University of Chicago law profesor Cass Sunstein blogs in defense of libertarian paternalism:
Becker and Posner make some nice points against those who like government bans and mandates (though Posner, interestingly, defends the ban on trans fats in New York City restaurants; libertarian paternalists would disapprove of any such ban). But libertarian paternalists do not mean to allow government to forbid the triumph of the supposed "weaker" self over the supposedly stronger one. If people want to eat a lot of candy and ice cream, or refuse to save for their retirement, that is their right. Far from neglecting the bounded rationality of government officials, libertarian paternalists emphasize government error as a strong reason for respecting freedom of choice.
What libertarian paternalists add is that the opposition between "individual choice" and "government" is confusing and unhelpful when government is inevitably establishing default rules that govern outcomes if choices haven't been specifically made -- and that influence people's choices in any case. A key point, then, is that private and public institutions can't possibly avoid a form of paternalism, so long as they establish default rules and starting points. (For some reason, economists in particular seem not to understand this point.) The question is how to make those starting points as good as possible, while also preserving free choice.
For more on this subject, see Sunstein's paper with Richard Thaler, "Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron," and Gregory Mithcell's response, "Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron."
Related Posts (on one page):
- Posner Again on Libertarian Paternalism:
- Sunstein on Libertarian Paternalism:
- Wright on "Libertarian Paternalism":
- Becker & Posner on Libertarian Paternalism:
I suppose he would say the only time true "individual choice" can be instituted under this thinking is in anarchy. And that whenever we deviate from anarchy we must have some form of paternalism. Since some forms of libertarianism reject anarchy, it follows that those forms must embrace a form of paternalism.
Sunstein's point is that, since we have to have these rules anyway (if only to avoid needless litigation), we might as well choose rules that provide "good" results. It's a weak form of paternalism, but it's still paternalism.
I'm not taking a position here, only pointing out differences.
While libertarians often couch their arguments in rights-talk, their embrace of things like contract enforcement (or the military) reveal that their case is really a pragmatic one. Those things could also be handled without government. I suppose Becker and Posner recognize this, though, and employ a different definition of paternalism.
While the government may intend to merely encourage behavior, certain people will percieve the encouragement as coercion. Often the mere suggestions of an authority are coercive. Also, people within government will likely misinterpret the effort to steer people in a given direction as a grant of authority to compel people in that direction.
While the government may intend to merely encourage behavior, certain people will percieve the encouragement as coercion. Often the mere suggestions of an authority are coercive. Also, people within government will likely misinterpret a policy steering people in a given direction as a grant of authority to compel people in that direction.
but now i can think about it, thx
In response to P_A_C_O, I think the idea is that very few, if any, people would honestly view this as coercive. That's the argument, at least — I'm not sure if I buy it myself.
I'd think a choice would mean someone's personal assessment of whether something is good or bad and how to make tradeoffs between it and other things. If someone can be induced to "choose" differently merely because they are told "10% are dead after 5 years" rather than "90% are alive after five years", how is that a choice at all in any meaningful sense?