No! You might think otherwise from various incautious commentaries, including the economist’s letter written a while back. (The letter said "go slow"; it didn't say "do nothing.") And it is true that most economists don’t like the original Paulson plan, and also don’t like the plan passed by the Senate. But the view that we are currently in a serious financial crisis—the worst since the Great Depression—is, as far as I can tell, unanimous. The view is based on readily accessible data on the credit crisis—including the TED spread—and overwhelming anecdotal evidence of financial institutions failing or hoarding capital and businesses having trouble obtaining credit. And the view that the government should engage in a massive intervention of some sort is nearly unanimous. The idea that governments should address financial crises by injecting liquidity in the system is not some new-fangled idea dreamed up by socialists, but conventional wisdom, proved again and again by experience, going back many decades. The problem is that every economist has his own theory about the proper solution. There is some convergence on the idea of recapitalization of financial institutions, which the current bill authorizes only indirectly (but which the Fed already has authority to do, as we saw with AIG), but otherwise there are as many views as there are economists.
Here is the problem. You are a member of Congress, and n economists tell you that they don’t like the bill you are about to vote on. When you ask these economists what the better approach is, you get n different answers. When you tell them that your only real choice is to vote up or down on this bill, they tell you that this bill is better than nothing. I have found plenty of criticism of the various plans by economists on the web, but it is very hard to find a single mainstream economist (the closest is thisone, but even he thinks something should be done) who unequivocally states that we will be better off with no regulation than with a flawed plan.
Related Posts (on one page):
- Economists and the Bailout Revisited:
- Do economists oppose the bailout bill?
Yes, many of us have different answers on what to do eventually. But the right thing to do right now is nothing. This stampeding of Congress into acting now now now is madness.
Yet there's no need to pass this bill this week.
White House: Will take weeks to start buying bad debt:
Congress has time to hold hearings. Congress has time to listen to other economists.
Imagine for instance that the government told you that you could go to Las Vegas and it would cover all of your losses while you would get to keep all of your gains. Indeed, they would even go so far as to punish you for not making the riskiest bets you could find. This is essentially what happened in the mortgage industry. It has NOTHING to do with the free market and EVERYTHING to do with social engineering on a grand scale.
So what effect does the government actually coming through with its guarantees have on the behavior of the people in the casino? All this bail-out for democratic donors does is ensure that we get to pay out even more a few years down the line.
These businesses NEED to fail and the government needs to get the hell out of the industry and quit mucking things up. It would also be helpful if the idiots in MA would quit sending socialists like Barney Frank back to cause even more trouble.
We know what the problem is. We know how to fix it. But doing so would lead to the total exposure of the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the left in our country so we are going to throw money at it and try to sweep it under the rug until after the election, at which time we can try to set up similar systems in the healthcare industry.
Yes, we face a crisis. But it is not that credit is in short supply... it is that common sense is.
Of course, Prof. Posner might not say the same thing after reading Prof. Phelan's comment.
If the government wants to buy up bad loans, it needs to start with those issued by Fannie and Freddie, as (a) they are probably the source of most of them and (b) we taxpayers are already on the hook for them anyway. Buy back the CDOs with underlying mortgages (for the lower of face value or what was paid), sort out and sell the performing ones, then review the nonperforming ones and give some relief to those homeowners who (a) were taken advantage of and (b) have a realistic chance of repaying the mortgage debt if the terms are changed. Based on what the newspapers say, I suspect that the group of "victims" is fairly small and therefore the amount of loan modification will not cost the government all that much.
This monstrosity also reminds me of why my vote for McCain will be of the nose-holding variety. Based on his campaign rhetoric, he should be opposing this bill naming names and making the beneficiaries famous. Because this is how pork is always done - as a parasite to something Congress thinks we will say is too important not to pass.
On a law blog, I hope that the VC contributers will comment on how this has to be the most egregious example of what is undoubtedly a common practice : to use the amendment process to make a mockery of the provision that spending bills originate in the House. I would love to read a discussion of why the framers didn't want spending to be something that either chamber could do, and why they preferred the House to the Senate.
Because the House is more quickly voted upon, and is replaced in its entirety each cycle.
George Will has pointed out that if you look at election data the stability of Congress's houses is the reverse of that intended in the original US Constitution. Gerrymandering by both parties has made House seats much more secure than Senate seats.
The popular election of Senators, their high profiles, and the exigencies of modern elections make Senate incumbents much more vulnerable than their House counterparts. Senators must pander to the electorate much more than Representatives.
Although my gorge rises when I write this, I believe that the House is currently more of a deliberative body than the Senate. This is just one more example of how the Constitution has been corrupted almost beyond hope of redemption.
False choice alert!
The choice is decidedly NOT this bill or nothing. Where is the world does Prof. Posner come up with this idea? He presents NO evidence that the alternative to this bill is nothing (ever). Indeed, Prof Posner explicitly acknowledged in his last post that one alternative to this bill is Fed/Treasury action without any additional statutory authorization. And as Prof Posner states here, there are plenty of other alternatives that Congress could weigh, if Congress decides to give themselves the time to do so by refusing to pass the Senate bill.
The choice is between a bad bill right now, or - as the 190+ economists in the letter counseled - holding hearings, gathering additional evidence about what may work and what likely will not, considering the alternatives, and crafting a better bill (if necessary).
I commented on the last post that my opinion of Prof Posner has teken a decided negative turn, given his continual erroneous posts on the bailout, and this post continues in like manner.
I am coming to the conclusion that Prof Volokh made a very bad decision in adding Prof Posner to the Conspiracy.
rp writes
Bernanke's is a fine economist and a fine Fed chair, but I believe he is making a huge mistake here. We simply disagree. But we need to note that his academic reputation was built on defending the idea that the Great Depression was largely due to destruction of financial intermediation services due to the collapse of the banking system. This is a mainstream explanation, but not the only mainstream explanation. There are lots of mainstream economists who disagree. But it shouldn't be surprising that someone of this is going to make damn well sure he does everything he can so that it isn't repeated on his watch.
I used the word "mainstream" purposefully in the last paragraph. I am a bit put off about in the original post, Prof. Posner states he trouble finding a "mainstream economist" who says we should do nothing. Does the petition need to be reissued and resigned every day? The petition clearly states we should move slowly -- that is, do nothing right now. It clearly reads that Congress should vote down this bailout, pause, hold hearings, and proceed in a non-rushed manner. And it was signed by over 200 economists, almost all of them "mainstream."
Unless they have changed their minds in the last few days, I believe I can vouch for the University of Minnesota economists who signed the petition that they still agree with it. Minnesota is usually ranked as a top 15 in the world economics department. Is that mainstream enough?
First, isn't this mostly an indictment of Paulson, Bernanke, and the Congressional leadership for not putting better alternatives up for a vote? For not holding hearings, even quick ones with testimony via videoconference if needed, that entertain other options?
Second, even if the leadership has fallen down on an issue of this magnitude, shouldn't the rank and file be held accountable for tolerating this sort of poor leadership? Prof. Posner identifies a "problem" for the rank and file folks and I'll accept that this is a really tough situation -- but does it really prove that there are no other options than to vote yes on a bad plan right away?
After all, while there was no consensus on a better plan a week ago (though Alex Tabarrok suggests one is emerging now) there absolutely was a consensus (viz., economists' letter) that Congress did NOT have to rush into a bad plan. So Prof. Posner's suggestion that a congressperson's only real option is to vote up or down on a bad bill RIGHT NOW presents a false dichotomy.
Yeah. Hence my edit. I too weep for America, and would support an amendment which abolished House districts and made them at-large within each State but apportioned by party proportionally to the vote received.
Cripes, read first, then have an opinion.
Your retort that the Fed/Treasury could act without further statutory authorization is non-responsive. If this is the case, the legislator should vote "down" -- which is completely consistent with a choice between an up or down vote.
Congress should, at least, listen to Professor Rogoff.
Congress has been doing enough listening to the panic-stricken ninnies who're screaming that we're all bankrupt. Well, the panic-stricken ninnies are bankrupt, that's for sure. But it's beneath the dignity of the Congress of the United States to succumb to hysteria.
Yes, Congress should act with due speed—nevertheless, it must act deliberately—with due diligence.
Before the House rejected the bailout, the Fed pumped $630 billion into the global financial system, flooding banks with cash. Did it help? Evidently not because the TED spread went even higher.
A new IMF study of banking crises contradicts the premises of the bailout bill. You can download the IMF study here. It does appear that many economists do think this bill is worse than doing nothing.
Eric Poser: Why don't you try doing some research before making dogmatic statements?
You could plausibly argue that the government's actions are actually increasing the instability in the credit markets. Why lend when there's a very good chance that the Treasury will step in and change the rules of the game? Why buy corporate bonds when you no longer have the ability to short the equity as a hedge?
It should also be noted that well-run banks are profiting now, as they should be:
"Given the financial conditions today, I feel like a kid in a candy store."
- Wells Fargo chairman Richard Kovacevich, Sept. 17, 2008.
Maybe you haven't read the letter by the 190+ economists. The economists clearly state that there is NOT a crisis that requires an immediate vote. In fact, the whole point of the letter was that Congress needs not to rush - but rather Congress should carefully consider what they are doing, by holding hearings and the like. Which is exactly my point - the relevant choice here is NOT between enacting this bill or doing absolutely nothing, as Prof Posner falsely asserts. Instead, the choice is between enacting this bill is a rushed manner without adequate consideration of the alternatives and consequences and slowing down and holding hearings to determine whether a better approach is available.
Your objection is also weak in that, of course no legislator can "fine tune the bill to suit each economist's recommendation". But that's not what is on offer as the alternative to passing this bill. What's on offer as the alternative to passing this bill is slowing down, holding hearings, and seeing if there an alternative approach that more economists could support.
I and others have mentioned specific problems with the Paulson-Bernanke plan. That you continue to recite vague authority and fail to collate and debate our rebuttals of your position makes your posts rather grating in their repetition.
You seem interested enough in the subject to write repeated and at length, please engage the topic seriously.
But whether you "believe" him depends upon whether you think that Treasury's purchase of $700 billion of mortgage debt will materially affect the market price and liquidity of these assets.
Current total outstanding mortgage debt is $3.44 trillion, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association's analysis of Fed data.
Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other asset backed securities (ABS) represent $762 billion of this total.
Based upon this data, Treasury could purchase almost the entire amount of CMBS, CDOs and ABS outstanding. It seems pretty clear that this would affect the market price and liquidity of these assets.
I've not heard anyone tie the proposed $700 billion to this number. Rather, most commentators have suggested that $700 billion was a total WAG (wild-ass guess).
Maybe some analysis of hard data would bring some rationality to this discussion?
This is plainly false.
Prof. Posner wrote: When you tell them that your only real choice is to vote up or down on this bill, they tell you that this bill is better than nothing.
Do you see the difference? Further, I'll just restate it: on the assumption that there is an imminent crisis, Congress does not have the luxury of prolonged deliberation. If you disagree with this assumption (and/or some economists), fine (and btw, if you disagree with it, this is hardly grounds for your ridiculous formal objection to Prof. Posner on this blog). But if you agree with it, it is quixotic to believe that Congress can deliberate and timely produce a piece of legislation that will garner consensus support from economists.
I've been poking around to try to find a good analysis of this, but come up short. They're definitely out there, though.
The basic gist of the argument is that the Community Reinvestment Act was enforced more stringently over the last 10-15 years, which pushed banks into making mortgage loans to low-income people even if their credit didn't check out. The government threatened fines and other punishments for mortgage originators who didn't preference "disadvantaged" borrowers. In conjunction, the government-sponsored entities Fannie and Freddie loosened their standards and became willing to buy virtually any mortgage, including the CRA-driven ones. With federal pressure to make subprime loans, a willing buyer for all of the loans, artifically low interest rates, and hefty fees, the incentives were all aligned for private companies to make way too many loans to bad borrowers. The government didn't force this on mortgage companies, but they greatly incentivzed it. Shouldn't be surprising that the result was more of the actions that the government incentivized.
And I'll just restate: Even under the Paulson plan, the administration does not intend to act for several weeks.
Live-Blogging The Treasury Call
(Emphasis added.)
Congress can use a few of those several weeks to do due diligence.
What kind of lawyer advises their client to dispense with due diligence?
Please explain this phrase.
I'd probably agree that the Fed has the legal authority to do so (some people dispute this), but does it, in fact, have any bullets left? According to Brad Setser, "the Fed is now providing about $1.25 trillion in liquidity support to the global financial system." Seems to me that the Fed would need Treasury support if it were to increase that support.
Yes. It's depressing how wingnut talking points get passed along despite the obvious flaws in them.
I wrote: “... it's beneath the dignity of the Congress of the United States to succumb to hysteria.”
Panic is beneath the sovereign dignity of the United States of America: Panic is beneath sovereign dignity of the Congress of the several States.
The institutions of our republic, and the people whom those institutions serve, deserve courage.
Courage.
This has to stop. Businesses must receive a new message from the taxpayer: <b>you are on your own</b>.
If we are to "inject liquidity" do it at the <b>bottom of the pyramid</b>, with consumers, not with the dumb asses that caused this crisis.
Let the shareholders and bankers lose their money. It's the only way to ensure large financial businesses operate ethically, efficiently, and without stealing from other people.
"Bush was in charge when subprimes got to be so hot, and he certainly didn't encourage this.."
Really? Then listen to Bush's speech, (transcript from the White House here)
It sure sounds like Bush encouraged lower underwriting standards.
I've not seen evidence of anything that is beneath the dignity of the Congress. I submit that no such thing exists.
"It's depressing how wingnut talking points get passed along despite the obvious flaws in them."
It's also depressing to see how people can't make the distinction between a cause and a catalyst.
The CRA certainly has played a part in this mess. It got the ball rolling by providing a strong impetus to the lowering of underwriting standards. Please explain how the subprime crisis could have occurred without lowering standards.
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/gfmt.htm
But, of course, I'm sure opinions run the gamut.
How can something that won't solve the problem be needed? Why not just pray?
As I wrote above, I disagree with the assumption that there is an imminent crisis that does not allow for time to consider the alternatives and craft a good bill that could obtain the support of economists. The letter by the 190+ economists supports my view of the situation, since the economists counsel that we should do exactly what I propose. What support do you have for your view that there is simply no time to hold hearings, understand the situation and the alternatives better, and craft a better bill?
As I noted in my original post, Prof Posner gives us a false choice. He states - and you quote him - that "this bill is better than nothing". But the choices are not only between "this bill" and "nothing". There is a third choice: slowing down, holding hearings on an alternative approach, and crafting a better bill. That is what economists generally prefer.
However, you keep blaming the CSA with some pretty weak arguments. Since the "strong impetus" to lower underwriting standards occurred as a result of the CSA, the strong impetus should only affect CSA regulated banks. Therefore, CSA lenders should sell more subprime loans and non-CSA lenders (who have no "strong impetus") would sell less subprime loans. Yet there's extensive evidence that loans by CSA regulated lenders were held to far more strict underwriting standards.
Amazingly, CSA regulated banks were able to meet CSA standards to sell to low incomes even selling less subprime loans then other lenders, so I can't see how there was a "strong impetus to lower underwriting standards".
For myself, I think I'll just go out and buy a few lottery tickets using my VISA card. I'm a little low on money, and it *might* help.
Neither an eventual economic meltdown nor the amount of time before it occurs is provable either way. Prof. Posner has posted on this point (the post on 9/11 intelligence). The danger is economic meltdown from the credit crisis -- there is plenty of evidence that things are bad and getting worse. There are other indicia of deep recession as well (e.g., today's news re jobs). So there is a big risk, which the bailout is intended to avert. There is a finite window of time in which steps can be taken before the meltdown (or, x percent chance of meltdown) occurs. Legislative deliberation takes time and, frankly, there is no guaranty it will work -- do you really think that Congress is good at deliberation or that "hearings" are usually productive? Have you seen, for example, the amount of pork that's been loaded onto the Senate's bill? There is an even smaller chance that the end result will please your favorite 190 economists.
Now all the politicians have cover (and pork as necessary inducements)for voting for it and if it doesn't work they can say it would have been worse if they hadn't done so.
Mark: Its not wingnut, but we do need to be cautious about single-causation theories. The blog you link to gets the argument very wrong. We need to be careful to distinguish between the general market decline in a region and the sub-prime loan implosion. These are really two different problems although they are connected in certain ways.
Home ownership only increased a few percent in the past 10 years. So the argument that the CRA drove the average income of homeowners down is a red herring. What isn't a red herring though is the legal pressure of the CRA and jaw boning to expand subprime lending. Lending standards were loosened because low-income borrowers lacked the savings for down-payments and the income. This isn't predatory; it was a big give-away by the banks.
These policies were instituted to meet low-income borrowing but what's good for the goose is good for the gander. Should better credit risks have the same options? Sure, that's exactly what happened. The terms were loosened across the board allowing traditional borrowers to bid higher.
But this had quite a bit to do with the flood of money from the Fed and the GSEs.
Last, oversight of the GSEs was blocked by Democrats, ostensibly in the interest of ensuring an uninterrupted flow of money to low-income borrowers.
Or perhaps the post will admit that Legislation by the Dow is unreliable.
However, you are certainly right that this isn't single cause. Lack of oversight of the GSEs helped cause problems, but I suspect investment banks would have securitized these mortgages on their own if GSEs were appropriately regulated. Politicians were cheerleading for these loans when they should have been asking if it was certain borrowers could afford them. Fiscal responsibility was thrown out the window.
You are wrong thought- this was clearly was predatory- these loans were subprime with extreme interest rates, banks only gave them out because they thought they were adequately secured if debtors defaulted- apparently they thought real estate would only ever appreciate in value. Also, creditors could hold these loans out to be incredible assets thanks to their interest rate. This was a wonderful strategy come bonus time.
As for the Dems blocking oversight, the claim I've seen involves some minimal efforts in the period 2003-5. The Republicans controlled Congress for that whole period. Even then, it's far from clear that any changes would have had much effect, particularly since, as I've linked on several previous threads, Fannie and Freddie had a relatively small role to play in this mess.
I'm glad you said "nearly."
One point most commenters seem to be ignoring is that what caused the Great Depression was a sharp drop in the money supply, with effects worsened by various things the government did in response. The current money supply is at or near its all time high and there seems no reason to expect any of the current difficulties to change that.
For my views on the crisis, see two posts to my blog:
The Price of Money and Other Errors
The Current Financial Mess
There are at least three problems with this argument. First, there is no evidence that anyone lowered their underwriting standards in response to the CRA. Second, the institutions that originated and purchased the overwhelming bulk of the subprime assets at the root of the current crisis were never regulated by the CRA.
But most importantly, even if it could be shown that underwriting standards WERE relaxed in response to the CRA, this explanation fails to explain why sophisticated brokers and derivatives traders, the bulk of whom are located in London, England and other points outside USA jurisdiction, were forced to treat subprime mortgages originating in the USA (not to mention England, Spain and elsewhere) as though each had a 98% chance of being repaid in full. It is this enormous, systemwide misjudgement of risk that is at the root of today's problem.
Not meaningful in the least. The whole point is that the '95 amendment to the CRA introduced securitization of subprime loans. That's why the institutions subject to CRA are not necessarily the holders thereof. The link between securitization and loosened standards has been widely reported.
There is about 10 trillion in domestic mortgage debt; 5 trillion of it is held by Freddie and Fannie. Later in the cycle they were buying 80% of the market. In other words they were establishing the price (value) of these instruments.
Why do people ever get caught-up in asset bubbles? You need to be more nuanced in your story. The most sophisticated traders did not get burned by this. The hedge fund industry for instance mostly avoided first-order disaster. The top of the top also survived quite well. Bear Sterns--an early and big player in the CRA securitization market was the first to crumble. But WaMu, Wachovia were classic bank-run panics which really have a different cause.
How's that? They bought half the mortgages in America and in so doing established the price (value) on the resale market. Their massive size meant that they defined DTI ratio and other aspects of the jacket.
Paul, you keep shifting the discussion between (a) the CRA and (b) Fannie and Freddie. Not the same thing.
As for Fannie and Freddie, I've repeatedly posted links in threads here to economic studies showing they had little to do with the current mess. Once again, see here and here and here.
Both the CRA and lowered underwriting standards were responses to pressure to extend homeownership to blacks and Hispanics. This pressure came from many sources, including but not limited to: the Boston Fed, ACORN, Clinton, Bush, Congress and Fannie Mae. One only has to browse the Fannie Mae handbook, Reaching the Immigrant Market to see results of this pressure. The handbook advocates abandoning all prudence in the granting of loans. Getting the underclass into their own home took precedence over everything else.
While there were non-CRA banks that provided subprime loans, they too were reacting to this pressure. To be sure, once the ball got rolling, lowered underwriting standards spread beyond the underclass to the working class and the more affluent as well. Now people were using their homes as ATM machines through the use of HELOC loans. Even the wealthy got in on the act by using "equity stripping" as an asset protection scheme.
Under the '95 provisions, Banks receive CRA credits for originating these loans but not for holding them. Further credit is available if the loans are sold. Holding them is just stupid, but it took several years for old mold to break--conservative banking executives, slow information dissemination, and a perception that they'd lose more money by doing this.
CRA loans are not commonly held by the originating banks any more. Looking at when the study was done matters. There has been a sea-change in behavior. The critical reason for mentioning this is that Mark Feld and other have posted links to arguments that the CRA couldn't have been responsible because CRA subject banks are not the epicenter of disaster. My point is that the 'bad' CRA loans have been distributed and concentrated in other entities at this stage: the GSEs, investment banks, Europeans, etc.
Mark Feld writes:
There is a nexus between them. Here for instance is a press release from '97 detailing the first securtiziation of CRA loans by Bear Sterns made possible by insurance from Freddie Mac.
--Bernanke , March 30, 2007 discussing the CRA
I'll say it again: we need to be cautious of single causation. Its neither right to whole attribute the trouble to one cause be it greed, CRA, GSEs, accounting standards, etc, nor is it right to disprove one linkage (say CRA) by assuming that it is can only be fingered if it explains everything.
Wait a minute. You want to blame CRA because European banks bought derivatives which included CRA loans? What about caveat emptor?
The ripple effect of Fannie’s plunge into riskier lending was profound. Fannie’s stamp of approval made shunned borrowers and complex loans more acceptable to other lenders, particularly small and less sophisticated banks.
Capitol Hill bore down on Mr. Mudd as well. The same year he took the top position, regulators sharply increased Fannie’s affordable-housing goals. Democratic lawmakers demanded that the company buy more loans that had been made to low-income and minority homebuyers.
The White House also pitched in. James B. Lockhart, the chief regulator of Fannie and Freddie, adjusted the companies’ lending standards so they could purchase as much as $40 billion in new subprime loans. Some in Congress praised the move.It should be crystal clear by now how this all came about. The forces that created CRA created a climate of intimidation that pressured banks and other loan institutions to make overly risky loans. Financial engineering provided the means to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear and big fortune for many. But let's not lose sight how all this started.
Uh, say what? Look, the "nobility" of the CRA is quite different than its immediate effect and purpose: to forcibly extent credit to low-income borrowers. We need to look critically here--looking beyond the motivates of the CRA.
I believe: 1) that the CRA increased the supply of subprime mortgage paper 2) that that increase was achieved in part through loosening lending standards too far. 3) banks faced penalties for not complying with the mandates.
.
Once the stuff was originated someone had to lose. Many community banks were smart, they dumped the worst of it early and first. Goldman was smart they dumped just in time. Merrill was slow they lost.
Yeah, yeah, Adam Smith would be against it. Where would we be without him? But, then again, where would we be without Albert Einstein. It was accepted that gravity was absolute, and it was simply a fact of the universe, just as it is now accepted that government intervention is bad for the economy. However, Einstein's theory of relativity not only explained gravity, it changed science completely. Couldn't it be possible in economics, where ceteris paribus is the key, that maybe, just maybe, Adam Smith was a little bit wrong. After all, Isaac Newton was, too.
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