The Auto Bailout Bill and the New Protectionism?

Economists believe that the Smoot-Hawley tariff law of 1930 exacerbated the Great Depression. It provoked retaliation by other countries and reduction of international trade at precisely the wrong time—during an economic contraction when demand should have been stoked rather than suppressed. Today, no one proposes an increase in tariffs, though some commentators have mischievously suggested that raising tariffs could be more effective than a fiscal stimulus (provided, I assume, that retaliation does not occur) for restarting the economy. So we have learned from our mistakes, right?

Not if the auto bailout bill is an indication. The bill applies only to “each automobile manufacturer that submitted a plan to the Congress on December 2, 2008”—which just happen to turn out to be GM, Ford, and Chrysler, not Toyota, Honda, or Nissan. The bill is a massive subsidy to American automakers alone; it will thus give them a competitive advantage vis-à-vis foreign carmakers (which, as we know, are more efficient manufacturers than the dinosaurs in Detroit). Other countries are already engaging in similar subsidy schemes, which will put American firms at a disadvantage in their markets. These beggar-thy-neighbor policies have effects similar to those of a tariff war—depending on the degree and pattern of subsidy, driving lower-cost manufacturers out of business and raising costs (in the form of regular taxes rather than tariff-inflated prices) for everyone, and hence suppressing demand.

The new wave of protectionism actually began a few months ago, when it was discovered that saving the credit market meant offering assistance to foreign banks as well as domestic banks. Many members of Congress balked and sought to limit financial assistance to American banks; otherwise, American taxpayers would end up putting money in the pocket of feckless foreign creditors rather than feckless American creditors. Differences were papered over and it remains to be seen whether Treasury doles out goodies on a discriminatory basis. (Hmm.) No doubt foreign governments are watching closely.

One can imagine a fiscal stimulus that was nondiscriminatory. The government would offer cheap loans to foreign automakers as well as domestic automakers, for example. The stimulus would benefit the Japanese and German economies as well as the American economy, but it would not give any advantage to American automakers unless their problem is really one of liquidity rather than economic fundamentals—which seems most doubtful—so the stimulus might buy a little time but eventually the American automakers would go out of business. In theory, the Japanese and German governments would also make available their stimulus packages to American companies. Don’t hold your breath. Put aside the outcry—already heard during the bank debate—against American taxpayers giving money to foreigners. Without reciprocal stimulus packages, giving aid to foreign companies is not a very effective way to help Americans (though it could raise demand for American products). Smoot and Hawley, maybe we were a little hard on you. In bad times, economic nationalism is hard to control.

Despite their perverse effects, international trade law does not ban domestic subsidies. At one time, the United States sought to change this rule. How times have changed.

Mitchell J. Freedman (mail) (www):
Eric,

I could argue about the negligible effects of Smoot-Hawley, which puts me in company with Joseph Schumpeter. I'd also ask you to consider finding and reading Gus Tyler's magnificent essay on Smoot-Hawley in I believe The New Leader magazine back in the mid to late 1980s.

But allow me to ask the following:

How are the Japanese car companies harmed by the subsidies they receive from the MITI? How are German automakers harmed by the subsidies they may receive from the German government? And if there are stimulus packages being passed in various nations (Japan, Germany, France) for their nations' car companies, what is the adverse effect on those companies?
12.11.2008 10:00am
TyrantLimaBean:
Under WTO rules, can foreign countries enact countervailing duties on US cars as as result of the bailout?
12.11.2008 10:02am
David Walser:
It could be argued that the auto bailout merely puts US car companies on similar footing with their foreign competitors -- most receive substantial domestic subsidies. I won't make that argument. I've never minded the government of France subsidizing my purchase of French products. (Assuming I've ever bought a French product. I've certainly never bought a French car.) I don't see why the French, German, or Japanese governments should be too concerned about the US helping to reduce the cost of living in those countries -- but I can think of several reasons why I might be concerned about such a practice!
12.11.2008 10:09am
martinned (mail) (www):
@Mitchell J. Freedman: Clearly the recipient of a subsidy is not directly harmed. The harm is to society, to the taxpayer, and indirectly to everyone as a result of governments "competitively" subsidising.

But does anyone seriously believe this car bailout is about liquidity? This is the first I've heard of it. Surely this is only about keeping those companies in business despite the "economic fundamentals"? Say a kind of very inefficient and indirect unemployment benefit to car workers? I thought that much was essentially undisputed.
12.11.2008 10:12am
Your parenthetical assumptions are not correct. (mail):
"which, as we know, are more efficient manufacturers than the dinosaurs in Detroit"

It ain't what you don't know that hurts you, it's what you do know that ain't so.

The manuafacturing efficiency of the domestic manufacturers is now largely on a par with the transplants. This measurement is a big deal in Detroit. The local papers always publish the survey results and a plant by plant ranking. The current differences between manufacturers are no longer meaningful statistically. Everyone has JIT (just in time) production. The supply chain is very much attuned to production and the efficiencies are all generally the same. What is still different IS the legacy costs and, to a lesser extent, the wages. The new contract with the UAW will, over a few years, bring wages in line with the transplants.
The current problem in Detroit is not about being a dinosaur. They have been continuosly downsizing for years. Yes maybe they should have been faster. But UAW membership in domestic manufacturers was over 700,000 at it's peak and now is in the 250,000 range. Today's problem is liquidity. Sales have dried up for every manufactuer.
12.11.2008 10:32am
mga (mail):
The premise of this post is that the bailout will salvage the Big Three. Unless and until they shed their uncompetitive UAW contracts and their inefficient distribution systems, that won't happen.
12.11.2008 10:33am
David Walser:
My biggest objection to the proposed bailout is NOT the one raised by Posner in his post. I do agree that a subsidy is the economic equivalent of a "negative tariff" and a "negative tariff" war is NOT something we should welcome. However, subsidizing a local industry requires cash from the government and may be self-limiting in a way that increasing tariffs is not. It's easy to delude one's self that raising tariffs will increase revenue and to help balance the budget. It's not so easy to adopt the same delusion about the fiscal effects of giving out cash.

My biggest objection to the proposed bailout is that it does nothing to deal with the underlying cause of the domestic car companyies' troubles. After the last world war, the US had a defacto monopoly on car production. Monopoly power allowed the oligarchy of domestic companies to adopt business practices -- including labor contracts -- that were not tenable in a competitive market. As the foreign makes took hold in the US market in the 70's, the domestic companies had to change their sales and manufacturing methods to compete.

The companies did make the necessary changes. Quality and designs and the ways cars are sold improved. (US designs and quality are on par with foreign makes. Yes, some foreign models are better than some US models. The reverse is also true.) Sales is NOT the problem. GM is one of the leaders in worldwide sales, yet it's loosing money.

The problem is the domestic's labor costs are still based on the generous standards only made possible by monopoly power. It costs a US manufacturer about $2k more per car than it does foreign manufacturers building cars in the US -- and most of that cost differential is labor. We've known for a long time that, long-term, US companies could not remain competitive on such a basis. What used to be a problem on the horizon is here. The problem must be dealt with, yet the bailout plan does not deal with it. At best, the bail out plan will delay the inevitable.
12.11.2008 10:37am
Ben P:

But does anyone seriously believe this car bailout is about liquidity? This is the first I've heard of it. Surely this is only about keeping those companies in business despite the "economic fundamentals"? Say a kind of very inefficient and indirect unemployment benefit to car workers? I thought that much was essentially undisputed.


I'd say it depends on how broadly you define liquidity.

GM still has massive assets and even as of 2006 controls 23% of the US market compared to ford's 17% and Toyota's 14%. People still *do* buy their cars (and trucks).

They basically have two problems.

1. they have a very high fixed cost stemming out of pension obligations for retired workers from the past.

2. Their most profitable division was light trucks, and light truck demand collapsed in 2007 and 8 when gas prices skyrocketed. In effect it's not really different than what happened to sales of V8 sedans when the Oil Embargo hit.

Those High fixed Costs + rapidly falling receipts = major liquidity crisis. Without an infusion of cash they simply don't have enough money to make it another business quarter and meet their financial obligations.

This was intensified by the fact that there's not enough excess capital out there right now for them to even try to raise it privately. If times were good I'm sure Gm could find some company willing to pony up a Couple Billion in liquid cash in return for an ownership stake.

Even though it partially stems from a failure to anticipate the market moving so quickly back to small cars, I'd still call it a liquidity crisis.
12.11.2008 10:43am
martinned (mail) (www):
@Ben P.: No High fixed Costs + Rapidly falling receipts = major losses.

Liquidity is the stuff you see showing up on the cash flow statement. If I'm not mistaken, the AIG bailout earlier this year was largely about liquidity. Liquidity is cash in compared to cash out. What you're talking about is (accounting) profit, i.e. economic fundamentals.
12.11.2008 10:46am
martinned (mail) (www):
P.S. Here is GM's most recent form 10-Q. (If the link works.)

Some numbers for the first 3 quarters:
- Change in cash position: $ -8.8 bn.
- Cash &equivalents as of Jan 1st: $ 24.8 bn.
- Net loss: $ 21.2 bn.
- Total sales: $ 118.5 bn (down from $ 133.6 bn)

Generally, looking at the numbers it looks like their bleeding cash largely because they're incurring massive losses. At this rate, they'll run out of cash by the end of March 2010.

Source: Edgar.
12.11.2008 10:53am
FredC:
Japan, Germany, Korea etc. already massively subsidies their auto industry and worker costs.
12.11.2008 10:53am
martinned (mail) (www):
@FredC: I don't know about Japan and Korea, but massive subsidies in Germany seems unlikely. Any evidence?
12.11.2008 10:57am
Ben P:

The problem is the domestic's labor costs are still based on the generous standards only made possible by monopoly power. It costs a US manufacturer about $2k more per car than it does foreign manufacturers building cars in the US -- and most of that cost differential is labor.


I think this is true but somewhat misleading. Labor costs are the big cost difference, but the majority of the source is not present labor costs.

Average wage for a UAW GM worker is $28, health care costs are about $12k per year, which raises that to about $34. That's higher than US toyota and Honda plants, but not astronomically so.

The problem is that GM's responsible for paying pensions and providing health insurance to almost half a million retired workers. (479,000 according to one source) These are the contracts negotiated when GM had a monopoly, and many of these workers retired 20 or 30 years ago under GM's old "30 year" work policy where a worker could get a pension after 30 years of work.


Comparatively Toyota has essentially 0 US retired workers to support. That's the big difference in labor costs.
12.11.2008 10:58am
martinned (mail) (www):
@FredC: Such a subsidy would have to be reported to the European Commission under art. 88 EC. When that happens, the Commission opens a dossier, which you can access here. The database contains 27 dossiers in the motor vehicles sector, none of which are from Germany or concern German car makers. (It does contain a € 780.000 subsidy by the Belgian government to Ford, though.)
12.11.2008 11:03am
martinned (mail) (www):
@Ben P: Sounds like a sound explanation, but then why didn't GM put money aside for this obligation years ago? Normally you have to make a provision for such pension obligations every year, as they accrue. That makes good business sense. Every year, your workforce accrue pension rights, and you should put them in your balance sheet as they accrue. That way, once you have to start paying them out, you'll have a big bag of money to do that with.
12.11.2008 11:08am
Ben P:

@Ben P.: No High fixed Costs + Rapidly falling receipts = major losses.

Liquidity is the stuff you see showing up on the cash flow statement. If I'm not mistaken, the AIG bailout earlier this year was largely about liquidity. Liquidity is cash in compared to cash out. What you're talking about is (accounting) profit, i.e. economic fundamentals.


I think it's the same thing, but a different source. AIG had fundamentally the same problem that GM is having, a "cash out" problem. But their business models are different.

AIG's losses resulted from them entering into large numbers of Credit Default Swap contracts on mortgage backed securities. BEcause of their credit rating they were not required to have a margin to do so. When the underlying assets fell in value (A) this caused AIG's credit rating to be downgraded forcing them to have to post collateral to all its trading counter parties. (B) it caused them to have to pay out on a lot of the contracts.

AIG lacked the cash to pay out it's obligations and its options were to default on the obligations (and go bankrupt) or find liquid assets to carry them through the extra costs.

GM's costs are high and fixed, and that's their primary problem. Their recievables dropped, but their position re the rest of the auto market isn't necessarily worse than it was before.
12.11.2008 11:09am
martinned (mail) (www):
@Ben P: As I understood it, AIG's business was fundamentally sound. On many/most of their activities, they were making a profit, and all it would take to restore them to financial health was to do something about their investment portfolio. (Here is AIG's 10-Q, for comparison.) They had to take huge write-offs on their investments ($ 18.3 bn in Q3, $ 30.5 bn in Q1-Q3), and that got them in trouble.

The car industry, on the other hand, seems like it cannot survive in its current form except with a constant flow of subsidies. What you're writing about the pension problems sounds like something that could be fixed with a one-off huge christmas gift from the federal government, but I doubt whether that would be enough.
12.11.2008 11:17am
martinned (mail) (www):
Some more background: Here's a post from PrawfsBlawg, where they referred to this article from the NYT, and this column by some guy I don't know but who has plenty of numbers and other facts.
12.11.2008 11:29am
RPT (mail):
If only those UAW guys would give up their foolish dreams of home ownership, college for their kids, health care and retirement, and realize that striving for a better life is antithetical to their interests, and move to Tennessee, Alabama, etc, where there are no state subsidies....the world would be right.
12.11.2008 11:42am
FredC:
@FredC: I don't know about Japan and Korea, but massive subsidies in Germany seems unlikely. Any evidence?


Are you saying that carmakers in Europe keep on thier books the costs of healthacre for their workers and retirees, and pensions?
12.11.2008 12:08pm
martinned (mail) (www):
@FredC: Don't even go there. Don't even think about arguing that German companies somehow have a competitive advantage because they work in a social welfare state with high taxes.
12.11.2008 12:10pm
FredC:
Someone has to pay for healthcare for workers and retirees and pensions. If you care about relative costs, that is.
12.11.2008 12:14pm
martinned (mail) (www):
@FredC: Exactly, so having the government take care of all that hardly gives anyone an advantage given that the government will want to tax someone for it somewhere.

If you're not convinced, take a look at BMW's 2007 annual report. The 10-year comparison is on page 152-153. Look at the entry for "Steuerlastquote", the ratio of taxes to gross profit. For 2007, it's 19,1%, and before that it is above 30% every year, with a max of 50,6% in 1998. And that's only the corporate income tax!

A bit lower on those pages is the number of employees, pretty constant around 100.000, and the personnel expense per employee, which stood at € 76.704 in 2007. (at an average dollar/euro exchange rate of $ 1,37 - see page 86 - that adds up to $ 105.084,50 per employee.) If you like, you can work that back to a rate per hour worked, bearing in mind that German workers undoubtedly work fewer hours and fewer weeks than their US counterparts, and then see how that compares to the $ 70 per hour figure that was mentioned above.
12.11.2008 12:29pm
Ben P:

Don't even go there. Don't even think about arguing that German companies somehow have a competitive advantage because they work in a social welfare state with high taxes.


well, there's an argument to be made. But it may be different than what you're thinking.

1. Corporate tax rates are not equal to individual tax rates. I'm really not familiar with the tax structure of germany but I've heard in more than one place that America places among the highest taxes directly on corporations in the western world.

2. Arguments about risk sharing get extraordinarily complex, but I think one can uncontroversially say that health care in the US costs more than just about anywhere else.

So I think you can make that argument to some extent. If the taxes to support a larger welfare state are borne by the workers but not corporations, then you do have some advantage, and ignoring any quality arguments for the moment, if socialized healthcare allows germany as a society to pay less for it, then they are actually paying less.

That's only looking at the cost half of the healthcare debate (the other half being quality/access) but I think there's an argument to be made.
12.11.2008 12:32pm
FredC:
And you still have not accounted for the costs to American companies of healthcare and pensions for retirees.
12.11.2008 12:33pm
martinned (mail) (www):
P.S. Actually, there is an easier way to do that last calculation. For the sum to add up to $ 70 per hour, they would have to work 1500 hours per year, or 187,6 8-hour days each year. Working that back to 40-hour weeks equals 37,5 weeks. Given that German auto workers are more likely to work a 35-hour week, it would be 42,9 weeks, or a little more than 10 weeks off each year, which is a bit high, but not much.

Point is: If you include all the costs, that $ 70 number comes out for the Germans, too, give or take.
12.11.2008 12:36pm
martinned (mail) (www):

And you still have not accounted for the costs to American companies of healthcare and pensions for retirees.

@FredC: I haven't? That $70 was described as including all the pension and health care expenses as well, so that's what I compared my BMW numbers to.
12.11.2008 12:39pm
Allan Walstad (mail):
Bankruptcy is the way to sort things out. If the auto firms have productive capital that can be put to profitable use making vehicles, investors have an incentive to do so. If that provides X number of jobs, fine.

As for the pensions, what in the hell are auto companies doing paying pensions? Why didn't they put their and the employees' contributions into an independent pension fund. I work for the University of Pittsburgh. My pension fund is a combination of TIAA-CREF and Vanguard. If the auto firms, when cash was rolling in, put their future selves on the line to pay pensions out of future profits, it may have been a deadly mistake. Why are the rest of us on the line to bail them out?
12.11.2008 2:07pm
NickM (mail) (www):
I have read several articles which indicate that the bill applies to Tesla too. Did they submit a plan?

Nick
12.11.2008 3:30pm
Seamus (mail):
12.11.2008 3:44pm
Jagermeister:
The "Big 3" have been at a competitive disadvantage for years. As far back as the
1997 Harbour report analysis shows, not only are their direct labor costs higher, but they have higher indirect labor costs as well, and total labor is 20% to 25% of the manufacturing cost. Even on direct labor, where U.S. vehicles are about 10% direct labor costs, the Canadians manage it for about 6%. Maybe part of that is government paid health care in Canada, but the bottom line is that U.S. auto manufacturing is at a disadvantage, and UAW demands only make it worse.

I don't care what the UAW member's dreams are. I have dreams of a yacht and sailing the Med. But that doesn't mean that my employer should overpay me to make it happen. The entire notion that people should be paid regardless of their utility is absurd, and is what has allowed the U.S. to become non-competitive. It is only when industries and labor accept that they need to increase their productivity and sometimes accept decreases in pay to remain competitive with the global market that long term viability can be maintained.
12.11.2008 5:42pm
Jagermeister:
From the summary of the 1997 report linked above:

A Warning

Ron Harbour puts it plainly: "Those plants that aren't competitive are going to die."

The explanation: "Capacity is going up in the U.S. Do you see sales volume going up? No. A plant that doesn't have a competitive product, a competitive workforce, and a competitive level of quality isn't going to survive."

Clearly, the burden is with the folks at many of the Big Three plants. The question posed to Ron Harbour, then, is whether they can do what's needed to survive against what's sometimes perceived to be "foreign" competition. He points out that Honda, Toyota and Nissan facilities in North America are essentially managed and staffed by North Americans, just like the Big Three plants, so there's no big difference there. The difference is the way they do what they do. The amount of value-adding activities makes all the difference.

The choice seems to be simple: Get more competitive in product, productivity and quality. Otherwise, Ron Harbour warns, "They won't have a decision. They won't be around."
12.11.2008 5:46pm
FredC:
I don't know why you go back to the 1997 Harbor Report. The 2008 Harbor Report says taht the reason that profits for the big three are squeezed is because they have higher healthcare, pension, and sales incentives.

The reason they have higher healthcost and pensions then foriegn and foreign owned automakers is because they have more retirees in the US. That's were the high health costs and pensions really bite.
12.11.2008 10:03pm

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