceful means (winning elections) are available. And in any event, all that bloodshed can’t be justifiable if it’s likely to be futile, as it certainly would be, and if it’s over policy differences that, important as they might be, cannot warrant bloody civil war.

I realize that this author is just an editor of a county party newsletter. And I quite doubt that more than a few Greene County Republicans really believe this nonsense. (The newsletter says, “Content of newsletter does not reflect the opinion of the Republican Party whole or in part, all contents offered are individual,” and in this instance I’m sure it’s true.) But I’ve heard enough people say variants of something like this that I wanted to speak out publicly about it. And I certainly hope that the Greene County Republican Party Committee does the same, and makes sure that such calls for violence don’t appear in its publications again.

UPDATE: Commenter redheadedbuddha reports that the site now says — apparently referring to the controversy —

~ all this rip roar Media hype….. is all about…..being armed with the voices of We the people…..you must arm yourself with a spoken word to be heard ~ just as the founding fathers spoke out during the revolution……So, Yes, arm yourself with many voices for the people and by the people….as your constitution allows….should the vote fail ….this November or at anytime……

~ Being Armed with Your Voices of We The People is The Only Way if Any Vote Should Fail No Matter Who You Vote for ~

” your voice being heard is the best method “

Yeah, that’s what “armed revolution” means — armed with words, “just as the founding fathers spoke out during the revolution.” Right.

The New York Times has an article describing how the TransCanada corporation is using eminent domain to forcibly acquire property to build the Keystone oil pipeline:

When the TransCanada men first came, Julia Trigg Crawford said, they were polite. They offered money. Seven thousand dollars to let the Keystone XL pipeline cross her family’s 600-acre farm on its way from the Alberta tar sands to the refineries on the Gulf Coast….

Ms. Crawford, 52, who serves as the farm’s manager, called the rest of the family. They agreed to sign. “We thought that at least if we signed we’d have some say in what happened,” she said.

They called the TransCanada representative. “He told us that if we could come up with a contract that worked for both parties, they wouldn’t condemn the land,” Ms. Crawford said…..

“I fully expected them to counter,” she said. “There were about five or six things we wanted, and we would have been happy to take one or two.”

Then, she said, TransCanada “went full radio silence.” The Crawfords never heard back from them — until October, when they got a letter saying their land had been condemned and a lease awarded to TransCanada.

But as the Crawfords discovered, when voluntary compensation agreements are not reached, Texas law allows certain private pipeline companies to use the right of eminent domain to force landowners to let pipelines through. This was true even for TransCanada, which has yet to get State Department permission to bring the Keystone XL across the Alberta border.

The article notes TransCanada’s claim that it has acquired the overwhelming majority of the property they needed for the pipeline through voluntary land sales. This may be true, but it is misleading. Like the Crawfords, these owners agreed to sell their land under the threat of eminent domain if they refused. Some might well have refused to sell for the price offered by the firm if eminent domain were off the table. The voluntariness of land sales undertaken in the shadow of threats of condemnation is dubious at best.

Back in 2006, co-blogger Jonathan Adler and I published an article explaining the environmental dangers of allowing the use of eminent domain for private economic development projects, as the Supreme Court ruled in the Kelo case. At the time, some environmentalists pooh-pooed the article, and one group even declared our article the environmental “outrage of the month” (it must have been a slow month for actual pollution). Ironically, as Jonathan explained here, several environmental groups are now trying to use post-Kelo reform laws restricting economic development takings to block the Keystone takings.

Such efforts are unlikely to succeed in Texas. As I described in this article, Texas is one of many states that have passed post-Kelo reform laws that pretend to constrain economic development takings without actually doing so. They might have a better chance in one of the other states through which the pipeline must pass.

Even if Kelo had been decided the other way, some pipeline takings might still be constitutional. The Constitution permits takings for “public use,” and even under the traditional definition of public use advocated by Kelo’s critics, condemnations for public utilities or common carriers that the general population has a legal right of access to are often permissible. However, pipeline takings would be subject to tougher constitutional constraints than under Kelo, and the government would at least have to prove that the pipelines in question really are public utilities or common carriers open to the general public.

Regardless, as Jonathan points out, the controversy over Keystone has led “some environmentalists… to recognize that allowing the government to seize private property for the purpose of encouraging private economic development can facilitate environmentally undesirable projects.”

UPDATE: In a response to this post, Mark Kleiman claims that Jonathan Adler and I “don’t seem interested in the fact that none of their friends on the side of inalienable property rights seems to have any problem with the use of eminent domain to build Keystone (any more than they objected to George W. Bush’s use of it to enrich himself and his business partners in the Texas Rangers by seizing private property to build, not merely a stadium, but a shopping mall).” Actually, people who are genuinely “on the side of inalienable property rights” are likely to be opposed to the use of eminent domain for this project. But if Kleiman means to refer to the GOP, I thought the fact that most Republicans support the pipeline is too well-known to require dwelling on. By contrast, (some) environmentalists’ change of heart on eminent domain is a development that is much less widely appreciated.

I have, however, criticized eminent domain abuses advocated by Republicans in many previous posts, such as here and here. In this 2006 post, I noted the inadequacy of the Bush administration’s response to Kelo. Few if any opponents of Kelo approve of the use of eminent domain to build sports stadiums. George W. Bush’s exploitation of it, of course, occurred many years before Kelo thrust the issue of eminent domain into the limelight, and few nonexperts remember it today.

Google commissioned me to write this White Paper (“First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results“), so I thought I’d pass it along. I wrote the paper as an advocate, and not as a disinterested academic, but I hope some of our readers might find it interesting nonetheless. Here is the Introduction, though of course it isn’t intended to be persuasive on its own — the supporting arguments are in the rest of the paper:

Once, the leading sources to which people turned for useful information were newspapers, guidebooks, and encyclopedias. Today, these sources also include search engine results, which people use (along with other sources) to learn about news, local institutions, products, services, and many other matters. Then and now, the First Amendment has protected all these forms of speech from government attempts to regulate what they present or how they present it. And this First Amendment protection has applied even when the regulations were motivated by a concern about what some people see as “fairness.”

Google, Microsoft’s Bing, Yahoo! Search, and other search engines are speakers. First, they sometimes convey information that the search engine company has itself prepared or compiled (such as information about places appearing in Google Places). Second, they direct users to material created by others, by referencing the titles of Web pages that the search engines judge to be most responsive to the query, coupled with short excerpts from each page. Such reporting about others’ speech is itself constitutionally protected speech.

Third, and most valuably, search engines select and sort the results in a way that is aimed at giving users what the search engine companies see as the most helpful and useful information. (That is how each search engine company tries to keep users coming back to it rather than to its competitors.) This selection and sorting is a mix of science and art: It uses sophisticated computerized algorithms, but those algorithms themselves inherently incorporate the search engine company engineers’ judgments about what material users are most likely to find responsive to their queries.

In this respect, each search engine’s editorial judgment is much like many other familiar editorial judgments:

• newspapers’ daily judgments about which wire service stories to run, and whether they are to go “above the fold”;
• newspapers’ periodic judgments about which op-ed columnists, lifestyle columnists, business columnists, or consumer product columnists are worth carrying regularly, and where their columns are to be placed;
• guidebooks’ judgments about which local attractions, museums, stores, and restaurants to mention, and how prominently to mention them;
• the judgment of sites such as DrudgeReport.com about which stories to link to, and in what order to list them.

All these speakers must decide: Out of the thousands of possible items that could be included, which to include, and how to arrange those that are included? Such editorial judgments may differ in certain ways: For example, a newspaper also includes the materials that its editors have selected and arranged, while the speech of DrudgeReport.com or a search engine consists almost entirely of the selected and arranged links to others’ material. But the judgments are all, at their core, editorial judgments about what users are likely to find interesting and valuable. And all these exercises of editorial judgment are fully protected by the First Amendment.

That is so even when a newspaper simply makes the judgment to cover some particular subject matter: For instance, when many newspapers published TV listings, they were free to choose to do so without regard to whether this choice undermined the market for TV Guide. Likewise, search engines are free to include and highlight their own listings of (for example) local review pages even though Yelp might prefer that the search engines instead rank Yelp’s information higher. And this First Amendment protection is even more clearly present when a speaker, such as Google, makes not just the one include-or-not editorial judgment, but rather many judgments about how to design the algorithms that produce and rank search results that — in Google’s opinion — are likely to be most useful to users.

Of course, search engines produce and deliver their speech through a different technology than that traditionally used for newspapers and books. The information has become much easier for readers to access, much more customized to the user’s interests, and much easier for readers to act on. The speech is thus now even more valuable to customers than it was before. But the freedom to distribute, select, and arrange such speech remains the same.

We will discuss this in detail below, both as to the First Amendment generally (Part III) and as to the intersection of First Amendment law and antitrust law (Part IV). We focus in this submission on Google search results for which no payment has been made to Google, because they have been the subject of recent debates; we do not discuss, for instance, the ads that Google often displays at the top or on the right-hand side of the search results page.

In R. v. Belghar (New South Wales Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2012), Ismail Belghar is being prosecuted for attempted murder of his sister-in-law (labeled “complainant” in the opinion). The government alleges:

On a day in October 2009, the complainant, her sister Hanife and a female friend went to the beach without the respondent’s knowledge. When Hanife returned home, the respondent demanded to know where she had been and whom she had been with. When she told him, the respondent telephoned the complainant and said, “You slut, I’m going to kill you. I’m going to fuck you up. I’m going to find you and kill you. You fucking slut, how dare you take my wife to the beach.”

[Two months later, Belghar ran into complainant at a shopping mall.] The respondent walked out of the shopping centre and towards the complainant with a key in his right hand. He stood in front of her and put his face against hers and said, “I’m going to kill you. I’m going to fucking kill you.” The respondent slapped the complainant once with an open right hand to the left side of her face. The respondent then bent down, put his arms around the complainant’s legs and waist and picked her up from the railing. He carried her to the railing on the boundary of the car park (“the external railing”) and held her over it to the extent that she could see the roadway below. The complainant was crying uncontrollably and believed she was going to die.

Complainant’s brother interceded and saved her. Belghar was arraigned for trial, and asked for a trial without a jury, but the government insisted on a jury. Under Australia law, when a defendant waives trial by jury and a prosecutor disagrees, “the court may make a trial by judge order if it considers it is in the interests of justice to do so”; and the trial judge reasoned (emphasis added),

[T]he attitude of the [respondent] regarding the sister-in-law victim is based on a religious or cultural basis and in light of the fact that there has been adverse publicity regarding persons who hold extreme Muslim faith beliefs in the community, I am of the view that the apprehension by the [respondent] that he may not receive a fair trial is a reasonable apprehension….

The reason for the animosity between the applicant and the victim as suggested by the Crown will be that the victim took the applicant’s wife to the beach where the applicant’s wife displayed her body because she was seen by the applicant to be sunburnt in her certain places on her body and this was abhorrent to the applicant by virtue of either his strict religious beliefs or by virtue of the fact that he believed he had absolute authority over the wife as opposed to the wife’s family having some authority over her….

In this particular case there is direct reference to aspects of the Muslim faith which may cause a jury to take their mind off the central issue which is a single issue, that is, what was the intent of the applicant at the point in time that he came into contact with the victim at the Broadway shopping centre….

In this particular case it really relates insofar as the Crown case is concerned as to his state of mind, and the rage created by his either faith (sic) or the culture that he had absolute control over the wife….

I feel that the application should be granted … and I do so on the basis that the Crown has not been able to demonstrate to me any prejudice that the Crown faces or any prejudice that the community faces in relation to the granting of the application.

The appeals court disagreed (emphasis added) (some paragraph breaks added):

Continue reading ‘Australian Juries and Muslim Defendants Accused of Attempted Honor Killings’ »

Lyle Denniston has an interesting post on SCOTUSBlog discussing whether the Court will reconsider its judgment in Nken v. Holder because the decision was based, in part, on erroneous factual premises.

The Justice Department last month told the Court that it had provided faulty information in that case about U.S. immigration policy, but it suggested that the Court need not do anything about it. Now, however, a group of immigrants’ rights lawyers have asked the Court to actually modify the opinion after the fact, so that lower courts do not rely upon the error, with a negative impact on immigrants’ rights.

The Court has formally accepted the Justice Department’s letter expressing regret over the development, as well as the lawyers’ letter filed last Friday asking for a change in the ruling. That letter, though, was not filed for a party in the case — the immigrant Jean Marc Nken or the federal government — but rather on behalf of several immigrants’ rights groups who took part in the Nken case three years ago as amici — not a direct role. The Department has already made clear it sees no need for a modification, and Nken may have no reason to seek it, since in the meantime he has been granted asylum to stay in the U.S.

When a factual error upon which the Court had relied in Kennedy v. Louisiana was disclosed, and both the SG’s office and Louisiana sought rehearing, the Court altered the wording of its opinion, but not the result. with Nken, on the other hand, the time for rehearing has passed, but the consequences of the Court’s error may be significant.

for the immigrants’ rights lawyers, they have told the Court that this is not just a matter of procedural inconvenience or nicety. Various lower courts have relied upon the incorrect statement in the Court’s Nken opinion to deny an immigrant’s plea to remain in the U.S. until that individual has a chance to challenge deportation in court, they said. Moreover, the attorneys’ letter said, there is reason to doubt even the Justice Department’s assurances to the Court that the government now has a policy that it will allow a deported non-citizen to return to the U.S. if he or she wins a challenge to being sent away. “There is still substantial agency discretion” about that outcome, the letter argued.

What’s more, the letter said, the government can give no assurance that, in the future, some other administration may rely on what the Court had said in Nken about the right of return, and thus feel justified in refusing a non-citizen’s re-entry. The government, it added, has made no commitment “to a permanent, legally binding policy.”

It will be interesting to see how the Court responds.

Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Maker’s Mark Distillery v. Diageo North America. The opinion begins:

Justice Hugo Black once wrote, “I was brought up to believe that Scotch whisky would need a tax preference to survive in competition with Kentucky bourbon.” Dep’t of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). While there may be some truth to Justice Black’s statement that paints Kentucky bourbon as such an economic force that its competitors need government protection or preference to compete with it, it does not mean a Kentucky bourbon distiller may not also avail itself of our laws to protect its assets. This brings us to the question before us today: whether the bourbon producer Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc.’s registered trademark consisting of its signature trade dress element—a red dripping wax seal—is due protection, in the form of an injunction, from a similar trade dress element on Casa Cuervo, S.A. de C.V.’s Reserva de la Familia tequila bottles. We hold that it is. The judgments of the district court in this trademark infringement case are AFFIRMED.

The folks at the Heartland Institute are mad, and that seems to have driven them a little mad. For years environmental activists have compared climate skeptics and those who raise questions about the likelihood of a warming-induced apocalypse to Holocaust deniers and worse. In 1989, then-Senator Al Gore famously compared those who downplayed the climate threat to those who ignored Hitler’s rise and NASA’s James Hansen compared coal-bearing trains to the rail cars headed to Nazi crematoria, drawing a moral equivalence between the use of coal and the Holocaust. Think Progress also trumpeted the “climate denial” views of Norwegian terrorist Andrew Breivik and claimed he was “inspired” by mainstream climate skeptics.

Then, earlier this year, Heartland was the target of directed smear campaign after the Pacific Institute’s Peter Gleick surreptitiously obtained internal Heartland documents by impersonating a board member. Gleick anonymously distributed the purloined documents together with a forged memorandum purporting to provide further evidence of Heartland’s internal dealings. Progressive bloggers trumpeted the materials, and the forged memo in particular, as evidence of Heartland’s sinister machinations. While it seems likely that Gleick himself forged the memo (or knows who did) Heartland may have difficulty seeking legal redress for his actions. I posted on what some call “Fakegate” here and here.

Instead of trying to retain the moral high ground by defending the substance of its views, Heartland took adopted the tactics of its most unhinged critics, purchasing a billboard comparing those who believe in global warming to the Unabomber. According to Heartland, this was to be the first in a series featuring famous “global warming alarmists,” including Osama Bin Laden, Fidel Castro and other “rogues and villians.” Heartland explained the campaign this way:

what these murderers and madmen have said differs very little from what spokespersons for the United Nations, journalists for the “mainstream” media, and liberal politicians say about global warming. They are so similar, in fact, that a Web site has a quiz that asks if you can tell the difference between what Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, wrote in his “Manifesto” and what Al Gore wrote in his book, Earth in the Balance.

The point is that believing in global warming is not “mainstream,” smart, or sophisticated. In fact, it is just the opposite of those things. Still believing in man-made global warming – after all the scientific discoveries and revelations that point against this theory – is more than a little nutty. In fact, some really crazy people use it to justify immoral and frightening behavior.

The response to this ad was quite negative from friend and foe alike, prompting Heartland to pull the ad within 24 hours. Heartland now claims the billboard was an “experiment.”

“This provocative billboard was always intended to be an experiment. And after just 24 hours the results are in: It got people’s attention.

“This billboard was deliberately provocative, an attempt to turn the tables on the climate alarmists by using their own tactics but with the opposite message. We found it interesting that the ad seemed to evoke reactions more passionate than when leading alarmists compare climate realists to Nazis or declare they are imposing on our children a mass death sentence. We leave it to others to determine why that is so.

Well lots of folks didn’t get the joke, including many of Heartlands friends and funders. Several speakers have withdrawn from Heartland’s annual climate conference, including Rep. James Sensenbrenner and IPCC critic Donna Laframboise. (More reactions here and here.) E&E News also reports the publicity stunt is costing Heartland financial support, and could prompt staff departures too.

Even if the billboard was initially designed as an “experiment,” it was a stupid idea. The implicit argument of the billboards is completely unjustifiable. So what if some tyrants and whackjobs believe in global warming. This is like arguing someone should eat meat because Hitler was a vegetarian. Lots of evil, crazy, and stupid people believe plenty of sensible things (and lots of brilliant people have embraced nutty ideas). Heartland’s justifiable anger at the vitriol spewed by its most extreme or unhinged opponents does not justify sinking to their level. If the folks at Heartland believe there is a double-standard — and I believe there is, even though I also believe anthropogenic global warming is a real problem — then they should explain why. There’s no need to provoke and offend countless commuters and others by suggesting that a believing in global warming makes one like the Unabomber. It was a know-nothing message, and not just because most so-called “skeptics” actually believe in global warming too, and only reject apocalyptic climate projections. I expect this sort of stunt from extreme animal rights groups, not those who purport to want an open and honest scientific debate. However angry the Heartland folks may be with some of those on the other side, this stunt was unjustified and unwise — and by all accounts it looks like it will cost Heartland dearly.

Big-name literary scholar Stanley Fish has an interesting column on The Hunger Games, the popular series of science fiction novels by Suzanne Collins which has recently been made into a highly successful movie:

A couple of weeks ago my daughter visited from California. She brought with her the first volume of Suzanne Collins’s “The Hunger Games.” She read it in short order and drove to the local Barnes & Noble to get the other two. She finished them in a day, and then passed all three on to me. I devoured them and passed them on to my wife, who also read them in record time.

What accounts for three overeducated adults being so caught up in the story of a teenage girl — Katniss Everdeen — who lives in a dystopian future ruled and controlled by the decadent and cruel denizens of “The Capitol”?

Many have commented on the excellence of the pacing (you’re always on the hook) and on the inventiveness with which Collins devises the obstacles — both animate and inanimate, and a few things in between — that challenge Katniss and her fellow contestants as they play a gladiatorial, televised game whose point is to defeat one’s opponents by killing them and so be the last person standing.

But the technical skills Collins displays are only a part of the explanation of the novels’ power. The other part is the thematic obsession hinted at by the title: just what is it that the characters, and by extension the readers, hunger for? On the literal level the answer is obvious. Kept at a near-starvation level by their rulers, the inhabitants of the nation of Panem (bread) hunger for food, and one of Katniss’s virtues is that as an expert archer she can provide it.

Food, however, is a metaphor in the trilogy for another kind of sustenance, the sustenance provided by an inner conviction of one’s own worth and integrity….

One of the tributes names that as the goal he desires more than survival. Peeta Mellark, in love with Katniss since the moment he laid eyes on her (the moment when he gave her bread), says to her, “I want to die as myself … I don’t want them to change me in there.”

Fish’s emphasis on the characters’ inner struggle for “authenticity” contrasts with the more politically oriented interpretations of the series developed by other commentators. I previously blogged about political and moral themes in The Hunger Games here, here, and here. I also discussed the subject in a recent podcast for the Institute for Humane Studies.