Federalism and Tort Reform:
On the Greedy Clerks board, AWC raises an interesting question: are conservatives hypocritical for favoring federal tort reform? After all, conservatives are usually in favor of limited federal goverment. When it comes to tort reform, however, many conservatives sing a different tune: suddenly they switch to talking about the dangers of state regulation and the need for federal protection of businesses. Are these conservatives just a bunch of hypocritical fair-weather federalists who want to protect businesses but not people? Or are pro-plaintiff state courts effectively creating inconsistent state regulatory schemes — exactly the kind of problem that the Commerce Clause power was designed to address?
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How this plays out in the tort reform arena may be slightly different, but undoubtedly there will be some conservatives that look first to what the business interests are, and only later will they consider how the principle of favoring a limited federal government affects the issue.
First, as was the case in the Same-sex marriage amendment following the Goodridge decision, conservatives argued that federal regulation was required in order to prevent one state court from bullying all the other states into adopting same-sex marriage. Similarly when one state's court allows huge punitive damage awards, multi-state corporations' activities in other states are collaterally regulated. This was a big issue in State Farm v. Campbell. So, I guess, the idea is that either way federalism is going to be impaired, and a little regulation will help a larger encroachment.
Second, I would agree with your second point, that this seems like the kind of problem that the commerce clause was originally meant to remedy. Most conservatives (at least those I know) admit that there are race-to-the-bottom problems and interest in uniformity that warrant federal regulation, and this seems like one that is worthy of regulation.
I do not claim to have thought through all possible scenarios, and maybe some tort reform issues do not impact interstate commerce. But it seems clear to me that some do. Whether a Massachusetts firearms manufacturer can deliver its products to a Texas firearms dealer should not be decided by a California court.
The state courts, IOW, are good enough for a poor person whose life or liberty is literally at issue. But a state court is not good enough for a business that can afford to retain Williams &Connolly or Gibson Dunn.
I have not thought through all possible scenarios, and probably some problems with the tort system do not have interstate commerce implications. But a California court should not be in the position to prevent a New England firearms manufacturer from delivering its products to a licensed dealer in Texas.
Instead, Congress should (using a scapel, I'm sure) be able to determine whether any person, in any of the 50 states, should get a firearm? Let's not forget that Janet Reno was AG just a few years ago before we start praising federal power.
Publius wrote: "C&F, I think you're comparing apples w/ oranges. How do state criminal judgments affect interstate commerce?"
The same way Angel Raich's homegrown marijuana does. ;^> Anyhow, I'd need to hear the IC argument developed more fully before I could reply. My initial point was that most tort reformers think lowly of state courts. A3G's tongu-in-cheeck characterization is not far off.
Anyhow, I'll anticipate your "we can't have 50 sets of regulations in our national economic union" argument by asking: Assuming Congress enacts comprehensive products liability regulations; Would you then trust state courts to apply this federal law? Let's remember that the proposals now are to MOVE cases from state to federal court. The arugement is not the need for Congressional substantive law (outside of med-mal and asbestos), it's one of transferring JURISDICTION from "icky" state courts (and "runaway" state juries) to federal courts. That tells me that the tort reformers don't think highly of state courts - at least when MONEY is involved.
Publius: That's fair, and I, as a fellow federalist, share your pain. I'm not advocating granting some form of protective jurisdiction, but would be more in favor of federal substantive law. Maybe a legislative version of the due process punitive damages jurisprudence.
My point with the criticism was only that whereas I can't see any way that congress even has the power under Article I to control state criminal law, at least there's a constitutional argument for federal punitive damages regulation. Whether or not it's prudent is, of course, a different question. :)
1) Cases that are wholly local; medical malpractice would be the best example. These should continue to be solely a state and local concern.
2) Cases that could affect interstate commerce, but are specifically local. An example would be the State Farm case. These cases should remain state cases, but a federal law enabling effective federalism would be very beneficial. Such a law would enable the seller of a product to specify a jurisdiction in which all claims must be brought, but leave jurisdictions free to set their own rules. However, jurisdictions with “bad rules” would be avoidable.
3) Cases that are not in any reasonable sense local, such as class actions with multi-state classes. I think these should be heard in federal court, unless all parties agree on a state jurisdiction.
1) Cases that are wholly local; medical malpractice would be the best example. These should continue to be solely a state and local concern.
2) Cases that could affect interstate commerce, but are specifically local. An example would be the State Farm case. These cases should remain state cases, but a federal law enabling effective federalism would be very beneficial. Such a law would enable the seller of a product to specify a jurisdiction in which all claims must be brought, but leave jurisdictions free to set their own rules. However, jurisdictions with “bad rules” would be avoidable.
3) Cases that are not in any reasonable sense local, such as class actions with multi-state classes. I think these should be heard in federal court, unless all parties agree on a state jurisdiction.
More interesting to me is the idea that we even need tort reform. With the exception of maybe meidcal liability, our legal system is working just like it should. Companies wary of being sued take extrodinary steps to insure their products and facilities are safe, and their practices are fair. I think that is a good thing.
And beyond that the vast number of lawsuits lose, or at best win very very little. We don;t hear about the guy that get's $200o. We only hear about the tiny minority of suits that result in huge awards.
And finally, what other system is in place to police corporations? CEO almost never face criminal prosecution, maybe becasue it's very hard to prove a case. So how else are unethical companies going to be held to account? And further, you need massive awards to deter corporations with massive income. Is GE going to sweat having to pay someone a couple hundred thousand dollars? That's just a cost of doing business. If you are going to deter someone (or something), the consequences have to be painful.
cw
p.s. This comment form process stinks.
So when people who consider themselves "federalists" or even "strong federalists" call for limiting state jurisdiction on the grounds of commerce (an absurd argument, because a state court proceeding is in no sense commerce), or limiting state control over class action lawsuits, it is just appalling. What happened to strict construction?
In the second place, to the extent that conservatism espouses a government limited to protecting peace and property, calls for tort reform do not seem necessarily to be hypocritical. This would be especially true if these reforms are perceived as a way to solve a problem of free-riders.
I see both of my proposals as explicitly supported by the text of the Constitution.
1) Explicitly and enforceably providing that jurisdiction can be subject to contract would seem to come comfortably under I.10.1 ("No state shall...pass...any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts").
2) National Class actions (as well as suits against businesses domiciled in another state, whether by citizens or State Attorneys-General) would come comfortably under the authority of Federal courts under III.2.1 ("The judicial power shall extend...to controversies...between a State and Citizens of another State; between citizens of different States....")
I think of this in just the opposite way. In my view, tort reform *is* a way of limiting government. It restricts the state's overly intrusive powers to asses limitless damages in civil disputes.
http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-17-04.html
In this case, the interstate commerce justification is pretty strong, especially in light of the rampant venue-shopping that goes on in tort cases (e.g. pharmaceutical product liability cases in plaintiff-friendly Mississippi). In criminal law, this is much less common. If a murder occurs in Massachusetts, it's pretty unlikely that a prosecutor will be able to venue-shop the case into, say, Texas. On the other hand, this happens all the time in tort cases.