Jurisdiction-stripping:

Several people e-mailed me to ask whether HR 3133, which was just passed by the House, is constitutional. The bill would provide that:

No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, section 1738C or this section.

Legal scholars have spent decades and volumes discussing the question of when Congress may strip federal courts of jurisdiction over certain matters. I’m not an expert on the subject, so I was reluctant to weigh in; and a brief conversation with my colleague Gary Rowe, who does know the literature, reinforced my reluctance. So I can offer only a few observations:

1. As I noted here, such a bill may do more harm than good even from its proponents’ viewpoint:

   Even if federal courts lose jurisdiction over objections to some statute, state courts would still be able to entertain them — state courts must enforce the U.S. Constitution just as much as federal courts do (that’s in art. VI, sec. 2). If people are worried that the U.S. Supreme Court may strike down the Defense of Marriage Act, then they should be worried that state supreme courts may do the same; and even those state supreme courts that might not take this view on their own might feel moved by precedents from other states, since courts throughout the country tend to try to interpret the U.S. Constitution consistently with the decisions of other courts.

   What’s more, if a state supreme court does hold DOMA unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution, then there’ll be no remedy (short of impeaching the state supreme court Justices). Amending the state constitution, which is a remedy for state supreme court decisions based on the state constitution — such as the Goodridge gay marriage decision in the Massachusetts — will do nothing to change the state court’s interpretation of the U.S. constitution. And an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court won’t be possible, because the Court has been stripped of jurisdiction to hear the case. (I suppose one could strip the Court of jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions upholding DOMA but not from decisions invalidating DOMA, but then if the Court upholds a decision invalidating DOMA, DOMA will be invalid throughout the country.)

   True, the jurisdiction-stripping would at least confine the DOMA invalidations to those states where the supreme courts rendered such decisions; that’s something DOMA supporters might appreciate. But my sense is that they won’t be wild even about this result, especially since the alternative might be the Supreme Court’s upholding DOMA on a nationwide basis. It seems to me that if you really want to make sure a statute isn’t invalidated, a narrowly tailored constitutional amendment (not the currently talked-about Musgrave draft Federal Marriage Amendment, which would go far beyond protecting DOMA) is indeed the first-best alternative, especially when it seems like it could well be politically plausible.

2. Such a jurisdiction-stripping statute would nonetheless probably be constitutional, because of article III, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution (emphasis added):

   In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

   (The “state shall be party” original jurisdiction proviso won’t help, because under another provision of article III, coupled with the Eleventh Amendment and certain longstanding court interpretations, lawsuits by individuals against states basically aren’t covered under the Court’s original jurisdiction.)

   People would still be able to assert their federal constitutional rights — just in state courts, which are also required to follow the U.S. Constitution, rather than in federal courts. (Recall that the Constitution doesn’t even require Congress to create subordinate federal courts at all, and, as the quote above shows, specifically authorizes Congress to limit even the Supreme Court’s appellate authority.) My understanding, from what Gary said, is that this is the majority view among leading federal courts scholars.

3. However, as I mentioned, some highly respected scholars argue otherwise; and Gary very kindly let me put on the Web his summary of the debate that he distributes to his students. It’s aimed at law students, and refers to other readings that they were assigned, so it will likely be quite cryptic; but I pass it along in case some of you find it interesting.

Please note that Gary is doing me a favor by letting me distribute this; please don’t bother him with any questions, counterarguments, or corrections. Please also note that, as I said, I myself am not an expert on the subject, and my view in item 2 above is based on a casual analysis, not any serious learning on the matter. I don’t expect to blog much more on the subject, but I thought I’d pass along what I had.