[David Schleicher, guest-blogging, December 11, 2008 at 9:24am] Trackbacks
Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections? Implications 1

If my paper and previous posts are correct, it has some rather dramatic implications for local democracy. I’ll try to sketch some of them out in this post and another post later today.

1. Local Elections Can Be Less Representative Than National Ones

It is a commonplace American assumption to view local elections as better and more representative than national ones (with state elections falling somewhere between). This may be true in small towns – there is certainly something to William Fischel’s argument about the role of homevoters in smaller localities. But, if I am right, it is not true about big city elections.

One might put it this way. While small town voters may have reasons to be informed and active in politics (according to Fischel, the potential variance in the price of their home), most voters in big city elections and national elections are rationally ignorant. Their vote is unlikely to be important to the outcome and, because government is complicated, the cost of becoming informed exceeds the benefits.

But voters in national elections are provided with a coping mechanism, a bit of publicly provided information, given to them directly at the moment of voting, the party label on the ballot. As Morris Fiorina argued, voters develop “running tallies” about the parties, using retrospectice evaluations of how life has been under one party or another. That is, they gather over time about the qualities, successes and failures of each of the political parties to develop a scoresheet or tally that will provide them with guidance about how to vote in the future. As long as the parties remain relatively consistent between elections, and different from one another over time, the party heuristic will provide voters in national elections with substantial information about the candidates.

(Note: There are extensive arguments about how much party heuristics help rationally ignorant voters. For instance, check out my colleague and co-Conspirator Ilya Somin’s extensive work on voter ignorance of party labels. Even for critics of the “running tally” model, like Ilya and Larry Bartels, it is clear that party heuristics at the very least mitigate the effect of voter ignorance to some degree.)

Voters in local elections — at least those that use partisan elections — are given information too, but it is of a lower quality. If I am right, the party heuristic provides only very weak information at the local level. As a result, big city voters are left largely adrift without the tools to provide much meaningful input in local elections. Voters use party labels almost exclusively, even though they carry little information, because they don't have any other information. Given rational ignorance, this means that big city elections do not regularly generate representative outcomes.

I can put this more starkly: There is little reason to believe that the outcome of City Council or other local races bears much resemblance to the preferences of local voters about local governance. Sometimes Mayoral races will be high profile enough that they can break from this – a Bloomberg or a Cory Booker will get enough media coverage and spend enough money on ads to develop a personal brand – but most local races will look more like the Lapin-Zinberg race which I described yesterday.

This effect is not only felt statically – individual elections are not particularly representative – but dynamically. The lack of competition in local elections results in there being too little policy idea development, incubation of promising candidates and interest group mobilization. As I wrote in the paper, the reason for this is that political parties do more than just endorse candidates “they serve as the fulcrum for the creation of ideas about governance and for the development of future political leaders. They also organize groups into politically effective coalitions.” In a one-party city, there is little reason to convince the populace of new policy ideas or to try to organize new coalitions, as it is unlikely that it will matter particularly. (Quick: How many think tanks can you name that study local policy? There are a few, but not very many.) Someone who wants power would do better just scrounging for support among party hacks.

This dynamic harm was best summarized by famous New York City Democratic Party Tammany Hall hand George Washington Plunkitt. He noted that that occasionally "reform" campaigns could win elections, but they could not sustain a challenge to machine's control of the city: "Reform committees ... were morning glories. Looked lovely in the morning and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on flourishing forever, like fine old oaks."

My next post will lay out the implications of my model for non-partisan elections and for party primaries.

Al Maviva:
But you are ignoring a key fact, which is how effective one party rule can be. With the ideologically bankrupt and much-hated Republicans shut out of power, look how well run our one party cities are? I give you Detroit, Philly, Baltimore, and especially Chicago. I suppose to the extent those cities have issues, the issues can be blamed on national republicans. Or will be blamed on them, at any rate. You see it's this damn Bush economy that's driving up the murder rates... These places are practically heaven on earth and the incubator for new Democratic leaders we can all look up to, like Martin O'Malley and Ed Rendell and Mayor Daley.

So I don't see what the problem is with one party rule.
12.11.2008 10:05am
18 USC 1030 (mail):
I don't see how you can use Tammany Hall to explain the issue. This was mentioned by another commenter yesterday. Back in the day, civil service jobs were based on who you knew. A political machine could control the city and would not have a chance of losing power because the people needed the machine more than the machine needed the people. Tammany Hall needed votes in order to control the city, and for that matter the state, the major way they got those votes were jobs. When you are in power and the people believe if they vote against you they won't get, or will lose, their civil service job, they won't vote against the party in power.

Today, civil service jobs are not nearly as political, and unless it is an appointed position, you have to go through the steps of the civil service system. The real issue here, I think, is the issues the people care about. There are few think-tanks about local government because the problems aren't that ideological, and are far more concrete. The city isn't charged with protecting the economy, defending the homeland, solving the middle east conflict, or any other major theoretical issue. People vote on zoning and whether streets are paved. People don't care, at the local level, as much about ideology as they do about results.
12.11.2008 10:39am
Spitzer:
David,

Very interesting series of posts. As a firm believer in localism - or what the EU might call "the principle of subsidiarity" (as if they really believed in it) - I have a philosphical preference for local politics but a practical appreciation for the empirical facts that most localities are poorly run and local politics are poor indicators of real voter preferences. You point to some serious issues with local politics, but I suspect that some of the problem might be structural/local and some might be structure/federal.

First, too many city councils (and county boards of supervisors) are simply too small to be truly democratic. Fairfax County, Va, (pop. 1 million) has only 10 supervisors (1 per 100,000 citizens, albeit it is really 1 per 111,111 citzens for 9 supervisors, and 1 per 1 million for the at-large seat). New York City (pop. 8.2 million) has only 51 council members (1 per 160,000). Los Angeles (pop. 3.8 million) has only 15 council members (1 per 253,000 residents). That sort of scale makes it effectively impossible for voters to get to know or influence their council members (assuming they have no special rent-seeking interests), and this lack of personal representation makes rational ignorance that much more rational - and rational ignorance makes partisan identification more important as a simple signal of the politician's ideas (or of the voter's self-identity). Small towns, by contrast, have many more representatives per capita, and that makes local politicians more responsive to voters' preferences (especially as the politicans will have less need to obtain the support of large organizations/machines to garner the necessary money/supporters/votes that those machines can deliver).

Second, local politics suffers a democratic deficit (again borrowing a term used in the EU). That is, most of the policies and laws (and sometimes revenue) of local jurisdictions is dictated by politicians external to the locality. To a voter in LA, for instance, the vast majority of the taxes they pay are determined at the federal and state levels, and they are subject to innumerable federal and state laws and regulations governing civil and criminal behavior, as well as such commercial activities as wages, hiring rules, and the like. Moreover, many of the public projects in the locality are run by external politicians (i.e. highway politics from Sacramento), and most of the funding for local public infrastructure projects derives from external politicians, and, therefore, most local public projects are designed with an eye toward the approval of external politicians, not toward local voters. Thus, voters will find that the activities and policies of their local councilmen are largely restricted and governed by external politicians (and external voters), and this induces even greater rational ignorance (because not only does one vote matter little due to the size of constituencies, but the relative impact of the election is minimized by the curbs and rules imposed by external politicians).

It should be noted, however, that most local politicians enjoy these restrictions in actual fact. As in the EU, politicians prefer it when they can shift (i.e. externalize) the blame for voters' pain to external politicians (blame DC! Blame Sacramento! Blame Brussels!) By diffusing political and legal power across jurisdictional lines, politicans reap the benefits of the blurring of accountability. What's more, one could argue that rising federal power reduces local accountability even further. That is, as the federal government grows in size and power, local politicians will be held less accountable as a trickle-down effect.

If I am even somewhat correct, there are no obvious solutions to the problem of local power (other than increasing the size of city councils, which is not in the interest of councilmen themselves).
12.11.2008 10:50am
Bob Goodman (mail) (www):
I've suspected that the same factor(s) that allow NYC to elect Republicans mayor are those that allow Mass. to elect Republican governors.
12.11.2008 1:39pm
Doug Sundseth (mail):
The dynamic you discuss for city council elections is even more pronounced for elections in independent suburbs. In small towns not a part of a major metropolitan area, it's fairly likely that there is a small local paper, you probably have met some of the members of the government, and if you haven't, your co-workers have.

If you live in a small independent suburb of a major city, it's likely that you don't work in the area and much of your shopping is not in the town either. And the news media are dominated by the affairs of the larger city (or cities).

If you think ignorance about elections of the city councils of Phoenix, Denver, or Los Angeles is common, try finding out about the elections for the councils of Gilbert, Federal Heights, or Whittier.
12.11.2008 2:01pm
ohwilleke:
I have to second Doug Sundseth's comment. Municipal politics are much more vital in big central city (consolidated city and county) Denver than they are in edge city Federal Heights.

This is echoed by the experiences of colleagues I once worked with who represented a pool of local governments legally.

Big cities have more access to media coverage, more competition for public office, and more qualified candidates. Small municipalities often struggle simple to get someone, anyone to run. Centerless suburbs also lack the information networks of people that small towns have to build communiciation.

Also, ignorance of candidates is somewhat compensated for with low turnout. People who vote for local government officials are much more likely to be informed than those who do not.

Why is leaving out so many people from the process tolerable? In part, because local governments are subject to people "voting with their feet" to a much greater extent than state or federal governments. If Englewood, Colorado is stingy about development, people will go to Greenwood Village, the next town over, which is not. The effect is even more pronounced in school district government in states with interdistrict school choice like Colorado.

Indeed, one explanation for greater partisanship in local government in Europe than in the U.S. is that Europeans are much more attached to the places they live than Americans. People who can vote with their feet, rarely bother to cast ballots. This is the governmental analog to the famous "Wall Street rule" in which people who don't like corporate management sell their stocks, and people who hold stocks almost always vote for existing management.
12.12.2008 5:37pm

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