From F.M. v. Commissioner of Children & Families (Conn. App. Ct. June 25, 2013) (some paragraph breaks added):
The plaintiff father, who is self-represented in this court, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of a department of children and families … hearing officer who found that the department had substantiated allegations of emotional and physical neglect against him and upheld the department’s recommendation that the plaintiff’s name be placed on its child abuse registry (central registry)….
Finally the plaintiff claimed that he was denied due process of law because the only evidence presented against him was hearsay, as well as [social worker Heather] Howard’s unwarranted consideration of the fact that the plaintiff’s family came from Iran and a belief that domestic violence is prevalent in Iranian society. He argued that there was no need for Howard “to gain background information on domestic violence issues and behaviors in Iranian culture.” The plaintiff also stated that the hearing officer’s finding that he poses a risk to the health, safety, and well-being of children was “absurd.” According to him, he is an educator with an excellent reputation who had never been the subject of a department investigation. He has no criminal history and has never been arrested. He placed significance on the fact that the allegations of child abuse came to light contemporaneously with his wife’s decision to divorce him….
Although the investigation protocol contains information concerning domestic violence, in general, and in Iran, in particular, the transcript of the substantiation hearing and the hearing officer’s final decision make clear that the plaintiff’s national origin was not a factor in finding substantial evidence to support the substantiation of emotional and physical neglect….
The plaintiff claims that the hearing officer was influenced by an inappropriate reliance on the fact that his family came from Iran. He acknowledges that the hearing officer sustained his objection when the department offered evidence of his national origin. Iran and Iranian culture were not mentioned again during the department’s presentation of evidence. The plaintiff himself, however, introduced such evidence when he cross-examined Howard about the Moradian article [Domestic Violence against Single and Married Women in Iranian Society, by Azad Moradian].
Despite his claim on appeal, the plaintiff concedes in his brief that the hearing officer does not mention his ethnicity or national origin in the final decision. When ruling on the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the hearing officer stated that he gave no consideration to Howard’s findings with regard to domestic violence and Iranian culture. The plaintiff predicates his claim on the fact that the hearing officer credited Howard’s testimony over his testimony. Once again, the plaintiff is asking this court to ignore our limited function and reverse the findings of the hearing officer and the judgment of the trial court on the basis of credibility. Not only does our standard of review preclude us from making credibility determinations, but also the findings of the hearing officer are supported primarily with evidence attributed to the plaintiff’s daughters, their mother, and school personnel.
Moreover, the plaintiff has conceded that he called his wife names and pushed her. There was substantial evidence in the record that the plaintiff’s daughters were afraid of him. His younger daughter was withdrawn and anxious at school. The older daughter was nervous, did not eat well, and bit her nails. Neither daughter wanted to spend time with him.
As to Howard’s including the quotation from the Moradian article in the investigation protocol, she testified that she needed to educate herself in order to understand why the mother was hesitant to come forward with allegations of domestic violence despite having lived with it for fifteen years. The information helped her put the mother’s statements in an historical and cultural context.
To base a decision on uninformed or negative inferences relating to a person’s religion, national origin, or ancestry is entirely improper. For a social worker tasked with a difficult investigation to educate herself so as to better understand the cultural context within which people may conduct themselves is entirely appropriate. We therefore conclude that the court properly determined that the department’s decision to sustain the allegations of physical and emotional abuse was not arbitrary, unreasonable or illegal. The court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the plaintiff’s administrative appeal.
This analysis seems quite right to me, and probably won’t be surprising to many readers. Still, the question of when a judge’s or investigator’s consideration of culture-related evidence becomes improper — whether because it unduly favors members of certain cultures or unduly disfavors them — is often an interesting question, and sometimes (though probably not here) a difficult one, so I thought I’d note this.