The Volokh Conspiracy

Comey Tried to Limit NSA Surveillance Program:
The New York Times has a fascinating article today about efforts by former Deputy Attorney General James Comey to limit or even block the NSA surveillance program back in 2004, when Comey was acting Attorney General:
  A top Justice Department official objected in 2004 to aspects of the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program and refused to sign on to its continued use amid concerns about its legality and oversight, according to officials with knowledge of the tense internal debate. The concerns appear to have played a part in the temporary suspension of the secret program.
  The concerns prompted two of President Bush's most senior aides - Andrew H. Card Jr., his chief of staff, and Alberto R. Gonzales, then White House counsel and now attorney general - to make an emergency visit to a Washington hospital in March 2004 to discuss the program's future and try to win the needed approval from Attorney General John Ashcroft, who was hospitalized for gallbladder surgery, the officials said.
  The unusual meeting was prompted because Mr. Ashcroft's top deputy, James B. Comey, who was acting as attorney general in his absence, had indicated he was unwilling to give his approval to certifying central aspects of the program, as required under the White House procedures set up to oversee it.
  . . .
  . . . [I]n early 2004, about the time of the hospital visit, the White House suspended parts of the program for several months and moved ahead with more stringent requirements on the security agency on how the program was used, in part to guard against abuses.
  The concerns within the Justice Department appear to have led, at least in part, to the decision to suspend and revamp the program, officials said. The Justice Department then oversaw a secret audit of the surveillance program.
  I'm not surprised by this; I would imagine there was a great deal of internal disagreement among advisors as to the legality of the NSA program. I'm also not surprised that James Comey played an important role in objecting to the program. In October 2004, seven months after Comey's objection, a Legal Times story by Vanessa Blum disclosed the extent of the tension between Comey and the White House over the former's perceived "neutrality and independence." According to the Legal Times story, that independence took Comey out of the running for the Attorney General slot when Ashcroft stepped aside:
  There are a number of candidates who could be tapped to replace John Ashcroft as attorney general if President George W. Bush wins re-election. But perhaps the most obvious choice, Deputy AG James Comey, almost certainly will not be.
  Since his confirmation as the No. 2 Justice Department official in December 2003, sources close to the department say Comey has had a strained relationship with some of the president's top advisers . . . .
  . . .
  Earlier this year, after the disclosure of internal administration memos that seemed to condone the torture of suspected terrorists overseas, Comey pushed aggressively for the Justice Department's memos to be released to the media and for controversial legal analyses regarding the use of torture to be rewritten.
  In a deeply partisan administration that places a high premium on political loyalty, sources say Comey — a career prosecutor and a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York — is not viewed as a team player.
  "[Comey] has shown insufficient political savvy," says the former official. "The perception is that he has erred too much on the side of neutrality and independence."
  Instead of picking Comey to replace Ashcroft, the President selected Gonzales -- who as White House Counsel had already committed to the view that the NSA surveillance program was legal. (Of course, it's hard to say if the NSA program played an important role in the White House's thinking on the AG slot -- it may just be a reflection of broader dynamics and priorities rather than a cause of them. Still, it's interesting to speculate on how the pieces might fit together.)
Huck (mail):
(This is a main example of the kind of posts that make me come back to the VC again and again.)
1.1.2006 1:31pm
Joe Jackson:
" ... he has erred too much on the side of neutrality and independence."

This is a tragic commentary on the state of things in Washington.
1.1.2006 1:36pm
Defending the Indefensible:
I'm waiting to find out if Comey was the source for the original NY Times article. Frankly, I think he's above prosecution for it, he is in a position to say that he believed it was a major violation of law, and he was uniquely qualified to make such a determination.
1.1.2006 1:53pm
Marcus1:
Wow, interesting to see these two stories come together. Good catch!
1.1.2006 2:31pm
Marcus1:
I was just wondering, after reading through the press briefing where Gonzales set out the framework of the program, whether the original impetus for this program may have been a denial of a particular warrant by the FISA court.

General Hayden made a comment there, when he was being pressed for why the retroactive warrants weren't good enough, and whether he was certain that this program was necessary: "GENERAL HAYDEN: I can say unequivocally, all right, that we have got information through this program that would not otherwise have been available."

Unless he's just posturing, it seems the only way that could be true is if the program was used for one of those 4 or 5 cases where the FISA court denied a warrant. It almost seems as if that's what he's trying to say.
1.1.2006 2:43pm
Dave:
My understanding is that there were a lot of sources for the NYT article, not just one. Comey might be one of them, though.

Dave
1.1.2006 2:59pm
Dave from Woodstock:
As we face an intractable and insidious enemy, I am amazed that I seem to be the only one concerned about the NYT continuing to publish these articles. If the program is effective, shouldn't we be concerning ourselves with figuring out how to correct any potential constitutional issues in a bi-partisan and non-public manner.

I say this not in support of the Administration, but in recognition of the fact that we face an enemy who openly wants to use WMD against us. I am more concerned with stopping them then finding out who to blame for the program.

Let's stop the leaks and start dealing with the issues in a serious manner.
1.1.2006 3:31pm
minnie:
Great post, Orin Kerr. You're becoming completely indispensable.
1.1.2006 3:36pm
Pooh (www):
The simple response is 'let's start dealing with these issues in a serious manner, and the leaks will stop.' I don't say that to be flip, the appearance that loyalty trumps competence in this adminstration is very real, and sadly extends to areas that really matter.
1.1.2006 3:46pm
Apodaca:
It's also worth recalling that Comey was the official who appointed Pat Fitzgerald as special counsel for the investigation into the Novak/Plame leak. That December 2003 selection -- of a scrupulously independent prosecutor instead of a pliant party hack -- surely hurt Comey's chances for promotion even more.
1.1.2006 3:48pm
Dave from Woodstock:
The simple response is 'let's start dealing with these issues in a serious manner, and the leaks will stop.' I don't say that to be flip, the appearance that loyalty trumps competence in this adminstration is very real, and sadly extends to areas that really matter.

That may very well be, but it assumes that all of the critics are acting in good faith. I heard my Congressman this weekend speaking with an NPR correspondant. His statements were utter hyperbole ("President Bush has violated explicit provisions of the United States Constitution and should be impeached for it"). In the atmosphere created by irresponsible statements like that, people think leaking secrets is the noble way to proceed.

My point is that the politics here have to be eliminated, and the NYT is one of the prime players. I think that puts all of us at risk.

Like I said, I am not an apologist for the Administration, I do think the leaks are detrimental to our national security however.
1.1.2006 4:07pm
Apodaca:
Also, note the following brain twister in the Times article:
The [Justice Department] audit examined a selection of cases to see how the security agency was running the program. Among other things, it looked at how agency officials went about determining that they had probable cause to believe that people in the United States, including American citizens, had sufficient ties to Al Qaeda to justify eavesdropping on their phone calls and e-mail messages without a court warrant.
This makes no sense. Either the authors of the Times article have mangled the facts -- entirely possible -- or the intercepts would have passed muster under FISA.

Something is very wrong here.
1.1.2006 4:13pm
JosephSlater (mail):
Dave from Woodstock:

Meanwhile, others of us are concerned that the NYT sat on a story about the president taking secret actions that violated the FISA for over a year.
1.1.2006 4:15pm
Pooh (www):
Dave, I think we're at a classic chicken/egg place here. I can easily respond with 'he played politics with security first', and we'll never really get to the bottom of it...

That being said, I don't think your congress critters' quote is 'utter hyperbole'. A very reasonable case can be made for 4th ammendment violations, see Prof. Lederman and Balkin for example, (though I personally tend to agree with Prof. Kerr's 'constitutional but not legal' analysis).
1.1.2006 4:16pm
Smithy (mail):
I'm waiting to find out if Comey was the source for the original NY Times article. Frankly, I think he's above prosecution for it, he is in a position to say that he believed it was a major violation of law, and he was uniquely qualified to make such a determination.

I would say just the opposite: that if Comey was the source, he is guilty not only of disclosing classified info but possibly of outright treason. It's clear that Comey had it in for the Bush administration -- his opinions on NSA surveillance and his decision to appoint Fitzgerald are proof enough of that. He made a cold, calculated decision to get back at the Bush administration, national security be damned.

They used to hang people like James Comey. But I'd be perfectly happy if he just spent the rest of his life in jail.
1.1.2006 4:18pm
Apodaca:
Dave from Woodstock says:
I do think the leaks are detrimental to our national security however.
I think Jane Hamsher best summed up this claim:
We picture a cave somewhere in Pakistan. Osama picks rat meat off a stick when countless number twos rush in screaming "Good God man, no warrants! Shut it all down!"
1.1.2006 4:18pm
Leibowitz (mail) (www):
After all of us fighting the war on terror, the biggest losers of all will be the dozen or so "confidential sources" who a year ago, under the old rules, trusted The New York Times. They are toast, as you can see in a memo from Bill Keller describing the situation as it exists tomorrow.
1.1.2006 4:25pm
Dave from Woodstock:
Pooh: Point taken, but are there not USSC cases authorizing warrantless searches in various sets of factual circumstances? One of which is involving the agents of foreign powers?

So, barring facts we don't know yet (of which I am certain there are many) how is this plainly unconstitutional let alone "impeachable" in the words of a member of the House of Representatives?

Apodaca: I am not familiar with Jane Hamsher, but I am certain that if data mining of cell and satellite data is what this is about, al Qaeda will learn from what we disclose and adapt. Having lived through 9/11, I don't want to see any of my countrymen go through anything like that again. So, I say, one more time, if the program is effective and unconstitutional (for no lack of good faith on the part of the actors (in contrast to the Watergate situation)), let's figure out how to fix it and get on with it.
1.1.2006 4:31pm
subpatre (mail):
JosephSlater writes “...others of us are concerned that the NYT sat on a story about the president taking secret actions that violated the FISA for over a year.”

Since there’s not the slightest hint any violations of FISA ever happened, what motives are left? Partisanship's one good candidate.

Apodaca's so something that's never been in evidence that a straight-forward report is disbelieved: "...This makes no sense. Either the authors of the Times article have mangled the facts ... or the intercepts would have passed muster under FISA." "Something is very wrong here."

Something is wrong. Can anyone point out a single allegation of FISA violation?
1.1.2006 4:32pm
Mr. P:
Orin, you forgot to tell us whether or not Comey would have had access to the magic information that makes this program legal.
1.1.2006 4:34pm
Anderson (mail) (www):
I appreciate Prof. Kerr's posts and the thoughtful comments, but it's beginning to seem to me that we could find a tape of Bush saying, "yeah, it's illegal, but do it anyway," and his supporters would continue unfazed. We would hear that Bush was just badly advised and that the deeds were indeed legal.

There's an emotional investment in the President that doesn't seem terribly mature or politically wise. I suppose it's a reflex of the 9/11 attacks ... the need to believe that Daddy is taking care of us.
1.1.2006 4:48pm
JosephSlater (mail):
Subpartre:

So you read Orin Kerr's analysis that the activities probably violate the FISA and conclude that "there's not the slightest hint any violations of FISA ever happened"?
1.1.2006 4:49pm
Smithy (mail):
There's an emotional investment in the President that doesn't seem terribly mature or politically wise.

It's called patriotism, andersen. And it may not be "politically wise" but it's what has kept us going for the past 200 years.
1.1.2006 4:51pm
akiva eisenberg (mail):
Does anybody remember the long-ago SF short, "Day of Succession"?
1.1.2006 4:56pm
Dave:
How, exactly does the leak hurt security? People don't know when the FISA court authorizes monitoring of them. Before Bush changed the program, terrorists would already have to live with the expectation that they could be monitored without their knowledge. Asserting that this revelation hurt security requires a plausible scenario in which a terrorist would be more careful now than he would have been a month ago. I can't think of one.

Dave
1.1.2006 5:05pm
Anderson (mail) (www):
Smithy, "patriotism" is the love of one's country, not the idolization of one's President.

You seem to be thinking of the "cult of personality," which I'm sure right-thinking Soviets praised for helping them to defeat the Germans after WW2.
1.1.2006 5:19pm
Smithy (mail):
is the love of one's country, not the idolization of one's President.

When you're at war, there's not much of a difference. And hating your president certainly isn't patriotic, no matter the circumstances.
1.1.2006 5:20pm
Justice Fuller:
Smithy,

What did you think of Bill Clinton during 1992-2000? Did you "hate your president" back then, and if so, were you being unpatriotic? Or did you idolize him?
1.1.2006 5:23pm
Smithy (mail):
I didn't hate Clinton, but I hated what he did to the office of the presidency. It makes me laugh when you liberals compare "Plamegate" or whatever your scandal du jour is (what are you guys calling the surveillance story, BTW?) to some of Clinton's whoppers. Travelgate and Filegate were much, much worse than anything that has gone on under Bush. And for lying about Lewsinky, he should have gone to jail the same way any other serial perjurerer would have.
1.1.2006 5:27pm
subpatre (mail):
JosephSlater writes "So you read Orin Kerr's analysis that the activities probably violate the FISA and conclude that "there's not the slightest hint any violations of FISA ever happened"?

Absolutely. If Orin Kerr is one of the NY Times' sources, "officials familiar with the continuing operation", or a "current and former officials, who were granted anonymity because of the classified nature of the program" then that's a different situation. His representation to date is that he is not.

Orin's analysis is unfortunately made on an assumption, one not in evidence. To be charitable, perhaps he thought the NY Times articles were using legal terms. A normal reading shows that's not true; the Times uses legal and common usage terms intermixed.

Can anyone point out a single allegation of FISA violation?
1.1.2006 5:27pm
Robert Schwartz (mail):
Encapsulates the essence of Washington insiderism. Lawyer covers his @$$, rats out bosses to newspaper creatures. "It wasn't my fault, I was against it."

Comey is a weasel. Remind me not to hire him. Washington is full of them (oh yes, and grafters and blow-drys), which is why we red-staters hold the swamp in contempt.

The real investigation has to be of those who regard government office as being their personal property. It is high time that the leakers and their enablers in the MSM go to jail.
1.1.2006 5:43pm
Justice Fuller:
Smithy,

Bush opponents say exactly the same thing about Bush that you say about Clinton: they don't hate him personally, they just hate the things he has done to the Presidency.

Oh, and I'm not a liberal -- I am a conservative and a Republican, so the "you liberals" line doesn't really work. Nice try, though.

Subpatre,

Clever trick: By your own terms, the only people who can point out a single allegation of FISA are the people who are forbidden by law to mention any single violation of FISA. Everyone else is merely going on assumptions which cannot be trusted. Nice!
1.1.2006 5:45pm
Smithy (mail):
which is why we red-staters hold the swamp in contempt.

With Comey out, there's one less weasel at DOJ, at least. That's been one of the real successes of the past few years: kicking out the weasels and replacing them with team players.
1.1.2006 5:52pm
Defending the Indefensible:
Smithy,

Do you happen to work for DOJ?
1.1.2006 6:06pm
Justice Fuller:
For those trying to follow along at home, you might want to know that the Smithy Dictionary has the following entries:

WEASEL (WEE-zull) n. Principled public servant committed to the rule of law.

TEAM PLAYER (teem PLAY-er) n. Political hack who will do anything and say anthing Karl Rove wants. Generally aspiring to higher level government position and eventual career as high-paid lobbyist.
1.1.2006 6:09pm
Pooh (www):
Well, at least one team (Abramoff/Delay) appears to be receiving a game misconduct.
1.1.2006 6:11pm
Smithy (mail):
Well, at least one team (Abramoff/Delay) appears to be receiving a game misconduct.

If you think that kind of Inside Baseball stuff has much traction outside the Beltway, you're in for a big surprise in November.
1.1.2006 6:12pm
Frank Drackmann (mail):
I wonder how the disclosures of the NSA program would have affected the 2004 presidential election? I wouldn't have voted for Kerry even if there was video of both Bush daughters applying the electrodes to Saddams genitals.
1.1.2006 6:15pm
Greedy Clerk (mail):
On a tangential note, I find Michelle Malkin's attempt to say that this is not a "real story" to be rather funny: "Nice try at nefarious spin. Two words: Big deal. So, an underling filling in for his boss doesn't want to sign off on a major, national security decision. Where's the controversy?" Link here.

I also find her consistent claims that anyone concerned about NSA surveillance is just a "chicken little." I guess to a person who thinks rounding up tens of thousands of American citizens on the basis of their ethnicity alone, this really is no big deal though. The right-wing blogosphere ought to be proud of their superstar Michelle Malkin -- another in the long line of righties trying to outdo one another by saying the most outrageous thing possible and then being considered an "intellectual" for doing so. See also, e.g., John Yoo; Ann Coulter (i.e. constitutional scholar Ann Coulter per Fox News); John Derbyshire.
1.1.2006 6:19pm
Smithy (mail):
The disclosure would have helped Bush, obviously. The American people don't care about legal niceties, they care about security. Bush made the right call here. Kerry undoubtedly would have whined about the surveillance and gone along with the whole Michael Moore crowd paranoia about it, and looked ever more the wingnut.
1.1.2006 6:19pm
Defending the Indefensible:
Smithy,

I asked, "Do you happen to work for DOJ?"

Since you've gone ahead and replied to others since, but ignored my question, should we take that as affirmation?
1.1.2006 6:21pm
Polaris (mail):
Sorry guys, but from what has been revealed no violation of FISA occured. What you are seeing is the NYTimes deliberately conflating the legal and common definitions of "domestic".

I will help everyone out. A communication is NOT domestic unless it:

1. Occures with at least on "US Person" as defined by NSA Regs/Statute. [Generally that means a US Citizen and/or Perm Resident NOT under the pay or control of a foreign power.]

2. BOTH ends of the communication are within US boundaries.

What is alleged applies to OUTGOING *international* calls, and as I explained at length elsewhere, FISA doesn't apply here (because 1801(f)(2) is meaningless in today's telecommunications environment).

-Poalris
1.1.2006 6:21pm
subpatre (mail):
Justice Fuller writes "Clever trick: By your own terms, the only people who can point out a single allegation of FISA [sic] are the people who are forbidden by law to mention any single violation of FISA.

The question was asking for a single allegation of FISA violations, not allegation of a single (ie particular) violation. The Times' anonymous sources did have potentially legitimate legal concerns; not one concerning FISA. Your rewording's a strawman.

Justice Fuller writes Everyone else is merely going on assumptions which cannot be trusted. Nice!

Everyone else to you perhaps.(grin) Everyone else that alleges FISA violations is doing so without any support or evidence at all, in the face of coherent and logical contradictory evidence.

I could even see people assuming something (FISA violations) in the absence of any contradictory evidence, but that's not the case. Every inside source contradicts it. Claims of FISA violations are, in essense, calling the Times' sources, the President and the Justice department bald-faced liars; all of them.

The only warrantlessness is assuming FISA violations.
1.1.2006 6:24pm
Greedy Clerk (mail):
Smith is doing his best Ann Coulter impression: "They used to hang people like James Comey. But I'd be perfectly happy if he just spent the rest of his life in jail." Sure, a guy who would not "sign off" on anything the President did should be hung. Please explain what "crime" Comer is guilty of. Or is it a "crime" not to give in to all the wishes of the President? If so, Janet Reno is a criminal for permitting Ken Starr to continuously expand his probe above and beyond anything having to do with its original purpose.

As to your truly laughable statement that Clinton did such horrible things and Bush has done nothing compared to him, I suspect that you take this Onion articleseriously. It never ceases to amaze me how far the Republican apologists are willing to go. I do not doubt that if George W. Bush went on TV tomorrow and said that he was running for a third term, brandished a John Yoo memo saying that the two-term limit on the Presidency was not applicable if the executive declared it harmful to National Security, people like Smithy, Powerline and Malkin would be writing about the "treasonous" people who questioned his actions. And I am not being hyperbolic, these people would defend anything the President does as long as it does not involve a blow job or a cigar.
1.1.2006 6:29pm
OrinKerr:
Polaris,

I don't think I follow you. The definition of electronic surveillance from 50 U.S.C. 1801(f) includes:

*****************************
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;

(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible under section 2511 (2)(i) of title 18;
******************

If you have evidence that the communications were not wire communications covered by 1801(f)(2), I would be very interested to see it. But what's your argument that the monitoring falls outside 1801(f)(1)?
1.1.2006 6:30pm
Dave from Woodstock:
Whoa, I take an hour or so off to clean up the home office and the things get pretty hot here. I am not going to take any political bait, but someone posited a question about what possible national security harm could come from these disclosures?

Here's one: I have read (and like everyone else I don't KNOW the facts) that much of this operation was a data mining operation, looking for the equivalent of key words in a search, but from an algorithmic perspective. Let's just say there are word or number patterns involved that a computer finds, and there are associations that some patterns have with bad guys. From what I've read, there aren't even names associated with the communications at this point, but there are "handles", IP addresses for example, or MAC machine codes (it is probably vastly more intricate then this but time is limited and we don't really KNOW the facts anyway).

In order to demonstrate constitutionality, facts WILL have to be discussed and examined closely. If that is done publicly, it seems obvious that al Qaeda's computer and espionage experts (and they apparently have some very good ones) will adapt, and thank us very much for the free gift.

This is a war (whether some partisans of the left believe it or not) and our enemy is dangerous and sophisticated (cave imagery notwithstanding).

So I say again, if this program is effective AND unconstitutional (for reasons other then the bad faith of the actors to distinguish this from the Watergate analogy liberal partisans seem to love...in other words I assume Bush has not been spying on his political opponents) let's figure out how to fix those defects quietly and get on with protecting the homeland.
1.1.2006 6:33pm
Defending the Indefensible:
Prof. Kerr,

I think Polaris' argument is that he thinks the definition of "United States person" does not include a person suspected of being involved with foreign terrorists.

Of course, what happens if those suspicions turn out to be incorrect is a separate question.
1.1.2006 6:34pm
Greedy Clerk (mail):
Polaris, you must work for Faegre &Benson LLP with John Hinderaker. Your legal analysis is very impressive.

By the way, who cares about the plain meaning of statutes anymore? I give up. I am going to have to just go along with the right wing, it's much easier to just pretend you are one of them. I believe the President did not violate FISA because he just didn't. Anyone who says otherwise is part of the Michael Moore hates America tin-foil hate paranoid conspiracy chicken-little crowd. That includes Orin Kerr, by the way, along with many, many other Republicans. But obviously, Orin has been corrupted by the librul academy, and these other "RINOs" just want to kiss up to the librul media.
1.1.2006 6:36pm
OrinKerr:
Defending the Indefensible,

"United States person" is defined in 50 U.S.C. 1801(i) as

************
a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101 (a)(20) of title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.
************

What's the case that a person suspected of being involved with foreign terrorists falls outside that definition?
1.1.2006 6:38pm
Anderson (mail) (www):
I wouldn't have voted for Kerry even if there was video of both Bush daughters applying the electrodes to Saddams genitals.

Actually, I think this would have reaped MORE votes for Bush.
1.1.2006 6:38pm
subpatre (mail):
Orin - You can't call overseas on a wire. You probably can't even call another state by wire any more.
1.1.2006 6:42pm
Greedy Clerk (mail):
I think Polaris' argument is that he thinks the definition of "United States person" does not include a person suspected of being involved with foreign terrorists.

Well, I just read Article II of the Constitution and I have to say that I think Polaris is definitely right. You see it's pretty clear when you read Article II real closely that it give the President the unilateral power to revoke a person's citizenship -- and status as a "United States person" -- if he determines, in his sole discretion, that the person is suspected of terrorism. Further, Article II provides that the President does not need to tell anyone about it. All he has to do is determine it.

It's pretty clear, just read Article II very, very closely --- you will see it. Only activist liberal judges with their "living constitution" and "penumbras" would come up with some absurd interpretation of the Constitution that precludes the President from exercising one of his express Article II powers, such as the ones I just mentioned. I mean it is clearly in the Constitution -- just read it. Plain meaning, baby. It's there.

For those elitist lawyers reading this, don't bring up the the 14th Amendment and try to use your activist judgifying powers. That stuff only works on the Micheal Moore crowd. Those of us in the know who studied at the Federalist Society's John Yoo School of National Security law know that the 14th's citizenship clause did not affect this unilateral power because, you see, the Framers of the 14th would have said so if they meant to repeal such an important Presidential power. Anyone who would think that the 14th Amendment repealed such an express and fundamental power of the executive must be looking for penumbras and emanations in the living constitution.

1.1.2006 6:45pm
subpatre (mail):
Dave writes "Asserting that this revelation hurt security requires a plausible scenario in which a terrorist would be more careful now than he would have been a month ago. I can't think of one."

Here's one :
A phone call of type YY needs a warrant to be tapped. Reviews by attorneys, including the notable Professor Orin Kerr, conclude that it's illegal for the US to tap these type communications without a warrant.

AQ or another force establishes contact protocol for their US operatives that, among other procedures, makes sure they qualify as a "US person", and call from US territory. These are the statutory requirements that type YY calls can't be intercepted without a warrant.

This assures AQ et al that, along with their other procedures (rolling clones, etc) it's a practical impossibility for the US to legally intercept the calls. Although still suspicious and careful not to make too much contact, type YY calls are used to notify operatives of impending arrests or when time is critical.

As of Dec 16th 2005, anti-American forces' communications training prohibits type YY phone calls.
1.1.2006 6:48pm
Polaris (mail):
Orin Kerr,

Actually my point is even simplier than that. The communications in question don't fall under 1801(f).

1801(f)
***********
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;

(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible under section 2511 (2)(i) of title 18;
**************

I emphasized the key loopholes that allow the NSA to function.

In 1801(f)(1), you must have a reasonable expectation of privacy. As you know that has a very specific set of criteria which are NOT met for foreign communications. As Tom Holsinger stated in an earler thread, because foreign governments do not protect communications crossing their boundries in any way (and in fact listen to them routinely), no reasonable expectation of privacy exists if either end is outside the US.

In 1801(f)(2), the subparagraph only applies to intercepts physically done INSIDE the US which is totally meaningless for the NSA and for modern telecommunications.

Thus the NYTimes has lied by deliberately obfuscating the term "domestic".

If one end of a communication is outside the US, it's NOT domestic surveillance, US Person or no.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 6:49pm
Polaris (mail):
Greedy Clerk,

Instead of trying to make me sound like a Nazi, why don't you try reading what I post...and read some of Bamford's books on the NSA (which I can not comment on). I make no reference to article 2 per se other than to say that the argument is academic because no violation of FISA occured.

For that matter, why don't you try reading FISA carefully.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 6:52pm
OrinKerr:
Subpatre writes:

"Orin - You can't call overseas on a wire. You probably can't even call another state by wire any more."

Yes, agreed. At the same time, the definition of wire communication in FISA is a little bit more particular. "Wire communication" is definited in 50 U.S.C. 1801(l) as "any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications." That means that if the tapping is happening over any kind of wire or like connection, the communication is a wire communication even if the rest of the communication is sent without a wire. I read the latest NYT stories as suggesting that there was some kind of tapping into the actual wires at the providers, at least in some contexts. Of course, as I've said from the beginning, it depends a lot on details we don't know, so all of these perspectives have to be a bit tentative.
1.1.2006 6:53pm
Wendy:
MR. SAFIRE: Right. But the very fact that the FBI has to do a little paperwork beforehand slows them down and makes them think for a minute. It doesn't slow them down as much as the president has made out to believe, because there's a wrinkle in it saying that if it's a real emergency and you have to get this information, then you can get it and get the approval within 72 hours afterwards. So there's always this struggle in a war between liberty and security. Doris, you go into that in your book, and Lincoln did, indeed, suspend habeas corpus, but there it is in the Constitution, "It shall not be suspended except in invasion or a rebellion," so he had the right to. He didn't have the right, I think, to close the Brooklyn Eagle or see the arrest of the leading dissident, Vanlandingham, and he made some mistakes.

But just as FDR later made a mistake with the eight saboteurs and hanged them all, and just as we made a terrible mistake with the Japanese-Americans in World War II and have apologized for that. During wartime, we have this excess of security and afterwards we apologize. And that's why I offended a lot of my conservative and hard-line friends right after September 11th when they started putting these captured combatants in jail, and said the president can't seize dictatorial power. And a lot of my friends looked at me like I was going batty. But now we see this argument over excessive security, and I'm with the critics on that.

--William Safire on MTP today

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10558586/
1.1.2006 6:56pm
Polaris (mail):
OrinKerr,

I can't comment on this more fully of course, but almost all international oceanic (trasatlantic/transpacific) cables are NOT common carriers per the wording of the statute. That hasn't been true since the 1950s. It's another big fat loophole.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 6:56pm
Polaris (mail):
Wendy,

When if comes to electronic intelligence/security, Mr. Safire doesn't know what he is talking about. When it comes to electronic intelligence, you have to make critical decisions in SECONDS not hours.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 6:58pm
Pooh (www):
subpatre,

WHAT? Make a showing that these are AQ phone calls and then get a warrant. Or start now and wait 3 days, and, wait for it, get a warrant.
1.1.2006 6:58pm
jrose:
subparte,

Aren't undersea fiber-optic connections wired?

Orin,

As far as I can tell, Polaris argues that the evidence to support his 1802(f)(2) claim would compromise national security.
1.1.2006 7:00pm
Polaris (mail):
Pooh,

How? In order to make that determination, you have to be listening in in the first place, and if you insist on excluding calls in such a way that YY is always excluded, then the volume is too great to do this selectively.

You seem to think this is a single operator with a headset listening into Grandma Kent.

That's not the way it works at all. [At least not for the NSA.]

-Polaris
1.1.2006 7:01pm
Willard:
I must say, OrinKerr, I think they have you. Clearly modern communications don't travel by wire, so (f)(2) doesn't apply. As to (f)(1), I don't believe that any of the 9/11 terrorists were lawful permanent residents (they were here under various statuses, some of them illegally). Is there any allegation that any communications with lawful permanent residents were intercepted?
1.1.2006 7:01pm
OrinKerr:
Polaris writes:
In 1801(f)(1), you must have a reasonable expectation of privacy. As you know that has a very specific set of criteria which are NOT met for foreign communications. As Tom Holsinger stated in an earler thread, because foreign governments do not protect communications crossing their boundries in any way (and in fact listen to them routinely), no reasonable expectation of privacy exists if either end is outside the US.

In 1801(f)(2), the subparagraph only applies to intercepts physically done INSIDE the US which is totally meaningless for the NSA and for modern telecommunications.
Whether foreign governments listen in on calls is probably not relevant to the question of a reasonable expectation of privacy in international calls. That's because a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes is not the same as an expectation of privacy that a reasonable person would have. The few courts that have touched on this have suggested that U.S. citizens retain Fourth Amendment protection outside the U.S., and have not looked to the actual practices of foreign countries to determine this. (Foreign law has been held to be relevant, but not, as far as I know, foreign practices.) Of course, there are arguments (see my initial post last week) that there is no Fourth Amendment protection anyway under the border search exception, or special needs, or other types of exceptions. But I don't think your analysis works.

As for your second point, regarding 1801(f)(2), what is your evidence that the monitoring is happening overseas? What overseas providers are letting the NSA tap into their communications lines?
1.1.2006 7:02pm
Polaris (mail):
jrose,

Yep. I realize to some of you it sounds like I am weasling out, but I am not. There are very specific things that are and are not classified....and proving that 1801(f)(2) is a dead issue would involve explaining methodes and means for the NSA that are classified. Point in fact while I have stayed within bounds, I still probably have said too much as it is.

You can rest assured that in the Intelligence Committee, they WILL see the full story....and the problem will pass legal muster. This of course makes it easier whenever the next wartime executive really *does* want to abuse his power.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 7:04pm
Apodaca:
A Shorter Freeper Apologia:
Everything was perfectly legal, and didn't violate FISA or the Fourth Amendment -- in fact, there was no legal restraint at all on intercepting these communications. That's why the President went out of his way to personally review and approve the program every 45 days. He was being extra solicitous of the privacy interests -- legally baseless though they were -- of all the 100%-proven-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt Al-Qaeda operatives inside the US.

1.1.2006 7:09pm
Polaris (mail):
Orin Kerr,

I suggest you read Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace". I think you will find there and elsewhere that foreign practice must be considered when talking about INTERNATIONAL communication. You have already admitted that there is no 4th amendment issue. I point to Tom Holsinger's posts in a prior thread on this. "Reasonable Expecatation of Privacy" is very precisely defined and as long as one end of a communication is not in the US, it does't apply. In fact in that prior (and long) thread, we've all pretty much come to that conclusion.

As for the second part, you know I can't go into the specifics. Suffice it to say that almost all NSA personelle work outside the US and the US has agreements with more than two dozen other nations that permit the NSA to act as agents of that nation for the purposes of gathering electronic intelligence. That means that FISA certainly doesn't apply to them. What's more, using TS/SCI (TK) systems, even an operator in...say...Kansas can technically do intercepts outside the US. That's all I can say on a non-secure system.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 7:09pm
OrinKerr:
Polaris,

Nope, it doesn't sound like you're weasling out. One of the interesting questions about this story from the beginning has been whether the surveillance is being done in a way that exploits a loophole in FISA. You're giving us food for thought. It would be nice to know whether you are an NSA insider or a 19-year-old college student having fun with us, but hey, that's the blogosphere for ya.
1.1.2006 7:11pm
subpatre (mail):
FISA was passed in another age, when the Cold War was at its height and 'conventional' (James Bond type) espionage was the yardstick. Even in ‘78 immigration was regulated, and any individual foreign national could, if needed, be located within a day or two.

By the time FISA was proposed, the Vietnam War was over, and there was no significant threat left from domestic radical groups that earlier declared war on the US. The Rockefeller (Presidential) and Church (Congressional) Committees revealed gross abuses of intelligence in the CIA and FBI, most in the 60’s and 70’s.

Congress was faced with outraged constituents demanding citizen protections, and on the other hand, America’s counter-espionage agencies steadily uncovered damage with the observation “most offenders are trusted insiders (citizens), not foreign agents”.

Congress had to reconcile the clamor for citizenship protections with the need to counter very real foreign threats. The result is a law that has many protections of all sorts and all ways; shot through with enough exceptions that any likely foreign influence can be monitored. Modern technology's created more loopholes yet.

Only wholly domestic communication by ‘US persons’ has any protection at all, and even that’s incomplete.


Has anyone come up with an allegation of FISA violations, even indirect, from the Times' sources yet?
1.1.2006 7:12pm
Polaris (mail):
Orin,

If you review the case law brought up by Tom and others, you will find that the courts have found the 4th amendment applies even in foreign countries if and only if that country had laws such that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed. For example, if I call from Vancouver B.C. to someone in Toronto, then the 4th amendment applies because Canadian Telecom laws protect that communication and provide me with an expectation of privacy. OTOH if I make a call from Seattle to Vancouver B.C., no Canadien law protects me and thus there is no reasonable expecation of privacy. Earlier Tom Holsinger explained this very well.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 7:12pm
Polaris (mail):
Orin Kerr,

I will say this much (it's UNCLAS EFTO....but I can reveal my own personal information). I was a Communications-Computer Operator (with some Analyst training) permanently stationed at the 381st at Elmendorf. I have told all of you things (which is why they are EFFIs) that only ex-NSA people would know but technically aren't classified.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 7:16pm
jrose:
Polaris,

What are the precedents that support your Seattle-to-Vancouver, no-expectation-of-privacy claim?
1.1.2006 7:18pm
Polaris (mail):
Orin,

It's the best I can do to show my bonafides. Either believe me or not. Regardless the Congressional Intell committees will get the full scoop and it will pass full legal muster (which is why the Intell chair is insisting that HE run the hearings...and I agree...it's too sensitive for open hearings).

-Polaris
1.1.2006 7:18pm
Polaris (mail):
jrose,

It's in the US code (chapter 50 I think). If you don't have an expectation of privacy under foreign law, then a reasonable person is supposed to know that (or learn of it). I believe they teach that in law school (but I am sure that the legal eagles here can be more explicit).

Think of it this way. If you SHOUT that you killed someone, then the police don't need a warrent to use that as evidence against you. Likewise, if you invite an officer of the government into your home, then anything he sees is admissable without a warrent.

Why? Because you are giving up your right to privacy.

A reasonable person is supposed to know that foreign governments can (and for that matter do) listen into communications (physical and electronic) that crosses their national bounderies. Because a reasonable person knows this, a reasonable person that does it anyway is giving up their right to privacy and thus their 4th amendment rights.

That's ALWAYS been the case and the litgation in 1978 against the NSA was settled in favor of the NSA on this basis.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 7:26pm
jrose:
Polaris,

Orin took issue with your privacy analysis by claiming "a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes is not the same as an expectation of privacy that a reasonable person would have." A review of the precedents on both sides would be helpful (or a more specific citation of the applicable statutes).
1.1.2006 7:32pm
subpatre (mail):
rjose writes "Aren't undersea fiber-optic connections wired?"

No. Wire is wire (metal) and optical fiber is optical fiber (glass-like) not wire. Not a great defense, but more than enough in other cases of defined substances, such as drugs.

Polaris gives other, better defenses to surveilling the trans-oceanic cables

In addition, "...if such acquisition occurs in the United States..." is another easily exploited loophole.

Microwave links are used for tons of short-to-medium distance trunk communications. Especially in the NE or California, these could be 'heard' in Canada or Mexico. [I know this could also be used for domestic-domestic acquisitions, but that's not been alleged] These links may also be exploitable by other means that aren't technically in the US.

FISA's full of holes on purpose. Now, has anyone found the NY Times' sources alleging that FISA was violated?
1.1.2006 7:35pm
Polaris (mail):
jrose,

I am not a lawyer so don't expect a full legal analysis from me. I do know that Tom Holsinger who is a lawyer has explained earlier and at length why REP doesn't apply to international communications.

Let me make this as simple as possible.

If I make a phonecall from Seattle to Vancouver B.C., is the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) allowed to tap my phone call without a warrent?

YES. This is legal under Canadian Law.

Because it's legal under Candian Law, the Canadian Government can then give that information to the FBI whereupon the FBI can use it as evidence against me.

A REASONABLE person (as legally defined) is supposed to know this and so there is no expectation of privacy as defined in Chapter 50 US Code (if I recall the chapter correctly).

I happen to know for a fact not only can the RCMP do this, THEY HAVE and it's been upheld in US courts every time.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 7:40pm
Smithy (mail):
Everything was perfectly legal, and didn't violate FISA or the Fourth Amendment -- in fact, there was no legal restraint at all on intercepting these communications.

You call it an apologia -- most scholars seem to call it the truth. The fact that you don't like president Bush doesn't make his actions illegal.
1.1.2006 7:41pm
Apodaca:
"Aren't undersea fiber-optic connections wired?"

No. Wire is wire (metal) and optical fiber is optical fiber (glass-like) not wire.
50 USC 1801(l): "a wire, cable, or other like connection"
1.1.2006 7:51pm
minnie:
It would be nice to know whether you are an NSA insider or a 19-year-old college student having fun with us, but hey, that's the blogosphere for ya.

Orin, my own take, after having masochistically forced myself to read all of his Walter Mitty ramblings, an endeavor I do not recommend, is he is more like a sixteen year old who read a few books by Bamford and Tom Holsinger and enjoys passing himself off as someone "in the know". Thank goodness you popped up to address him before he had driven away even the most loyal of your readers. I agree that's the blogosphere, but I worry about its future as a vehicle of exchange between serious people. Only a moderator of your extraordinarily unique qualifications could hold me here if the price of admission is wading through such repetitive teenage malarky.
1.1.2006 7:54pm
moonfall:
subpatre, polaris, rjose: As Orin says,
"Wire communication" is definited in 50 U.S.C. 1801(l) as "any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier

If we're going to nitpick about wires and common carriers, lets do so:
1) If you have a landline phone, you have a "wire", at the very least from the base of your phone to the wall.
2) Even if you don't, and you want to argue that a fiber optic cable isn't an "other like connection", it will go through the switching station at some point, and a wire will be involved.
3) And regardless of the status of the transatlantic cables, every phone co in the US is a common carrier, so a common carrier will be involved.

Oh, and polaris: "almost all NSA personelle work outside the US". Bull.
1.1.2006 7:57pm
jrose:
Polaris,

All you have done is re-state your belief in "the reasonable person" standard without any supporting citations. In particular, you did not address Orin's claim that "a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes is not the same as an expectation of privacy that a reasonable person would have."
1.1.2006 7:59pm
Perseus:
Since top officials of the Justice Department serve at the pleasure of the president--and should do so to promote executive energy and accountability--I don't consider Comey's alleged "neutrality and independence" to be a virtue regardless of whether his views are correct.
1.1.2006 8:00pm
Polaris (mail):
Jrose and others,

Orin is simply incorrect about REP as are you. I am reposted this post written by Tom Holsinger who IS a lawyer with direct experience with the case law here and this post is taken from a prior threat on Article 2 and the NSA.


Attacks on electronic surveillance of foreign communications are flat out laughable. NONE of the people doing so have at all considered the applicability of foreign law here, or the intelligence agreements we have with foreign governments.

Foreign commmunications - those to and from the U.S. - have two ends, here and in some foreign country. 50 USC 1801(f) requires a "reasonable expectation of privacy" for there to be any warrant requirement, so it is necessary to consider the law of the foreign countries involved, not ours alone, in determining whether there is a privacy expectation.

And there isn't. Foreign governments can SECRETLY monitor phone calls and email to their countries from other countries. I am not aware of ANY foreign country whose government is subject to any check whatever on secret monitoring of phone and email traffic involving other countries. Some have laws creating, for purposes of 50 USC 1801(f), reasonable expectations of privacy for phone calls which take place entirely within their national boundaries, but none have any restrictions on monitoring of foreign (for them) communications.

Furthermore foreign governments can grant other governments the right to monitor the same communications, and many have. With us. The United States government has intelligence agreements with lots and lots of countries which expressly allow the U.S. government to monitor all their foreign communications, and in many instances their domestic traffic as well.

The neat thing about 50 USC 1801(f) is that it defines "electronic surveillance" as only that surveillance of communications in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (provided the surveillance takes place outside the U.S., which is almost always the case). If there is no privacy expectation, listening to 'em is NOT "electronic surveillance" and so not at all subject to FISA.

FISA has a great big built-in loophole for foreign communications - those between the U.S. and other countries. It does not in any way limit the government from monitoring those communications. It does not apply at all to foreign communications.

Those here who continue to contend that FISA applies to foreign communications are wasting their time, and ours.

Phone calls and emails which originate and terminate in the U.S. are domestic communications and so subject to FISA's warrant requirement for surveillance, albeit with many exceptions.



It's very cut-and-dried. If one end of a communication is outside the US, then you don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the LEGAL sense and 1801(f)(1)(3,4) simply do not apply.

It's always been that way, ant FISA was written this way deliberately to allow the NSA to do just this.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:02pm
Smithy (mail):
Since top officials of the Justice Department serve at the pleasure of the president--and should do so to promote executive energy and accountability--I don't consider Comey's alleged "neutrality and independence" to be a virtue regardless of whether his views are correct.

Well said. Comey wasn't a team player. He put his own personal liberal ideas about governance ahead of the tasks the president asked him to do. He deserved to be passed over. And now -- he deserve to go to jail.
1.1.2006 8:03pm
Polaris (mail):
Moonfall,

BULL right back out you. Most NSA personelle are uniformed members of the military and most work overseas.

Look it up.

As for carriers, once the US boundary is crossed, the communication is fair game because no REP exists. That's always been true...and AC-2 cables are non-common cables.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:05pm
subpatre (mail):
jrose - I withdraw the "wire-v-optic" defense, as it's just plain wrong.
§1801(l) "Wire communication" means any communication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications.
The bolded portion would undoubtedly include fiber-optics. It's the common carrier requirement that eliminates protection of oceanic cables; perhaps some interstate cables too.
1.1.2006 8:06pm
Polaris (mail):
Moonfall,

In addition, vitually all data collection occures outside the US (almost all NSA stations are outside the US) and even those in the US can within seconds technically collect outside US boundaries using the correct (and classified) techniques.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:06pm
Polaris (mail):
Smithy,

If he was involved with the leak, the punishment under Title 18 US Code is 10 years hard labour.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:08pm
Smithy (mail):
If he was involved with the leak, the punishment under Title 18 US Code is 10 years hard labour.


That seems about right. I think he should do a little more, though, in light of extenuating circumstances, such as the fact we're at war.
1.1.2006 8:09pm
Polaris (mail):
Minnie,

The joke is on you. I worked at the 381st in Elmendorf.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:12pm
Polaris (mail):
Minnie,

Of course you should be ashamed of yourself for buttering up to the moderator and demanding that I give bonafides (at least more specific ones) that you know are classified.

That makes you a really swell person.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:14pm
jrose:
Polaris,

Holsinger's post also states the "reasonable person" standard without supporting citations. He may very well be correct, but I would like to see his - and Orin's - citations.
1.1.2006 8:22pm
jrose:
subparte,

Why does the "common carrier" requirement eliminate oceanic cables from the purview of FISA?
1.1.2006 8:27pm
Polaris (mail):
JRose,

Look up "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" in a Law Dictionary. "reasonable" as defined by statute is quite different from the common meaning. A "reasonable" person is supposed to be aware of the protections that foreign law may or may not provide. As Holsinger said much earlier, that is taught under "Jurisdiction" (it's another way of saying that ignorance of a foreign law is no excuse). I am not a lawyer, but even I know that much.

Well, it's cut-and-dried. If you give up your right to privacy (which you do when you cross international bounderies), then no Reasonable Right to Privacy Exists. The FISA w/r/t the NSA has always been interpreted that way.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:29pm
Polaris (mail):
jrose,

Transoceanic cables are type AC-2 which are explicitly non-common cables.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:30pm
OrinKerr:
I was thinking primarily of United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987), United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093-95 (9th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F.Supp.2d 264 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
1.1.2006 8:32pm
Polaris (mail):
JRose,

Let's put it another way. Let's say that a criminal runs a smuggling ring from Seattle to Vancouver B.C. Can the FBI tap his phone without a warrent? Not in the US.

However, the RCMP in Vancouver BC CAN tap his international calls from Seattle. What's more the RCMP can (and often does) give the FBI matching authority in Canada (and vice versa of course) which means the FBI can act in Vancouver BC under Canadian law and tap his international calls without a warrent.

Is such evidence admissiable?

YES it is. Not only is it, but it always has been.

The point is that a reasonable person (as defined legally) knows that there is no expectation of privacy for phone calls that cross the US/Can border. Thus 1801(f)(1,3,4) do not apply.

The same applies to the NSA but more so.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:36pm
Polaris (mail):
Orin,

Both those are 9th CT cases and I believe you will find that they deal with cases INSIDE a foriegn govt where there was REP based on foreign law.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:37pm
jrose:
Polaris,

What is an AC-2 cable and why are they "non-common" cables (citations, please).
1.1.2006 8:39pm
Apodaca:
Smithy:
Comey wasn't a team player. He put his own personal liberal ideas about governance ahead of the tasks the president asked him to do. He deserved to be passed over.
Edmund Burke:
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
[Speech to the electors of Bristol, Nov. 3, 1774]
1.1.2006 8:39pm
Just an Observer:
Orin,

As I recall from the previous thread, Tom Holsinger and Polaris said there has been a longstanding. twofold loophole in FISA's definitions that allowed interception of international traffic:

* 1801(f)(1), 1801(f)(3) and 1801(f)(4) did not apply because there was no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in international communitions

* 1801(f)(2) -- which omits that language, did not apply because NSA intercepts typically occurred outside the United States.

That sounded interesting, and may well have been the case historically. But then I pointed out that the 12/24 NYT story reported one of the novel things about the NSA program Bush authorized was that it began capturing the information at communications switches inside the United States.

Polaris' rebuttal, IIRC, was that the NYT was biased so the facts it reported were probably falsified.

At that point, I withdrew from the dialogue. (I also do not argue with anyone who insists their religion is right and everyone else's is wrong. Theoretically they may be right, but their assumptions are beyond reasonable debate.)

The historical points Polaris and Tom make remain interesting, I think.
1.1.2006 8:39pm
Polaris (mail):
However, as I said before, I am not a lawyer so I might be mistaken.

However, I would be astonished if you *seriously* are trying to claim now (as you did not in the Article 2 discussion earlier when Tom Holsinger who is an expert in this area brought this up) that somehow the US constitution and US law somehow applies outside the US. Frankly, no insult intended, I find the notion laughable.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:40pm
Polaris (mail):
Just An Observer,

That was not my rebuttal and I invite those to go read it for themselves. I do think the NYTimes is biased and I DO think they are deliberably obfuscating the distinction between international and domestic communication for political gain.

However, the operative rebuttal was that switching even for US switches *technically* does not occure in the US. It is this that voids 1801(f)(2).

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:42pm
OrinKerr:
One more thought -- I assume the precedent Polaris is thinking of is Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336
(2d. Cir. 1978), in which a U.S. citizen in the U.S. called Canada, and the Canadian authorities tapped the call in Canada pursuant to Canadian law. They then turned over the tapes of the calls to U.S. authorities. The Second Circuit held that this didn't violate the Fourth Amendment:

******************
As a starting point, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to arrests and searches made by foreign authorities on their home territory and in the enforcement of foreign law, even if the persons arrested and from whom the evidence is seized are American citizens.[FN12] United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968), Cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960, 89 S.Ct. 2102, 23 L.Ed.2d 747 (1969). The rationale underlying this limitation is the doubtful deterrent effect on foreign policy practices that will follow from a punitive exclusion of the evidence in question by an American court.[FN13] However, if the circumstances of the foreign search and seizure are so extreme that they “shock the judicial conscience”, a federal court in the exercise of its supervisory powers can require exclusion of the evidence so seized. United States v. Morrow, supra, 537 F.2d at 139; United States v. Cotroni, supra, 527 F.2d at 712 n.10; Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963, 86 S.Ct. 449, 15 L.Ed.2d 366 (1965); See United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970), Cert. denied, *342 401 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 935, 28 L.Ed.2d 219 (1971). The circumstances in the instant case do not fall within this exception.


FN12. That Stowe was in the United States when his calls were intercepted does not change the result here. The law of the locality in which the tap exists (and where the interception takes place) governs its validity, even though the intercepted phone conversations traveled in part over the United States communication system. United States v. Cotroni, supra, 527 F.2d at 711.


FN13. United States v. Morrow, supra, 537 F.2d at 139. Stowe argues that exclusion would deter further Canadian intrusions upon the privacy of American citizens. However, the exclusionary rule, as a deterrent sanction, is not applicable where a private party or a foreign government commits the offending act. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455-56 n.31, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976). Rather, the exclusionary rule is intended to inculcate a respect for the police of our own nation. United States v. Cotroni, supra, 527 F.2d at 713. Since it has little if any deterrent effect upon foreign police, See United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972), it is seldom used to bar their work product. United States v. Cotroni, supra, 527 F.2d 713.



There could be no contention here that the Canadian authorities did not scrupulously follow their own prescribed procedures, or that their conduct could in any way shock the conscience of the court. There exists no case, so far as we are aware, which suppresses evidence obtained in a foreign country under such conditions, regardless of whether the foreign officers failed to follow American constitutional procedures or of the extent to which American agents may have been involved in their activities. The courts can hardly be said to have spoken with one voice in articulating the reasons for their decisions, but as a statistical matter they have apparently been unanimous in rejecting attempts to suppress the challenged foreign evidence.

************************
1.1.2006 8:43pm
Polaris (mail):
Just An Observer,

The switches aren't in the US. They are above it.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:44pm
Polaris (mail):
Orin,

I did say that I wasn't a lawyer, but that is indeed the precendent I was thinking of. Note that the possible exclusion depends on a consideration of FOREIGN LAW just as Tom Holsinger stated.

It seems to bear out what I have said all along at least on this issue.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:48pm
Just an Observer:
Polaris,

Do you have personal knowledge of the special NSA program Bush authorized and how it has been operated recently? Or are you drawing on your general experience with that large agency?
1.1.2006 8:49pm
Justin (mail):
The United States constitution does apply extraterritorial to the degree it restricts the efforts of the United States government on United States citizens. Of course, the effect of this extraterritorial application varies based on the circumstances, but it definitely exists.
1.1.2006 8:49pm
OrinKerr:
Polaris,

Not quite, actually. As I read Stowe, the key was that the monitoring was undertaken by a foreign government to investigate a violation of foreign law. That is quite different from a rule that there is no REP in any foreign communication against monitoring by the U.S. (Granted, I say that with the caveat that there are lots of arguments that reach the same result, as explained in my 1st post on all of this stuff.)
1.1.2006 8:52pm
Apodaca:
The FCC seems to think that some transoceanic cables are used for common carriage:
The Filing Manual defines international facilities-based circuits as “international circuits in which a carrier has an ownership interest. For this purpose, the term ownership interest includes outright ownership, indefeasible right of use (IRU) interests, or leasehold interests in bare capacity in an international facility, regardless of whether the underlying facility is a common or non-common carrier submarine cable ...
But I'm sure they don't really have any expertise on the subject.
1.1.2006 8:57pm
Polaris (mail):
Justin,

Not quite. It doesn't apply when US personelle by treaty agreement are empowered to act as agents of a foreign government. That is the usual case with the NSA.

Orin,

I am not a lawyer, but a plain language reading of the precedent makes it clear that:

1. Any REP depends on FOREIGN law (just as we contended).
2. If the Foreign law doesn't offer an REP (which is always the case with international communications), then one doesn't exist even for a US person.

Now, there *are* cases (and I have never said otherwise) where an REP exists even in foreign countries. The example I gave was a phonecall from Vancouver BC to Toronto. That is protected as a Canadian Domestic call and thus an REP exists.

Canadian law doesn't protect international calls at *all* and so no REP exists for such. BTW, I know of no country that does protect international calls.....the US is the only country I know of that has even toothless restrictions on it.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 8:58pm
Polaris (mail):
Apodoca,

That doesn't say what you think it does. The FCC is acknowledging that some trans-Oceanic cables are in fact non-common cables. Point in fact all AC-2 cables are non-common.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 9:00pm
Polaris (mail):
Apodoca,

Hint: Trans-Oceanic cables USED to be common and the FCC had to cover all possible cases. There are still regulations covering leaded gasoline in most US states even though you can't find it and it's illegal in most places now.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 9:02pm
Perseus:
Apodaca: Note that what Burke says is: "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but judgment..." An appointed subordinate of the executive is not a representative of the people, but rather, one of the president's "servants," and as Mr. Conservative, Burke certainly expected servants to know their place in society.
1.1.2006 9:02pm
jrose:
Polaris,

What does "the switches aren't in the US. They are above it" mean?
1.1.2006 9:03pm
Polaris (mail):
Just An Observer,

I do not have direct experience with the program Bush is said to have started. I left the NSA before then.

However, I DO know (rather intimately) how the NSA intercepts communications.

I can also read (minus the political angnst) what the NYTimes alleges the NSA has done.

To make it very clear, this is what is alleged:

The the NSA moniter calls from the US sometimes by "US Persons" to a destination ouside the US.

If you read the original article, the only thing new is that the intercepts are being done for communications that started in the US. The original article admits that the NSA has always intercepted communications that originated overseas even if they ended in the US, US Person or no. The original article also stated that warrents were still sought for "purely domestic" communications (i.e. both ends in the US).

*Legally* there is no distinction between international calls the originate in the US and originate overseas as long as one end is outside the USA. Certainly FISA doesn't make any such distinction....and the NYTimes never alleged that any FISA violation existed (from sources that were intimately familiar with it at that!)

Thus the only thing Bush is alleged to have done is "step up the pace" and use powers the NSA already had but weren't currently using to the fullest.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 9:11pm
Polaris (mail):
jrose,

The answer to your question is classifed TS/SCI (TK).

-Polaris
1.1.2006 9:12pm
Just an Observer:
Polaris: "I do not have direct experience with the program Bush is said to have started. I left the NSA before then."

Then you have no evidence, only your own speculation, that the facts reported in the NYT stories about this new program are wrong. The Times specifically reported that the new intercepts occurred at communications switches located inside the country.
1.1.2006 9:14pm
Polaris (mail):
Just An Observer,

Not true. I have direct relevant experience and that IS evidence. Ask any lawyer here and they will agree (testimony is evidence).

What's more, I happen to know where the switches are located and I can assure you that even US switches are *techncially* not in the US.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 9:25pm
Polaris (mail):
I note that even the NYTimes didn't allege any FISA violations nor did they say that intercepts occured physically in the US. They just said they occured at US Switches.

There is a difference.

-Polaris
1.1.2006 9:26pm
Kazinski:
This whole arguement seems more and more line arguing about angels on the head of a pin. Bush defended the NSA program again today:

Bush stressed that the surveillance involved telephone calls from "a few numbers" outside the United States by people associated with al-Qaida, the terrorist organization that plotted the Sept. 11 attacks. The White House later clarified Bush's remarks, saying he meant to say calls going to and originating from the U.S. were being monitored.


So accorgding to the President what he ordered was only monitoring of communications from and to Al Qaeda or associates, with one end of the communication on foreign soil. Even Jackson in his Youngstown framework concurrance said:

We should not use this occasion to circumscribe, much less to contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander in Chief. I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain his exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the outside world for the security of our society.


Now I'll admit that statement isn't any more controlling than anything else in Jackson's unjoined concurrance, but those who have been quoting Jackson trying to say that FISA can impede the president from ordering warrantless wiretaps on that very group that Congress has declared war against is more a farce than serious debate.
1.1.2006 9:28pm
jrose:
Polaris,

I don't see how Stowe supports your claim that "If the Foreign law doesn't offer an REP (which is always the case with international communications), then one doesn't exist even for a US person."

On the other hand, I'm not certain if Orin's citations were cases in which the searches were prohibited under foreign law.
1.1.2006 9:29pm
John Lederer (mail):
Apodoca,

In researching something that I know virtually nothing about, I plowed through a bunch of FCC orders and notices. I think Polris is likely quite correct -- almost all the later submarine cables seem to be not operated as common carriers.

Without knowing for sure, I suspect this is a result of the increased participation of companies like Global Crossing that are in the "fiber optic cable" business rather than the telephone business.
1.1.2006 9:29pm
subpatre (mail):
The NY Times reported that surveillance policy changed, and some surveillance officials had privacy concerns with it. Violations of FISA aren't mentioned.

A follow-up article stated that US monitoring agencies had access to enormous volumes of data. Today’s article is about the legal oversight of the program, with no hint of misconduct. Violations of FISA aren't mentioned.

The President says a post-911 classified interception program is "consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution".

Every month or two the program's reviewed by the AG and Counsel to the President. NSA action's are reviewed, monitored, and secretly audited by Justice and NSA counsel. Verified by anonymous leakers.

Congress was briefed many times on this program; four times since Rockefeller wrote his note, due to increased reporting requirements of a Senate resolution. Uncontested.

Why allegations of FISA violations? Why are the President, A.G. and Justice liars; with two Congressional Committees silent co-conspirators? Just who murdered William of Occam?
1.1.2006 9:29pm
jrose:
Kazinski,

If all Bush has done is the "monitoring of communications from and to Al Qaeda or associates, with one end of the communication on foreign soil," then why didn't he get warrants from the FISA court?
1.1.2006 9:32pm
Justin (mail):
So I did some research on Ian Polaris, and it turns out that Ian Polaris is the infamous handle of a teenage "Axis and Allies" internet gamer. So congrads, we've all been had for a laugh.

Clever kid, tho.
1.1.2006 9:34pm
Justice Fuller:
Subpatre,

Why is the AG, the President and DOJ relying on Article II and the AUMF when, at least according to you, they didn't need to? When asked why the surveillance program doesn't violate FISA, they're relying on the AUMF and Article II....
1.1.2006 9:35pm
(