The decision is here. Among other things, the court rejected the argument that the search was improper because it could have captured lawfully privileged confidential Congressional documents, as well as the unprivileged evidence of Jefferson's bribe-taking. (I thought most of Rep. Jefferson's claims were quite weak, but that this one was at least more plausible.) Here's the core of the court's reasoning on this:
The fact that some privileged material was incidentally captured by the search does not constitute an unlawful intrusion.[fn7] See In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F. Supp. 211, 214 n.2 (D.D.C. 1980) (“The Speech or Debate Clause does not protect confidentiality of material”). The Speech or Debate Clause is not undermined by the mere incidental review of privileged legislative material, given that Congressman Jefferson may never be questioned regarding his legitimate legislative activities, is immune from civil or criminal liability for those activities, and no privileged material may ever be used against him in court.
Amicus contends that even a review of the documents by the Court to determine privilege is unconstitutional. See Amicus Brief 29. Contrary to the arguments of amicus, legislators do not have the right to determine the scope of their own privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause. The Founders expressly rejected a constitutional proposal that would have permitted Members collectively to be the exclusive judges of their own privileges. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 503 (Max Ferrand ed., 1966). In opposition to the proposal, Madison explained that it would be preferable “to make provision for ascertaining by law” the extent of privileges “previously & duly established” rather than to “give a discretion to each House as to the extent of its own privileges.” Id. Indeed, it is the Judicial Branch that ascertains the requirements of the law in accordance with Article III of the Constitution. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974) (citing The Federalist No. 47, at 313 (S. Mittell ed., 1938)).
[fn7] The cases that address how to remedy the improper use of protected legislative material in a criminal prosecution support the proposition that the mere disclosure of Speech or Debate material to the Government does not offend the Constitution, as in those cases, privileged material had certainly been exposed to the Government. The remedy imposed in those cases was simply that the material was excluded from use against a Member of Congress. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185 (“With all references to [Speech or Debate material] eliminated [from the indictment], we think the Government should not be precluded from a new trial on this count, thus wholly purged of elements offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause.”); United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Government does not have to establish an independent source for the information upon which it would prosecute a Member of Congress. Rather . . . the Member must show that the Government has relied upon privileged material.”); Id. at 1301 (where “the indictment is valid on its face, the Speech or Debate Clause does not require pre-trial review of the evidence to be presented at trial”); United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 300 (3d Cir. 1994) (even if two overt acts were alleged in violation of the Clause, there were “numerous other overt acts” to support the indictment); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 941 (2d Cir. 1980) (dismissal not required although grand jury heard “some evidence of legislative acts that is privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause”); compare United States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 200, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1980) (indictment must be dismissed where the “improper introduction of privileged matter permeated the whole proceeding”). None of these cases suggest that the exposure of protected legislative material to the Government violated the Speech or Debate Clause.
Related Posts (on one page):
- FBI Search of Rep. Jefferson's Congressional Office Upheld:
- The Constitutional Argument Against the Search of the Congressman's Office:
I also was struck by J. Hogan's remark--and EV's selection of excerpts--that:
Seems the same reasoning girds Hamdan. And Nixon. And cabins the argument of some that under Art. II, a president can assert uncheckable power by claiming to act under the C-i-C clause.
By the way, the president's response to a reporter's question at last week's Chicago press conference about the administration's reaction to Hamdan was very interesting . . . and apropos J. Hogan's remark:
"I am willing to abide by the ruling of the Supreme Court," the president said.
Here's a link to the transcript.
Did they not want the principle established that they were subject to search warrants when evidence of crime was in their offices? Well then maybe they should've thought of that when the subpoena came to them.
And if they can't, why does the Judicial Branch get to?
Which leads, inevitably, to a question I aksed many years ago:
Most Americans think there is judicial supremacy, but of course, the Constitution and the intent behind the document tell us otherwise. Now, if by "federal court system" you include the Supreme Court, such a law would be unconstitutional as the Constitution creates the Supreme Court.
The Constitution does grant Congress the power to create "inferior tribunals" (Article 1, Section 8.). "The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. (Article 3, Section 1.)." I read this to mean that Congress can create courts, but only abolish it when the seat is vacant. A judge may only be removed for "bad behavior (Ibid)." Abolishing an office is effectively removing the judge from office, by taking the office away.
However, for Congress to impeach and remove a judge it does not in my view have to arise to a criminal offense. I think some of the judges on the 9th Circuit could be removed simply for being, so out of the judicial mainstream. The Constitution grants the House the power to impeach and the Senate to try impeachments (Article 1, Section 2.). However, Article II outlines what executive branch members can be removed for, and that is "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors (Article 2, Section 4.)." On the other hand Article III says that judges only hold there office during “good behaviour,” therefore Congress has more flexibility to remove a judge.
Such a law as you described would be a clear constitutional violation, and the Supreme Court should act. They probably would!
Neither a constitutional amendment nor the President's consent would be required, given sufficient Congressional will. Congress could impeach and remove the entire Supreme Court and refuse to approve new members. Of course, they should top it off by defunding the Judiciary, just to pour salt in the wound!
Once they've completed their coup of one branch, they can also coup the other and appoint whoever they want as President. Or... maybe not. Who would preside over the trial? Perhaps you have to decapitate the Executive first, then remove the SC, then impeach everyone else, and finally defund the Judiciary. Before the next election cycle. That's an ambitious agenda for the 110th Congress.
Those founding fathers were a devious bunch. I can imagine delegates at the Constitutional Convention considering just these kinds of morbid possibilities.
It is a pity Congress does not have spine to stop this nonsense. If they did, they would not hire pay any D.C. District Clerks next year (the judges can do their own research), cancel their Westlaw/Lexis subscriptions (having to use the Paper Shepards would be good penance), grant mandatory de novo trials in all parking and traffic cases in the District of Columbia before the U.S. District Court, and put the FBI and Justice Department officials responsible on trial before the House of Representatives for inherent Contempt of Congress and jail them for the duration of the Session. This kind of abuse of power is exactly what the Powers of Contempt and the Purse are for.