More on Goodling and the Fifth Amendment Privilege:
Monica Goodling's announcement that she will take the Fifth before Congress has focused a lot of attention on whether she has a right to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege in these circumstances. I blogged a bit about it earlier, and I wanted to add a few more thoughts. My bottom line: I tend to doubt the assertion of privilege was proper, but I can't be certain without knowing a lot more facts.
In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1983), is instructive. Morganroth had given testimony under oath in an earlier proceeding, and in this case was going to be asked under oath about his earlier testimony. Morganroth asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege on the ground that he worried his truthful testimony this time might lead to prosecution for earlier false statements. Here is how the Sixth Circuit analyzed the question:
So the test seems to be pretty mushy and fact-sensitive: the question is whether Goodling could establish to a judge "sufficient evidence" such that the judge could "by the use of reasonable inference or judicial imagination, conceive a sound basis for a reasonable fear of prosecution." I tend to doubt that such a sound basis exists here. But then we would need to know a lot of factual details to make that call with any certainty; we would need to know exactly what Goodling could tell the judge about why she feared prosecution. (We probably also need to know what the judge ate for breakfast, but that's another matter.) We just don't know those details, so I don't think we can make an assessment of whether Goodling validly asserted the privilege. It seems unlikely to me that the assertion of privilege is valid, but I can't be sure.
Finally, I wanted to respond to Eric Muller's point that the Fifth Amendment protects the innocent. It's very true that the Supreme Court has said this, although I think it's generally meant in a somewhat specific way. For example, Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), suggests in dicta that a person can assert the privilege when they have reason to think they'll be prosecuted despite being innocent. When might that occur? Imagine a case in which a suspect was framed and all the evidence points towards him. He's innocent, but he would have reason to think that even his innocent disclosures could be used against him. He would still be able to assert the privilege even though he is innocent and would testify truthfully. So as in Morganroth, the key issue is always whether there is a "real danger" of prosecution.
Anyway, that's my sense of things. I'm not a Fifth Amendment expert, so if I'm off base please let me know and I'll post a correction.
In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1983), is instructive. Morganroth had given testimony under oath in an earlier proceeding, and in this case was going to be asked under oath about his earlier testimony. Morganroth asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege on the ground that he worried his truthful testimony this time might lead to prosecution for earlier false statements. Here is how the Sixth Circuit analyzed the question:
[W]hile it is clear that a witness, upon interposing his claim of privilege, is not required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, Hoffman, supra, 341 U.S. 486, it is equally clear that a witness' "say so" does not by itself establish the hazard of incrimination. Id. Where there is nothing suggestive of incrimination about the setting in which a seemingly innocent question is asked, the burden of establishing a foundation for the assertion of the privilege should lie with the witness making it. We do not hold, however, that a witness has the burden of proof on this issue. A witness presents sufficient evidence to establish a foundation for the assertion of the privilege and shows a real danger of prosecution if it is not perfectly clear to the court "from a careful consideration of all of the circumstances in the case, that a witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such a tendency to incriminate." Hoffman, supra, 341 U.S. 488, 71 S.Ct. 819.Id. at 169-70.
Stated differently, sufficient evidence is presented by a witness if a court can, by the use of reasonable inference or judicial imagination, conceive a sound basis for a reasonable fear of prosecution. Short of uttering statements or supplying evidence that would be incriminating, a witness must supply personal statements under oath or provide evidence with respect to each question propounded to him to indicate the nature of the criminal charge which provides the basis for his fear of prosecution and, if necessary to complement non-testimonial evidence, personal statements under oath to meet the standard for establishing reasonable cause to fear prosecution under this charge. Statements under oath, in person or by affidavit, are necessary because the present penalty of perjury may be the sole assurance against a spurious assertion of the privilege. Argument may be supplied by counsel but not the facts necessary for the court's determination.
So the test seems to be pretty mushy and fact-sensitive: the question is whether Goodling could establish to a judge "sufficient evidence" such that the judge could "by the use of reasonable inference or judicial imagination, conceive a sound basis for a reasonable fear of prosecution." I tend to doubt that such a sound basis exists here. But then we would need to know a lot of factual details to make that call with any certainty; we would need to know exactly what Goodling could tell the judge about why she feared prosecution. (We probably also need to know what the judge ate for breakfast, but that's another matter.) We just don't know those details, so I don't think we can make an assessment of whether Goodling validly asserted the privilege. It seems unlikely to me that the assertion of privilege is valid, but I can't be sure.
Finally, I wanted to respond to Eric Muller's point that the Fifth Amendment protects the innocent. It's very true that the Supreme Court has said this, although I think it's generally meant in a somewhat specific way. For example, Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), suggests in dicta that a person can assert the privilege when they have reason to think they'll be prosecuted despite being innocent. When might that occur? Imagine a case in which a suspect was framed and all the evidence points towards him. He's innocent, but he would have reason to think that even his innocent disclosures could be used against him. He would still be able to assert the privilege even though he is innocent and would testify truthfully. So as in Morganroth, the key issue is always whether there is a "real danger" of prosecution.
Anyway, that's my sense of things. I'm not a Fifth Amendment expert, so if I'm off base please let me know and I'll post a correction.
Related Posts (on one page):
- More on Goodling and the Fifth Amendment Privilege:
- Goodling's Basis for Taking the Fifth:
- Goodling To Take the Fifth:
"Goodling, 33, is a 1995 graduate Messiah College in Grantham, Pa., an institution that describes itself as "committed to embracing an evangelical spirit."
She received her law degree at Regent University in Virginia Beach, Va. Regent, founded by Christian broadcaster Pat Robertson, says its mission is "to produce Christian leaders who will make a difference, who will change the world."
These are the legal eagles we have in the Department of Justice? God help us....
She testifies the original DOJ line on these firings. Several members of committee have declared that they believe the DOJ line is part of a conspiracy to defraud congress. Testifying in this matter yields a referral for perjury.
She repudiates the original DOJ line on these firings. She has directly opened herself to charges under 18 USC 371.
Either way the committee refers her for prosecution.
So Orin, you still hold that it is unlikely that the facts meet the test?
[OK Comments: ARLTRFTC, is the test whether a real danger exists that the Committee would make a referral for prosecution? Or is the test whether there is a real danger of actual prosecution? I believe the latter, not the former, but I hope you'll share any authorities to the contrarty.]
What does her religion have to do with her legal skills?
As far as the threat of a perjury trap, consider Libby and Fitzgerald - no crime was involved other than several perjurious sentences.
So there was no crime other than a few crimes?
Nothing. US News rated it as a "Tier 4" law school. It's not generally regarded as a very good school. What is this person doing at such a high level within the DOJ?
Oh, that's right. I guess it's the same reason Brownie was hired to be in charge of FEMA.
The Constitution explicitly states that is protects rights that pre-exist the Constitution itself; the document itself does not create rights. Whether these rights come from God, from man's nature, or some other source, is perhpas an open question, although the Declaration of Independence, states that rights come from the Creator.
If you agree with the jury's fact finding.
I concede that the latter is required. But that being so is not contrapositive as regards my claim. Your position then is that the link between referral and prosecution is weak. I might agree, except that in less than two years we'll have a new (maybe democrat) DoJ. This is soon enough to dangle the desire to prosecute thru the next election on the promise of doing 'the right thing' by bringing 'these people' to trial in the next administration.
Members of the Committee are on record as believing the testimony provided by DOJ was false or misleading. Ms. Goodling helped prepare that testimony. Now, the Committee wants to interview her under oath about activities (giving false and misleading testimony, firing a US Attorney to frustrate a prosecution, etc.) members of the Committee have called criminal. In short, she's being asked to give testimony about her own actions that some on the Committee might view as criminal. She may think she has done nothing illegal, but she may also believe that her testimony -- particularly if her testimony is that the prior DOJ testimony was accurate -- will tend to convict her in the eyes of the Committee and prompt a criminal referral. Given her position in the DOJ, there's also likely to be a call for a Special Counsel. (Note: None of this is based on a fear that the Committee will find her actual testimony is false, just that they may find her role in this whole affair was criminal.)
I'm not asking you to place odds that events will play out such that she ends up being indicted; instead, I ask just how great a threat do you feel there need be before the Constitution kicks in to protect Ms. Goodling from self-incrimination? The case you cited didn't seem to place a high threshold on the probability that Ms. Goolding's testimony would incriminate her only that it was possible that it might. Do you read it differently?
Scooter, is that you?
In less than two years we'll have a new (maybe democrat) DoJ. This is soon enough to dangle the desire to prosecute thru the next election on the promise of doing 'the right thing' by bringing 'these people' to trial in the next administration.
Yes, a prosecution may be possible. But the legal standard requires more than just possibility: it requires "real danger." That's why I tend to doubt the standard has been met here. But as I said, this is all just speculation; we don't know enough facts yet to really say.
I'm fairly confident that I've correctly parsed Orin's comments as meaning that while he concedes a referral is likely, a subsequent prosecution is not. To review: congress cannot pursue the matter on its own, the prosecution must be initiated by Justice either directly or by appointing a special prosecutor.
It is fair to say that with the current AG, neither of those circumstances is likely. Nonetheless, if you follow the DailyKos opinion, they seem to believe that forcing the AG to resign will pull the plug from the dam.
Personally I think a clean-up prosecution in 2009 is more likely. The Democrats will gin-up this issue as being as severe as possible during this next election cycle. Consequently gratuitous prosecutions in 2009 are a likely follow-through.
That does raise the possibility that had he been acquitted, Goodling would actually be in a stronger position given that an actual mistaken prosecution took place--establishing the climate of irrational prosecution which would lend credence to her concerns.
Wherein do you read that real danger implicates whether not discretion is exercised by the prosecutor? Real danger means that the questions you refuse to answer bear a material connection to the crimes with which you could be charged as a result of your statement.
On that point I agree that we don't have the facts because we don't know what questions the committee will ask. But then Goodling did not refuse to appear. She asserts that she will take the fifth (and expects the questions to be of the nature where that will be possible). She then asks as a matter of course that the committee reconsider calling her in light of her position.
So I don't think our (and her) not knowing the details of what she will be asked makes her letter untoward.
Which is really the question here right? Is her letter reasonable as a matter of law. Certainly it is sound enough that you could argue it to the Supreme Court with a straight face, even if it lacks the cites to be a sure winner.
In the tax world, we have "substantial authority", "reasonable basis", and "realistic possibility", as legal standards. They equate roughly with 40%, 33%, and 20% probability of being sustained on the merits of a particular position. What the heck is meant by "real danger"?
I think the answer is found in the rest of the sentence where the court articulates the real danger standard: that the [testimony] cannot possibly have ... a tendency to incriminate. (Emphasis added.) That seems to be a very low standard. Much lower than "realistic possibility". All that's required is that it be possible that the witness' answers tend to incriminate her. Won't any basis that rises above the merely frivolous do? Which is to say any basis at all.
Professor Kerr's reading requires the witness rely on a prosecutor exercising discretion in her favor. (This assumes that he believes there is a real danger of a criminal referral coming from the Senate.) In the current politically charged atmosphere, who can say in good faith that a prosecutor won't pursue a criminal referral that might come from the Senate? It's already been suggested that an new DOJ under a Democrat President might pursue the issue to fulfill a campaign promise. Let me add two additional scenarios, a career prosecutor takes up the case to curry favor with a future administration. The current AG agrees to appoint a Special Counsel as part of an attempt to make peace with the Senate. I'm sure others, exercising "
judicialimagination" can come up with even more scenarios in which it would not shock to learn Ms. Goodling's been indicted.Unless we can say that a prosecutor won't prosecute, we must admit that it's possible that a prosecution might happen. Possible is all that's required.
Assuming the "possible" part of the two prong test has been met, what about the "tend to incriminate" part of the test? In determining whether truthful answers to questions tend to incriminate, is it required that an actual crime have been committed (although not necessarily by the witness)? No. That would mean a witness need not fear the possibility a prosecutor might be willing to adopt a "novel" approach to the law. I posit that "when looking at all the facts in the light least favorable to the witness, it's possible that someone might believe she committed a crime" captures meaning of "tend to incriminate" in this context. (Given the comments of some posting in the comments on this blog, it seems that the "tend" prong of the test is met by anyone who admits to working at the DOJ.) Given the statements of members of the Committee, it appears that anything the witness says that would place her in the vicinity of the crime (helping the DOJ mislead Congress or any involvement with the "firings" of the US Attorneys) would have the tendency to further convict her in their eyes.
What am I missing?
I am no judge... nor even a lawyer... but I can easily imagine prosecutions emerging from this scandal, and consider it quite reasonable to infer that such a danger exists.
I don't think the opinion is all that mushy. The Court wants to make sure that the 5th Amendment is not turned into an "I don't have to testify if I don't want to" privilege, without at the same time forcing people to incriminate themselves just to assert their right not to do so. Like so many things in our society, this works better in a reasonable, sane environment. Sadly, I don't think that prevails in Congress at the moment (in either party). As I said in my earlier post, these kinds of very thorny problems will continue to arise until we back off from the use of prosecutions of Administration staffers (regardless of the party of the Administration) as a political tool.
What makes this a very liberal test with a broad application is that a "reasonable fear of prosecution" can consist of anything the judge can imagine. As the posts here and elsewhere demonstrate, it really doesn't take much imagination to come up with a variety of scenarios where Ms. Gooding can have a reasonable fear of prosecution.
I am also unsure if there is a fundamental difference between a congressional referral for prosecution and the likelihood that a prosecutor will take the case. These political cases often end up in the hands of special prosecutors with unlimited budgets and time and intense pressure to bag convictions, no matter how far removed from the original mandate. Mr. Fitgerald's turn as a special prosecutor which lasted for months after he found out that the leak about Plame came from a war opponent in the State Department and preceded Wilson's op-ed piece in the NYT in order to bag Libby for having a different memory than a couple reporters, who themselves had varying memories.
In such an atmosphere, I would say that Ms. Goodling has reason to fear liability no matter what she testifies.
The Declaration, you mean? The 9th Amendment is a bit agnostic on the subject.
Was it in the other thread that I anticipated Goodling's forthcoming journal article, "Pleading the Fifth - An Evangelical Perspective"?
Most of the rest of her attorney's letter focuses on expected unfairness or political bias in the committee hearing, and those parts of the letter probably do not provide a sufficient basis for assertion of the privilege.
Yeah, I guess all the liberals who are saying "only guilty bums take the Fifth" aren't really excoriating her. They're just raising the overall tenor of the debate!
who exactly are you quoting?
And as non-liberal Orin Kerr said:
"So the test seems to be pretty mushy and fact-sensitive: the question is whether Goodling could establish to a judge "sufficient evidence" such that the judge could "by the use of reasonable inference or judicial imagination, conceive a sound basis for a reasonable fear of prosecution."
(Emphasis added)
It presumably could; but absent some indication from her that her testimony would be worth a grant of immunity, why bother giving it to her? Frankly, from a political standpoint, her taking the Fifth is probably better for the Democrats in Congress than anything she could actually say, unless she could testify that the WH told her to assist in misleading Congress.
Because they want to use her future testimony to prosecute her, or at least threaten to do so.
You would have to be an idiot to say one word under oath in front of such a committee.
Kevin
In the context of this legislative investigation, how would such a question ever get before a judge? The only route that comes to mind is that Goodling is subpoenaed, refuses to testify by invoking the Fifth, then the Judiciary Committee and the Senate cite her for contempt, referring the matter to a U.S. attorney for prosecution. Only then, as I see it, could a judge ever weigh this question.
Are there other plausible scenarios?
Yes, the Democrats won't quit until every low-level staffer is imprisoned.
Is anyone here going to argue against Orin Kerr's points without relying on some sort of vicarious persecution fantasy?
Well, since the Judicial power of the United States is vested in an Article III court, regardless of whether the prosecution is brought by an Article I or Article II prosecutor, that's the only way the subpoena could ever be enforced, as well. If you or me violated the law, the only way we'd get a determination of that is if we got arrested and hauled before a competent court, no?
And count me as another liberal who isn't excoriating Goodling for exercising her constitutional rights. It is nice to see conservatives concerned about criminal rights all of a sudden. I will say that I think it's reasonable to assume that somebody who is exercising their Fifth Amendment rights is guilty. There is a strong correlation between those two things. (And I say this as somebody who has represented a number of criminals.)
She could be prosecuted, could she not, in 21 months once Hillary is sworn in? Or am I mistaken as to the statute of lims on this particular group of crimes?
That would certainly be sufficient justification for taking the Fifth, I would think.
I'd have to concede that the Constitution is implicit rather than explicit in any discussion of rights. But by being "agnostic" about the rights, the 9th amendment unmistakably concedes that there are other sources for rights -- unless you'd like to argue that it's claiming there _are_ no other rights.
Anyhow, though, the original claim was:
The belief that the Bible "ought to be the law of the land" would indeed properly disqualify a person from high responsibility (but what exactly would such a belief mean? Aside from the ancient Hebraic law, there's no law in there sufficient to order a land, and that's long obsolete in any sense). If the person meant to say that a belief that the Bible ought to guide the law of the land... Well, that seems about a religious as a belief that the Bible contains some truth (hint: that's just good sense).
But the first alleged disqualifier is not only a reasonable belief, it's the belief that most of the people who formed the Constitution professed (even most of the ones who weren't orthodox Christians), for some definition of the word "God".
Chuckle. But Leonard Levy's history of the 5th Amendment actually does show major religious underpinnings to that amendment, and to the requirement of proving the corpus delecti before admitting a confession. In the days when any offense worth committing was a capital offense, there was concern that self-incrimination was immoral as a form of suicide (and that allowing conviction without checks such as the corpus delecti might be "suicide by court," to coin a phrase). And a major impetus to recognition of the right arose from puritan attempts to avoid prosecution under Elizabeth, where Star Chamber proceedings traditionally began with a challenge that the defendant either swear to his innocence or confess.
As far as they lady's qualifications ... hey, it was a political appointment, a payoff to her or some patron of hers. Her experience, schooling, or legal skills came under "oh, that's nice, too." At Justice, most of the appointees spent their time travelling and giving speeches, while the career people ran the show. As often as not, the career people we worked with were wet behind the ears, too, could write decent (if overly long) motions, but had less courtroom experience than any county prosecutor or PD got in their first few months out of law school.
Seriously, what powers do congressmen/women have if she *does not refuse to answer questions* but *refuses to answer questions under oath*? I know congress has certain 'contempt of congress' powers (how could we tell?) but what are the limits of the exercise of that power. Do they have to appoint a Special Prosecutor to determine if it was contempt?
I ask these questions seriously, because it appears that in Ontario and Canada, a member of a parliamentary committee has NO powers to require *anyone* to appear and to answer questions. My MP is not only an unknown, he is a powerless unknown....He's so unknown I cannot remember his name at the moment and I've voted *against* him at least 3 times!
Geoff
Can anyone really justify a blanket "I won't testify" if the testimony being asked for is regarding the activities of others. I think that the case Ms. Goodling is making is very slim (it seems she is afraid of committing a potential crime as compared to the revelation of any past crimes), however, any arguments about a hostile atmosphere seem to be empty posturing and more importantly what about a whole universe of questions regarding others. If I witness a crime and then go down the street and commit a crime, it does not seem that I can make a blanket reference to the Fifth Amendment with respect to the acts that I witnessed just because the acts occurred near in time to my own criminal actions? If a question is posed that may tend to incriminate, then refuse to answer, but to pre-emptively state that any testimony would be self incriminating is the kind of stretch that I think even libertarians, literalists, textualists or whatever flavor of "conservative" one might ascribe to could not support with a straight face.
Only a paranoid schizophrenic could get away with stating that any testimony before a Congressional panel would tend to incriminate them.
And you people are attending/teaching/graduated from law school?
Here's a question:
Would anyone here arguing for Ms. Goodling have made the same arguments for Bill Clinton in refusing to give a deposition? Remember, Ms. Goodling is being asked to testify in a Congressional hearing, not in connection with any particular criminal proceeding.
Just to remind everyone, the actual words of the Amendment (sorry to bring that pesky text up) state:
Do we just ignore those words this time? Or is there a penumbra that I haven't notice emanating from the words?
Now, let's say that she refuses based on the Fifth, and she's found not to be exercising the privilege appropriately because she's not in real danger of prosecution; she then testifies. Is she effectively immunized at that point? It would seem that if not, she could then be prosecuted, having been told she was in no danger. Doesn't this effectively mean that she's expected to be prescient, and know whether or not she's going to be prosecuted, even irrationally and abusively?
My point is that it seems almost impossible to conceive of a condition under which she could be forced to testify, or have a contempt finding upheld, without either an explicit or implied promise of immunity.
"nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself "
Eddie, I'm not a lawyer, but I assume these words have been extended to mean that you can't be forced to testify under other auspices if that testimony can then be used against you in a criminal trial. Is this correct?
Glad to see support for strict meritocracy around here. I thought various posters supported affirmative action for victims of color and others otherwise unqualified for various positions.
Students attend the few conservative schools extant for a number of reasons. Just as blacks would eschew attendance at schools run by the KKK (if they could gain admittance) conservatives loathe commie schools.
I'm looking for a Montessori school for my grandson. In the course of the search the obvious occurred to me. New Jersey has thousands of pre, primary, secondary, and tertiary schools and almost all of them are run by hard core lefties.
The administrators and teachers believe in such things as high taxes, taxes, affirmative action, welfare, medicare, medicaid, social security, collectivization of schools, etc. Not to mention all the politically correct garbage.
No wonder home schooling is so popular. Home schooled lawyers are also unrated in US Snooze and World Report but of course the libertarians on this blog oppose legal licensure so such listings lose some of their relevance.
I don't think anyone is arguing for a blanket right to refuse to testify in front of a hostile Congressional committee. In this case, Ms. Goodling is being asked to testify about matters she participated in. Members of the Committee are on record stating that those matters were criminal in nature and I think she has a reasonable fear that she would be viewed as an accessory in those criminal activities. As such, I don't think she should be required to testify about those matters. I don't have any problem making that case with a straight face. (See my post above for why I the facts as we understand them meet the legal requirements for asserting 5th Amendment protection.)
As for your concern about whether she should be able to avoid appearing simply by sending a letter stating she plans on asserting her 5th Amendment rights in refusing to answer questions, your beef is with Congress. IIRC, there was some Congresscritter (What was his name?) who was famous for bringing people in to ask whether or not they were members of the communist party. The goal was to get them on camera refusing to answer on grounds it the answer might tend to incriminate them and to then hold them up for public ridicule. For some reason, the practice of calling people in front of the camera for the sole purpose public ridicule left a poor taste in the mouth and, with rare exceptions, Congress adopted the practice of NOT calling someone who's made it clear they would refuse to testify. Instead, the accepted practice is to negotiate the matter with the proposed witness' attorney. So, the practice of sending a letter such as the one sent on behalf of Ms. Goodling is not in the least unusual.
Lastly, with regard to your hypothetical, my reading of the 5th Amendment prevents your being forced to testify about the criminal activity of others if such testimony might tend to incriminate you -- even if it would incriminate you of an entirely unrelated crime. That is, if you witness a crime and soon thereafter commit a crime yourself, to the extent your testimony regarding the first crime would prove that you were in the vicinity at the time the second crime took place (proving your opportunity to commit the second crime) the 5th Amendment would apply to prevent your compelled testimony. Do you disagree with this reading?
That is not correct. He could have refused to testify, either in the deposition or at the trial, or he could have simply refused to answer specific questions he didn't feel like answering.
It is true he might have ended up with a judgment against him because of his resistance, but that's it.
Now of course this is a practical danger of any of a number of diseases, some incurable, and not a legal danger.
I have no idea if Goodling is a good attorney or not. Perhaps she is brilliant, fair, impartial, and just wants to do a good job implementing the laws. And perhaps I can buy the Brooklyn Bridge at a discount.
Regent U. is a baby of Pat Robertson, who makes no bones about that the fact that he wants to mold new legal minds to be in his very narrow definition of Christianity. He has promised to change the world and make it more in line with HIS values with these graduates, which I take at face value.
I really really dislike Pat Robertson, and think he is dangerous, egomanical, and blah blah blah. I freely admit that I have an irrational hatred of the man (most gay people do, and most liberals do, so I'm in good company). That one of his disciples is up so high in DOJ scares the hell out of me, and it shows just how beholden this Rebpulican party is to the Christianists.
I realize many people will disagree, and that I have a blind spot on this one.
BUT imagine if Michael Moore founded a 4th tier law school with the express purpose of 'changing the world' to his vision, and a law school grad was in the same position as Goodling in a Dem administration. Then tell me you wouldn't howl in protest. That's exactly how I feel on this one.
One strongly suspects that in a strict meritocracy, Goodling would not have any kind of job at DOJ at all, let alone an important one. Who knows how she got her job - but I doubt "strict merit" had much to do with it.
I apologize if this question has been covered.
Of course she has every right to take the Fifth amendment.
So there was no crime other than a few crimes?
"If you agree with the jury's fact finding."
I missed that. Did the jury proclaim that nobody committed any crime apart from Libby's perjury? They didn't leave it open whether there was a crime involved in compromising a CIA agent, but they declared that there was definitely no crime there?