The Fourth Circuit has just held that Jose Padilla -- a U.S. citizen and alleged al Qaeda combatant who was captured in the U.S. -- can indeed be kept in military detention. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court took this view as to Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen and alleged al Qaeda combatant who was captured overseas. The question before the Fourth Circuit was whether the place where Padilla was captured should make a difference, and the Fourth Circuit said no. (The Court in Hamdi concluded that the military had to provide detainees some review procedure to determine whether they are indeed enemy combatants; but Padilla's challenge was apparently to the government's very power to detain him, and not to the process it has used to decide whether he's a combatant, see n.4 of the Fourth Circuit decision.)
So here's an interesting twist: The Hamdi decision rested on the votes of five Justices -- Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and crossover sensation Breyer; but in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the dissent of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer opined that "American citizens arrested in the United States" could not be detained (at least for "protracted" times and "incommunicado"). Thus, it looks like Justice Breyer, the necessary fifth vote in the Hamdi precedent on which the Fourth Circuit relies, saw a distinction between detentions of U.S. citizens arrested in the U.S. and those arrested overseas, the very distinction that the Fourth Circuit quickly (and plausibly, given the reasoning of Hamdi) rejected.
When I wrote about this shortly after the Supreme Court's decisions in Hamdi and Padilla, I said,
I suspect that many lower courts would be reluctant to mix four Justices' views from one case (Hamdi) with one extra Justice's views in another (Padilla), especially when those views came in a footnote to a dissenting opinion written by another Justice (though, to be sure, an opinion that Justice Breyer did join without reservations). So in future cases involving Padilla . . . lower courts would be free to conclude that Padilla loses . . . .
This seems to have happened here: The Fourth Circuit followed the five Justices' view in Hamdi, and ignored Justice Breyer's endorsement of a limiting principle in the Padilla dissent. (Note, incidentally, that if Justice Breyer wanted to, he could have written a concurrence in the judgment in Hamdi that expressed the view that Hamdi was limited to U.S. citizens detained abroad. That would have affected the precedential weight of Hamdi; but his joining the dissent in Padilla didn't have that effect.)
But, as I also wrote, "What the Supreme Court will do with that, when and if Padilla's case comes back to the Justices, is impossible to tell." If the Court grants certiorari here, then Justice Breyer might well join Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg -- the Hamdi dissenters -- in reversing the Fourth Circuit's decision.
In terms of the substance, my highly off-the-cuff hip-shooting commentary is here.
"A republic, if you can keep it," indeed!
For myself, I feel more comfortable "sounding off" on more political or theoretical issues. On this one, I would want to do a bit of legal research before commenting.
If?
The real question here is how will the new CJ vote?
Frankly, I'm deeply disturbed that there is even a legitimate debate on this issue. It is chilling to think that the Executive can declare an American citizen detained on American soil to be constitutionally persona non grata.
"Enemy combatant" sounds far too much like "enemy of the state" for my peace of mind. We don't need to go down that road.
I'd also like to point out, for the reflexive "The Fourth Circuit is crazy" types that the decision was unanimous, and that Luttig is the only Republican appointee on the panel- Judges Michael and Traxler are both Clinton appointees.
Furthermore, the court's practice is to circulate all opinions, both published and unpublished, for comment before they're submitted. This isn't just pro forma, eitehr- I've seen replies from non-panel judges that describe in detail things that they believe should be changed and indicate that they would consider calling for an en banc poll if they aren't. Sometimes this works, sometimes it doesn't, but it does keep a bit more consistency in the output.
I haven't seen any correspondence of that sort from this case- we wouldn't get it since my judge wasn't on the panel, but I would be surprised if Judge Motz didn't have something to say about this.
I too, have something to say: go team! Hopefully this will be upheld.
Much like the old CJ, is my guess. "Meet the new boss ..."
Shelby, point well taken. Still, there seems something visceral about the abolition of habeas corpus, at least at a law blog. (And I should note that it follows from my comment that I very much appreciate the attention of Profs. Volokh and Kerr to the case.)
Much like the old CJ, is my guess. "Meet the new boss ..."
I dunno. This question cuts across some traditional liberal/conservative lines. Remember, Scalia dissented in Hamdi.
Absent some compelling evidence to the contrary, I think Roberts' vote is up for grabs.
All this proves is that overtly liberal judges can be as boneheaded as overtly conservative judges, as Stevens definitively proved in both Raich and Kelo just this summer. And on the other hand, Scalia and Stevens wrote a fairly blistering opinion in Hamdi that demolished the administration's case. I enjoyed reading it almost as much as reading "The Road to Serfdom."
I too, have something to say: go team! Hopefully this will be upheld.
Why? I don't care for the unchecked expansion of executive power, and even though I'm neither a lawyer or a law student all of the justifications I've seen for these detentions seem transparently absurd and predicated more on logic ("terrorists don't deserve rights") than legal reasoning. Justice Scalia certainly agrees with me on this.
Oops. "predicated more on emotion."
2) I am surprised the 4th circuit cirulates draft opinions outside the panel charged with deciding the case. Seems like ex parte communication. I thought such communications needed to be shared with the parties.
3) I am not too hopeful about Roberts, given the result in Hamdan. Do not see Scalia standing behind the 4th circuit here, absent another terrorist even on US soil of 9/11 magnitude.
In other words, it's one thing to disagree with this opinion, it's another to pretend that this is some bizarre new land Luttig has thrust us into (and at the same time ignoring the existence of sixty-year old precedent).
But the facts in Padilla make the government's position much more dubious than the facts in Hamdi did. Hamdi was, as it were, caught red-handed and arrested on a foreign battle field. Padilla was arrested in a U.S. airport while doing nothing in particular. To the extent that the strength of the case is relevant (and I'm not at all sure it should be) you have to take the government's word that they've got a slam-dunk case against Padilla. There are three words you have to remember when evaluating this claim -- Wen Ho Lee.
If I were reading the tea leaves, I'd say that the Court tried to give the government a nudge in Padilla by disposing of it on procedural grounds. The government pointedly refused to take the hint. It's quite possible that even some members of the Hamdi majority will be a lot less comfortable with the idea of the federal goverment rounding up not-obviously-guilty American citizens in New Jersey than they were with American military forces capturing American citizens on battlefields in Afghanistan.
That being said, when I read the opinion, I actually found myself maybe okay with the Court's position, (though I am little confused as to Padilla's attorney's strategy). The key to me is footnote one. When I first scanned the opinion, I kept wondering why is the Court just accepting that he is an enemy combatant, but then I actually read the footnote and it became clear. For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, Padilla stipulated that the govenrment allegations are true. To me this seems to be stipulating away the best part of his case. The Court is left with the question of whether the the president has the authority to detain an undisputed current member of Al Qaeda captured on U.S. soil.
There is an opinion by Charles Lee, the third attorney General under Washington that frames the issue nicely:
If Padilla admits the things in the affidavit he should be tried for treason and be found guilty. Treating him as an enemy combatant with a "commission" is actually doing him a favor.
The problem, of course, is that Padilla probably does not actually admit the allegations or have a "commission". Therefore, in my view, he must be charged and tried for treason and given all related process. The limits on treason are one of the great rights the Founders put in the Constitution itself. But given the posture of the summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit did not reach that question.
Padilla's contention, as I understand it, was that--"enemy combatant" or no--he's a U.S. citizen apprehended on U.S. soil, and is thus entitled to be tried in the civilian courts, not by a military kangaroo court--excuse me, tribunal. (Folks, even some *prosecutors* have been complaining that the tribunals are too weighted against the detainees.)
Whether Padilla's in custody is not the issue. It's whether he's in the custody of the U.S. courts or of the executive branch.
At this late date, 3+ years after being picked up, I strongly suspect they're resisting the courts because the evidence against Padilla is inadmissible (i.e., hearsay, or torture-produced). Maybe one day we'll see.
Original TS: I hear ya, but I'll bet a silk pajama that Roberts's nomination rests 1st &foremost on assurances that he'll back Bush's expansion of C-in-C power, which certainly seems to matter to Bush more than anything else under the sun.
Amongst the facts that the Court recites is the following sequence:
I was puzzled why Padilla would be even for the purposes of the motion stipulate to this ( I assumed that the argument was basically the president had no power to detain even if he was unabahedly an enemy combatant). Readign over the district Court's opinion though, it seems to me the 4th Circuit is playing fast and loose with what was stipulated. It looks like Padilla only stipulated to the circumstnces of his arrest.
Given this, I am back to thinking this opinion is a travesty.
Perfectly legal.
Either way, the *rhetoric* of the 4th Circuit's op is interesting. Notice how heavily they lead with the "facts," especially as compared with the district court's op. One could say that the appeals court is showing a greater sensitivity to the real-world issues that the President must take into account. Alternatively, one could say that the 4th is substituting emotive reaction for dispassionate legal reasoning.
Antinome, &others, I was skeptical we could know what was stipulated to. The indispensable Marty Lederman has posted on the "return to the battlefield" argument; anyone interested in Padilla's case should read this &his previous posts.
Lederman included a link to part of the Joint Appendix, cited in Antinome's quote above as "J.A. 30-31."
Unfortunately, 30-31 contains no such stipulations, and the table of contents of the J.A. represents the stipulation as starting at pg. 92 of the J.A.---which the link gives only up to pg. 91.
Anyway, according to Lederman, the 4th got the "return to Afghanistan" bit *not* from any stipulations, but from the "Rapp declaration" by the feds. And that info wasn't known to the feds when they nabbed Padilla, but rather came out after what Lederman calls "highly coercive interrogation," which I suspect is equivalent to the kind that won't produce admissible evidence.
So maybe Bush is counting on that, or on his knowledge of Robert's thinking - but a deal??
So maybe Bush is counting on that, or on his knowledge of Robert's thinking - but a deal??
Assuming, of course, that someone at the White House has put a little more thought into this nomination than went into, say, Souter's.
The Civil War was an exception involving vastly different facts. I am not aware of any 200,000 detentions analogous to those of Padilla. Detentions of 200,000 civilians by Lincoln happened where? I suspect the procedure was to rely on parole (written promises to return home and fight no more, as when 35,000 surrendered to Grant after Vicksburg).
What we want to avoid, it seems to me are 2 things: 1) over-reaction of the sort that led to detention of tens of thousands innocent Japanese Americans duing WWII without charges; and 2) releasing the equivalent of a Willie Horton who will promptly blow himself to smithereens in some public place, killing innocents. Twenty years from now, historians will be hard to persuade that Bush, the FBI, the CIA, the police, the military, etc. could not release and shadow Padilla (legally) instead of resorting to indefinite detention without trial.
Bush does not have the 200,000 hostiles (or questionables) within his jursdiction that Lincoln had to deal with, or the hundreds of thousands detained in foreign lands (generally) that FDR had to neutralize.
As for the Civil War, I think that when "200,000 civilians" is used, you probably mean citizens. Those were soldiers, so they were simply detained until the end of hostilities (or when, as you point out, it seemed a better idea to just let 'em go). As for civilians who were detained by Lincoln, he did go through the rudiment of suspending habeas corpus (as Scalia suggested). The stickier question is what do you do with a US citizen who also happens to be an enemy soldier? Obviously, if you catch him on a foreign battlefield, you can treat him like a war prisoner. If you catch him on US soil, apparently, a lot of you think you can't (or shouldn't) I'm not sure why. If there was a mass invasion of Canadians tomorrow (snicker), and battles were being fought in Vermont and Minnesota, should we have to give the captured American citizens in the Canadian Army (and I'm sure there would be some) access to US courts?
I'm not sure what you mean by "pretrial detainee." I don't think he's under indictment, nor has he been charged with anything (but I could be wrong). If he's treated as a soldier, he gets to be a prisoner until the end of this war. Then, I suppose, he could be tried for some crime he may have committed (assuming the statute of limitations hasn't run).
Maybe he's gonna spend the rest of this war in a brig b/c the gov't doesn't wanna admit that he's John Doe No. 2. :}
FWIW, a military commission won't have the same procedural safeguards as a court martial (but I don't think it's fair to characterize it as a rubber stamp thing)
"Maybe he's gonna spend the rest of this war in a brig b/c the gov't doesn't wanna admit that he's John Doe No. 2. :}" If we had in mind a 3-4 year war, this might not look extreme, at least at this point. But we may have a 20-30 year sort of cold war on terror.
FWIW, a military commission won't have the same procedural safeguards as a court martial (but I don't think it's fair to characterize it as a rubber stamp thing)Military commission procedures were one thing in 1945, and can be something more elaborate now. The President simply signs an executive order saying the manual for courts martial, UCMJ procedures will apply. Bush wants to go back to procedural rules from 1945, and then hack back the rights of the defense still furthter. I am not seeing how he will be able to convince the JAG Corps that this treats Padilla et al fairly. As a former Army JAG, I would be disappointed if the relevant JAG lawyers now blithely let themselves be used as Bush now suggests. So far, the relevant JAGs, or at least a reasonable number, seem to have resisted.
If AQ was concerned about its soldiers wasting away in prisons, they could surrender. Or arrange for an exchange. Or something. But I don't think the continued (i.e., potentially indefinite) detention of AQ terrorists should be the concern of the US.
Your point about military commissions is well-taken.
But one needs a really high-class, state of the art trial procedure to make that sort of call fairly and reasonably, in my view. I would not want to make that call as a Rumsfeld, Bush or Myers without trial procedures that comport with due process as we now understand it.
Sexually violent predators in CA have due process rights of the sort I could see being given to folks like Padilla.
Skimpy commission procedures of the sort now proposed make us look like uncivilized pikers and "scaredy cats", in my view. UCMJ Article 15 non-judicial punishment for minor offenses (drunk driving, etc.) gives a citizen soldier more procedural protections than the commission procedures proposed.
I am not sure I would have said what I now say in October 2001, or 1943, or 1863, or 1798, but times change, and we need to build procedural rules from reason, without too much emotion.