The Washington Post tried to defend Jamie Gorelick against “Mr. Ashcroft’s Smear,” but fails. While the Post pretends that Ms. Gorelick’s 1995 memo, and the subsequent guidelines, did not erect a “wall” between intelligence and law enforcement, it misses the larger point. At issue is not whether Ms. Gorelick played a postive or negative role in the Justice Department’s pre-9/11 anti-terrorism efforts. Rather, as I explained here, at issue is the fact that she was intimately involved in the develoment and implementation of policy decisions that affected law enforcement’s ability to detect and prevent terrorist attacks. If there is a genuine dispute between Ms. Gorelick and Mr. Ashcroft over the extent to which this “wall” was required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillence Act and various court opinions, that dispute should be aired in front of the Commission, not between a witness and a purportedly disinterested Commissioner.
Perhaps, as the Post suggests, Gorelick’s critics should have called for her recusal sooner. Perhaps. But us civilian types had no way of knowing precisely how involved she was in developing Justice Dpeartment policy during the Clinton Administration until now. Indeed, I saw no reason to for her withdrawl or recusal until after the memo was declissified by Ashcroft and Gorelick took to the Post‘s editorial page in her own defense. Perhaps those at Justice who were aware of her role should have suggested she was an inapprorpiate choice to be on the Commission, but imagine the Post‘s reaction had John Ashcroft complained about the Gorelick choice. The person in the best position to assess the appropriateness of her serving on the Commission was Gorelick herself, and she simply made the wrong call.
Andrew McCarthy also comments on the Post‘s editorial. Among other things, he notes that the Post misrepresents the history of the “wall” and the role of Ms. Gorelick’s memo and the subsequent guidelines that she helped develop. Contrary to the impression Gorelick and the Post have tried to create:
Gorelick’s March 1995 memo is highly relevant to unfolding the thought process that generated intelligence lapse, the key issue being probed by the 9/11 Commission. In it, Gorelick explicitly asserted that the precautionary measures she sought to install, which ultimately became the wall, “go beyond what is legally required…[to] prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation” (Emphasis added).
In the end, however, McCarthy returns to the central point: Whatever one’s view of Ms. Gorelick’s actions while at Justice — and McCarthy defends Gorelick’s policy decisions on several fronts — she is simply the wrong woman for the job.
Under the circumstances as they exist, we can have either of two things: (a) nine commissioners, access to all essential witnesses, and no interested witness shaping the commission’s findings; or (b) ten commissioners, no access to a pivotal witness, and the commission’s hearings and final report tainted by a self-interested participant who even now is making public, unsworn allegations. No matter how we have traveled to this point, that is not a difficult choice.
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