Yesterday the criminal trial of the W.R. Grace & Co. and various responsible corporate officers began in U.S. District Court in Missoula, Montana. The trial is one of the most-watched environmental prosecutions by the Justice Department in recent memory, as it involves allegations of release of asbestos into Libby, Montana over the last several decades. Law professors and law students at the University of Montana School of Law are running this very interesting blog tracking the trial.
An extremely important crime victims' rights issue has come up during the case, which will be resolved this week by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Are persons who have been endangered by an environmental crime sufficiently "harmed" to obtain rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act?
According to the indictment, over more than three decades, defendant W.R. Grace & Company mined vermiculite ore containing asbestos and released asbestos into the air around Libby. The indictment alleges a conspiracy to knowingly endanger persons in Libby as well as several substantive endangerment counts under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A).
The Crime Victims' Rights Act extends its rights to all "victims" of federal offenses, which it defines as persons "directly and proximately harmed as the result of the commission of a federal offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e). In a pre-trial ruling, however, the U.S.District Judge presiding over the trial concluded that the charges involved mere “risk of harm” rather than “harm” itself. The district court stated in a short written order that the charges involved exposing the witnesses
to an imminent risk of harm. The [Crime] Victims’ Rights Act, on the other hand, defines a crime victim as “a person directly and proximately harmed.” . . . One plausible resolution of the issue here is to say that the federal offenses alleged in the Superseding Indictment have “victims” who have been exposed to an imminent risk of harm, but who have not necessarily been harmed. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that because victims of the federal offenses alleged are not necessarily harmed, they are not necessarily victims under the Act, which are by definition person directly and proximately harmed.
I am representing two residents of Libby, Montana, pro bono on this matter — Mel and Lerah Parker. This morning I am filing in the Ninth Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus for them arguing that the district court's ruling was erroneous. Here is a summary of my argument:
The district court’s conclusion threatens to strip crime victims of their rights in a whole host of federal criminal proceedings and should be reversed for three separate reasons.
First, the Superseding Indictment alleges that the Parkers have been placed in “imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.” Being placed in grave danger is, ipso facto, a harm sufficient to trigger the protections of the CVRA. Any other conclusion would mean that there would be no “victims” of a whole host of federal offenses that involve threat of injury rather than actual physical injury, including not only the most serious environmental crimes but other federal offenses such as attempted murder, drive-by shooting, assault, child endangerment, and mailing of threatening communications. These offenses are not “victimless” crimes because they create fear and other emotional injuries. The Parkers have been harmed by the defendants’ crimes because of the obvious psychic harm stemming from being placed in the shadow of imminent death and serious bodily injury. Moreover, in this case the Parkers have suffered very tangible harm from being forced to undertake medical monitoring to detect any asbestosis that might develop. For reasons such as these, this Court has already held that a person who is knowingly exposed to a hazardous substance has been harmed. United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2001).
Second, even if physical injury were a necessary precondition for the Parkers to claim their rights, they have suffered physical injury. Tragically, they both have asbestosis – a clear physical harm that the district court simply ignored in denying them “crime victim” status.
Finally, for several years it has been the “law of the case” that the Parkers (and other victim-witnesses like them) were protected by the CVRA. Shortly before the trial, the district court abruptly changed their status by concluding that they were not protected victims under the CVRA. The district court violated the “law of the case” doctrine in reversing course without any good reason for doing so.
The Justice Department has also filed its own petition for a writ of mandamus.
The CVRA requires a decision by the Court of Appeals within 72 hours. Presumably, then, the Ninth Circuit will hand down a decision on this issue by Friday. Its ruling will presumably be quite important in establishing who can claim the protections of the Crime Victims Rights Act. More information can be found here.
Related Posts (on one page):
- Crime Victims Win in the Ninth Circuit:
- Briefs All Filed on "Crime Victim" Issue in W.R. Grace Environmental Case:
- Who Are "Victims" of Environmental Crimes? Ninth Circuit Fight Brewing in the W.R. Grace Prosecution:
I don't think it's true that the lower court's conclusion would necessarily vitiate the victimhood of the crimes you mention. Attempted murder often involves injury, drive-by shootings cause bullet-holes, etc. As you point out, there are ancillary harms caused by those activities -- "fear and other emotional injuries."
Which leads me to ask: to the plaintiffs in this case have no "fear and emotional injuries", or were these types of injuries rejected by the court, which is your point?
Well I should hope they feel that way, as they were committed enough to bring this case in the first place. But I suspect that not every prosecutor would have done the same. I have to imagine that a case of this magnitude against a major corporate defendant consumes a tremendous amount of resources, and prosecutorial discretion surely encompasses the judgment to refrain from spending the entire office budget on a single case.
But set that aside. If your interpretation of the CVRA is upheld, to what extent do you believe this would add to the cost or complexity of the proceedings, in an environmental case such as this one?
And is the W.R. Grace of "A Civil Action" fame? Still up to their old tricks eh?
Good on them and good on you for taking this case.
I don't know your case well enough to know if the judge was right the first time or not, just that "law of the case" seems to be a weak argument.
If it becomes a federal crime at some point to emit too much CO2 into the atmosphere to stem global warming, then would every single person on the planet be a victim of a party that emitted too much CO2?
I think these are rational public policy questions, esp. where you have the problem of mass psychogenisis piled on top. I have seen EPA risk assessments of the sort discussed here make a mountain out of a molehill and probably do more psychological harm than any physical manifestation of the studied 'exposures' could ever possibly have done. It is a gross miscarriage of justice to portray someone responsible for any releases of hazardous substances are effectively culpable for EPA's agenda fueled incompetence.
These public processes did not result in criminal charges, although they might have under various theories of federal hazardous waste disposal statutes. And I blame the harm in those cases on poor risk communication and poor work by EPA, but society has all but insulated government contributions to the problem from challenge.
I have good friends in Libby, a community that has been victimized literally almost to the point of destitution by the environmental movement shutting down any logging or mining in the environs and I would argue have proximately harmed citizens from a psychological standpoint in a manner verging on criminal, indeed in a manner that I would think criminal if I didn't think various federal conspiracy charges to be inappropriate (see, e.g, Buddy Cianci who wasn't convicted of any underlying criminal acts there were supposedly part of the conspiracy to use the City of Providence as his own piggy bank, but was found guilty of the conspiracy...).
Certainly, this is a case where the nominal accused criminal was exploiting resources, rather than exploiting their preservation and, as such, it is a balanced approach to victims rights to disregard the fact that the defendant is not some street thug but a once respected paragon of the Libby industrial community -- and to accept the government's theory of the crime in asserting the PArker's right to attend the trial (absent a narrow showing that their testimony might be affected).
I really cannot suggest an awareness of the state of mind or approach of the highest echelons at Grace. However, I know that management employees on the ground in Libby who were part of that community have been swept up and charged criminally. I know one in particular was viewed as an integrated corporate citizens commanding the highest respect of many in Libby and that the case has torn the town apart, as if the depradations of the protectionists hadn't laid it waste enough already. This is a tragedy on many levels and Shakespeare might do it more justice than criminal prosecutions, although that is strictly my heresay view.
On the technical point, since there is a criminal prosecution, I think Paul is right that even though the indictment does not allege that the crime was harming the Parkers, but rather placing them at risk of harm, I think if the acts alleged did harm them that probably meets the literal test of the victims statute. But I don't think that dispositive of the question whether they are victims under the Crime Victims Act and I don't think that is precisely the point with which the judge disagreed.
Additionally there is the question of whether a prudential absention from applying that to a case where the actual harm is not the gravamen of the charge is the kind of thing that courts might do from time to time, esp. given that victim status could conceivably be claimed by an exceedingly wide range of people with more tenuous relationship to the case than the Parkers. Of course this might not be relevant to the extent that most of these more attentuated 2000 "vicitims" can't possibly be on the list of potential witnesses which contains 34 names.
Nor does the debate over actual disease in the Parker, remove the element that they may have suffered mental harm from being placed in jeopardy. I'm sure Paul and others are better aware of the precedent for the inclusion of mental harm alone in the category of harm contemplated by the victims rights act.
So then I read the judge's "short written order". He doesn't seem too happy regarding either the government's or Counselor Cassell's representations as to the law of the case. And if Paul considers a 20 page decision on this question a "short" order, that does leave open the question of intellectual hyperbole sneaking in.
But I read the whole thing anyway despite whether Paul's representation was an innocent mistatement or a disingenuous attempt to get me to open a .pdf I would never have clicked to add another half hour to my avocational investment if he had fairly characterized it. And [this] one finds that the debate over victim status takes place against the backdrop of an unusual theory of the crime undertaken to avoid the criminal statute of limitations, although the judge does not expound on precisely how this impacts consideration of the Parkers's circumstances.
The judge obviously recognizes the extent to which, in the charged environment of risk communication that itself could give rise to mental jeopardy, a loose theory of who is a victim would be imprudent and preciptous. I can't say in full whether I would find identically to the judge, but there do seem to be considerable equities supporting his outlook.
Additonally, there may be prudential or legal reasons to draw some other lines here about presumptions regarding the correctness of the government case. The simple examples in the judges order show that if a victim of a robbery is allowed to attend a trial and testify and ultimately the individual charged is exonerated, that does not necessarily mean that the person was not robbed (the judge actually says bank...).Here if the government loses the case, there is not necessarily evidence that there was a crime at all. That is a very significant point.
Furhter, is the court required to accept the scientific as well as legal theories of evidence in order to conclude victim status before they are established. The judge quite well illustrates this is not a question about presumption of innocence but goes to the question of whether one can really assume there was a crime on tenuous theories and then afford victims rights in advance of such a finding during the charged environment surrounding the proceedings to determine if there was a crime at all.
I don't take issue with the notion that they should view as true allegations that Grace deposited asbestos containing material on the property it then sold to the Parker's, but I question whether this duty to view evidence in favor of the prosecution includes accepting the inherent scientific proposition that this was the proximate cause of harm along with the bifurcated statute of limitations. To the extent that there is dispute of this question in an expert way, that would make EPA as likely the culprit in mental harm cases. After all isn't President Bush guilty of forcing people to drink arsenic because he rescinded absurd Clinton administration regulations? And weren't a lot of people highly agitated about that. Let's get him in the dock.
I tend to think the case for a crossover to physical harm stronger here, but I do see prudential and legal considerations that don't make victims in this case easily analogous to the plain class covered by the Victims Rights Act. There may also be prudential and legal reasons why you ought to extend them such status. I think one question that could have been considered is the burden the defendant would have sustained in offering an individual calculus as to each witness and why their testimony could be affected by attending the trial. You might have gotten to the same result while respecting the act although the time and expense for the defense, the prosecution and the court itself, offer considerations in opposition.
I will defer to experts,i.e. not Erin Brockavich, on statistical epidemiology on the proximate cause of the suffering pursuant to airborne asbestos exposure. My sense is that concerns about airborne asbestos are widely shared and bear scientific legitimacy, albeit the range of exposure concentrations and terms that can be reliably associated with the manifestation of asbestosis is probably not well established (which is distinct from EPA saying 'they can't announce a safe exposure' which is improperly taken to mean that any exposure no matter how small or shortlived is harmful or bears significant statistical potential for harm)but actual exposures are not really stipulated here. Only the deposition of asbestos bearing material. I don't think it is implausible that this lead to airborne exposure, but the question of how much and it epidemiological relevance isn't something to take for granted.
Paul's brief reports what is no doubt a statistically significant elevation of occurrence of asbestosis (40 to 80 times the rest of Montana and the US, can't tell if that is two numbers compared to two populations, e.g. the rest of Montana as distinct from the rest of the US. The range of the estimate leaves one to wonder the strength represented by sample size or other confounders but I haven't seen extensive discussion refuting the notion that this is an actual cluster)
However, to cast a skeptical eye, I think it is important to note that asbestosis is chronic inflammation, not to be confused with the manifestation of mesothelioma. Low level, i.e. wikipedia research, suggests asbestosis presents with shortness of breath, but not coughing, sometimes clubbed fingers (although the link for finger clubbing lists mesothelioma and not asbestosis amongst a list of lung diseases that could be causes). 50% of the time plaques are present in the parietal pleura In my limited understanding I couldn't say how one differentiates shortness of breath associated with asbestosis and other progressive degeneration of lung function, e.g. I get short of breath from exertion compared to earlier life experience because I don't exercise enough. I have had mild occupational exposure to asbestos in a lifetime of construction work, but it is the furthest thing from my mind to place the two ideas as coordinate.
There is no reference in any of these linked instruments as to the extent of pathology that presents and suggests a causative association. I don't wish to belittle what may indeed be highly aggravated and ebilitating cirucmstances that could indeed be asbestosis but these does seem to be another level of inquery or alternatively suspension of disbelief to establish a crime here.
I'm not expressing a high level of skepticism that asbestos bearing materials have been deposited by Grace in varying settings (I understand that their tailings were actually considered favorable fill during much of their tenure and sought after) The timing and extent of aerosol character that eventually obtained seems plausible enough, including some testiony at the UMT trial blog that the EPA project manager saw one of the Parker children throwing clods of surface soil at the side of the house to break them up. To take the medical history and associate it with certain symptoms in an objective, if not absoultist, framework does not to seem to be the subject of any of the many dissertations on the Parker's circumstances that jumped out of any of the links I read. I admit I did not read all 60 pages of Paul's Brief (guess maybe if you write 60 pages briefs you could call a judges 20 page order short). I thought I hopped to relevant subheads, but it could be in there and I missed it.
This whole set of circumstance and approach to this tragic community makes this seem a close question to me. I respect Paul for strong advocacy on the general point but pragmatic and legal considerations militate for good devil's advocacy in opposition to his position. I trust this may be appreciated in that spirit.
Sorry for the thesis.
Brian
Instead of it being a real-life version of the coincidental flick "China Syndrome", it was a pretty nothing event. I heard some congressional testimony to the effect that in the fallout pattern in the next forty years, 40,000 cancers could be expected not taking into account 3MI's effluvia. With the latter taken into account, the number of cancers which could be expected rose to 40,000 &1/2.
But the panic was extraordinary. Indeed, one Catholic bishop provided conditional absolution to his flock. This is usually done for soldiers going into combat who have not time for confession and individual absolution. It appears to have first been provided in North America to the Irish Brigade before they went into the line at Gettysburg--saith Mackinley Kantor in his Landmark book on the battle.
Clearly, radiation poisoning is not such a rapid killer that the traditional sacrament would be ruled out, especially when it isn't, you know, actually happening.
So, is the panic the fault of 3MI who didn't actually commit any kind of environmental crime, but merely provided fodder for the attention-deprived and anti-nuke nutcases?
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