A very interesting exchange between Seventh Circuit Judges Posner and Easterbrook in the majority, and Judge Evans in the dissent, about what courts should do about certain kinds of procedural errors by lawyers. Beyond the obvious schadenfreude appeal of such things, and the case's utility as a reminder to lawyers to be careful, there's an important question here about what courts should do in such situations; fortunately, both opinions are thoughtful and eminently readable.
POSNER, Circuit Judge [joined by EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge].... Before [reaching the merits], we remark the confusion in the parties’ briefs concerning the elements of the diversity jurisdiction. The jurisdictional statement in the appellants’ brief states that the federal district court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship “and the jurisdictional amount of $75,000.” In fact diversity jurisdiction depends on the jurisdictional amount’s exceeding $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
The jurisdictional statement goes on to recite that the plaintiffs are citizens of Wisconsin (a proper jurisdictional allegation since the plaintiffs are natural persons) and that defendant Mazda “is a foreign corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of California.” A corporation, however, has two places of citizenship: where it is incorporated, and where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). If Mazda’s principal place of business is in Wisconsin, diversity is destroyed.
To ensure that litigants in diversity cases attend carefully to the dual citizenship of corporations, our Circuit Rule 28(a)(1) requires the jurisdictional statement in a diversity case to specify both the state (or other jurisdiction) in which a corporate party is incorporated and the state in which its principal place of business is located. The appellants’ jurisdictional statement violates our rule but more remarkably it does not so much as mention the second defendant, the Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company.
The appellees’ jurisdictional statement begins promisingly by stating that the appellants’ jurisdictional statement “is neither complete [n]or correct.” But neither, it turns out, is the appellees’. It does not mention the amount in controversy, erroneously alleged in the appellants’ statement; and concerning citizenship it violates Rule 28(a)(1) by stating that the appellees are “citizens of a different state” from the appellants, without indicating what state they are citizens of. It turns out that the insurance company is actually a citizen of a foreign country, so that the relevant provision of the diversity statute, unmentioned in either jurisdictional statement, is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
We asked the parties to submit supplemental jurisdictional statements. The appellants’ supplemental statement corrects the omission of Mazda’s principal place of business (also California), but blunders with respect to the insurance company by stating that it is “a corporation organized under the laws of Japan with a United States branch domiciled in the State of New York with its principal place of business located at 230 Park Ave, New York, NY 10169” (emphasis added). The location of a branch office is irrelevant to diversity jurisdiction. But reference to “domicile” and “principal place of business” naturally raises the question, unaddressed in the statement, whether this branch might be a corporation having its principal place of business in New York but incorporated elsewhere, such as Wisconsin.
We might have expected the blunder to be corrected by the major Chicago law firm representing the appellees. No such luck. Its supplemental jurisdictional statement repeats that the insurance company “is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Japan with a U.S. Branch. The principal place of business of the U.S. Branch is New York, New York.” The fact that “Branch” is capitalized and its principal place of business alleged suggests that it might be a corporation, but at argument the appellees’ lawyer said no, it’s just a branch. When asked by one of the judges why then it was mentioned in the jurisdictional statement, the lawyer replied inconsequently that “with a U.S. Branch” is Japanese corporate lingo.
The appellees’ supplemental jurisdictional statement contains two further errors. It says that the amount in controversy “allegedly” exceeds $75,000. Actually, as we know, the amount in controversy in the appellants’ jurisdictional statement is $75,000, not $75,000 plus.
In addition, the use of the words “alleged” or “allegedly” in this connection is erroneous. The amount in controversy in a diversity case is the stakes that the plaintiff or defendant alleges, and provided the allegation is not false to a “legal certainty” the amount is taken as true for purposes of jurisdiction. E.g., Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276-77 (1977). In other words, “When the complaint includes a number, it controls unless [the plaintiff’s] recovering that amount [in the litigation] would be legally impossible.” Rising-Moore v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 435 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2006). The appellees’ use of “allegedly” suggests an inclination to question whether the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum, but they do not pursue the point.
We are satisfied that the parties’ errors in regard to the amount in controversy are harmless, given the severity of the injuries alleged. [Details omitted. -EV]
But the lawyers have wasted our time as well as their own and (depending on the fee arrangements) their clients’ money. We have been plagued by the carelessness of a number of the lawyers practicing before the courts of this circuit with regard to the required contents of jurisdictional statements in diversity cases. See, e.g., BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., No. 05-3077, 2006 WL 2972108, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 19, 2006) (per curiam), and cases cited there; Hicklin Engineering, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006); Wild v. Subscription Plus, Inc., 292 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 2002). It is time, as we noted in BondPro, that this malpractice stopped. We direct the parties to show cause within 10 days why counsel should not be sanctioned for violating Rule 28(a)(1) and mistaking the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. We ask them to consider specifically the appropriateness, as a sanction, of their being compelled to attend a continuing legal education class in federal jurisdiction. E.g., In re Maurice, 69 F.3d 830, 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1995); DiPaolo v. Moran, 407 F.3d 140, 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Dragoo, 186 F.3d 614, 615-16 (5th Cir. 1999).
Are we being fusspots and nitpickers in trying (so far with limited success) to enforce rules designed to ensure that federal courts do not exceed the limits that the Constitution and federal statutes impose on their jurisdiction? Does it really matter if federal courts decide on the merits cases that they are not actually authorized to decide?
The sky will not fall if federal courts occasionally stray outside the proper bounds. But the fact that limits on subject-matter jurisdiction are not waivable or forfeitable—that federal courts are required to police their jurisdiction—imposes a duty of care that we are not at liberty to shirk. And since we are not investigative bodies, we need and must assure compliance with procedures designed to compel parties to federal litigation to assist us in keeping within bounds.
Hence Rule 28 and hence the responsibility of lawyers who practice in the federal courts, even if only occasionally, to familiarize themselves with the principles of federal jurisdiction. It would be delightful, but irresponsible in the extreme, for us to ignore the limits on our jurisdiction, forget the rules intended to prevent us from ignoring those limits, direct the Clerk of the court to tear out the parties’ jurisdictional statements before distributing the briefs to us, and jump directly to the merits of any case that the parties would like to litigate in federal court.... [Merits discussion omitted. -EV]
EVANS, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the court’s opinion [as to the merits question]. But I decline to join the court’s stinging criticism of the attorneys regarding their less-than-perfect jurisdictional statements. Sure, the plaintiffs should have said the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000, not that it is $75,000. And sure, both sides stumbled on their declarations regarding the dual citizenship of the corporate defendants. But, at best, these are low misdemeanors; yet the court treats them like felonies. I would not label these minor flaws as “blunders,” nor would I come close to saying this is “malpractice” which must be stopped. Also I would not issue an order to show cause, and I certainly would not suggest that an appropriate sanction might be to compel the lawyers’ attendance at “a continuing legal education class on federal jurisdiction.”
What happened in this case is not particularly unusual. The plaintiffs, represented by what appears to be a small law firm, filed this suit almost five years ago in state court where jurisdictional requirements are easily satisfied and rarely questioned. The defendants, represented by a “national law firm with lawyers in 27 offices coast-to-coast” (according to the firm’s Web site) removed the case to federal court.
That there is diversity jurisdiction has never been questioned by anyone, including at least two district court judges who issued written decisions as the case poked along for four years through discovery and several in-court proceedings. The plaintiffs then lose their case on summary judgment and file an appeal raising the issue that cuts to the very heart of their suit. Given this situation, when all eyes are really on the guts of the case, I think we should be more tolerant of the jurisdictional statement hiccups that have occurred here.
(Hide.)
On a completely unrelated note, let me remark the unusual use of the term "remark" in the first sentence quoted above. It's quite legitimate, even to a prescriptivist, but I don't recall ever having seen it.
I would note that it is not particularly unusual, in the real world, for a judge to get increasingly incensed over a common type of mistake made by lawyers, and to finally choose one victim to "make an example of" in disproportion to the actual offense. In their minds, they probably believe that this sort of stinging rebuke will get the attention of the Bar in a way that would be otherwise impossible, but it sure isn't any fun to be the unlucky offender who gets singled out.
Come on, why pick on Judge Posner for omitting one little word when it is perfectly clear what he means? (Oh, wait.)
Simon: Frank Easterbrook practiced for five years in the Solicitor General's Office; Richard Posner spent five years working as an assistant to an FTC commissioner, an assistant to the Solicitor General, and as General Counsel of a presidential task force. I suspect that all these jobs required the sort of care and attention to the detail that is required of a lawyer in private practice. I'm pretty sure of this as to Easterbrook's positions, and suspect this as to Posner's.
I should have acknowledged the judges' time in the SG's office (Judge Posner's other positions appear to me to be legal policy, not practice). But the SG's exalted practice is far removed from the workaday world that most of us legal stiffs inhabit. And, in my experience, judges who spent time in that workaday world tend to side with Judge Evans and Commentator Bobbie refusing to embarass lawyers on trivialities, which, to my eyes, is just a higher form of bullying.
(The "trivialities" point is important. If there was a real question about jurisdiction, or a misapprehended issue that went to the heart of the case, or some other suggestion of misconduct on the part of the lawyers or judges, then of course a hard line is appropriate. But it seems from the excerpts you posted that isn't the case.)
Simon
While my sympathies lie in this direction, the court did direct the parties to file a supplemental jurisdiction statement. At that point, they certainly should have taken the time to get it right.
In other words, neither Easterbrook nor Posner ever had to justify to a client billing $X on getting the jurisdiction section of the brief perfect when neither side disputed the jurisdiction.
Anybody know what the "large national law firm" is?
Unfortunately, he starts out with a nitpick about $75K versus "exceeding $75K". He's technically correct, but it makes him look petty.
Anything can be a triviality, including jurisdiction, if the answer is apparent and not in dispute.
If the panel really cared about being a court of limited jurisdiction, then it would have demanded yet further briefing or dismissed the case because Tokio Marine's state of incorporation is unknown. But instead it chose just to embarass the lawyers and reach the merits of the case.
Judge Easterbrook has properly excoriated lawyers (and lower courts) for missing important jurisdictional points, see, e.g., Belleville Catering. Unlike Belleville, jurisdiction here wasn't really an issue, just an excuse to go off on the lawyers. If these were repeat offenders, then maybe. But that doesn't appear to be the case, either.
It’s a two-edged sword, isn’t it? On the one hand, it’s a great benefit to have two of the smartest and most capable people in the federal judiciary decide your case. On the other, Easterbrook is known for at times being a complete jerk. Two decades on the bench has an unfortunate tendency to turn some people into bullies. Needless to say I agree with Evans. I assume they are going to fine these lawyers, like they did some others a while back. I think it’s ridiculous in the circumstances.
Wow, even in this thread about a funny little incident for appellate geeks, a right winger can't resist the urge to blame everything on Clenis.
Memo to such right-wingers: lighten up. Turn off Rush and Hannity, stop pressing "refresh" every five minutes on Instapundit, Hugh Hewitt &Malkin, and go outside, take a walk, meet a girl, whatever gives you some pleasure. . . .
COUNSEL: For MAGDALENE M. SMOOT, RYAN M. SMOOT, Plaintiff - Appellant: Peter S. Balistreri, DUBIN, BALISTRERI, FUCHS &SCHELBLE, Milwaukee, WI. USA.
For MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee: Jeffrey S. Fertl, HINSHAW &CULBERTSON, Milwaukee, WI. USA.
For TOKIO MARINE AND FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, Defendant - Appellee: Jeffrey S. Fertl, HINSHAW &CULBERTSON, Milwaukee, WI. USA.
The plaintiff alleged $75,000, which the court tells us is wrong. OK, fine. But $75,000.01, exclusive of interest and costs, would be fine???? Yup.
For the hypothetical error of one penny, one has to be berated and suffer sanctions?!?!?!?!
The court even admits its hyperventilating refers to a "harmless" issue.
They've got a better point on dual citizenship of corporations, but even still -- who cares??? It didn't affect any outcome at all.
Lawyers who are sanctioned need to report that fact on many documents and in many ways -- it can really affect their lives in a negative way. It's really offensive to see how easily judges can mete out such punishment for nothing.
Posner's use of the word "malpractice" is also troubling, as this clearly isn't malpractice, yet the lawyers will likely need to inform their malpractice carrier of this incident, which could mean higher payments in the future.
The lawyers here clearly screwed up. I don't think anybody denies that. As Steve noted, particularly after they were directed to check jurisdiction, they should have been more thorough. But lawyers are people and people make mistakes. It’s going to happen. I’m sure Posner’s ego will even allow him to admit at times that he makes mistakes. So why should a judge be able to publicly embarrass a lawyer for his or her mistakes without allowing the lawyer an opportunity to publicly explain? Although, at times, even that wouldn’t be sufficient: often times the perceived “mistakes” of lawyers are client driven and no lawyer is going to blame the client in front of the judge. Again, I think any practicing attorney would agree. I don’t like that we treat judges like their semi-gods. They’re not. We shouldn’t have to say “thank you, your honor” when they rule against us, and we shouldn’t have to stand every time they enter the court room. They should, of course, be treated with respect, but they should treat the lawyers with respect, even when they screw up. This is particularly true when, as was the case here, there is no longstanding pattern of the lawyer in question being sloppy.
These two comments together indicate why the lawyers deserved being berated. Jurisdiction, esp. subject matter jurisdiction, is fundamental to any federal case. And, when the Court gives you a chance to correct your sloppiness, then shame on you for not getting the not-too-subtle hint.
[EV: D'oh! Fixed the typo.]
Say wha? Instapundit supports gay marriage, flag burning and drug legalization, who taught you that you should lump him in with right wingers? Kos Kids, gotta love 'em!
Frankly, I think the Court may have even been soft on the parties. They could have simply held that, because no proper allegations of jurisdiction had been made, they had no choice but to remand the case to the state court from which it originated. The rule is simple and straightforward.
Plus, as other posters have pointed out, once the court directs you to file a supplemental pleading on jurisdiction, you better have enough sense to get it right.
There, that took five minutes. Only unclear thing is the principal place of business of the insurance company, easily checked with the client.
Basis for Original Jurisdiction:
then insert prior post.
Basis for Appellate Jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391.
One year in law school, the chief judge for our moot court final was VC favorite Alex Kozinski from the 9th Circuit. Humorous, since Judge Kozinski had recently written an article calling for the abolition of moot court, but anyway.
The topic was some typically esoteric moot court thing, and the students went up to argue being fully versed in the nuances of Calder v. Bull and the like. Appellant's counsel had not finished a single sentence of his argument before Judge Kozinski interjected his first question: "Counselor, what's the basis for subject matter jurisdiction in this court?"
All I can say is, lucky for me I didn't make the finals.
To which the only answer is: "It's moot, Your Honor."
Only because he is.
Evans is right, but he didn't identify the real problem. This is a classic example of "Judge-Itis," a malady well known to all litigators who actually go into courtrooms. It tends to strike judges (particularly those appointed for life) after a few years on the bench, as they forget their own failings and secretly long to form a krytocracy.
Of course, it's also possible these guys were asses before they became judges.
I'm heartily sick of what I perceive to be a growing tendency of judges to attack lawyers for minor errors or perceived slights. My evidence is only anecdotal, but I am seeing this kind of crap more and more often out there in the real world.
Never against me personally, of course....
I blame Judge Judy. Or perhaps Chief Justice Burger, who loved to speechify about the poor quality of lawyers.
Of course, there were those who thought Burger wasn't exactly the sharpest tool in the shed, but I leave that topic for another day.
sorry but your omission will cost you $1000 in sanctions.
I'd bet judges see growing tendency of lawyers to make sloppy mistakes.
I would think that latter in which case, I'm sure smart judges could find a way to express their (completely justified) anger in a way that produces positive results.
I think that when plaintiff referenced a jurisdictional "amount" of $75K, they meant the case satisfied a jurisdictional threshold of $75K, not that the amount in controversy was exactly $75K.
In this particular case, these attorneys would not have known who their panel would be when they filed their briefs. But given the widely-publicized tear Easterbrook has been on, and the relatively small pool of judges sitting on the Seventh Circuit, they would have been well-advised to take more care from the beginning. Especially the attorneys who attempted to correct the initial jurisdictional statement!
I would assume, though, that the order requesting a supplemental jurisdictional statement would have to have been issued by a particular judge or panel.
In my experience, this kind of thing yields to the latter, as you suggested. Courts who pride themselves on rejecting briefs for trivialities simply drive up the costs of litigation, because attorneys have to spend countless additional hours worrying about stuff that simply has NO bearing on the case. And the more an attorney is thinking about the technicalities of the brief, the less time that attorney is thinking about the actual merits.
From where exactly does the schadenfreude derive?
To my mind there is no such obvious misfortune at the suffering of the lawyers here. As others have noted, this shows the difference between academics and practicing lawyers, few of whom I imagine would find any "schadenfreude" moment here.
On the other hand, by smacking them around publicly, they could be assured that the opinion would get press, including the likes of this post, and everyone who litigates in the 7th Circuit (if not elsewhere) would be careful not to make the same mistakes as these counsel.
So their overreaction may in fact be merited insofar as it acts as a general deterrant to the same behavior by counsel in other cases, including in cases where the mistakes would not be trivial. I suspect that was a large motivator for the language used. The other motivator was probably annoyance that even after requesting a supplemental jurisidction statement, the parties still couldn't get it together. How many bites at the apple do they get?
If the lawyers don't say it, then either the court ignores the problem, requests a do over, or has to do its own research into the facts of the case. I'll criticize judges who don't work hard enough, but I don't think it's their job to develop the factual record for the litigants. In this case, the court DID request a do over, and they still screwed up. At that point, what's the court to do?
By the way, Suzanna: that was really painful to listen to. The part about the pro se was the best part, though.
Why is humiliation proportionate to an offense that was "petty" (the $75K issue) or one that the panel was willing to ignore even though it was unresolved (the incorporation issue)? You can't have it both ways: either the jurisdictional issue is very important and the panel should have dismissed the case because the allegations were facially inadequate, or it's unimportant and the panel shouldn't have wasted its time or humiliated the lawyers. What we have here is the worst of all worlds: the panel pretends it thinks jursidiction in this case is important enough to humiliate the lawyers, but then when the rubber really hits the road (reach the merits or dismiss the case) it fudges.
Jurisdiction as a subject is important. Diversity jurisdiction is in particular can be tricky, depending on the circumstances. But that doesn't mean that properly giving jurisdictional statements can't be trivial.
Again, I wonder how Judgse Posner and Easterbrook would hanlde it if the Supreme Court started granting cert in all of their cases and reversing those with trivial mistakes of law or fact.
As one of the seniormost "bet the company" litigators in Chicago says, the waste and inefficiency in the legal system is almost criminal. He claims the 80/20 rule applies (work/value) but no one has the guts to say to the clients, or the courts, that the 80% result is enough and the rest is a waste of time and money.
You're missing the point. How do you know if there's jurisdiction if the parties don't properly give the jurisidictional statement?
You're acting as if the problem is that they used blue ink instead of black when you talk about "properly" giving it. But they got the substance wrong, as the opinion showed.
Look, citizenship and amount in controversy are jurisdictional questions; stating them is not. The court has no authority to hear a 1332 case without diversity; it has authority to hear a 1332 case where there's diversity, but improperly alleged by the litigants. But that requires that the court do the work to figure out whether there's actual jurisdiction -- and why should the court have to, especially when the litigants had two bites at the apple to get it right?
As a practical matter they could have done any of things. Of course, they could have done any of them before starting this little charade. Alternatively, they could have addressed the deficiencies (in both the statements and the lawyering) to the lawyers instead of publicly shaming them. But if you look at their records -- especially Judge Easterbrook -- you know that just isn't their way.
In any case, I don't read Judge Evans opinion to entirely dispense with jurisdictional concerns for all time. It is more a realization about the silliness of hitting the lawyers so hard in this particular case.
Obviously.
Mr. Woland: I don't see why the court's policy should be "be as sloppy as you want, and we won't punish you unless you happen to be wrong." Nor do I see your argument about how it's "clear" that there was diversity jurisdiction. No, I don't think a federal judge in Wisconsin knows if these are Wisconsin corporations. How on earth does a judge know where a company was incorporated (without doing outside research, I mean)?
I'm not ignoring your point, it's just irrelevant to mine. The panel asked the laywers to submit additional jurisdictional statements. The lawyers did. The additional jurisdictional statements left the panel no better off (at least in reaching the merits of the jurisdictional questions) than they had been previously. So what did they do? They looked outside the record and figured that Tokio Marine was not (or not likely to be) incorporated in Wisconsin.
Why couldn't they have done that first? Or done it after the revised jurisdictional statements were submitted without the additional attacks and, as someone pointed out above, completely inappropriate and borderline crazy suggestion the attorneys had committed malpractice?
Shaming lawyers is for gross negligence and/or willful misconduct. As Judge Evans said, the panel turned some misdemeanors into felonies. The real question ought to be why Judges Posner and Easterbook kept the language in their opinion even though one of their colleagues dissented.
And that is how you show your respect for their function? Dark sulking looks when they rule against you and high fives with the associates when you win? Slouching in your chair when the Court is called into session?
Like the man who will not stand for the Anthem, how do we know it is a political statement instead of just plain being rude? If you don't stand, then you are just being rude.
"They should, of course, be treated with respect, but they should treat the lawyers with respect, even when they screw up."
Thanks to Ms. Sherry, I have heard the audio in Jenkins, and I have read the excerpt above, and in both cases I think the judges treated the lawyers with respect and courtesy, even though they had screwed up. Disrespect would have involved something like tossing the brief back at the lawyer or using personal invective, 'you ignorant stupid idiot'....(Not that I would be surprised that that has ever happened in a courtroom!)
Every lawsuit is, in its own way, the history of a mistake. A mistake as to the law, a mistake as to the facts or a mistake as to the application of the law to those facts. We get taught law in a particular way because law has a particular structure which has evolved as lawyers, over the years have analysed the interactions between people who are litigants. And if we are to be considered good lawyers, we must remember the cases we have read, because *those are mistakes we should not make*.
As Will Rogers said:
There are three kinds of men: The ones that learn by reading. The few who learn by observation.
The rest of them have to pee on the electric fence and find out for themselves...
We are supposed to be the ones who learn by reading, or at least by observation..
The failure to properly deal with the jurisdiction question was a mistake by the lawyers, not the parties. It deserved to be raised, and the order in Jenkins makes it clear that it had to be raised and dealt with.
I think the judges were fair. In the end they 'fudged' on the question, so as to avoid visiting the possible cost of the error on the parties. There was clear evidence to sustain diversity jurisdiction provided by the respondent: Mazda is a California corporation. If jurisdiction existed between the plaintiff and one defendant, there is no need for proof of the domicile of the other defendant as diversity jurisdiction is binary, not quantitative.
And the status of the New York office of Tokio Marine is important: how was Tokio Marine served? In Tokio, or through the New York office? And is a 'principal place of business' under the Rules implicitly the 'principal place of business within US jurisdiction' or 'worldwide'? Since that affects the manner of service and the reach of any order including and especially injunctive relief....
For someone giving a lecture on accuracy, you need to reread your outline from Federal Courts.
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity between parties in diversity suits, so that if any plaintiff has the same citizenship as any defendant, the courts lack jurisdiction over the entire case until the defect is cured).
And each corporation has only one prinicpal place of business, which can be within or outside of the U.S.
Finally, the statement that "Mazda is a California Corporation" doesn't resolve that issue - you need to determine as well where Mazda's principle place of business is.
And as for malpractice, I would say that being unable to understand day one of CivPro comes awfully close. How much do you think they billed their clients for preparing the supplemental jurisdictional statements?
What's the difference between this and the Belleville case, or than the Jenkins case linked above by Ms. Sherry? Nothing, except that the lawyers got lucky.
Screwing up once is negligence. Screwing up the same thing again -- when the court specifically pointed out to them what they needed to get right -- is gross negligence.As I said, nonsense. (Well, I didn't use the word, but I expressed the sentiment.) They didn't threaten to disbar the attorneys. They threatened to send them to class to learn how to do their jobs properly. If there are felonies for which criminals are sentenced to CLE -- well, the eighth amendment MIGHT apply there -- I'm not aware of them.
And a bunch of presumably professional people think it's overkill.
But suing a business out of $50k for having handrails at the wrong height in the restroom is perfectly OK.
Cry me a frikken river, you overprotected, priviledged stuffed shirts. You sure don't show any sign of policing your own profession.