I'm wondering, has anyone written anything good about the structural and systematic effect of filibustering judicial nominees? Putting aside the question of this president and these nominees, it seems to me that having a de facto 60-vote requirement for confirming appellate judges is an interesting idea. I don't know how it would work or what the scope of it would be, but I'd be interested in reading something thoughtful about its pros and cons. If anyone knows of such a discussion, please provide a citation to it (with the URL or a link if it's online) in the comment section.
UPDATE: A reader asks why I think a 60-vote requirement might be an interesting idea. I'm an outsider to this area, but I imagine the pro-con debate might go something like this:
Pro: A 60-vote requirement is a good idea because we don't want extremist judges. We should have judges with bipartisan support, and a 60-vote requirement ensures that.Something like that, anyway.
Con: You're being naive. You're assuming that the minority party will act in good faith, only blocking judges that they think are "extremist." In reality, minority parties will just block judges they don't like.
Pro: How can the minority party only block judges they don't like? They won't like any of the opposing party's nominees. They'll have to pick and choose which judges to filibuster, and they'll pick the most extreme nominees.
Con: But that will only create an incentive for the President to nominate more "extreme" nominees, whatever that means. If the minority can only stop a few, the President will name a few people knowing that they won't get confirmed.
Pro: Maybe, but political pressures might just prevent that from happening.
Yours,
Wince
Here's McGinnis and Rappaport in this year's Cardozo Law Review:
McGinnis
If anything, you'd think it should be tougher to get judges approved, since they are (1) lifetime appointments, and (2) part of an independent branch of government. But at a minimum, it sure seems hard to justify why they should be MORE easily confirmed than other nominees.
Not that my opinion matters, but I would agree with a supermajority for the reasons stated above by wiser commenters. I am even starting to think that a single term of 15 years or so might be a good idea, rather than lifetime appointments.
Don't Go Nuclear: There are other options for fighting Democratic obstructionism.
KILL THE FILIBUSTER? THE "NUCLEAR OPTION" AND WHAT'S WRONG WITH IT
Why Filibusters Should Be Allowed
(also here)
Minority Rules
(full text here)
(1) What is the optimal number of senate votes that should be required to confirm a judicial nominee?
The mere fact that the senate rules currently say that it only takes 60 votes to end a filibuster is arbitrary. The Senate can change its rules to require 65, 70, 75 or . . . 100 votes to end debate. Maybe we should require more than 60 votes to confirm judicial nominees.
(2) The best interest of who? The senate, the president, the judicial nominees, the "People"?
A thoughtful treatment of this issue should identify very carefully how all the above stakeholders would be impacted by the various voting threshholds.
(3) Would a requirement of 100 votes to confirm a judicial nominee be constitutional?
I don't think so because this would convert the President's influence over the make-up of the federal judiciary into that of a single Senator's (barring recess appointments, which undoubtedly would increase).
(4) If it would be unconstitutional to require 100 votes to confirm a judicial nominee is it constitutional to require anything above 50?
I don't think so. Just as the power to tax is the power to destroy, the power of the Senate to raise the voting requirement above 50 is the power to raise it to 100. This is why I don't like the idea of a judicial filibuster. The Senate should not have the power to increase its influence over the judiciary by an internal senate rule.
Come on, Paul. What you're talking about is an increase in bi-partisanship not an increase in non-partisanship. They are different creatures.
What I think you mean by "non-partisan" is that judges should be impartial. They should follow the law, not their opinion of what the law should be. And isn't that the Republican position on judges? Maybe you disagree, but I don't. That is the number one reason I am a Republican and vote for Republicans. It follows, then, that allowing the Democrats to have some sway by requiring 60 votes will make judges more likley to be biased, to read their own preferences into the law, and to adhere to precedent which grossly deforms the Constitution. How is that a formula for impartiality or non-partisanship?
Requiring 60 votes for confirmation would, however, make nominees more "moderate." We would likely get more Sandra Day O'Connors. I don't know many that would describe her as "impartial." Unprincipled and incoherent maybe. Moderate is a word for a politician or a policy, it is not an interpretive philosophy. How do you "moderately" interpret a statute or the Constitution? Choose the position halfway between what a statutue says and what it doesn't say? Halfway between what a statute says and what you want it to say? Maybe you can explain that one to me, Mr Gowder.
Have the Democrats filibustered his other nominees? No, so your argument is a hypothetical.
(I'll assume that Challenge disagrees, because he's against reading things into the Constitution that aren't there.)
I can't agree that a unanimity requirement would violate the separation of powers; it would make the Senate more powerful vis-a-vis the President, but he would still have the power of nomination, plus other ways to make the Senate behave. Besides the evident impracticality of such a rule.
I suspect that such a discussion will not be forthcoming. My own knowledge of the scholarship of the filibuster is that the scholarship is highly abstract, removed and largely speculative. It seems accepted as a truism that the filibuster encourages moderation, but I know of know studies actually showing this in results, and the baseline problem remains inherent (e.g., which was more "radical," supporting the Civil Rights Act or opposing it? it rather depends on your "certain point of view," as Obi-Wan Kenobi reminds us).
And as Prof. Kerr's concern is with a particular application to filibusters of judicial nominees, I suspect hard studies are going to be even more unlikely.
One obvious note: Scalia was confirmed 98-0, and Souter was expected to be a hard conservative vote. The most likely outcome of any change may be null, as predicting judicial behavior is washed out in the noise of misperception (or just the failure of perfect foresight).
Let me see, Orin..... Since NO judicial nominees have been filibustered until today (with the exception of Abe Fortas, which was supported by approximately equal numbers of Republicans, and Democrats), that would mean very little would change. Right? What's so drastic of a change? It seems eliminating the filibuster is a formula for maintaining the status quo on judicial nominations rather than a radical change.
Now, maybe the threat of filibuster has been used to temper a given president's choices, but I think that it is unlikely threats alone have played a large role in the nomination process.
I recall that both times President Bush ran he said he would appoint judges like Scalia and Thomas. The idea that these two are so "extreme" as to be unconfirmable today suggests that the filibuster is not now being employed in a way that is consistent with any reasonable interpretation of its meaning or history. For the record, I never agreed with the GOP efforts to block Clinton's nominees to the court, either, but at least then you were dealing with a majority opposition party in the Senate, unlike today.
I hate to clutter up a legal discussion with debate over silly (and false) talking points like "no judicial nominee other than Fortas has ever been filibustered," so I hope that practice will simply stop.
Geometry of Chaotic and Stable Discussions
On the other hand it strongly supports the senate not trying to change thier procedures by a simple majority vote (as per the nuclear option).
That is NOT a false statement. Name another.
I don't think so because this would convert the President's influence over the make-up of the federal judiciary into that of a single Senator's (barring recess appointments, which undoubtedly would increase). "
Yes, it would be constitutional. It would be a Senate rule, and the Senate makes its own rules. It would be a terrible idea, of course, but constitutional.
I think blocking appointees in committee without a vote is more objectionable than filibustering them.
It makes its own rules within the confines of the Constitution. If "advise and consent" was intended to mean "majority vote" then such a rule would indeed be unconstitutional.
If Challenge is an originalist, he won't have a difficult time discoverying that the precise allocation of powers found in our Constitution was the subject of great debate among the framers. Is it consistent with that debate to believe that the Senate has the power to upset that allocation of powers by senate rule? Did the framers really give the Senate the power to unilaterally increase its own influence over the make-up of the judiciary at the president's expense? I don't see any difficulty for originalists in concluding that the answer is "No."
Now, whether the "political question doctrine" should or would permit a court to strike down judicial filibusters as unconstitutional is a question I'll leave for someone else.
Are you suggesting senate rules are impervious to constitutional attack simply because the Senate has the power to adopt the rules of its proceedings? What if the Senate adopted a rule prohibiting black senators from holding leadership positions?
Nice distinction between the Senate as an institution and individual senators. I think Challenge is right though. The question is what was intended by "advise and consent." If it was intended to mean "majority vote" then the Senate cannot thwart that meaning through the use of a senate rule.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION TO CHANGE SENATE RULES AND PROCEDURES:
A MAJORITARIAN MEANS TO OVERCOME THE FILIBUSTER
I was in high school when Southern DEMOCRATS stalled the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act by using the filibuster. At that time every politically correct liberal believed that the filibuster was an abomination.
In that opinion, I concured. I have not changed my opinion on that subject. Of course that is not the only subject on which my opinion has not changed, but on which the so-called liberals have abandonded me, which explains why I am not a liberal anymore.
Every argument advanced by the parties to the current debate was advanced by their opponents a few years ago. Newspapers like the NYTimes which for years condemed the filibuster in the most rigorus terms have now discovered its virtues. Yet no one is embarased.
I have not changed my position, the filibuster needs to be sent to join the hateful instituons it was invented to protect, in the dustbin of history.
Well, the Republicans filibustered President Clinton's choice for Surgeon General, Henry Foster . . .
That would only happen if Senators of the President's party never opposed a nominee. Surely once you get to the further edges there will be opposition even from within the party. And note that, as is happening with the Bolton UN nomination, that it may take only one or two such Senators to block a nominee in committee.
Or maybe 62... who can tell?
I think the better argument would be that it violates separation of powers by showing disrespect to the executive branch. Legislation requires extensive debate to weigh the pros and cons of any particular law... in the case of judicial nominations, that is the job of the executive branch. I don't think we should be seeing compromises of this sort in the senate because the only real choice should be "yes or no" for each nominee individually. I still don't think this argument carries much weight though...
It's been argued here that one benefit of the filibuster is that it would promote "moderation" in the courts. I wonder though... is this a good thing? I really don't think the federal courts are the proper forum for political compromise. Perhaps it goes along with my belief that most of the issues the Court deals in these days should properly be handled in the legislature. Political moderation and compromise are only a good thing if you're setting policy.
Syd,
Are you suggesting senate rules are impervious to constitutional attack simply because the Senate has the power to adopt the rules of its proceedings? What if the Senate adopted a rule prohibiting black senators from holding leadership positions?"
The courts might be willing to squeeze their way in through the 14th Amendment, but I think they would more likely decide they have no jurisdiction over the matter. The actual penalty would be that the senators who voted for the rule would stand a high probability of being thrown out at the next election.
The filibuster, on the other hand, is a consequence of the rules of debate in the Senate, and the courts have no authority to tell the Senate how to conduct debate.
When Justice Scalia was nominated in 1986, he was well known as an honest conservative and originalist, and has since performed as expected. He was unanimously confirmed by a 98-0 Senate vote! Do you think Democrats would confirm Scalia today 100-0 like in 1986? Of course not. Pelosi, Boxer, Biden and the like would filibuster, then levy a bogus character assassination, claim he will destroy democracy as we know it with right-wing hate, and call Scalia the most "activist" judge ever presented to the Senate.
If Democrats actually thought a minority party filibustering a judge was appropriate, they would have done it with Clarence Thomas.
There is simply no real world precedent for the Democrat party's behavior here--the evidence you cite is evidence, in two cases, of failed attempts and in one case of a successful filibuster against a nominee who, because of his ethical lapses, did not have the support of a majority of senators. Quite a bit of precedent?
Never before has a MINORITY of Senate support stopped a judge from getting an up or down vote. That is the main distinction today. Almost 30% of Bush's appellate nominees have been filibustered indefinitely by a MINORITY.
Fortas was filibustered for 4 DAYS before voluntarily withdrawing, Pracilla Owens was filibustered repeatedly for more than 2 YEARS.
Really? How about when one Senator does it, as happened all the time during the 1990s (and before) by use of a blue slip.
If it's okay for one Senator to unilaterally derail a nominee, why not 41?
I don't think blue slips were ever used on circuit court nominees, either.
Honestly though, I'd never heard of blue slips until this filibuster debate entered the news. Please let me know if I'm mistaken here.
None of these nominees ever received a hearing, let alone a vote.
How about a senator introducing a resolution to withhold consent for a nominee, and if that resolution fails, make the assumption that the failure to withold consent implies consent?
It would appear, therefore, that the Senate prior to 1872 was a very different institution from that which followed -- purely because the vice president of the United States once declared it so. Could the president of the United States similarly abandon one of his constitutional powers -- committing his successors to the change for all time -- simply by declaring it gone?
Am I misunderstanding the history and meaning of this?
Let Them Filibuster
The Filibuster-Proof Majority?
Mark R. Levin, A Great But Misguided American
Bush's "Nuclear Option" for Judicial Appointments: A Conservative Dissent