I certainly believe that federal statutes, such as the ban on "partial-birth" abortion violate federalism principles, transgress the limits of enumerated powers, and are contrary to the spirit (if not the letter) of the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence. (See for instance, this NRO article from 2002.) Given existing precedents, however, I do not beleive that a facial challenge to the federal Partial Birth Abortion act would have fared particularly well.
The big problem with making a commerce clause challenge to this specific statute is that it contains a jurisdictional element. Specifically, the prohibition only applies to "partial-birth" abortions that are conducted “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” This would likely prevent the facial invalidation of the statute, as it effectively limits the application of the statute to those instances that are within the federal commerce clause power. Under existing precedent (e.g. Jones v. United States interpreting the jurisdictional element in the federal arson statute), the Court would almost certainly have adopted a narrow construction of the jurisdictional element to preserve the statute. Moreover, this approach would also convert as-applied constitutional challenges into statutory cases in which the court would merely consider whether a given occurrence fell within the scope of the statute's jurisdictional scope.
Related Posts (on one page):
- Federalist Society Online Debate on the Partial Birth Abortion case:
- How Many Justices Would Support a Commerce Clause Challenge to the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban?
- The Federal PBA Ban and the Commerce Clause:
- Federalism and Partial Birth Abortion:
- Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban: A Violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause?
- Scalia Having Second Thoughts About the Commerce Clause?:
Would the same arguemtn apply to the reenacted Gun Free School Zones Act, which contains a similar hook, on elacking in the law SCOTUS struck down in Lopez?
Would the same arguemnt apply to the reenacted Gun Free School Zones Act, which contains a similar hook, one lacking in the law SCOTUS struck down in Lopez?
Would the party challenging the statute have to allege and prove that the incident did not affect interstate commerce? Or is the burden on the gov't to prove that it does, once alleged by the other party? What kinds of evidence would come in?
Sounds like a terribly painful inquiry to me.
Personally, I think the commerce clause jurisprudence is so wrong that it isn't deserving of respect. However I don't think completely ignoring precedent in constitutional cases, as argued by Thomas, is completely right either.
2. There is a Supreme Court firearms case (I forget the caption) that blurs the distinction between probibited persons possessing "in or affecting," or receiving a firearm that has *ever* moved in interstate commerce, and simply ruled that a felon who possessed a firearm that had ever moved in commerce was within the statute.