A commentator on this post by Ted Barlow at Crooked Timber writes, in reference to my “tipping point” post below:
What remains amazing from Sullivan and the other hard-core rationalists at the Volokh Conspiracy (for example) is their inability to admit to their lack of predictive powers. It isnt that a gross miscalculation was made as to the feasibility of achieving peace, democracy, etc., merely that we employed the wrong people to do it.
As I said: I freely admit to my lack of predictive powers. I didn’t think things would go this badly wrong. I’m just not making the admission “rascalnikov” is asking for: that the idea of bringing a government to Iraq that was more just, more democratic, and more peaceful than its predecessor, and while still being strong enough to keep the internal peace and thereby transforming the politics of the Middle East in intensely desirable ways (by getting U.S. troops out of Saudi Arabia; by showing a path to progress for Arab states that have otherwise faced a choice between fundamentalist repression and corrupt repression (or, sometimes, both at once); by showing that constitutional, non-theocratic, non-autocratic orders can take hold in Arab countries; by shifting the balance of power in the Arab world decisively away from Saudi Arabia and substantially away from Egypt and Syria; and by building the moral capital of the U.S. by demonstrating an active desire to enhance Arab and Muslim freedom) was necessarily misguided, doomed to failure, or even always very likely to fail, on its merits, regardless of the quality of execution.
Indeed, it seems to me that the Bush Administration had to do an impressive number of things wrong to bring things to their current impasse. High on the list has been a refusal to commit an adequate number of troops to postwar reconstruction. Also high on the list was the disbanding of the Iraqi army without pay. (I’m inclined to say that disbanding was the right idea, but that soldiers should have been offered substantial compensation in exchange for turning in their arms.) But then there’s been mistake after mistake since– the election issue has been handled very badly and with a real tin ear; Sistani has been badly handled; and now Abu Ghraib has done massive damage to American credibility (and for good reason– I’m not saying that we only have a perception problem there, though we have that, too).
Now, that doesn’t exculpate those of us who supported the war. The people who are on hand to implement a policy are a relevant consideration in calculating the policy’s expected value. But rascalnikov seems to be saying that the ex ante expected value was negative regardless of competence of implementation; and I don’t agree.
By the way, a number of people have e-mailed me over the past couple of weeks saying, “Why insist on firing Rumsfeld when responsibility rises all the way to Bush?” To which I answer: well, Presidential resignations are very rare and very disruptive in our system. The mechanisms are set up so that Presidents are replaced at the ballot box rather than by resignation. A resignation is sure not to happen; the only President who has ever resigned did so under immediate threat of impeachment. A resignation moreover wouldn’t make things better; President Cheney isn’t likely to suddenly clean things up in Iraq.
But firing, or extracting resignations from, cabinet officers does happen. (Eugene rightly points out that voluntary resginations to take responsibility for mistakes are rare. Firings are much less so; and a firing often takes the form of extracting a letter of resignation.) And if the Administration suddenly smartened up on Iraq policy– which I must hope for, no matter how little I expect it– firing Rumsfeld would provide a desirable mark of emphasis for the new strategy, giving credibility to what must now be at least a twofold acknowledgement of error (Abu Ghraib, lack of security and order in Iraq).
No, I don’t think it’s likely. But it’s the best short-term option I see.
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