The Volokh Conspiracy

I bet they caught all the water bottles though.

My first reaction was geez, way to let the terrorists know that its all just for show. As a frequent air traveler (1-2 round-trips per month these days) I often got the impression that everything was just for appearances. Consider for instance the rules about placing your computer in a separate bin: yeah its a complex thing, they want a better look. BUT that's precisely the point, its complex. The batteries could well be explosives--I know because 15+ years ago (1990) I was stopped precisely because they were suspicious of a spare battery I had in my bag. But also back in the 90s, the screener used to ask you to actually turn the computer on to demonstrate that it was real.

Does this happen now? No. Instead we're run through some procedures to make it appear as though something is happening.

Similarly I had an experience in 2004 with a lead-lined film bag. The screener had absolutely no idea what it was despite a visual inspection of the outside, and expressed complete disbelief upon my verbal explanation of what it did. He actually called his supervisor over, repeated what I said and asked, "is this possible?". Shocking. The best part came next: he didn't even inspect the contents of the bag. He just handed it back.

This may indicate that the absence of terrorist attacks in the US since 9/11 is not due to increased security.

Not only is SF better at detecting threats, a study two years ago also found that SF's private firm was faster and had shorter lines. I noted that study here (the link to that full article appears to no longer be valid).

I suggest that the TSA knows that screenings don't accomplish much. In an experiment, I tried traveling with a sealed canister of Comet scouring powder. Three times out of four it went through with no questions. One time I had to wait while it was checked. Hopefully there are other methods such as checking ticket purchasers which are more effective.

Two words: Turkey Sandwich.

Based on some reading I've done in the past few months, I suspect the only response that will come from this article on the part of the TSA Administration will be to try to ferret out the employees that leaked the information to the press. There won't be any thought given to tightening or improving security; rather, management will be looking to control information about their screw-ups. The TSA is apparently one of the worst of the federal agencies in the area of introspection or needed improvements.

Anderson, or it may be that somehow the terrorists have been eliminated or disabled before they ever reached the airport. It's hard to see just what the Bush administration has been doing specifically that would accomplish that, but at least a few potential terrorists must be among the multitude imprisoned in Gitmo, and maybe the rest of them decided to go to Iraq and make IED's, or to bomb places in Bali, Spain, London, etc., where they have a good chance of getting away rather than to make a suicide run at an airliner.

Isn't one statistic lurking here that SFO has many less passengers than both O'Hare and LAX?

While they must also have proportionately more screeners, the higher volume of people suggests more things get missed.

Another inference would be that the busier the airport, the less likely it is that a screener will be able to detect small potential bomb components on a passenger. (Which is what we're talking about - tiny potential "bomb parts", often right off of a hardware store shelf, some as small as a pen cap.)

Screeners at busy airports have to deal with the host of nonsensical rules, treating every passenger as a significant potential threat, shoe removal rules, rules on the expanded number of items which must come out of carry-on bags.... The comparison to Israel in another thread is silly, not just because of scale, but because Israel seems very unlikely adopt such a system of intense generalized suspicion over individualized suspicion.

AJ,

Why would a private security company have any more incentive to administer more testing than the TSA? To administer such testing sounds like either (1) something that is paid for by government through the contract or (2) an unauthorized activity that causes the company to incur unrecoverable cost that cut into profits. If it is (1), then presumably the government knows and approves of paying for this greater frequency of testing. But, if government is paying for greater testing at San Francisco than Los Angeles, one wonders why the government has not decided that more testing at San Francisco is cost effective, but not in Los Angeles. If it is (2), one wonders why a private security company would sacrifice its own profits by taking on tasks for which it is not paid.

There is no reason to think that private security companies have any incentive to engage in testing that is not paid for by the government. (2) is an absurd scenario that one would not expect a profit maximizing private company to engage in.

So, the government is in charge of the amount of testing that is done, whether or not such testing is carried out by private actors or by the government itself. I should note that implicitly you assume that the testing is carried out by the private security company itself. But, this is a factual question, and this assumption could be wrong. But whatever the case, the point is that the amount of testing is essentially controlled by the government, assuming that no private company would purposely squander funds on activities for which there is no prospect of compensation.

Thus, it is absurd to say that the private sector is more effective, because the private sector engages in more testing. Ultimately, the level of testing for either private security companies or the TSA is going to be controlled by the government, which is ultimately paying the bill. So, it would be absurd to say this is a matter of private security being more efficient the public security, because private security "decides" to engage in more testing.

Further, this is rendered all the more absurd because if the matter were truly as simple as increasing the amount of testing, that is something that can easily be done without resorting to private security companies. In that case, Orin's attribution of the difference to private sector versus public sector security would be ridiculous.

Every time I hear the talking point about how "Bush has kept us safe from terror attacks since 9/11," I think about these recurring reports on the TSA. It seems a good bet that if we haven't lost any more planes, it's because no one is really trying. Which says something good about human nature, I guess.

You think al-Qaeda decided not to bother us anymore? I guess fighting them elsewhere must be working, huh?

No, seriously, I suspect that a lot of why we haven't had more attacks in the U.S. has been that there's a lot of stuff going on that this isn't getting press attention--stuff rather like 24, but a lot more gritty, less high-tech, and probably a lot uglier.

And there have been a few arrests over the last few years, and a few convictions. Do you suppose some of these might have been people that would have been problems?

Sez OK:

"I would think the real story is the dramatic gap between the performance of TSA employees and private sector employees: an 80% success rate seems like an enormous improvement over the TSA's pretty dismal 25% and 40% success rates, at least assuming that the tests were the same."

There's a big leap of faith in those last nine words, particularly in light of the notable differences in lay-out, volume, and nature of traffic at the three airports in question. Don't know that it supports the inference; I'd like to see the actual study protocols, but they're SURE not going to release those.

. . . and just what is a "simulated explosive"? A lump of unidentifiable stuff? A lump of unidentifiable stuff of density similar to real explosive, and that leaves traces of the relevant nitrate compounds, but really is non-flammible? A black iron ball with a fuse sticking out?

r gould-saltman

You think al-Qaeda decided not to bother us anymore? I guess fighting them elsewhere must be working, huh?

No, seriously, I suspect that a lot of why we haven't had more attacks in the U.S. has been that there's a lot of stuff going on that this isn't getting press attention—stuff rather like 24, but a lot more gritty, less high-tech, and probably a lot uglier.

Or perhaps the "Terr'ists" have realized that we are doing quite well enough destroying America by ourselves. Why need terrorists bother to blow up any more buildings when, merely by blowing up the WTC in 2001, they have caused Americans to give up their civil liberties, their suspicion of police states, their self-confidence and everything else that once made America so great.

This may indicate that the absence of terrorist attacks in the US since 9/11 is not due to increased security.

My theory is that the real reason is that the terrorists are rolling on the floor laughing so hard at the Bush Administration's pathetic attempts at improving security, failure to pursue them in Afghanistan, and the enormously expensive diversion to Iraq, that they can't engage in terrorism.

Or perhaps the "Terr'ists" have realized that we are doing quite well enough destroying America by ourselves. Why need terrorists bother to blow up any more buildings when, merely by blowing up the WTC in 2001, they have caused Americans to give up their civil liberties, their suspicion of police states, their self-confidence and everything else that once made America so great.

When did George Clooney and the Dixie Chicks get arrested? When did newspapers stop criticizing the Bush Administration? I must have missed this loss of civil liberties.

They may have missed bomb parts but what matters is whether they would have missed all the parts needed to make up the bomb on a single day.