Here's the decision; thanks to How Appealing for the pointer. The dissent (with which I disagree) captures the facts well:
On June 10, 2004, Justice [Laura] Blackburne was informed that a police officer was present who wished to speak with a defendant who had been referred to a drug treatment program. She was subsequently informed that the officer was there to arrest the defendant. She was not informed what the arrest was for. She directed a court officer to escort the defendant from the courthouse to avoid being arrested in the court. [Note: The court officer was told to just release the defendant, and not to turn him over to the would-be arresting officer's custody outside the court. -EV] She stated on the record that she was not trying to prevent the arrest but was acting because she felt that she had been misled.
The majority, I think, is quite right to conclude that this misconduct was serious enough — I would say even criminal obstruction of justice, since it involved giving a suspect active help in avoiding arrest — to warrant removal from the bench, even based just on this one incident.
The dissent argues that a lesser penalty should be imposed, based partly on the judge's past "outstanding" record. But my sense is that a judge who misbehaves this seriously needs to be removed from the bench (in a state such as New York which allows such removal for the judge's not being "faithful to the law"), and that the majority analysis is therefore quite right. And though there was no specific precedent on point about the propriety of this sanction, "That until now no judge has thought to prevent the lawful arrest of a suspected felon cannot shield petitioner from the necessary consequence of her actions."