Wild Speculation:

This phrase from Justice Scalia's dissent in Indiana v. Edwards is a foreshadowing of a phrase in one of the pro-individual-rights opinions in D.C. v. Heller: "As I have explained, I would not adopt an approach to the right of self-representation that we have squarely rejected for other rights -- allowing courts to disregard the right when doing so serves the purposes for which the right was intended." We'll see in a few days whether I'm right.

J. Aldridge:
I have the hunch that says if Justice Scalia is really the strict constructionists it is believed to be, then I look for something along the lines of reversing Heller under the condition there is no violation of "Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia."
6.23.2008 12:51pm
J. Aldridge:
Edit: "it is believed" should read "he is believed."
6.23.2008 12:53pm
Per Son:
Ironically:

Antonin Scalia says that he is "not a strict constructionist and no-one ought to be . . ."

Antonin Scalia "A Matter of Interpretation" 1998.
6.23.2008 12:54pm
J. Aldridge:
Per Son: Well, he applies strict construction as a textualist.
6.23.2008 1:02pm
LawClerk1 (mail):
I believe he is referring to his right to counsel opinion in United States v. Gonzales-Lopez. From the third paragraph of Section II of that opinion:


Stated as broadly as this, the Government’s argument in effect reads the Sixth Amendment as a more detailed version of the Due Process Clause—and then proceeds to give no effect to the details. It is true enough that the purpose of the rights set forth in that Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair. What the Government urges upon us here is what was urged upon us (successfully, at one time, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980) ) with regard to the Sixth Amendment ’s right of confrontation—a line of reasoning that “abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Since, it was argued, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to ensure the reliability of evidence, so long as the testimonial hearsay bore “indicia of reliability,” the Confrontation Clause was not violated. See Roberts, supra, at 65–66. We rejected that argument (and our prior cases that had accepted it) in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004) , saying that the Confrontation Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” Id., at 61.
6.23.2008 1:09pm
Bart (mail):
J. Aldridge:

Per Son: Well, he applies strict construction as a textualist.

The Second Amendment right has no textual limitations, merely a preamble listing one reason for recognizing the right.

State constitutions with similar preambles for their right to free speech do not limit that right to only the reason(s) listed in the preamble.

The use of the phrase "shall not be infringed" suggests a nearly absolute right. I doubt even Scalia will find an absolute right, but the text is there to support such a ruling.
6.23.2008 1:46pm
DJR:
Congratulations Bart, you have succeeded (in just the sixth comment!) in turning this discussion to your view of the merits of Heller. Now we can safely ignore this thread as both sides trot out their tired arguments one last time before there is actually something new to debate. Wake me on Wednesday.
6.23.2008 1:53pm
Dave D. (mail):
..." trot out their tired arguments..."
..I don't think you are wakeable. Slumber on in snarky repose.
6.23.2008 3:00pm
Nappy (mail):
Let's not bother to wake DJR on Wednesday, he seems kind of cranky and could use the extra sleep.
6.23.2008 3:03pm
krs:
Congratulations Bart, you have succeeded (in just the sixth comment!) in turning this discussion to your view of the merits of Heller.

The first comment was asking for it.
6.23.2008 3:35pm
cjwynes (mail):
I agree with LawClerk1, I think that remark is primarily a reference to the Confrontation Clause and his Maryland v Craig dissent. I've noted that he has a real quarrel with the idea that the specific procedural safeguards adopted in the Constitution can be abstracted out to some larger principle which some then claim is what the document is really trying to protect. I think that is a big part of his views on criminal justice, but I think that analogizing outward from that field to the issues in Heller may be a stretch. If you go back and read the Craig dissent, I'm not seeing any broader implications to that idea. Obviously he was being joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, who may have had no problem with "abstracting from the right to its purposes" in other contexts.
6.23.2008 4:02pm
krs:
but I think that analogizing outward from that field to the issues in Heller may be a stretch

Perhaps that's why Prof. Volokh chose the title he did for the post.

Re Craig, I don't doubt that Brennan, Marshall and Stevens have no problem abstracting from a right to its purposes, but I think that in general, Justice Scalia does.
6.23.2008 4:14pm
theobromophile (www):
EV - you're as bad as us Harry Potter fans were right before the 7th book came out. (I can't say "like children before Christmas," because we don't yet know whether or not the Heller opinion will be like Christmas or Halloween.)
6.23.2008 4:35pm
David E. Young (mail) (www):
We also don't know for sure if it will be announced by Holloween or Christmas.
6.24.2008 2:52pm