Co-Conspirator Jonathan has already remarked below on the seeming collapse of the media-academic-NGO-international organization-et al. global warming coalition in-between last year’s Copenhagen meeting and this year’s much-subdued Cancun event. I broadly agree with Jonathan, and with Margaret Wente, on whom he comments, on the policy merits.
I also think the right approach to climate change is not some massive project for the most far-reaching, long-term, costly, uncertain attempt at governance through the demands of climate for the whole globe. It is wrong as a global political project, doomed not to just fail but to transmute into some set of spectacularly bad unintended consequences, and wrong as a question of management of long-run uncertainties. It is noteworthy that even the voice of the global establishment, bien pensant global opinion, the Economist, is now saying what should have been said a decade ago – you have to manage the problems as they arise through mitigation, not some exercise in doomed global political glory to seek to head it off on the front end.
I say all that as background, not to try and persuade anyone, but simply to be clear what the starting point of the discussion is for me (be warned, this is a long post). As far as the future of the global project over climate change is, I would point you to Walter Russell Mead’s new blog essay on Cancun (h/t Instapundit) (for the glass-half-filled view, see this news story from the NYT; note that it is filed from DC and NY, not Cancun). It is useful in large part because it lays out something on which I have commented occasionally in the course of writing about the UN and its member states as a (non-) governance mechanism, and its “public choice” pathways of rent-seeking, income extraction, and wealth transfer under the banner of climate change. Mead offers a comprehensive essay in a relatively short space and it is worth reading closely. But on the daunting problems of collective action at Copenhagen and UN mechanisms generally, Mead notes, a Copenhagen climate treaty
was intended to be the successor to the ineffective and expiring Kyoto Protocol, and was conceived of as a ‘grand bargain.’ The US Senate had in effect rejected Kyoto 95-0 because the Protocol limited US emissions without placing restrictions on the rapidly growing economies of the developing world. Son of Kyoto (call it SOK for short) would get around this by placing limits of some kind on all the world’s countries. The geniuses behind SOK framed the problem this way: how do we get the developing countries to sign on to carbon limits strict enough that the US Senate would ratify the next global treaty?
The answer was obvious: bribe them. Put enough rich country taxpayer money on the table and even the most corrupt and shortsighted rentier regimes in the developing world will experience an extraordinary upsurge in green conviction. The dream was that the developing countries properly and appropriately compensated would sign on to emission limits of their own, the US Senate would ratify and as Barack Obama explained it to us, the earth would begin to cool and the seas start to recede.
In the diplomatic negotiating event, the “experts and enthusiasts” of the northern environmental lobby departed, predictably, from anything the rich country publics, in the midst of financial crisis on top of everything else, might have been expected to support. The elites of the climate change movement, raised on the statist milk of the EU breast, figured they were doing God and Gore’s work on behalf of once and future voters, and devoted themselves to negotiating with the developing countries, seemingly without regard for the willingness of said publics to pay the price. On the developing country side, the question was how much and how fast:
Northern green activists lobbied to get strict carbon targets adopted. Developing country diplomats focused on ‘appropriate compensation’. Just how green did the North want the South to become, and just how much money was the North willing to pay to make this happen? Negotiators played with rich country aid budgets like kids with Monopoly money, and issued vague and intoxicating pledges that, in an era of austerity, will never be honored.
In the hothouse fantasy land of UN negotiations, the path to compromise looked simple. Soon enough, the numbers began to come clear: northern activists developed a formula for carbon restriction that they liked and the southern diplomats found a number that worked for them: a $100 billion sweetener to start, ultimately rising to $100 billion a year to be paid by the advanced countries to the developing ones in order to compensate them for pain and suffering.
But now a couple of additional observations that take things a step further than Mead does. In the past I have remarked (and say in my little book manuscript now in copy editing on UN-US relations) – that the environmental intellectuals and campaigners might have done better to have paid less attention to their own favored issue and more attention to the incentives as evidenced by the history of the UN not just on this issue, but a long list stretching back decades. They might have learned that the UN follows a well-laid out path of embracing an issue to see how much institutional leverage toward “governance” it might yield, combined with the rent-seeking interests of the UN-complex and member states.
The UN believes – Ban Ki Moon, for example – fervently that climate change is every bit as important as it is to Al Gore. And, “serial absolutist believer” that the UN is, it will believe so … until it perceives that it has got whatever it can get in the way of leverage toward its own notions of global governance at the UN, and member state rent-seeking. Whereupon – as is unfolding now – this issue is down the memory hole that is so crucial to being a “serial absolutist” and on to the Next Big UN Thing that promises an accretion of global governance at the UN and more money for member states. The environmental lobbyists could have learned from considering their issue as the UN does – not as the sole issue in the history of the human race, but instead as simply a succession of possible political levers for the UN. Continue reading ‘Cancun and Copenhagen, and Carbon as Pure Regulatory Object’ »