I’ve blogged before about this case, Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, which Mayer Brown — the firm with which I’m affiliated part-part-part-time — is handling pro bono, and on which I helped. The Ninth Circuit just dissolved the injunction; here are some relevant excerpts (some paragraph breaks added):
[Tim] Oey initially supported
TFN’s claim to the FREECYCLE mark. Experiencing a
change of heart and convinced that the term should remain in
the public domain, Oey later urged TFN to abandon its efforts
to secure the mark, conveying his feelings in an August 8,
2005, email to fellow TFN group moderators. In the following
weeks, Oey made various statements on the Internet that
TFN lacked trademark rights in “freecycle” because it was a
generic term, and he encouraged others to use the term in its
generic sense and to write letters to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) opposing TFN’s pending registration….In April 2006, TFN sued Oey, seeking an injunction and
damages, alleging that Oey’s statements constituted contributory
trademark infringement and trademark disparagement
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),
as well as injurious falsehood, defamation, and intentional
interference with a business relationship under Arizona law.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction based
solely on TFN’s § 1125(a) claims, apparently conflating
TFN’s allegations of contributory trademark infringement and
trademark disparagement….A) Trademark Infringement
[The alleged] facts — even if true — simply
do not demonstrate that TFN has a likelihood of success on
its § 1125(a) infringement claim…. Oey’s actions likely did not constitute
a “use in commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), as the
record in this case does not indicate they were made to promote
any competing service or reap any commercial benefit
whatsoever…. []“[Trademark law’s ‘use in commerce’]
refers to a use of a famous and distinctive mark to sell goods
[or services] other than those produced or authorized by the
mark’s owner.”[] Rather, based on his view that the term was
generic, Oey simply expressed an opinion that TFN lacked
trademark rights in the term “freecycle” and encouraged likeminded
individuals to continue to use the term in its generic
sense and to inform the PTO of their opinions.Furthermore, even if Oey’s statements could somehow be
construed to be a “use in commerce,” such use was not likely
to cause confusion, mistake, or deceive anyone as to the connection
of Oey’s services (or any other) with TFN…. [O]ur review of the record identifies
no potential likelihood of confusion resulting from Oey’s
activities. Oey simply did not use TFN’s claimed mark or a
similar mark in any manner likely to confuse the relevant public:
his statements neither mention any competing service or
product, nor claim any affiliation with TFN.Finally, Oey’s statements also do not satisfy the requirements
for false advertising, misrepresentation, or unfair competition
under § 1125(a)(1)(B). There is no evidence that
Oey’s statements were made in “commercial advertising or
promotion.” And, even if such evidence
existed, § 1125(a)(1)(B) creates liability only for product
disparagement -— i.e., misrepresentation of “the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin” of “another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities.” …B) Trademark Infringement
TFN’s complaint also alleged “trademark disparagement”
under § 1125(a). However, no such claim exists under the Lanham Act….[But e]ven assuming TFN’s trademark disparagement claim were
somehow cognizable under the Lanham Act, … Oey’s conduct does not
satisfy TFN’s asserted elements. Oey’s statements were not
“false.” At worst, Oey offered an erroneous legal opinion (by
a layperson) that TFN lacked trademark rights in the term
“freecycle.” “Statements of opinion are not generally actionable
under the Lanham Act.”To this day, there has been no formal determination that
TFN has trademark rights in the term “freecycle.” The mark
is not yet registered and both an opposition to registration and
action seeking a declaration that TFN lacks trademark rights
in the term are currently pending. Oey’s statement that TFN
lacked trademark rights in the term therefore cannot be considered
a false statement of fact. []“Absent a clear and
unambiguous ruling from a court or agency of competent
jurisdiction, statements by laypersons that purport to interpret
the meaning of a statute or regulation are opinion statements,
and not statements of fact.”[]TFN and the district court
emphasize Oey’s prior support of TFN’s efforts to trademark
the term, but these prior efforts do not render his subsequent
statements “false.” Oey is entitled to change his mind. Until
it is definitively established that TFN holds a trademark in the
term “freecycle,” it cannot be false to contend that it does not….C) Genericide
the crux of TFN’s complaint is that
Oey should be prevented from using (or encouraging the use
of) TFN’s claimed mark FREECYCLE in its generic sense.
However, TFN’s asserted mark —- like all marks — is always at
risk of becoming generic and thereby losing its ability to identify
the trademark holder’s goods or services. Where the majority of the relevant public appropriates a
trademark term as the name of a product (or service), the
mark is a victim of “genericide” and trademark rights generally
cease…. Genericide
has spelled the end for countless formerly trademarked terms,
including “aspirin,” “escalator,” “brassiere,” and “cellophane.” …Of course, trademark owners are free (and perhaps
wise) to take action to prevent their marks from becoming
generic and entering the public domain — e.g., through a public
relations campaign or active policing of the mark’s use.
The Lanham Act itself, however, contains no provision preventing
the use of a trademarked term in its generic sense.Nor does the Act prevent an individual from expressing
an opinion that a mark should be considered generic or from
encouraging others to use the mark in its generic sense.
Rather, the use of a mark in its generic sense is actionable
under the Lanham Act only when such use also satisfies the
elements of a specified cause of action — e.g., infringement,
false designation of origin, false advertising, or dilution.
TFN’s mere disagreement with Oey’s opinion and frustration
with his activities cannot render Oey liable under the Lanham
Act.
Because of these holdings, the court didn’t have to reach the question whether the injunction violated the First Amendment.
Congratulations to my colleagues Don Falk, Dennis Corgill, and Ian Feinberg, and my former student Pete Patterson, who worked on the brief. Congratulations and thanks also to the amici — Jamie Boyle, Lauren Gelman, Larry Lessig, Declan McCullagh, David Post, Glenn Reynolds, Martin Schwimmer, Jimmy Wales, and Jon Zittrain (represented by David and by my friend Bruce Adelstein), as well as the 38 Intellectual Property Law Professors and the EFF (represented by Mark Lemley).