The Volokh Conspiracy - Funk on <i>Eurodif</i> & <i>Chevron</i>:

Among the decisions handed down on Monday was United States v. Eurodif, in which the Supreme Court held unanimously that certain contracts for enriched uranium are sales of goods subject to federal anti-dumping laws. The case may seem obscure, it is potentially important for administrative law, as Lewis & Clark's William Funk explained in a recent e-mail to the AdminLawProf e-mail list-serv. I thought this might be of interest to any admin-law junkies out there, so I reproduce it below (with Bill's permission):

Monday the Supreme Court decided US v. Eurodif (2009 WL 160582), in which the Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit in an anti dumping case. The case turned on whether the court should give Chevron deference to a determination made by Commerce in an adjudication. Justice Souter, who with Justice Breyer, has done more to screw up Chevron law than anyone else, spent some time explaining why the statute in question was ambiguous and why Commerce’s interpretation in its antidumping decision was reasonable. Unfortunately, he nowhere identified what sort of adjudication it was – formal or informal. He suggested it was formal by dropping a footnote saying “The specific factual findings on which an agency relies in applying its interpretation are conclusive unless unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E),” which by its terms is limited to reviews of formal adjudications. However, the factual findings in an antidumping case are not subject to 706(2)(E), they are subject to the specific requirements of the judicial review provisions of the antidumping act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i), applicable to “determinations on record.” My quick search has not been able to disclose the procedural requirements attendant to these antidumping determinations. If it is formal adjudication, then Eurodif breaks no new ground. On the other hand, if the adjudication is not formal adjudication, then the decision breaks new ground at least in the sense that it assumes an “adjudication” by itself is entitled to Chevron deference.

SCOTUSBlog has more on the Eurodif decision here.

	[Jonathan Adler, January 28, 2009 at 2:28pm] Trackbacks Funk on Eurodif & Chevron: Among the decisions handed down on Monday was United States v. Eurodif, in which the Supreme Court held unanimously that certain contracts for enriched uranium are sales of goods subject to federal anti-dumping laws. The case may seem obscure, it is potentially important for administrative law, as Lewis & Clark's William Funk explained in a recent e-mail to the AdminLawProf e-mail list-serv. I thought this might be of interest to any admin-law junkies out there, so I reproduce it below (with Bill's permission): Monday the Supreme Court decided US v. Eurodif (2009 WL 160582), in which the Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit in an anti dumping case. The case turned on whether the court should give Chevron deference to a determination made by Commerce in an adjudication. Justice Souter, who with Justice Breyer, has done more to screw up Chevron law than anyone else, spent some time explaining why the statute in question was ambiguous and why Commerce’s interpretation in its antidumping decision was reasonable. Unfortunately, he nowhere identified what sort of adjudication it was – formal or informal. He suggested it was formal by dropping a footnote saying “The specific factual findings on which an agency relies in applying its interpretation are conclusive unless unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E),” which by its terms is limited to reviews of formal adjudications. However, the factual findings in an antidumping case are not subject to 706(2)(E), they are subject to the specific requirements of the judicial review provisions of the antidumping act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i), applicable to “determinations on record.” My quick search has not been able to disclose the procedural requirements attendant to these antidumping determinations. If it is formal adjudication, then Eurodif breaks no new ground. On the other hand, if the adjudication is not formal adjudication, then the decision breaks new ground at least in the sense that it assumes an “adjudication” by itself is entitled to Chevron deference. SCOTUSBlog has more on the Eurodif decision here.