National Performance Measures Strategy

Testimony of Alexander Volokh
Policy Analyst, Reason Foundation
before the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
San Francisco, Ca.
relating to the National Performance Measures Strategy
March 17, 1997


My name is Alexander Volokh of the Reason Foundation, a public policy research organization based in Los Angeles. I am also the co-author of Environmental Enforcement: In Search of Both Effectiveness and Fairness.” Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you about the National Performance Measures Strategy.

I will offer some ideas for developing new performance measures, but we cannot begin to reform the old system without precisely understanding its failings. The problem with the old input-counting system was not that it gave us wrong information, but that the information it gave us did not help us to figure out whether the enforcement agency was doing a good job. The main problems are the following:

1. First, the numbers that are reported are often meaningless, because they do not make important distinctions — such as distinctions between trivial and harmful violations, accidental and intentional violations, and violations taking place in different media.

2. Second, increasing numbers of enforcement actions are interpreted as success, while in fact (even when the numbers are meaningful) this is not necessarily the case.

Let me briefly discuss two sorts of problems with the current performance measures.

1. What do the numbers mean?

Because not all violations are the same, aggregated numbers often mean less than they seem.

a. Violations have different impacts.

A one-time permit exceedence involving a low-level, low-toxicity pollutant in an uninhabited area is not the same as dumping a highly poisonous chemical into the water supply near a major city. To say that "one trivial violation + one harmful violation = 2" gives us no information on whether the EPA is solving real problems.
b. Violations have different moral qualities.
Since the law is at least in part supposed to be a deterrent to bad actors and a tool of moral education, we would like to concentrate our resources on intentional and reckless violations. An accidental paperwork mistake is not the same as intentionally defrauding the EPA or treating chemicals in a way that one knows has a high chance of killing people. To say that "one accidental violation + one intentional violation = 2" gives us no information on whether the moral goals of the law are being properly fulfilled.
c. The environment is multi-dimensional.
Suppose that by transferring resources from air to water enforcement, we reduce air enforcement actions by 2 but increase water enforcement actions by 1. The numbers would indicate that total enforcement actions have decreased by 1. But counting total enforcement actions does not work here either. An air quality violation is not equivalent to a water quality violation, which is not equivalent to a taking of endangered species. In allocating its enforcement resources, the EPA is implicitly making this judgment. But there will always be a certain amount of arbitrariness in the decision. To say that“"one RCRA violation + one FIFRA violation = 2" gives us no information on whether “enforcement results,” in some absolute sense, are increasing or decreasing.
d. Environmental quality is subjective.
Intimately related to this last point is that environmental quality is subjective. "Environmental quality" has no rigorous definition. Some people consider biodiversity to be the most important environmental issue; other people care about human mortality rates; others care about sustainability. Even though we know that not all "paperwork" violations are trivial -- some are quite important, since the entire system depends on honest and accurate reporting -- there is no clear way to rank a paperwork violation, which represents the possibility of future harm, against, say, an actual oil spill.
Any measure that tries to reduce the enforcement program to just a few aggregated numbers cannot hope to capture the complexity of environmental protection and enforcement. Knowing the size of penalties or the number of enforcement actions does not help us.

2. What do increases in the numbers mean?

Even seeing the evolution of these numbers through time gives us misleading information. Here are two problems related to the interpretation of changes in enforcement quantity.

a. Any improvement in environmental compliance will make the numbers go down.

When the measure of success is the quantity of enforcement, the agency’s performance record is hurt by any improvement in the environment or in compliance. The business community has a more cooperative attitude toward enforcement today than it had in the 1970s. This makes the numbers go down and makes the EPA look as though it is doing less. If regulations suddenly become simpler, noncompliance will drop dramatically, and again, the EPA will look bad; conversely, if a new regulatory program is enacted, the numbers will suddenly increase, giving the illusion of greater effectiveness.

Every time the EPA spends money on a compliance assistance program or on an audit program, it is taking resources that could otherwise be used on traditional enforcement, and using them instead to increase compliance. To the extent that an audit or compliance assistance program succeeds, it again makes enforcement numbers decrease, and gives the impression that the EPA is doing a bad job.
b. Any shift to more difficult cases will tend to make the numbers go down.
We all know that environmental law is complicated and highly technical. A National Law Journal survey reported that about two-thirds of corporate environmental attorneys believed that their companies had violated some environmental law over the past year, largely because of uncertainty and complexity. They also believed that full compliance with all local, state, and federal environmental laws was impossible. This means that someone looking for violations of environmental laws is likely to find them, especially in statutory regimes characterized by elaborate permit and record-keeping systems, like the Clean Water Act. When the numbers increase, it could mean that the enforcers are doing their job, or it could mean that they have shifted to those violations that are easiest to find, which are not necessarily the most valuable ones. Decreases or increases in enforcement or failure. If the numbers increase, it doing their job properly; that is, that numbers could indicate either success could mean that the enforcers are they are trying harder and catching more people. Or it could mean that compliance has gone down -- in other words, that the enforcers are not doing their job. Or it could mean that enforcers are picking the easier cherries. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell by looking at the numbers.

3. What should be done?

Whatever measures EPA know what the numbers adopts, it must address these problems. We should be able to mean, and we should be able to interpret what changes in the numbers mean. I suggest the following steps.

1. First, we should abandon our reliance on the total number of cases, the total number of enforcement actions, or the total amount of penalties. Such numbers, because they do not distinguish between intentional and unintentional or between harmful and less harmful, cannot tell us whether we are doing a good job. We should only add comparable things. This means that the enforcement measures should be substantially more disaggregated:
  • by amount of harm -- separated into “paperwork violations, "harmless permit exceedences," "harmful emissions," and the like;
  • by level of intent -- separated into "accidental violations," "negligent violations," "reckless violations," and "intentional violations";
  • by medium or by regulatory regime -- separated, for instance, into "Clean Air Act violations," "Clean Water Act violations," "RCRA violations," and so on.
A report that avoids excessive aggregation would allow different observers to look at the numbers, knowing that the cases counted in them are closer to being truly comparable. It would not mislead readers into seeing trends that may not really be there. For instance, separating cases by regulatory regime would allow readers to see when cases increase or decrease because of changes in regulations and not because of changes in enforcement quality.

Naturally, having too many categories could become unwieldy, so the number of categories needs to be kept manageable. Even disaggregated, every one of these categories will contain dissimilar cases. For instance, the "accidental violations" category will contain both harmful and harmless violations. Ideally, within any category, violations should be weighted by gravity -- either by how much harm was caused, how bad the defendant’s state of mind was, or both. One possible way of doing this would be by using the factors that the EPA already uses to calculate its gravity-based penalties.

2. Second, the EPA should be able to take credit for improvements in compliance. Violations found by regulated parties over the course of an environmental audit, or as the result of a compliance assistance program, and . reported to the environmental agency, should be credited toward the enforcement agency’s accomplishments at least as much as if the agency had found the violation itself and punished the violator (even though the EPA would not be allowed to assess actual penalties).

3. Third, the EPA should be able to take credit for improvements in the state of the environment. The EPA should track environmental quality and report it together with traditional enforcement numbers as part of its accomplishments report. Thus, if enforcement has gone down because the environment has improved, the accomplishments report should reflect this trend.

Of course, interpretation of these data can be complicated, so all reports should also be accompanied by narrative. For instance, as we run into decreasing marginal returns, improving the environment may become more and more difficult as time goes by, so maintaining a given level of environmental quality may indicate success. Environmental enforcement agencies should not have to take the blame for the results of substantive policy decisions made by legislatures.

As I have mentioned, the environment is multi-dimensional and subjective: no one number can capture environmental quality. Environmental quality measurements may have to be broken down by medium, by pollutant, by geographical area, or by some combination of the above. This would be a desirable development, as it would underscore the complexity of environmental quality measurements. Different observers, with different value judgments about what constitutes the environment and which environmental variables are more important, should be able to come to intelligent conclusions from reading enforcement and performance reports.

4. Fourth, the measures of the enforcement program should not only provide useful information for the concerned reader, but should also be useful to legislators trying to decide whether to increase or decrease the agency’s budget, and to the EPA itself, when trying to decide how to allocate its resources. But deciding how to allocate resources -- and even deciding whether particular environmental improvements are worthwhile -- is impossible without some consideration of cost. The EPA should make some effort to incorporate enforcement costs, both to itself and to private parties, into its report. These costs could take the form of cost per life-year saved or some other meaningful economic measure.

5. Fifth, the "reinventing enforcement" effort could also use some help from Congress. If we are interested in some sort of rational resource allocation that relates somehow to environmental risk, harm, and intent, and that is interested in getting the greatest amount of environmental protection from each enforcement dollar, it does not help that Congress has required the EPA to enact complicated and expensive requirements, often unrelated to risk, that sometimes tie up the EPA in enforcement actions that may not be worthwhile. Congress should take the opportunity during the upcoming RCRA and Superfund reauthorizations, for instance, to improve compliance and enforcement by simplifying its regulations.

Some groups have suggested that whatever the EPA does in developing better enforcement measures, it should not increase the amount of classified information that might help citizen groups sue companies that violate an environmental law. The importance of citizen suits has been used as an argument against extended audit privilege laws. I would suggest, however, taking a different approach. The entire Performance Measures Strategy is based on the realization that bad measurements lead to bad incentives, which lead to environmental enforcement actions that are not always justified or even useful. But today, we live in a world where citizen groups can sue a company for an accidental, harmless violation of an environmental law. We do not require citizen groups to have standing -- that is, particular, individualized harm -- to enforce environmental laws, and we cannot hold them accountable for excessive enforcement in the way that we can hold the EPA accountable. Therefore, if we are concerned about wrong cases being brought by the government, we should be at least as concerned about wrong cases being brought by private parties. The effect of audit privilege laws on citizen suits should not distract us from the need to develop meaningful incentives for environmental compliance.

This concludes my remarks. Thank you for your attention.

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