The Volokh Conspiracy - A Troubling Passage

from Bull v. U.S. Congress, 2007 WL 1462213 (D.S.C. May 16, 2007):

The first three quarters of the plaintiff's brief (Entry No. 1-5) are characterized by what some courts have described as “buzzwords” or “gibberish.” See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 812-816 (5th Cir.1988)(collecting cases); Ramos v. Thornburg, 732 F.Supp. 696, 702 (E.D.Texas 1989); Stafford v. Ellis, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 12007 (D.Colo.1992); FN10 Yocum v. Summers, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 12091, 1991 WESTLAW® 171389 (N.D.Ill.1991); McCutcheon v. New York Stock Exchange, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 8141, 1989 WESTLAW® 82007 (N.D.Ill., July 10, 1989); Peebles v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1988 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 17247 (D.S.C., November 1, 1988)(magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation) ....

Not for the substance -- for those awful registered trademark symbols. Fortunately, it doesn't look like WESTLAW is adding the symbols itself; a quick search suggests that only a few recent cases include them, so presumably it's the judge's decision.

And it's not a good decision, I think: It needlessly draws the reader's attention to something that's as far from the substance of the case as possible. Nor is there any legal requirement to use these symbols in writing opinions, briefs, law review articles, and the like. Why would the court do such a thing?

	[Eugene Volokh, May 22, 2007 at 6:52pm] Trackbacks A Troubling Passage from Bull v. U.S. Congress, 2007 WL 1462213 (D.S.C. May 16, 2007): The first three quarters of the plaintiff's brief (Entry No. 1-5) are characterized by what some courts have described as “buzzwords” or “gibberish.” See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 812-816 (5th Cir.1988)(collecting cases); Ramos v. Thornburg, 732 F.Supp. 696, 702 (E.D.Texas 1989); Stafford v. Ellis, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 12007 (D.Colo.1992); FN10 Yocum v. Summers, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 12091, 1991 WESTLAW® 171389 (N.D.Ill.1991); McCutcheon v. New York Stock Exchange, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 8141, 1989 WESTLAW® 82007 (N.D.Ill., July 10, 1989); Peebles v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1988 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 17247 (D.S.C., November 1, 1988)(magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation) .... Not for the substance -- for those awful registered trademark symbols. Fortunately, it doesn't look like WESTLAW is adding the symbols itself; a quick search suggests that only a few recent cases include them, so presumably it's the judge's decision. And it's not a good decision, I think: It needlessly draws the reader's attention to something that's as far from the substance of the case as possible. Nor is there any legal requirement to use these symbols in writing opinions, briefs, law review articles, and the like. Why would the court do such a thing?