Some of today’s respondents have expressed skepticism about my assertion that having a better bureaucracy was the key advantage enjoyed by England over Spain in the 1580s or by the U.S. over Iraq more recently. If it didn’t have a better bureaucracy–i.e. one capable of producing a more effective navy, with better ships, better cannons, better sailors, and better commanders–it is hard to know how England could possibly have defeated the Spanish Armada, when Spain was considerably richer and bigger than England. For the record, here is a very brief excerpt from Chapter One of my book which gives a partial overview of the English bureaucratic advantage (there is much more on this in the book itself):
“The Royal Navy was ready to meet them [i.e., the Spanish warships]. It had ancient roots, but as an official body it had existed for only half a century. In medieval times English kings would raise fleets from among the merchant marine when necessary in time of war, and few if any ships were built expressly for fighting. Even the king’s personal ships, when not needed in a campaign, would be used to transport Bordeaux wine or other goods for the royal household. Henry VIII (r. 1509-1547), Elizabeth’s father, had pioneered among European monarchs a standing fleet belonging to the crown, and, as important, a standing department to administer it. This was part of what is sometimes called the Tudor Revolution, which gave England the prototype of a modern bureaucracy long before Spain possessed one. Under Henry VIII and his energetic ministers, Thomas Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell, the center of English administration shifted away from the royal household and toward new governmental departments.
“To manage the navy, officials were appointed with such titles as Master of Naval Ordnance, Lieutenant of the Admiralty, Treasurer, Controller, Clerk of the King’s Ships, and General Surveyor of the Victuals for the Seas. Beginning in 1546, many of these senior managers sat together on the Council of the Marine, popularly known as the Navy Board, direct ancestor of the modern Admiralty. The slightly older Ordnance Board was responsible for procuring weapons and everything needed to operate them. Together, these two organizations provided England with more efficient naval administration than that of any contemporary state, with the possible exceptions of Portugal and Venice. The Spanish navy was a virtual one-man operation by comparison, and that man was the overworked King Philip II, isolated in his gloomy cell at the Escorial.
“Spain had nothing like the royal dockyards and storehouses that had sprung up around southern English ports like Portsmouth, Woolwich, and Deptford. Nor did it have officials, as England had, who carefully drew up mobilization plans to make full use of its maritime might. England, not yet possessing lucrative colonies, was much poorer than Spain (Elizabeth’s ordinary revenues were a tenth of Philip II’s ) and could not keep a large fleet mobilized for long periods. It needed accurate intelligence and ready contingency plans to defend itself when danger materialized. There was no margin of safety. As part of this planning, the Elizabethan navy launched an ambitious program of construction in the 1560-1570s to take advantage of a (so to speak) sea change in warship design.”
As for the U.S. and Iraq, there was no question that the U.S. was much bigger than Iraq so it should have defeated Iraq–if the bigger power were guaranteed to come out on top. But it isn’t. We found that out in the Vietnam War. We’re finding it out today in Iraq. Iran learned the same lesson when it failed to defeat Iraq during their war in the 1980s even though Iran has about three times as many people. The U.S., of course, is even bigger and richer than Iran, so the odds are that we would defeat Iraq no matter what–but no one expected that coalition forces would win the 1991 Gulf War as easily or cheaply as they did. That was a tribute to American skill at warfighting–especially to the changes made in the previous decade to incorporate new technologies (e.g., stealth and smart bombs) and new organizational models (the all volunteer force, Goldwater Nichols, etc.). The result: one of the most lopsided defeats in military history. The reason the U.S. proved more effective, I would argue, is that it had a more efficient organization for marshalling military power. Whereas Saddam frittered away his military capabilities with a perverse organizational model designed NOT to field powerful armies–for fear that they would rise up against him.