[David Adesnik, 7:28 PM]
RIDING OFF INTO THE SUNSET: It seems that Eugene is back and that the time has come for myself and Josh to return from whence we came. (No, not the local pub. I meant OxBlog). It has been a pleasure.

 
[David Adesnik, 6:57 PM]
I AM NOT ALONE: Stephen Schwartz shares his thoughts on democracy and Islam.

 
[David Adesnik, 6:27 PM]
ALGERIA VS. IRAN: As promised, I am now going to present a solid, empirical case for the viability of democratization in the Middle East. The way I'm going to do it is country by country. First up is Algeria. Now if you asked me last week what I know about Algeria, I would've told you this: It was a secular dictatorship until the early 1990s, at which point it decided to hold elections. When a radical Islamist party won those elections, the military nullified the result and the country descended into a bloody civil war. In short, I would've had to admit that Algeria was a perfect example of the "Iranian paradigm" in action.

That, however, was last week. Now, thanks to the Journal of Democracy, I know a lot more about Algeria. So let me share.

The civil came to an end, more or less, when the government and the Islamic guerrillas declared a truce in 1997, followed by an official amnesty in 1999. The current president of Algeria is Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who came to power after all of his rivals in the 1999 presidential "election" withdrew because they knew if would be rigged. Bouteflika is, of course, the candidate of the military, who still have the final say in Algerian politics. Nonetheless, elections for the national, provincial and local assemblies have been essentially fair, including the most recent National Assembly elections in May 2002. Bouteflika's party, the FLN, took 36% of the vote, more than any other party and enough to give it a majority in the Assembly.

According to William Quandt, professor of politics at the University of Virginia (and author of the Algeria article in the current issue of the Journal of Democracy), Algeria

seems to be divided into at least three main ideological blocs: 1) a nationalist group backed by between 25 and 30 percent of the population—officials, state workers, and rural voters—that reliably votes for the FLN or other government-endorsed parties; 2) an Islamist bloc that commands the loyalties of some 15 to 20 percent; and 3) a Berber-nationalist bloc that has the support of another 10 to 15 percent. Political allegiances within the remainder of Algerian society are scattered among small groups of democrats, regionalists, and independents. No single bloc has a majority, and none can easily govern without some support from at least one of the others.

Second, elections have revealed the main fissures in Algerian society, but they have done little either to legitimize governance or to challenge the positions of those in power. Nor have democratic procedures taken root as a way of resolving conflicts. While elected officials are by no means mere puppets of the military, they know that the latter potentially has veto power over major decisions.

While it would be hard to call this good news, it does underscore one critical point: that there is no need to fear a radical Islamic resurgence should Algeria progress further toward liberal democracy. The initial cycle of revolt against the old regime has run its course and a new political structure is emerging. As Quandt observes, the military "has now succeeded in reducing the chances of an Islamist victory—whether by force of arms or at the polls—to almost nil."

Taking a somewhat more long-term perspective, one might whether Algerians are culturally ready to accept democracy or whether, as critics allege, Islamic culture is inherently unable of sustaining democratic politics. The evidence cuts both ways. While "there are some convinced democrats, but there are probably many more Algerians who have a narrowly instrumental view of democracy—in particular, viewing it as a means to get rid of a political order that they detest." On the other hand,

...multiparty democracy is no longer a disparaged concept in Algeria, as it was in the early days following independence. Most Algerians today say that they would welcome democracy, greater accountability, the rule of law, and more transparency. They are tired of the contempt with which the regime treats ordinary citizens...

Finally, a vibrant free press and growing access to satellite dishes and the Internet have made for lively political discussion within the country. Satire, political cartoons, rai music, and a rich political slang in dialectical Arabic provide outlets for political sentiment. The large community of Algerian expatriates living in nearby Europe also helps to ensure that ideas of modernity and democracy are well understood by Algerians back home, many of whom are fluent in one or more foreign languages—principally French, but increasingly English as well.

I find the existence of a strong and independent press to be the most encouraging of the positive trends, since it is an indication that Algerians themselves believe in the importance of the free flow of ideas as well as the right of the public to know what its government is doing in its name. If Islam truly were antithetical to democracy, the development of such a strong and independent press in just over a decade would be extremely suprising. However, arguments about Islamic culture often neglect to address the national and international dimensions of culture, which are no less important than the religious. While the concept of national culture is well-recognized (though not well-defined), international culture is a more elusive concept. Without engaging in a definitional or theoretical debate, I think it is possible to say the following: Ideas cross borders. Even in nations that are far from being democratic, there is a general awareness of what democracy is. This second-hand knowledge has been influential enough to mobilize mass democratic movements in nations that had never before experienced democracy, most notably in the former Soviet Bloc. Of course, there are those who explicity reject democracy, most often on religious grounds. But people everywhere believe that government must rest on a conceptual foundation, be it Islamic or democratic. In the absence of conceptual legitimacy, governments find themselves forced to justify their existence on narrow and defensive grounds, such as the need to avoid violence and chaos. While such arguments have for, example, allowed the Algerian military to insist that it is only the bulwark against an Islamic revolution. Now that the threat of such a resolution has subsided, however, the military cannot hold on without resorting to violence of its own. Fortunately, it seems to have decided that freedom is more important than power.

One thing Quandt does not talk about in his article is the role that the United States might play in promoting Algerian democracy. The reason he doesn't is because he can't. A hidden clause in the Journal of Democracy's editorial policy dictates that authors should not prescribe (or even project) a given course for American foreign policy. This clause exists to protect the Journal, since it is published by the National Endowment for Democracy, which is a federally-funded though nominally independent organization. (Note that its website exists in the .org rather than .gov domain.) Broadly speaking, I sympathize with this desire to protect the Journalfrom political controversies that might interfere with its intellectual mission. Still, in light of how academic the Journal has become, I think there is a place for measured, non-partisan considerations of what America can and should do to promote democracy abroad.

Regardless, the fact remains that the Journal's contributors cannot address such questions. So I will. In general, I believe that American foreign policy is the most powerful instrument available for encouraging democratic reform abroad. In the case of Algeria, as with all other Middle Eastern countries, we should make it eminently clear to those in power that we see democratic reform and the war on terror as inseparable. Terror is the antithesis of democracy, and cannot survive long if a democratic public is aware of it. In light of its demonstrated interest in relaxing its grip on power, there is every reason to believe that the Algerian military will respond to American overtures. On the other hand, if we say nothing, the military may exercise the conservative option of preventing further liberalization until the current crisis in the Middle East subsides. There are no predetermined outcomes. But focused action can make a difference.

 
[David Adesnik, 3:52 PM]
I CAN"T RESIST GLOATING. Kissinger has resigned as head of the 9/11 commission. I blasted Kissinger's appointment as soon as I heard about it. I said we couldn't trust him. Now he's admitted it as well. Don't think for a second that this admission was voluntary, however. Only the disclosure requirements imposed on the commission members forced Kissinger to decide between his consulting business and the national interest. Contrary to what his erstwhile defenders have said, Kissinger hasn't changed. If he really cared about his historical reputation that much, he would've chosen to head the commission rather than protect his clients.

To be fair, however, I made some bad calls as well. On Dec. 1, I wrote that

The NYT and WashPost have offered subtle but still unequivocal criticism of the President's choice. One might even say that such criticism is more effective, since Dr. K has already taken the Times' advice and promised to sever ties with any clients whose interests might be affected by the outcome of the investigation. Still, such a promise is irrelevant. There is no reason to thnk that financial interests will affect Kissinger's judgments. The real problem is his total lack of respect for the public's right to know what their government does, a right he disrespected time again while serving as Secretary of State and National Security Adviser.

Obviously, I was wrong about financial interests not affecting Kissinger's judgment. Also worth noting is that Kissinger promised to sever times with any clients whose interests conflicted with that of the commission, but then resigned once it became clear that he would have to provide evidence that he had done so. I guess the lesson here is that Henry Kissinger is even more dishonest than his harshest critics make him out to be.

On the bright side, Kissinger's resignation leaves room for the administration to appoint a credible director. Not that I have much confidence it will, however. After all, it didn't just appoint Kissinger, but also tried to exempt him from the disclosure requirements that eventually forced his resignation. If I had my druthers, John McCain would be Kissinger's replacement. He'll tell the truth no matter who it gets hurt (and especially if it Clinton and Bush get hurt). But I have a feeling a McCain commission isn't in the cards. As such, I'm going to second Dan Urman's endorsement of Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. Both men are independent thinkers who demonstrated their insight into America's best interest with their recommendation in January 2001 that the new administration establish a Homeland Security Department. If they came up with that idea, they may have some insight into what we should do about the agencies who describe themselves as being in the business of "intelligence".

UPDATE: Apparently, Kissinger isn't taking his resignation well.

 
[David Adesnik, 3:22 PM]
MISSING THE STORY: Both the NYT and WashPost have in-depth accounts of yesterday's gathering of Iraqi opposition groups. In a manner reminiscient of Kurosawa's Rashomon, the accounts of the respective papers' correspondents are so different that one has to wonder what actually happened. The Times focuses on the Iraqis interest in cultivating relations with Iran and resistance to the prospect of an American military government. The Post focuses on the infighting that is dividing the opposition and preventing any coherent planning ffor postwar Iraq from taking place.

If I were a journalism professor, I would have to give an 'A' to the Post's story and a 'C-' to the Times. If you don't know much about the Iraqi opposition-in-exile, the Times' story leads you to believe that American militarism is driving potential allies into the arms of Iran (which the Times duly informs us is "part of what President Bush has called the "axis of evil"). The real story, however, is that the fragmented Iraqi exiles have become desperate to win back the respect they once had in Washington, but which they lost after the United States recognized just how divided and ineffective the Iraqis are. References to Iran are signs of that desperation. Threatening the US is probably not a good idea, however. As for the opposition's resistance to a US military government on faux nationalist grounds, that is nothing more than a shameless attempt to prevent the US from sidelining the opposition completely. But that's exactly what the US should do. Above all, the opposition is not representative of the Iraqi people in any significant way. It is closer to being a collection of special interests than a democratic forum. Talented opposition figures should be encouraged to serve in the postwar government, but on the grounds of merit, not representativeness.

The fragmentation and selfishness of the Iraqi opposition is a long-standing trend that the Post has done quite good job of covering. As it reported a month ago, the various opposition groups couldn't even agree on a date or venue for the conference. Long before that, the Iraqi National Congress, one of the leading groups was already pressing the State Department to grant it exclusive rights to run the postwar government. As I see it, the best hope for establishing a legitimate government in Iraq will be to have Tommy Franks run it long enough for a new political class to emerge.

UPDATE: Over at the National Review, Amir Taheri puts a more positive spin on the Iraqi opposition.

 
[David Adesnik, 6:04 AM]
LEFTOVER TURKEY: Embarrassing itself yet again, the EU has refused to even set a date for membership negotiations with Turkey. Accordingly, the NY Times lashed Europe for "a needless and damaging delay" that in some respects is "merely a facade for anti-Muslim prejudice".

Interestinlgy, the Post chose to publish a column by, Jeffrey Gedmin, a Berlin-based analyst who makes a strong case for the difficulty of admitting a nation whose economic and legal structures have so far to go before meeting European standards. Yet even Gedmin acknowledges, with regard to the EU's justification of its decision that "seldom has the gap between rhetoric and reality been as great as now."

One point that has unfortunately been left out of today's raft of articles on Turkish membership is the way in which opening negotiations with Turkey might affect the electoral prospects of Europe's current governments. Knowing that popular support for EU expansion is lacking, European leaders have avoided submitting the issue to public referenda. Ireland, the one nation that has held a referendum, had to hold a second referendum as well after the first expansion proposal was rejected. (Special thanks to Matthieu Vasseur for elaborating this point.)

In the absence of a popular mandate for expansion, Europe's governments know they cannot push much farther without risking a backlash. While, on the one hand, such behavior is thoroughly democratic, it also entails shameless pandering to racist and religious prejudice. While a popular backlash might not result from admitting too many white and Christian nations, admitting one dark-skinned and Islamic one would create a furor. Or should I say "create a Fuehrer"?

In short, Turkey's prospects-- and, by extension, those of democratization in the Middle East -- are being held hostage by Europe's twin domestic crises: First, its inability to broaden and deepen the EU in a democratic manner; Second, its inability to confront the implications of religious diveristy, both in the form of violent Islamic fundamentalism and the racist reaction to it. Thus, at a time when George Bush is visiting mosques and the Turkish electorate has opted for a party that reconciles Islam and democracy, Europe finds itself struggling to balance church and state.

UPDATE: I just ran across a Fareed Zakaria op-ed on Turkey and the EU which I linked to a few weeks back. The key quote is this:

Europeans often complain that America's strategy in the war on terror is one-dimensional. It's all military might with little effort to engage the Islamic world in a constructive way. They point out that unless we help Muslim countries prosper, all the F-16s and Predators in the world won't stop the flow of terror. It's a valid criticism, but the single biggest push that could shift events in this direction lies not in America's hands but in Europe's. And Europe is about to blow it.

 
[David Adesnik, 5:18 AM]
HIGADO PICADO is Spanish for "chopped liver". That is pure trivia. It is profoundly significant, however, that the best chopped liver in NYC can be found at the 2nd Ave. Deli. While the Deli does have an excellent mail order service that allows customers from Missoula to Montgomery to sample its kosher delights, chopped liver is apparently too delicate to be included on the mail order menu. As such, I have often served as a personal courier for this legendary Deli delight, taking containers of it on planes with me as I have traveled from Naragansett to New Mexico.

In contrast to Henry Kissinger, who seems to have problems disclosing conflicts of interest even America's national security is on the line, I freely admit that my evaluation of the Deli is hopelessly biased. I have known the Lebewohl family, owners of the deli, since I was the size of a matzah ball. Abe, the Deli's founder and a much beloved man on lower 2nd Ave., was tragically killed one morning in the process of depositing his receipts in the bank. His brother Jack took over the Deli, however, and it continues to be a living memorial to the fallen. I have taken friends from America, Hong Kong and El Salvador to eat at the Deli with me, and their praise has been unanimous. But even if you can't trust my opinion, you should know that Zagat has rated 2nd Ave. as the No. 1 deli in New York. Mazel Tov!

 
[David Adesnik, 4:38 PM]
HELLO SASHA: I have not yet seen the new Bond film. And now that you've told me how it ends, I'm not sure it's worth my time. Thanks. Thanks a lot. Now to return the favor, let me save you some time. Don't go see the next two Lord of the Rings flicks. Why spend all that money on tickets if you know that Frodo will eventually destory the One True Ring in the fires of Mt. Doom, thereby saving Middle Earth? Oh yeah, and Strider is really Aragorn, the king of men in Middle Earth.

 
[David Adesnik, 4:31 PM]
DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: In his September 12th speech at the United Nations, the President declared that the United States is committed to the creation of a democratic Middle East. This statement provoked an extensive and detailed debate (in one corner of the blogosphere) on the prospects for democratization in the Middle East. The optimists argued that American power has the potential to transform the Middle East just it as it did Germany and Japan. The pessimists responded that Islamic culture is a barrier that no American commitment can overcome.

Both sides made strong points and learned a lot, but no consensus was reached. As the participants approached the limits of their knowledge and the debate began to wind down, I proposed that we resume discussion in the late autumn after the publication of the Journal of Democracy's special issue on democracy in the Middle East. The issue is now out, so let the games begin.

(Unfortunately, the contents are available online only to subscribers. Most universities have subscriptions, however. If you live in the real world, you can probably afford the eight bucks for an actual printed copy of the journal.)

Where to begin? With Iran, of course. Not, however, with the ongoing student protests or even the election of Iran's reformist president, Mr. Khatami. Instead, I want to begin with the fall of the Shah and the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini. This revolution has become the paradigm on which the argument against democratization in the Middle East rests. Sometimes, the presence of the Iranian paradigm is explicit, at other times not. If one strips the revolution down to its fundamentals, one can describe it as in this manner:

The enduring rule of a secular, brutal and pro-American regime led to widespread resentment among the masses. In the absence of a moderate alternative to the ruling regime, the masses accepted the violent message of fudamentalist Islam as the possible response to government repression. When American support for the regime wavered, the masses enthusiastically supported an Islamic revolution. After taking power, the clerics dedicated themselves to promoting fundamentalism throughout the Islamic world as well as sponsoring extensive terrorist actions that targeted both Israel and the West.

Is there any reason to believe that if the United States presses for reform in Saudi Arabia, Egypt or any of its other dictatorial client states, the result won't be the same as it was in Iran? In spite of current indications that Iran is headed in a democratic direction, I do not hesitate to admit that the United States cannot afford to permit similar revolutions to happen elsewhere. If such revolutions took place simultaneously, there is every reason to believe that the new regimes would launch a massive campaign of terror while also promoting additional revolutions in neighboring states. Moreover, the chance that one of these regimes would develop weapons of mass destruction -- and then distribute them to both state and non-state actors -- would be extremely high. If all this were to happen, one would have to say that the United States had lost the war on terror.

In arguing for democracy in the Middle East, I take on myself the burden of showing that the Iranian paradigm is a misleading indicator of what would happen if the United States were to commit itself wholeheartedly to democratic reform. Thus, I cannot make my case in general terms but must instead present strong empirical evidence that the differences between the current Arab dictatorships and pre-revolutionary Iran are greater than their similarities. I don't know if I will succeed, but I am willing to try.

Stay tuned...

 
[David Adesnik, 12:57 PM]
THE UN-REALISTS: From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1980s, a cadre of scholars known as "realists" dominated the discipline of international relations. Realists insisted that in the struggle for international dominance, power balances power and that conflict is inevitable. While their stranglehold on the discipline began to relax for a complex set of reasons, the decisive blow to their influence was the United States' bloodless victory over Soviet Communism and subsequent consolidation of its role as the lone superpower. The idea that one "pole" in a "bipolar" world might watch passively as its empire crumbled before its eyes was inconceivable to scholars of the realist persuasion. Even more inconceivable was the idea American dominance represented anything more than a "unipolar moment" in a world headed toward its natural state of "multipolarity".

Among active scholars, the most prominent realists are Stephen Walt of Harvard's Kennedy School and John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago. In the early 1990s, both Walt and Mearsheimer took the bold step of using realist theories of international relations to forecast the political trends of the near future. Walt predicted that NATO would dissolve in the absence of a Soviet threat. Mearsheimer predicted that Europe would return to the competitive power-balancing system of the 19th century rather than continue its march toward a continental union. While such predictions have severely limited the appeal of realism to the current generation of IR graduate students, realism continues to exert a strong influence in the academy because many of its most prominent advocates -- including Walt and Mearsheimer are still relatively young.

One positive aspect of the realist tradition is its practitioners' commitment to using their knowledge to benefit policymakers. As such, Walt, Mearsheimer et. al. have consistently published provocative essays in policy-oriented journals such as Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy. In fact, Walt and Mearsheimer are the co-authors of an extended essay in the current issue of Foreign Policy which argues that the US is on the brink of waging "An Unnecessary War" against Saddam.

The foundation of their argument is that -- contra Kenneth Pollack -- Saddam is eminently deterrable. However, as is so often the case with academicians-turned-policy analysts, they push their theoretical premises too far. Consider the following passage:

But what if Saddam invaded Kuwait again and then said he would use nuclear weapons if the United States attempted another Desert Storm? Again, this threat is not credible. If Saddam initiated nuclear war against the United States over Kuwait, he would bring U.S. nuclear warheads down on his own head. Given the choice between withdrawing or dying, he would almost certainly choose the former. Thus, the United States could wage Desert Storm II against a nuclear-armed Saddam without precipitating nuclear war.

From a strict logical standpoing this argument is not a bad one. By the same token, one could have argued at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis that according to strict logic, nuclear war was impossible. Yet no one knew that then and no one knows it now. Real life introduces so many uncertainties into the policymaking process that even the most rigorous predictions derived from the most rigorous theoretical frameworks cannot predict what will happen if there were a nuclear showdown in the Middle East.

Beyond such concerns, it is instructive to take note of what Walt and Mearsheimer leave out of their analysis. First of all, they do not consider the what impact it would have on the credibility of the United Nations if Saddam were found, once again, to have blatantly violated its unanimous resolution calling on him to disarm. While it is not hard to argue that the UN has proven to be more of a hindrance than a help in getting Saddam to disarm, the institution does play a critical role in postwar situations, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and (presumably) Iraq. Moreover, as opponents of using force, Walt and Mearsheimer ought to recognize that the UN is the one institution that has held the United States back from declaring a war they believe to be both dangerous and unnecessary. Unless Walt and Mearsheimer believe that this is the last time the United States will seek to resolve a crisis through the use of force, they should think long and hard before recommending a course of action so devastating to the credibility of the United Nations.

On a related note, Walt and Mearsheimer fail to consider the possibility that a nuclear-armed Iraq would play a leading role in spreading weapons technologies to as many other anti-American governments as possible, a la North Korea. (The authors do consider the possibility that Saddam would provide Al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction and dismiss it out of hand. Again, their case is strong on logical grounds but doesn't seem to reflect reality.) But if the United States doesn't punish Saddam for developing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, what would prevent Syria, Libya, Iran, etc. from developing them as well? While, according to Walt and Mearsheimer's logic, such rogue states could be deterred as well, the risk of a nuclear conflict rises precipitiously with each additional state that has such weapons. Besides, if India and Pakistan went to the brink of war despite having nuclear weapons, there is no reason to think that keeping the peace in a nuclear Middle East would be an easy task at all. And in whose lap would the responsibility for keeping the peace in such a situation fall? You know who. Trigger-happy Uncle Sam.

 
[David Adesnik, 11:35 AM]
DEAD HORSE BEATEN: Amidst the avalanche of posts about Trent Lott, a critical question has been overlooked: What has Strom Thurmond himself said about Trent Lott's remarks? There is nothing on Thurmond's Senate website. If Thurmond wants to be remembered as he is now and not as he was then, he should speak out before his time in Washignton ends.

Oh, and if you really do want more links to articles and posts about Lott, go to Instapundit.