[Josh Chafetz, guest-blogging, July 22, 2008 at 8:23am] Trackbacks
Leaving Pre-Constitutional American Legislatures,

or, Part II of Leaving the House. In my last post, I went through the history of devices by which Members have quit their seats in the House of Commons. Not only has a right of resignation never existed at English or British law, but, during the crucial period of American constitutional development, it was not the case that a Member who sought the Chiltern Hundreds would necessarily be granted it.

In this post, I will look at pre-constitutional American practice. I should begin by acknowledging that the historical record relied upon here is thinner than the record for the House of Commons. But as far as I have been able to piece it together, with a single, explicit exception, no pre-constitutional American legislature allowed for resignations as a matter of right.

As historians of the American colonies have noted, colonial American legislatures tended to model themselves — especially in matters related to their procedures and privileges — after the House of Commons. Thus, in several colonies (e.g., Pennsylvania and North Carolina), the election laws provided punishments for elected delegates who did not appear when the legislature was in session, without making any distinction between elected delegates who had been seated and those who had not, or between those who wished to continue as members and those who did not. Other colonies (e.g., New York and South Carolina) provided for the filling of vacancies caused by an enumerated list of causes, and resignation was not listed. And in 1770, the New Jersey legislature and governor quarreled about which of them would accept John Ogden's resignation, but no one asserted that it was effective without someone's accepting it.

The practice of the states in the years between independence and the drafting of the federal Constitution seems to have been the same. A number of state constitutions (e.g., Pennsylvania, Virginia, New York, Vermont) mentioned resignation for executive and judicial officials without any mention of it for legislators.

Indeed, an incident from the Pennsylvania state legislature vividly illustrates the unavailability of resignation. On September 28, 1787 — one day before the expiration of the legislature — a member introduced a two-part resolution for the calling of a state convention to ratify the proposed federal Constitution. The first part, which expressed the Assembly's general desire to call a convention, was considered the morning it was introduced and passed by a vote of forty-three to nineteen. The assembly then adjourned for lunch. When it reconvened to consider the second part — which specified the date and procedures for electing delegates to the ratification convention — all nineteen members who voted against in the morning were absent, leaving the assembly one member short of a quorum. A quorum of the Pennsylvania Assembly consisted of "two-thirds of the whole number of members elected," (emphasis added) meaning that the denominator for quorum purposes did not change when a seat was vacant. The assembly sent its Sergeant out to round up some absent members, which (with the help of a band of concerned citizens) he did. The detained members sought to be excused — a request which the house denied — but they never sought to resign. Given that this all occurred on the final day of the legislature, they had nothing to lose by resigning, if they could. But they never even mentioned it. They knew there was no point in asking permission to resign — it would be refused — and without permission, the resignation would be of no effect.

One state, however, did allow for resignations: Maryland. Its 1776 Constitution specifically provided for the filling of legislative vacancies occasioned by, among other things, resignation.

The Continental Congress seems to have followed the majority rule. Although service in the Continental Congress was distinctly unpleasant, and it often had difficulty mustering a quorum, delegates nevertheless sought leave of the body to retire from it.

It thus seems that, with the sole exception of Maryland, pre-constitutional American legislatures followed the same rule as the House of Commons: Members had no individual right to quit their seats. Rather, if they wished to leave the house, they would need the house's permission to do so.

If you want further documentation of or elaboration on any of the points above, they are summarized from pages 19-28 of the article draft on SSRN. In the next post, I'll discuss the treatment of legislative resignations in the Constitution itself.

non-native speaker:
Did resignation in Maryland have to be accepted/approved in order to be effective? Or was it a "right" of the legislature member, and not a circumstance of him like death (i.e., distinct from a "right" to die)?
7.22.2008 10:07am
dearieme:
This is slightly reminiscent of Late Roman times, when rich men would try hard to avoid public office.
7.22.2008 10:17am
Eric Muller (www):
Can a person be President and a Senator at the same time?

If not, would McCain or Obama have to resign his Senate seat in order to take the Oath of Office as President?

If so, does your article imply that the Senate should have to approve of such a resignation before it became effective?

If so, does your article imply that a Democratic-controlled Senate could block Senator McCain from assuming the duties of the Presidency by withholding permission for him to resign the Senate? (Or that a Republican-controlled Senate could do the same to Senator Obama?)

Just wondering.
7.22.2008 11:29am
Josh Chafetz (www):
Prof. Muller,

Great question; if you don't mind, I'm going to hold off answering until Thursday when I do a post responding to comments.
7.22.2008 12:16pm
Kevin Lynch (mail):
This isn't my field, but I don't think those hypotheticals would be an issue:


Can a person be President and a Senator at the same time?


Certainly not ... Article I, Section 6:

... no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.


I guess the question then is whether the Senate would have any discretion at all in whether the duly elected person takes the office of President ... and I don't think they have a choice. Amendment XII contains the following bits of language, concerning the selection of the President following the submission of votes by the Electoral College:

The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;--the person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.

That doesn't seem to give the Senate, or the House for that matter, any option to prevent a sitting Senator from becoming President once the College has spoken. Of course, in the event the College fails to select a President by majority, the House could certainly prevent a given Senator from becoming President, but the Senate wouldn't have any direct input.

I look forward to finding out that I missed something :-)
7.22.2008 12:41pm
A Law Dawg:
A Law Dawg, J., joins in the opinion of K. Lynch, J. supra.
7.22.2008 12:55pm
Soronel Haetir (mail):
I would also note that if the argument is that English practice somehow controls that becoming President would be akin to acccepting a crown office. Just because HoC members did not always receive such an office when sought, could the HoC deny a member such an office if it were offered outside their control?
7.22.2008 2:09pm
Tritium (mail):
If the Office of President had an increase in wages, wouldn't the current candidates be disqualified from said office?

I'd be interested in some thought on amendments. Since by definition, Amending "adds, or clarifies" and does not allow repeal, nor can an amendment that conflicts with existing clauses be valid.

Thus, leading me to believe a lot more is wrong then most could imagine.
7.22.2008 7:15pm
Tritium (mail):
If the Office of President had an increase in wages, wouldn't the current candidates be disqualified from said office?

I'd be interested in some thought on amendments. Since by definition, Amending "adds, or clarifies" and does not allow repeal, nor can an amendment that conflicts with existing clauses be valid.

Thus, leading me to believe a lot more is wrong then most could imagine.
7.22.2008 7:18pm
Tritium (mail):
If the Office of President had an increase in wages, wouldn't the current candidates be disqualified from said office?

I'd be interested in some thought on amendments. Since by definition, Amending "adds, or clarifies" and does not allow repeal, nor can an amendment that conflicts with existing clauses be valid.

Thus, leading me to believe a lot more is wrong then most could imagine.
7.22.2008 7:19pm
Milhouse (www):
Tritium:

Since by definition, Amending "adds, or clarifies" and does not allow repeal, nor can an amendment that conflicts with existing clauses be valid.
Huh? An amendment can certainly delete text from the thing that it amends. Where on earth did you get the idea that it couldn't?
7.23.2008 10:46am