The Volokh Conspiracy

Last week, when I posted a link to my new article, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, I received several messages telling me that SSRN was inaccessible. Presumably, it is working now, so if you were unable to download it, you should try again. Here is the link, and here is the abstract:

The contribution of abolitionist constitutionalism to the original public meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was long obscured by a revisionist history that marginalized abolitionism, the “radical” Republicans, and their effort to establish democracy over Southern terrorism during Reconstruction. As a result, more Americans know about “carpetbaggers” than they do the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this cloud began to lift with the work of Jacobus tenBroek, Eric Foner, and William Wiecek, knowledge of abolitionist constitutionalism among constitutional scholars was all but snuffed out by the dismissive writings of William Nelson and Robert Cover.

This study provides important evidence of the original public meaning of Section One. All the components of Section One were employed by a wide variety abolitionist lawyers and activists throughout the North. To advance their case against slavery, they needed to appeal to the then-extant public meaning of the terms already in the Constitution. Moreover, their widely-circulated invocations of national citizenship, privileges and immunities, the due process of law, and equal protection made their own contribution to the public meaning in 1866 of the language that became Section One.

The more one reads these forgotten abolitionist writings, the better their arguments look when compared with the opinions of the antebellum Supreme Court. But even if the Taney Court was right and the abolitionists wrong about the original meaning of the Constitution, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted to reverse the Court’s rulings. To appreciate fully the public meaning of these Amendments, therefore, we need to know whence they came.

The original “Nebraska Compromise” (the Kansas-Nebraska Act) was an attempt to compromise a contentious national issue. At least arguably, the abortion spending restrictions in the Senate health care bill fits in this broad description, and like the KNA, the new abortion provision includes an element of state-based choice. However, another provision of the Senate bill is no compromise at all: the requirement that taxpayers in the other 49 states pay the full cost of the extra Medicaid spending that will be necessary in Nebraska because of the Senate bill. “Cornhusker kickback” is the more accurate term for this provision.

Is the Cornhusker kickback constitutional? A recent blog post by University of Montana law professor (and Independence Institute Senior Fellow) Rob Natelson explains the issue for laymen: It’s not an Equal Protection violation, because Equal Protection does not protect states from discrimination. It is a gross violation of the “(1) the General Welfare Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1), designed to prevent taxation for regional or special interest expenditures and (2) the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18), whose ‘proper’ requirement probably was meant to assure that federal legislation met minimal fiduciary standards of fairness.” However, at Natelson notes, the Supreme Court has historically been timid about enforcing those provisions of the Constitution, and after 1937 gave up entirely.

But as I have argued elsewhere, the Constitution is more than merely what the Courts say it is. Even when Courts act as if a constitutional provision had never been written, the People can still act to protect constitutional provisions, through the political process, and through public debate. If the people do so in regards to the “Cornhusker kickback,” they will be acting faithfully to the original meaning of the Constitution. For the original meaning, see: Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 239 (2007). See also Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 243 (2004); The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1 (2003).

The Institute for Justice has recently filed a new case challenging an especially egregious infringement on economic liberties under the Constitution:

A civil liberties law firm has filed suit against the state of Texas on behalf of eight eyebrow-threading entrepreneurs, several of whom are based in San Antonio.

The Institute for Justice, Texas Chapter, is alleging the state government has violated the entrepreneurs’ constitutional rights by requiring them to go through a licensing process that mandates 1,500 hours of instruction at an estimated cost of $20,000…..

Wesley Hottot, lead attorney for the Institute for Justice Texas Chapter, says Texas’ proud heritage as a beacon for entrepreneurship is in danger “when the state tries to regulate every new industry rather than trusting entrepreneurs and consumers.”

Hottot says eyebrow threading is an ancient technique for removing unwanted eyebrow hairs using tightly wound cotton thread. “Threading is a booming industry in Texas because it is cheaper, faster and less painful than waxing,” he says.

But now the TDLR has threatened this small business-based industry by requiring practitioners to obtain what Hottot says are “expensive and irrelevant licenses in Western-style cosmetology.”

“Threading is not mentioned anywhere in state law, yet TDLR expects threaders, some with over 20 years of experience, to immediately stop working and spend $20,000 obtaining up to 1,500 hours of instruction in government-approved beauty schools that do not even teach threading,” Hottot says. “Further, threaders must pass government-approved cosmetology exams that do not test threading.”

Here is a link to an IJ video on the case. Despite the longstanding claim that judicial protection for economic liberties is just “judicial activism,” such protection actually has strong support in the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other clauses. The original meaning evidence is discussed at great length in Bernard Siegan’s classic book Economic Liberties and the Constitution, and some of it is summarized in Alan Gura’s brief for the petitioners in the McDonald gun rights case currently before the Supreme Court.

Even if we accept the idea that economic liberties deserve significant judicial protection, there is room for debate as to how broad that protection should be. However, this case is sufficiently egregious that it is difficult to imagine any reasonable basis for judicial protection of economic liberties that would allow this regulation to be upheld.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST WATCH: As regular readers probably know, I have done various pro bono projects for the Institute for Justice over the years, and was a summer clerk there when I was a law student.

The briefs filed in McDonald v. City of Chicago have raised a lot of questions here about the role of originalism versus stare decisis in constitutional interpretation. Some have argued that stare decisis must give way to correctness on these issues as a matter of constitutional purity: We should always follow the original public meaning of the constitution, the argument goes, whether we think that interpretation is good policy or bad policy or whetever the reliance interests interrupted by doing so.

Here’s my question for readers who take this view: How do you interpret the Sixth Amendment right “to have the Assistance of Counsel” in criminal prosecutions? The right to Assistance of Counsel was a response to the traditional English common law practice of forbidding defense lawyers in criminal trials. Defense attorneys were banned for fear they would focus the jury on technicalities, not guilt or innocence. The core concept of a criminal trial at common law was that the defendant would be forced to testify without preparation or counsel, and that the jury would be able to distinguish a lying defendant from a truthful one directly without a lawyer getting in the way.

By the time of the framing, the English practice had been changed and criminal defendants were allowed to bring an attorney if they had hired one. The Sixth Amendment then recognized that right as the right to have the Assistance of Counsel. However, my sense is that this was originally understood to mean the same as the English right: It was a right to have a lawyer if you had one, not a constitutional right to have a lawyer provided to you free of charge (and one who had to do a constitutionally effective job). That’s my sense, at least; I am the first to admit that the history here is sparse. The history is sparse in part because federal law provided by statute that counsel should be appointed in criminal cases, at least capital ones. It is also sparse because no one really wants to go back to the old rule, so no one is invested in looking more closely at the question. But as far I can tell, the idea that the Constitution provides a right to the appointment of counsel that the defendant doesn’t have to pay for arose in the 20th century.

Specifically, inPowell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court stepped into save the “Scottsboro boys” from an outrageous injustice that the entire country was watching. In dicta, the Court added a section indicating that at least in that particular case, the Due Process clause would required the state to provide counsel to the defendants:

If opportunity had been given, to employ counsel, as the trial court evidently did assume, we are of opinion that, under the circumstances just stated, the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, ‘that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.’ Holden v. Hardy, supra. In a case such as this, whatever may be the rule in other cases, the right to have counsel appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel.

A few years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), the Court recited language from Powell and quoted an unrelated case that was in turn reflecting on state criminal justice policy, in a way that made it sound like the Sixth Amendment required the affirmative appointment of counsel paid for by the government:

Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and other parts of our fundamental charter, this Court has pointed to ” . . . the humane policy of the modern criminal law . . .” which now provides that a defendant ” . . . if he be poor, . . . may have counsel furnished him by the state . . . not infrequently . . . more able than the attorney for the state.”

Years later, in Gideon v. Wainright 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the author of Zerbst (Justice Black) then cited Zerbst for the following statement about what the Sixth Amendment provides:

We have construed [the right of Assistance of Counsel] to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.

As a matter of precedent, that mostly settled the issue. As far as I know, no one really wants to go back to what seems to be the original understanding that assistance of counsel means counsel only if you can afford it. That sounds totally neanderthal. It would be bad, extremely bad.

So here’s my question: If you are a pure originalist concerned only with getting it right, and you believe stare decisis has no role at all, how do you interpret the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel? Let me break it into two questions. The first is the most interesting: If you agree that the original understanding was just a right to have a lawyer present you if you hired one, do you believe that courts should overturn the modern precedents and return to that original understanding? And second, and somewhat less interesting for my purposes: do you agree that this is the original public understanding?

Below, my colleague Orin offers his predictions as to whether the Supreme Court will restore the “lost” Privileges or Immunities Clause to constitutional law. He may well be correct in predicting but a single vote for that proposition, but I remember when many predicted Angel Raich would get 0-1 votes for her Commerce Clause challenge to the Controlled Substances Act. Instead, in addition to Justice Thomas’s vote, she also received the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor–in a “marijuana case” no less. True, her challenge did fail, as widely predicted, but she definitely beat the spread.

But note that, by Orin’s count, only one Justice is willing to follow the text of the Constitution. According to him, the others will decide the case based on stare decisis–i.e. their own ancient decisions (Scalia), the potentially revolutionary implications of reviving the actual text of the Constitution (Roberts & Alito, the latter of whom gave a speech just last week on the importance of Justices following the actual text as it appears to the naked eye), his personal “style” (Kennedy), and undesirable results (Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens & Sotomayor). How sad it is that one can implicitly criticize a brief to the Supreme Court of the United States for relying on the text of the Constitution. Although Alan Gura’s brief does stress both original public meaning and original intent, under the relevant precedent Orin thinks the Court will or should (?) follow, the alternative is not that the Privileges or Immunities has a modern meaning but has no meaning whatsoever!

I wonder how Orin would have predicted the grant of cert, which stated the question presented as follows:

Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses.

When choosing between the two pending cases in the Seventh Circuit, why would four Justices grant cert on the McDonald case in which the challenge was focused on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and deny cert on NRA case, which confined its argument to the Due Process Clause? Why would they have rejected the City of Chicago’s proposal which limited the question presented to Due Process?

Faced with this background and the actual question presented, I wonder how would Orin have briefed the case. Would he have offered any of the analysis in his post? Would he have told the Court just to ignore the Privileges or Immunities Clause? Or might he not have assumed as an experienced litigator that the Justices could write a Due Process Clause “incorporation” opinion in their sleep–heck, their clerks could write that opinion in their sleep–and then devoted the bulk of his brief to describing the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in context?

Ultimately, Orin’s analysis is based in what he thinks will be the Justices’ dislike for the interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause described in the brief. The conservatives will hate the references to “natural rights” while the liberals will hate the references to “property.” Fair enough. But notice that the brief does not offer Alan Gura’s theory of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. All the phrases to which Orin objects are taken from quotes from the historical sources. Was Gura supposed to conceal these sources from the Court or faithfully report them? Orin may think this case is a hoot, but for the parties and the Court it is serious business.

To see where the references to “natural” and “property” originate consider the rights protected from state discrimination by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended, in part, to constitutionalize:

to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property

Or consider this portion of Bushrod Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell identifying “privileges and immunities” to which Art. IV, sec 2 refers, a quote repeatedly offered in Congress to help identify “privileges or immunities”:

What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.

Washington merely borrowed the canonical formulation of natural rights expressly affirmed in numerous state constitutions at the time of the founding and leading up to the Civil War (each of which became or was admitted as a free state):

Massachusetts: “All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.” New Hampshire: “All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights; among which are—the enjoying and defending life and liberty—acquiring, possessing and protecting property—and in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.” New York: “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” Pennsylvania: “That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending of life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” Vermont: “That all Men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable Rights, amongst which are the enjoying and defending Life and Liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting Property, and pursuing and obtaining Happiness and Safety.” Ohio: “That all men are born equally free and independent and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights; among which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. . . .” Indiana: (1816): “That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and unalterably established; we declare that all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights, among which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and pursing and obtaining happiness and safety.” Illinois (1818): “That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.” Iowa (1846): “All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursing and obtaining safety and happiness.” Wisconsin (1848): “All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. . . .”

This is scary stuff indeed.

Of course, all that is before the Court is the protection of the right to keep and bear arms. In this case, the Court need not decide how or even whether the other privileges or immunities of citizens should be judicially protected. But the Court now has rich doctrinal resources by which it can protect both the rights enumerated in the Constitution and unenumerated fundamental rights that are as “deeply rooted in our nation’s tradition and history” as are these rights. As the Supreme Court, they may not be as afraid to transfer these constitutional doctrines over to the correct clause as Orin predicts. Of course, that is not likely to happen unless the parties or amici inform the Court of the meaning of the now-lost Privileges or Immunities Clause. The sort of “legal realist” analysis offered by Orin in his post would simply be of no assistance to the Court in reaching its decision. Nor would it help much in oral argument. But who knows? As a mere prediction, it could turn out right, in which case Orin can say he told us so.

As I mentioned yesterday, the petitioner’s brief in McDonald v. City of Chicago written by Alan Gura asks the Supreme Court to overrule The Slaughterhouse Cases and adopt a very different interpretation of the Fouteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The obvious question is, how many Justices will agree?   My guess: only one.  In this post, I want to peer into my crystal ball and see how each of the Justices (or group of Justices) will react to Gura’s argument.

1) Justice Thomas. I suspect Justice Thomas is Gura’s only vote.  Justice Thomas more or less took Gura’s position in his dissent in Saenz v. Roe a decade ago. He’s likely on board today.

2) Justice Scalia. In contrast to Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia  probably won’t agree with the Gura brief in light of stare decisis.  In speeches about originalism and stare decisis, Scalia often uses the 14th Amendment incorporation doctrine as an example of a line of cases that he thinks was wrong but that he won’t overrule because of all the reliance interests built up around it over the years.  If Scalia won’t overturn the 50-year old incorporation doctrine even though he thinks it was wrong, I doubt he’ll want to overturn the 116-year old Slaughterhouse Cases even if the brief convinces him they were incorrect.  That’s particularly true because the Gura brief advocates a version of privileges or immunities that is so vague it would vest tremendous new discretion in judges  (more on that below).  I just don’t think Scalia is going to want to do that.

3) Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are also sympathetic to originalism, and may harbor the sense that Slaughterhouse and the incorporation cases were both wrong as an original matter.  But I don’t think they’re revolutionaries, and the brief calls for a revolution.

To see this, it helps to realize exactly what life the brief aims to breathe into the Privileges or Immunities clause.  At various points in the brief, the brief lists the following new rights that the Fourteenth Amendment should be read to protect beyond what it already protects under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses:

a) “a broad array of pre-existent natural rights believed secured by all free governments.” (p.10)

b) “What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.” (p.17) (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.)

c) “The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state . . . [and] the elective franchise” (p.17) (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.)

d) “Natural rights which are those rights common to all men, and to protect which, not to confer, all good governments are instituted.” (p.24) (quoting Bingham)

e) Rights that “are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature.” (p.25) (quoting Howard)

f) “The right to contract” (p.25) (quoting Rogers).

g) “The natural, fundamental rights, believed to fall under Article IV, Section 2, and the rights codified in the first eight amendments.” (p.26)

Are Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito (and Justice Scalia, for that matter) going to want to give the federal judiciary a new power to strike down legislation because it is inconsistent with “natural rights,” including “the right to obtain happiness and safety,” with some of those natural rights undefinable “in their entire extent and precise nature”? I just can’t see that. From their perspective, the Ninth Circuit already makes up lots of stuff as it is. Do you really wanna give them this loosey-goosey undefinable natural rights stuff and let them run free with it? I don’t think so.

I think Roberts and Alito are particularly unlikely to agree with the Privileges or Immunities argument in light of basic judicial restraint principles. The Due Process argument here is pretty straightforward: Heller itself has enough language to make the case that the 2nd Amendment is incorporated under Due Process. It would be a huge break from any traditional concept of judicial minimalism to decide the case by overturning Slaughterhouse.

4) Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy is not an originalist, and he basically likes the Court’s existing Due Process jurisprudence. I think he’s a solid vote for incorporation via Due Process, but I don’t see him wanting to change the law in such a radical and far-reaching way under the P or I clause. It’s just not his style.

5) Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. I suspect the Justices on the more liberal half will read the Gura brief and conclude it’s just trying to resurrect Lochner. The Gura brief envisions a Privileges or Immunities Clause that would include “the right to contract,” the right “to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal,” and the right to “an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state.” That sounds like Lochner, which to them is the very epitome of a wrong turn in constitutional law. Plus, they presumably realize that overturning Slaughterhouse is a major goal of libertarian legal activists like the folks at the Institute for Justice who want to resurrect P or I as a way to attack the modern regulatory state. I don’t expect them to help.

Last night, Orin noted the filing of the Petitioner’s brief in McDonald v. Chicago, the case that will decide whether the 14th Amendment makes the 2d Amendment applicable to state and local governments. As Orin noted, that brief is almost entirely devoted to incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities clause. It directly asks the Court to over-rule Slaughterhouse, Cruikhank, and Presser.

In my view, it’s a superb brief. It’s worthy of study by law students and anyone else who wants a great example of legal writing that is passionate and forceful, yet also sober and serious.

In the brief’s short discussion of Due Process, attorney Alan Gura aptly writes: ”A ‘law’ depriving one of life, liberty or property ‘must not have exceeded the limits of legislative power marked by natural and customary rights.’” (quoting Frederick Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 Emory L.J. 585, 644-45 (2009).) This is an important point; ”substantive due process” may be ill-named, but it is founded on legitimate, originalist doctrine.

Many folks have been wondering why the Gura brief concentrates so heavily on the bolder theory (Privileges or Immunities) rather than the one that courts have used over the last century (Due Process). Here’s the answer: After Heller, the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF) and the National Rifle Association each filed separate lawsuits against the Chicago handgun ban. The cases were consolidated in the Seventh Circuit; after the panel ruled, SAF and NRA each filed separate petitions for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted cert. in the SAF case, McDonald v. Chicago. A few weeks later, the Court added NRA to the case as a party. So NRA is now a “Respondent in Support of Petitioners.” The suburb of Oak Park, which had been sued by NRA but not by SAF, was also added as a party.

So as a party, NRA filed its brief yesterday. The lead attorneys on the brief are Stephen Poss (attorney of record), Stephen Halbrook, and others. The NRA brief takes the more conservative approach. It mainly argues for incorporation via Due Process, with only a brief discussion of Privileges or Immunities. NRA does not ask for any cases to be over-ruled, since Slaughterhouse, Cruikshank, and Presser are all P or I cases, and predate the Court’s recognition of selective Due Process incorporation.

Because the Question Presented by the Court asked about both P or I and Due Process incorporation, it was appropriate that one party brief focused on the former, and the other party brief on the latter.

Amicus briefs (including one I am writing) in support of Petitioners are due Monday, Nov. 23. The Chicago and Oak Park briefs are due Dec. 30, since the Court granted them a two-week extension. Amicus briefs in support of the Chicago and Oak Park handgun bans are due one week after that.

When the amicus briefs start appearing a few days, I will blog about the most important or interesting ones.

As many readers probably know, McDonald v. Chicago involves a constitutional challenge to the Chicago handgun ban, which raises the issue of whether the individual right to keep and bear arms, which was recognized by the Supreme Court in DC v. Heller also applies to the states. Somewhat amazingly, the Court announced that this was the question presented:

Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses.

This indicates that the meaning of the long-ignored Privileges or Immunities Clause is now in play, and that the Court wants to squarely address this constitutional question, as Justice Thomas has long been urging it to do. Rarely do constitutional law cases involve the isolated issue of the original meaning of the text. Heller is one such case; McDonald could be another. Is it really possible that the court will restore not one, but two clauses of the Lost Constitution?

Next Friday, November 13th, from 12:30-2:30pm, the Georgetown Law Journal will be hosting a program entitled, “A Vain and Idle Enactment: Could McDonald v. Chicago Un-Slaughter the Privileges or Immunities Clause?” The discussants are Georgetown Law graduate Alan Gura, who argued and won the Heller case and is Lead Counsel who will argue McDonald, Kurt Lash, James P. Bradley Chair of Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School (and who has recently accepted an appointment to the University of Illinois faculty), David Gans of the Constitutional Accountability Center, and me. I am coauthoring an amicus brief on the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the CAC.

The program is free and open to the public. Details are here.

UPDATE: Webcast will be available here:

Participating in the Constitution in 2020 conference at Yale this weekend gave me a chance to consider the state of constitutional theory on the left. The contributors to the Constitution in 2020 book and many of the participants in the conference are well-known liberal constitutional scholars. My dominant impression is that there is a great deal of consensus among left of center con law scholars about which way most important cases should come out, but much less agreement about why. If you look at the big constitutional issues facing the Supreme Court – federalism, property rights, criminal defendants’ rights, the death penalty, executive power in wartime, abortion, campaign finance – there is very little disagreement among liberal scholars about the question of what the Court should do; though there is some divergence about how fast the courts should go in getting from here to there.

On the other hand, there is a great deal of debate about the theoretical reasons justifying these preferred results. Big-name liberal constitutional law scholars range from originalists like Akhil Amar, to Bruce Ackerman’s “constitutional moment” approach, to “living Constitution” theories of various types (e.g. – Laurence Tribe), to representation-reinforcement theories (e.g. – the late John Hart Ely and those who have build on his ideas), to “judicial minimalism” (Cass Sunstein), and several other theories I won’t go through here. The Constitution in 2020 book and conference largely sidestepped these theoretical debates by focusing on preferred outcomes in particular issue areas. As Paul Kahn (a participant in the conference, but not a contributor to the book) put it, the Constitution in 2020 project seems to call for “less talk and more action.”

The state of affairs on the right is almost exactly the reverse of that on the left. With rare exceptions, most conservative and libertarian constitutional theorists are originalists. Nowadays, most of them even agree that original meaning originalism is preferable to original intent. Despite this near-consensus on theory, there is enormous disagreement about its application to particular cases. Right of center originalists range from co-blogger Randy Barnett – who would urge judicial invalidation of a wide range of federal and state laws – to Robert Bork and Lino Graglia, who argue for near-total deference to the political branches. Some of this disagreement is a result of the conservative-libertarian ideological division. But even among conservatives, there is a fairly wide range of opinion on the proper scope of judicial review. My frequent coauthor John McGinnis, for example, favors much stronger judicial review than Bork or Graglia, for instance. Steve Calabresi and Michael McConnell are somewhere in between.