Reader Don McGregor writes:
The army has (not surprisingly) an extensive checklist for what constitutes “ready” or not. It’s actually a graduated readiness appraisal, not a binary go/no-go rating.
Divisions are rated at C1 to C4. C3 means it can perform only some of its combat missions, and C4 means it may need additional manpower.
This is normal and expected for divisions coming back from deployment. Equipment needs to be overhauled, NCOs and officers need to go off to schools for training, etc.
The army used to use the individual replacement system in Vietnam and WWII, which meant that a unit like the 1st Cavalry division might stay deployed in Vietnam for years while individuals roated in for a one year tour. It was a disaster from a unit cohesion standpoint, since people don’t fight well when they’re placed with strangers or led by strangers. So the army is keeping whole units together for a full deployment, then rebuilding the unit after it comes back. This typically takes about 4-6 months.
Reader James Killmond writes:
The L.A. Times is using Army readiness reports to hang its story on. Army units have to file readiness reports. The Pentagon and all the higher-ups need to know whether the military assets they control can be used. No surprise there.
In peacetime, meeting readiness criteria is largely within the commander’s control. With proper planning and budgeting, the commander should have little problem conducting the necessary training, maintaining the equipment, etc. Accordingly, failing to meet the criteria and having to report that a unit is unfit almost never happens because it tends to be a career-ender for the commander.
This is all different in wartime, of course. Equipment is used much more severely when deployed in combat than it is when used in training. Maintenance and training are still conducted, but have to be balanced with real missions. At some level, Army units in combat cannot maintain readiness indefinitely. Even if they are successful in combat, periods of rotation and refit are necessary. Our current Army is not well-sized for this, and some wear is inevitable. Spending more money on equipment would help and is probably being done. However, the L.A. Times would have to do a lot more reporting, not just reading readiness reports, before it could be concluded that there is a real problem.
As you note, in other conflicts U.S. Army units have sustained much higher casualty levels without losing effectiveness. The 101st is famous for its steadfastness. In the WWII battle of Bastogne that killed thousands, the completely encircled commander of the 101st, Gen. McAuliffe, had this response to a German surrender demand: “Nuts!”. I would be skeptical of reports that the 101st isn’t maintaining its usual morale.
Reader Rob Crowley writes:
As a former Special Forces major and current 1L, I’m probably in a unique position to answer your questions on the story about the 101st. As you correctly surmise, the correct answer is both 1 and 3–it is always like this, and the LA Times is actively spinning. That the LA Times is eager to paint our military situation as darkly as possible is probably not a big surprise.
Virtually every time a unit returns from a deployment it finds itself in the same situation–in need of retraining and an equipment refit. Training and operations wear out both. That’s true whether the deployment is a couple of weeks in Panama, three months in the Balkans, or a year of combat in the desert. Men and equipment both need recovery time before they are ready to get back in the fight. That’s just the nature of the beast. Of course, sand does play hell on kit, but I don’t really think that’s the point the LA Times was trying to get across.
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