Maybe it’s because I’m originally from Virginia, where they don’t have an initiative process. Or maybe it’s because I was reared an Episcopalian, since Episcopalians are not known for populist enthusiasm. All I can say is that I seem to have an inbred skepticism about direct democracy. As a California voter, I put a pretty firm thumb on the scale against popular initiatives. If I haven’t read it, I vote no. If I don’t understand it, I vote no. If I don’t feel strongly in favor of it, I vote no. It’s not that I always vote no; there are quite a few well-drafted, well-conceived popular initiatives in California that I do feel strongly about. I even co-chaired the statewide campaign for one of California’s more important popular initiatives back in 1996. Obviously, it is more than just possible for an initiative to overcome my presumption. But in the 15 years that I’ve lived in California, I’ve certainly cast more no than yes votes.
But there’s one argument against direct democracy that I think is quite unfair, and that’s the one that holds that the initiative process has been captured by corrupt monied interests and that therefore the initiative process should be abolished or severely curtailed. In essence, the initiative process is said to be subverting the true will of the people. It’s a argument that I hear a lot of. David Broder made it in his Pulitzer Prize winning book Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money. Lots of others have made it too.
Of course, well-organized, well-heeled interests have a significant influence on the initiative process. Welcome to politics. But these interests have a significant influence on the legislative and the administrative process too. Unless initiative process opponents can make the case that the problem is greater in the initiative arena than it is in the legislative arena, the argument has no force. And at least in my experience, it’s quite the other way around. (I’d probably cast even more no votes if I were a legislator in Sacramento and Washington.)
I just finished editing an article by U.S.C.’s John G. Matsusaka entitled “Subversion of the Many by the Few: Some Scientific Evidence on the Initiative Process.” I found it extremely interesting on this general point. Matsusaka decided the test the “subversion hypothesis” by looking into the state and local fiscal policies of initiative and non-initiative states. And what do y’know, he actually comes up with some evidence. It seems that there are real differences in the fiscal policies of initiative and non-initiative states. Initiative states spend less than non-initiative states. Initiative states concentrate more of their spending at the local level. And initiative states raise a greater portion of their revenue through fees rather than through taxes. The subversion hypothesis, however, gets no support from Matsusaka’s research. In each case, the initiative states move public policy in a direction that it consistent rather than inconsistent with popular will. Voters tend to want their state governments to spend less money, etc. Hence, instead of subverting the true popular will, the initiative process appears to be giving that popular will a means with which to influence public policy.
The Matsusaka article will be published soon in the University of San Diego’s Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues. Look for it.
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