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Saturday, July 12, 2003

 

Las Vegas Review-Journal Story on the Nevada Decision: It's here, and quotes this blog, among other sources. I particularly like this comment:
Gary Peck, executive director of the ACLU of Nevada, said members of the organization were troubled by the reasoning the Nevada Supreme Court used to reach its decision, "particularly the dubious distinction it made between substantive and procedural constitutional rights."

"We hope that distinction does not set a precedent that might be used to improperly create a hierarchy of rights inconsistent with core constitutional principles," Peck said.

 

More on the Kate Spade/ Napster connection: A reader responds to my earlier post about the similarities between downloading copyrighted music and buying counterfeit Kate Spade bags by suggesting that the connection may be stronger than I had initially thought. She writes:
I bought a knock-off Spade bag because, as the women you spoke to said, it's lunacy to spend the money when a knock-off is perfectly acceptable. But I do it with a bit of the hostility that some bring to music downloading. It irritates me when a bag that is made of fabric costs that much. I know what it's made of. I'll spend the money on quality leather, but not on a piece of sturdy cardboard covered with microfiber. She sells her brand. That's great. But I don't have to buy it!

 

One way to get off a university mailing list is to falsely report your own death. Sure, the news of your death might cause a bit of pain and suffering among your friends who read your obituary, but hey, it sure will get you off that mailing list.

 

Know your blogger: When you send an e-mail about a blog post, please make sure that you send it to the right coconspirator. All our e-mail addresses are available just by clicking on the blogger's name on the left-hand side of the screen. (Some of the addresses have the word "at" instead of an @ sign, just to try to foil robots that harvest e-mail addresses for spamming purposes, so if you don't instantly see the address, just look a bit more closely.) Sending the message to the right blogger will save time both for you and for us.

 

Quotable Holmes: I was leafing through my copy of the Posner-edited collection The Essential Holmes, and was reminded of some of Justice Holmes's great lines, both on life and law:
Culture of course often means having more wood in your woodpile than you have in your furnace, and of a size that won't go in. (p23)

There is no short cut to fame or comfort and all there is is to bore into it as hard as you can. (p30)

Life, not the parson, teaches conduct. (p43)

Why? Why do I desire to win my game of solitaire? A foolish question, to which the only answer is that you are up against it. Accept the inevitable and do your damndest. (p44)

[W]hen I say a thing is true I only mean that I can't help believing it -- but I have no grounds for assuming that my can't helps are cosmic can't helps and some reasons for thinking otherwise. I therefore define truth as the system of my intellectual limitations. (p107)

The trouble is that our ideals for the most part are inarticulate, and that even if we have made them definite we have very little experimental knowledge of the way to bring them about. (p118)

To have doubted one's first principles is the mark of a civilized man. (p119)

I always say that I regard legislation like buying a ticket to the theatre; if you are sure that you want to go to the show and have the money to pay for it there is an end to the matter. I may think you foolish to want to go, but that has nothing to do with my duty. (p138)

 

Howard Dean guest-blogging on Larry Lessig's blog: Larry just announced this. Sounds pretty cool, and a sign of how important the Net -- and, in some measure, blogging -- has become. It will be interesting to see whether the posts will have the freshness and personality of a typical blog, or whether they will be (for perfectly understandable reasons) the typical canned campaigner rhetoric. In any case, many thanks to Larry for arranging this (and congratulations to him for having the prominence to be able to arrange it).



Friday, July 11, 2003

 

Springtime for Hitler: I saw The Producers tonight. Wonderful cast, terrific performance, great choreography, gorgeous sets. If you agree that this was one of the funniest musicals you have seen in recent memory, that you laughed until your sides hurt, and that you left the theater singing one of its original songs, then I do NOT want to hear from you. But if you could not understand why everyone was laughing so hard at such antiquainted schtick, including good old fashioned gay jokes that never ended, if you cannot recall a lyric or tune--other than "Springtime For Hitler," of course--to save your soul, if you did not think there was a single line delivered as well as in the film, if you longed for Gene Wilder, if you have absolutely no idea why this play won so many awards with seats going for $1000 a pop when it opened on Broadway, then please write to me. I do not want to think that my wife and I are completely crazy, as we seemed to be the only ones in the theater with smiles plastered on our faces (though we did appreciate and applaud the talent and efforts of the cast). We just didn't get it. Don't help us get it. We need reinforcement, not enlightenment. Be our Producers support group. Let us know you're out there.

(OK, there was ONE impressive moment: the way they replicated the classic overhead movie shot of the dancing swastika. I was wondering how they were going to do that and it worked.)

 

Stewart & Alt on cloning: Nathaniel Stewart and Robert Alt respond to my criticisms of their National Review Online piece (see here and below) at the NoLeftTurns site (see here and below). I'm afraid I'm too swamped to respond in turn, but I thought I'd pass along the links.

 

Nevada case information: Howard Bashman of How Appealing was kind enough to e-mail me the link to a Web page containing most of the documents (briefs and the like) in the Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature case.

 

"Anti-Left Viewpoint Discrimination": Eric Muller (IsThatLegal?) -- with whom I often agree, though not this time -- mentions the following incident (go to his site to get the links):
The little town of Carrboro, North Carolina, "The Paris of the Piedmont," as we locals like to call it, surely must be North Carolina's most liberal town. One of the first towns to pass a resolution protesting the PATRIOT Act. A town that declared April "French Products Month" to counter the anti-French mood in Washington during the Iraq war. A very popular and openly gay mayor. You get the picture.

Well, Carrboro doesn't get the picture.

The second-highest elected official in Carrboro ordered the removal last week of a controversial piece of artwork from a public display in town hall on the eve of Carrboro's Independence Day celebration? The piece, "Trying To Make Black and White Out of Red, White, and Blue," is an American flag with the stars arranged in the shape of a swastika. The alderman who removed the work was reportedly concerned that older people, including veterans, who would be playing bingo in the boardroom where the work was exhibited might be offended by it.

Sheesh. If you can't show a provocative piece of artwork in a public display in Carrboro, where can you show it?
Well, how about on your own property? Or on the property of someone else who's willing to display it? Or even in a public forum that the city opened for a wide range of private speech, which the city wouldn't be endorsing?

     The newspaper story suggests that the City was putting up an art exhibit, not as part of a broadly available open forum, but just because some city officials chose to showcase this particular artist's employees. Higher c ty officials were perfectly free to decide that, no, they didn't want to give this special benefit to this particular artist.

     Just to give an analogy, imagine that a Carrboro city employee decided that a city building should prominently display a sign saying "Liberals are Traitors to America." The mayor got some complaints, and said "Well, I don't think the City should be promoting this viewpoint." I think the mayor would be quite right to take it down.

     No-one is entitled, either as a legal or as an ethical matter, to have his work be specially displayed in a government building. Government officials can choose what messages they want to send (e.g., anti-drug but not pro-drug, anti-racism but not pro-racism, pro-American but not anti-American), and they can also decide when a display is pro-drug, pro-racism, or anti-American. That's viewpoint discrimination, but it's perfectly permissible viewpoint discrimination. (Incidentally, I think that exclusion of American flag / swastika mixes isn't "anti-Left viewpoint discrimination" any more than exclusion of a poster saying "Liberals are Traitors to America" is anti-Right viewpoint discrimination.) And if one lower-level government official authorizes such a specially privileged display, a higher-level government official may decide otherwise.

     If the government were denying an artist the right to put up this poster on private property, I'd firmly oppose that. Likewise if I saw some indication -- which I don't see -- that the artist was participating in a broadly open public forum, in which your or I could have our work displayed just for the asking. But if the artist is complaining that the government changed its mind about giving her special access to a piece of prominent government property, I'm not terribly impressed.

     Incidentally, I realize that the artist claims her poster isn't anti-American: "In t e statement, Levinsohn explained that she created the art in 1990 as a protest against the flag amendment, which would ban flag burning and, she believed, threaten First Amendment rights to freedom of speech. In an interview Thursday, Levinsohn, who is Jewish, said she had used the swastika because she thought it would make it clear to people that her art is about a type of repression that would threaten the freedoms in this country. The artist said she considers herself patriotic. On Thursday, she wore red, white and blue, down to her shoes." That's fine by me -- but passersby can quite reasonably perceive this as anti-American, and city officials may therefore reasonably conclude that they're helping spread an anti-American message, regardless of the artist's subjective intentions. To return to my hypothetical, imagine that the person who posted "Liberals are Traitors to America" actually intended this to be not an anti-liberal statement, but a parody of anti-liberal statements. Government officials could still conclude that this will be perceived as anti-liberal, and that they therefore don't want to display it on government property (at least unless the property has been opened up as a broadly accessible public forum).

 

Truman, Prejudice, and Anti-Semitism: David Bernstein has a thoughtful and informative post on this.

 

Apologies in advance over the brevity of my e-mail responses: I much appreciate getting messages from readers -- among other things, many of our posts have flowed precisely from such messages. Messages about interesting news items, such as the CBS News headline errors, or the Nevada Supreme Court decision, are particularly helpful, but arguments are also sometimes useful, too; you'll note that I sometimes quote them and respond to them.

     I should warn people, though, that I'll often reply simply with a "Sorry, swamped, have to pass" or some such. I'm sorry about that, especially when the message contains a substantive argument criticizing one of my posts; but unfortunately, I just have to sometimes leave my points undefended, rather than respond to what are often dozens of substantive messages per day. There are are only so many hours in a day, and some of them have to be occupied with real work! So, apologies in advance about this, but I'm afraid that there's nothing else I can do.

 

More about the Nevada situation: Some people have pointed that the Nevada Governor, who filed the lawsuit, should also be faulted. I asked Greg Boderick, from the Pacific Legal Foundation (which I believe was involved in the case), whether the Governor actually asked the Court to reject the Nevada Constitution's 2/3 requirement for tax increases. Here's what he wrote about the Governor's role, and about the background more broadly:
The Governor's petition, written by the Attorney General, was murky at best. I thought it was a tactic to give the Court wiggle room . . . . At any rate, the Governor asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus that:

1) Finds the Legislature in violation of the Nevada Constitution by failing to approve a balanced budget including K-12 spending; and
2) Directs the Legislature to act by a certain time (unspecified) to authorize and appropriate sufficient funds for the schools (here, $1.65 Billion); and
3) Directs the Legislature to "provide[e] by law for an annual tax" sufficient to meet the overspending (In this case $860 million plus)

Then there was the usual language about amending the writ and "such other relief" and all of that.
So...He didn't specifically ask for suspension of the 2/3 requirement, but he sort of asked the Court to appropriate the money and raise taxes itself. Very odd.

You may find all of the documents relating to this suit here: http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/geninfo_gpetition.html

The real problem in this case was how they got this far.

The Legislature passed the budget in parts, leaving education to last.
After passing everything else, they had only $800 million (give or take) left to spend before they exceeded the tax revenue.
The Senate passed the Governor's education bill and $864 million in tax increases (21-0).
The Assembly Bill failed to reach the 2/3 margin by one vote (27-15).
The 72nd Regul r session expired.
The Governor called a special session (Special Session 19), but limited discussion to passing the Ed bill and raising taxes (The Constitution gives him authority to do so).
The Republicans held out and the Session ended with nothing.
The Gov. called Special Session 20, same result.

The Republicans are OK with raising taxes some amount, but they want to cut spending in other Spending Bills that already passed. Spending Bills pass by majority, taxes by 2/3, so they held out on taxes.

That is the simplified background story. . . .

 

There might or might not be a God but Allah -- of course we would never be so rude as to express a firm opinion on that: The Council on American Islamic Relations posts on its site this excerpt from a Newsday story:
A national Muslim organization demanded an apology Wednesday from a Flushing Buddhist priest who allegedly made disparaging remarks about Islam that were posted on the Internet.

Ghazi Khankan, executive director of the Council on American Islamic Relations-New York, said the Rev. Jisei Nagasaka made disparaging statements, including "Islam is a false religion." His comments came after another Buddhist priest made similar statements, including Allah "is a figment of the imagination."

"I was surprised because I know Buddhists are peaceful people," he said. "Why attack others? It didn't make sense to me."

After a news conference in front of the Buddhist temple - Nichiren Shoshu - on Beech Avenue in Flushing, Khankan and other Muslim leaders delivered a petition containing 388 signatures to a temple official.

The petition called on Nagasaka, the Flushing temple's chief priest, to apologize for his remarks, which were made to an audience and later posted on the temple's Web site, Khankan said.

While the statements in question were promptly removed from the Web site after letters and phone calls from Muslims, the council said Nagasaka's comments can only be rectified with better understanding and an apology...
     Now naturally Muslims won't agree with the Buddhist priest's view that "Islam is a false religion" -- just like the Buddhist doesn't agree with the Muslims' view that Islam is the true religion. And Muslims don't agree that "Allah 'is a figment of the imagination,'" just lik people of other religions (for instance, Hindus) don't agree that "There is no God but Allah."

     But one aspect of religious freedom is the freedom to express that you think other religions are mistaken. What, did Muslims think that Buddhists thought Allah was real, and Islam was a true religion? If the Buddhists did think that, they'd be Muslims, not Buddhists. Of course they think your religion is false -- and they're perfectly entitled to say so.

     Perhaps some especially gentle or subtle folk would avoid such statements, and instead not publicly opine on whether they think Islam is a false religion -- or, for that matter, not publicly opine on whether there is no god but Allah. But people have no ethical obligation to refrain from such statements, which (at least looking at the quotes that CAIR posts on its own Web site) actually seem pretty calm and measured. (All criticisms, political or religious, may be made so harshly that they'd become rude -- but saying that you think other people's viewpoints are false, or that there is no God but your God, is a proper way to express an important point of view.)

     Actually, it seems to me that CAIR's complaint can't really be about the Buddhist speakers' "attack[ing]" anyone, because they didn't attack anyone, or about the speakers being non-"peaceful," since they seemed to be expressing their views quite peacefully. Rather, their complaint appears to be about blasphemy, since that's the only offense that the speakers were committing. In America, though, this sort of blasphemy -- the civil disagreement with the beliefs of another faith -- is a treasured part of our religious freedom, not an offense which demands an apology.

 

SAY "HI" TO ME AT NORTHWESTERN On Monday, I will be lecturing for 6 hours on contract law at Northwestern University School of Law for LawPreview. I don’t often get invited out to speak on contracts, so for me it is a refreshing change of pace. If you are one of the aspiring legal eagles who will be attending, be sure to identify yourself to me as a reader of The Volokh Conspiracy.

 

Thanks for the Responses to my NRO column on Lawrence v. Texas: I have received a lot of links and responses to my NRO piece, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution. I am especially impressed with the respectfulness and thoughtfulness of those writers who disagreed with my position. There is, of course, much much more to be said about a constitutional "presumption of liberty"--both historically, doctrinally, and practically--than I could get into in even a lengthy column. Understandably, therefore, many respondents had technical questions that will be addressed at length in Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (which will be $32.50, not $39.50).

I normally try to respond to thoughtful blogs and e-mails, but I am leaving town tomorrow and really need to get back to reading the page proofs for the book and writing the index. I will try to catch up later if I can. If you are interested in more on the difference between liberty and license--or rightful and wrongful conduct--this is the subject of The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law.

I probably should emphasize that, in my NRO column, I was not predicting what the Supreme Court will do with Lawrence. I was only describing what the reasoning of the opinion means, if the Court takes it seriously. Whether or not one is optimistic about the Court, one still has to accept a victory when it occurs.

 

Appealing to the wrong authority: Several people e-mailed me to ask whether the Nevada Supreme Court decision can be appealed to the federal courts, on the grounds that it violates article IV, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." I think that would be the wrong solution.

     First, the Supreme Court has consistently held that it's not for the federal courts to decide which forms of government are "Republican" and which aren't. Now perhaps that's a mistake -- maybe courts should enforce even such vague provisions, rather than leaving them to Congress and other political actors. But it's the law, and I don't think the Court is likely to reverse it. What's more, while I think the Nevada Supreme Court's decision is outrageous, I'm not sure that it makes Nevada into a "non-Republican Form of Government"; it takes more than just some awful decisions like this to do that, I think. (Incidentally, the Guarantee Clause has in the past been used to challenge voter initiatives, on the grounds that they're not "Republican" enough; I think this argument is unsound, precisely because the system remains Republican even if it has some direct democratic components, and a considerable amount of judicial power.)

     But, second, the trouble here is that the Nevada Justices has rejected the will of the Nevada voters. The solution isn't, I think, to put your trust in other judges. The solution is for the voters -- or their direct representatives in the legislature, or both -- to fight back themselves. Nevada Justices can be recalled by the voters, and they can be removed by the Legislature, even without there having to be grounds for impeachment (see my first post on the subject below). I'm hoping that Nevadans will be incensed enough by the judges' decision to take these necessary steps.

 

The CBS screenshot I mentioned below: Here's the GIF, and here's the JPG. You can see (if your eyesight is good, sorry for the low aulity) the "Bush Knew Iraq Info Was False" headline, the "Video: Bush's Phony Iraq Claim" item, and the "Poll: U.S. Losing Control in Iraq" headline.

 

Can anyone answer a MS Word 2002 question for me? Sorry to trouble all of you, but I'd like to post that CBSnews.com screen shot, but I can't seem to extract it from a Word document. I had done a "Print Screen" and then pasted the result into a Word document; now, the picture is right there in the document, but I don't know how to extract it as a .GIF or .JPG or whatever else. When I right-click on the picture, I don't get any "Save As" option. Once I have it as an external file, I'll be able to easily upload it to my site -- but I just don't know quite how to do it. (Even a "File / Save As Web" command, which is supposed to save the whole document as an .HTM file, doesn't seem to yield proper results -- when I look at the resulting page, the pictures don't show up -- but in any event I'd rather just save the pictures as .GIFs or .JPGs.) If anyone can help me with this, please e-mail me at volokh at law.ucla.edu. Thanks!

UPDATE: Due to two typos, the original title of this post referred to "MS Word 1001," which I'm told is a somewhat obsolete version (though it does have a great "illumination" option).

FURTHER UPDATE: Reader Stuart Greene gave me the answer (or at least an answer), which was to copy it to the photo editor. Thanks, and thanks also to Mike Cakora and John Owen for other suggestions.


 

A perspective from Nevada: Reader Rick Henderson writes:
As you guessed, there's a LOT of politicking going on here, which I hope to write about for Reason or NRO or someplace outside my normal channels. What led to the impasse was a Republican governor who won re-election virtually unopposed and misread that victory as a mandate to give a big gift to the state's public sector while imposing a series of unpopular new taxes. When his plan failed to gain the necessary supermajority support, he forced the Legislature into special session, which accomplished nothing, although from a $5 billion budget, the two sides were less than $60 million apart in their spending demands. (There was also a spirited debate over the composition of the tax increases, with Republicans favoring an expansion of existing taxes, and Democrats backing a new, revenue-based "gross receipts" tax on non-gaming businesses.)

The governor refused to negotiate, setting the stage for the court battle. The outcome was a total shock, and though legislative Democrats are giddy right now, even they may soon rue this decision. I would not be surprised if the chief justice, Nancy Agosti, who's up for re-election next year, is recalled before she's defeated. She may become the Rose Bird of Nevada. (The black helicopter crowd also believes the Supreme Court was literally bought off by the casino industry, which ruthlessly worked over lawmakers who balked at the size of the spending increase and the implementation of the gross receipts tax. I find that hard to believe, but reporters at our paper are tracking down those rumors.)

It's also possible that the decision will stand and no one will be called to account for this gross injustice, meaning that Nevada will indeed become, as one Republican lawmaker suggested earlier this year, East California.

 

ed that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa,” Mr. Bush said.

The statement was technically correct, since it accurately reflected the British paper. But the bottom line is the White House knowingly included in a presidential address information its own CIA had explicitly warned might not be true.

Today at a press conference during the President’s trip to Africa, Secretary of Sta e Colin Powell portrayed it as an honest mistake.

“There was no effort or attempt on the part of the president or anyone else in the administration to mislead or to deceive the American people,” said Powell.

But eight days after the State of the Union, when Powell addressed the U.N., he deliberately left out any reference to Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa.

“I didn’t use the uranium at that point because I didn’t think that was sufficiently strong as evidence to present before the world,” Powell said.

That is exactly what CIA officials told the White House before the State of the Union. The top CIA official, Director George Tenet, was not involved in those discussions and apparently never warned the President he was on thin ice.

Secretary Powell said today he read the State of the Union speech before it was delivered and understood it had been seen and cleared by the intelligence community. But intelligence officials say the director of the CIA never saw the final draft.
There is still nothing in the story that says anything about what Bush knew (as opposed to what some lower level White House officials knew). How can this sort of headline-writing go on? The headline writers didn't make an error about some external information -- rather, all they needed to do was read and accurately summarize a 420-word article. Yet they seem to have failed in that task, both the first time and the second time when they knew they had to correct the headline. And they failed in a way that makes a serious personal and political allegation, the sort of allegation that people should know to double-check. What's up here?

 

And another incorrect headline from CBS News: Another CBSNews.com front-page story has the headline "Poll: U.S. Losing Control in Iraq." (I originally noticed the story because it was right up there in the top middle of the page -- again, it's on the screen-shot that I'll put up in the morning -- with a subhead of "Less Than Half of Americans Now Say U.S. is in Control in Iraq"; it now rates just a one-liner with no subhead lower down on the page.)

     Sounds from the headline like a majority of respondents say that the U.S. is losing control in Iraq, no? Ah, but appearances are deceiving, at least on cbsnews.com tonight. The whole story (which has the same "U.S. Losing Control in Iraq" headline that was also given on the front page) reports, in relevant part:
With U.S. troops continuing to take casualties in Iraq, less than half of Americans now believe the U.S. is in control of the situation there -- a dramatic decline from April, when 71 percent thought it was. . . .

Americans’ belief that the U.S. is in control of the situation in Iraq has plummeted to 45 percent, down from 71 percent in late April.

IS THE U.S. IN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ?

Yes
Now
45%
4/03
71%

No
Now
41%
4/03
20%

. . .
That's right:
  1. The "yes" numbers fell from 71% to 45%, which means that (unless some people thought the U.S. wasn't in control in late April but is in control now) a whopping 26% believe the statement in the headline "U.S. Losing Control in Iraq." Or, if you prefer, 26% more people believe that we're losing control than the percentage that believe we're gaining control. (I'm assuming that by "losing control" CBS means "the U.S. had control in late April but doesn't have it now," since that's the definition that its questions reflect. One may also define "losing control" as "the U.S. has less control now than in late April, whether or not it on balance still has control now; but that's clearly not what CBS's questions are trying to gauge.)


  2. Even today, 45% of respondents say "yes" and 41% say "no" (a statistical tie), so it's not even accurate to say "Poll: U.S. Not in Control in Iraq."
That's right, the CBS headline said Poll: U.S. Losing Control in Iraq. The actual story is better summarized as Poll: U.S. Evenly Split on Whether We're in Control in Iraq or Poll: A Quarter of Americans Seem to Think We're Losing Control in Iraq. Not a good night for CBS News.

 

Falsehoods about falsehoods: Reader and UCLA Law School student Shannon Mader points out this striking headline on CBS News:
Bush Knew Iraq Info Was False
(UPDATE: The headline was changed overnight, after I wrote this post and the UPDATE below; but the new headline is still mistaken -- see the post from this morning at 8 am or so, as soon as Blogger gets around to posting it.) Quite an allegation, and one that was the lead story on the cbsnews.com page when I read it, with promise underneath of "Video: Bush's Phony Iraq Claim." (UPDATE: The line has just been changed to say "Video: Bush's Iraq Claim"; the headline has not been changed. I'll try to put up a screen shot of the old page, which I saved, when I get into the office tomorrow morning.)

     Here, however, is the whole story (I rarely reproduce entire stories, but because I think it's necessary to properly comment on it, I believe such a reproduction is a fair use in this situation):
(CBS) Senior administration officials tell CBS News the President’s mistaken claim that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa was included in his State of the Union address -- despite objections from the CIA.

Before the speech was delivered, the portions dealing with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were checked with the CIA for accuracy, reports CBS News National Security Correspondent David Martin.

CIA officials warned members of the President’s National Security Council staff the intelligence was not good enough to make the flat statement Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa.

The White House officials responded that a paper issued by the British government contained the unequivocal assertion: “Iraq has ... sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” As long as the statement wa attributed to British Intelligence, the White House officials argued, it would be factually accurate. The CIA officials dropped their objections and that’s how it was delivered.

“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa,” Mr. Bush said.

The statement was technically correct, since it accurately reflected the British paper. But the bottom line is the White House knowingly included in a presidential address information its own CIA had explicitly warned might not be true.

Today at a press conference during the President’s trip to Africa, Secretary of State Colin Powell portrayed it as an honest mistake.

“There was no effort or attempt on the part of the president or anyone else in the administration to mislead or to deceive the American people,” said Powell.

But eight days after the State of the Union, when Powell addressed the U.N., he deliberately left out any reference to Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa.

“I didn’t use the uranium at that point because I didn’t think that was sufficiently strong as evidence to present before the world,” Powell said.

That is exactly what CIA officials told the White House before the State of the Union. The top CIA official, Director George Tenet, was not involved in those discussions and apparently never warned the President he was on thin ice.

Secretary Powell said today he read the State of the Union speech before it was delivered and understood it had been seen and cleared by the intelligence community. But intelligence officials say the director of the CIA never saw the final draft.
     That's right: "The top CIA official, Director George Tenet, was not involved in those discussions and apparently never warned the President he was on thin ice," which seems to suggest the opposite of what the headline says. But more importantly, not a single sentence in the story supports the serious charge in the headline. The closest I could see was "But the bottom line is the White House knowingly included in a presidential address information its own CIA had explicitly warned might not be true" -- but even there (1) the allegation is about "the White House," not "Bush," and (2) the allegation is that the White House knew that the information "might not be true," not that it was "false."

     I haven't been following the uranium/Niger/Iraq/State-of-the-Union story closely, but I'm perfectly prepared to believe that there were serious intelligence screw-ups, stretches by government officials, or even intentional attempts to mislead people on some people's part. Among other things, I'm perfectly prepared to believe that because that's the way governments (or, for that matter, human beings) often operate. If this happened, then it's bad, and it's right that people should try to get to the bottom of things.

     But as we follow the story, it's worth remembering that falsehoods can come from lots of sources, and in particular both from the Administration and its critics. Here, in particular, we have (1) the headline on a lead story at a major news source that (2) accuses the President of lying, but (3) appears to entirely misrepresent the actual content of the story. Seems like there are potential credibility gaps all around here.



Thursday, July 10, 2003

 

When is Real Faux? In When is Faux Real? I blogged about my experience watching Pink Voyd, a tribute band imitating Pink Floyd. While watching them I kept wondering which is "real" and which is faux? The young guys playing in front of me, the old guys who would now be Pink Floyd, or my 30 year old recordings? Tonight I had a converse experience.

I went to the Chris Isaak concert at Foxwoods. It was fabulous. Real Rock and Roll (not Rock), with a touch of Rockabilly, and some smoooooth ballads. He played a lot of the best songs from his latest album, Always Got tonight as well as his biggest hits. This band is tight and 'loud and clear.' A great 2 hour show with lots of personality. If you EVER get a chance to catch these guys do so. You'll thank me. (Here are their current tour dates.) But as I watched, I couldn't help thinking . . . .

Thanks to my Tivo, I regularly watch the Chris Isaak Show on Showtime. The characters are Chris and his real band, The Silvertones--Roly (bass), Hershel (guitar), & Kenney drums....plus a fictional keyboard player--Anson--for comic relief. The thing is, the show seems based on these guys' real personalities. (They've played together since right out of college.) So watching them perform you feel like you really know them. On the TV show, we've lived through their on stage and off stage foibles and exploits. Chris is cheap, Hershel is naive, Roly is cool, Kenney is raunchy. And, like all TV personalities, you tend to think they know YOU back. Which isn't true of course, but it's hard to remember this when you see them in person.

So there they all are on stage right in front of you. Just playing guitars like ringing a bell, as on TV. You feel you know them, you've seen their life on TV. Except its all fiction. My guess is the personalities of their "characters" are pretty true to life--its not as if they are great actors--but their experiences are all unreal. Here the real Chris Isaak and Silvertones are playing out there like pros--not a faux tribute band--and Chris is goofing on the band like he does on TV. I find it terribly hard to separate this brief slice of reality from the fiction I have seen for weeks in a row, up close and very personal. So is "real," really "faux"?

By the way, in an unusually personal touch reminisent of country and western performers, Chris came out to the lobby after the show to sign autographs. He stood behind a horseshoe set of tables and went from one end to the other, over and over again, signing pictures and CDs and T-shirts and anything else put in front of him, posing for pictures, and schmoozing as much as he could given the crush of over 100 fans pushing towards the tables. When he passed by me I told him I really enjoyed the show and he said thanks. I told him I really liked the TV show too, and he looked up with a twinkle in his eye, looked straight at me and said, "Of course you do, its got naked girls." You don't suppose he really DOES know us do you?

 

Satellite radio The world is catching on to how great it is. See this post on today's Slate.

Better than cable, as I wrote on my first-ever Conspiracy blog.

 

Sundry points: Books and music A new (2002) book is Their Word is Law: Bestselling Lawyer-Novelists Talk About Their Craft, interviews by Stephen Murphy.

Most of you who wrote back don't think that downloading music is anyway near as bad as stealing food. One spirited correspondent, Stephen, wrote the following about the motives for downloading:

"Screwing the Man. Youth are a rebellious sort...Because of all the backhanded tactics the RIAA has used to screw over both artists and consumers, stealing their money is our way of getting back at them."

I loved this post, thanks Stephen.

 

Nevada Supreme Court orders violation of Nevada Constitution: I just read one of the most appalling judicial decisions I've ever seen. It was just handed down today, and it's available here (Guinn v. Legislature).

     Nevada appears to be in the middle of a fiscal crisis: Its constitution more or less requires a balanced budget (art. 9, sec. 2(1)). There's a shortfall. The Legislature hasn't funded the budget. Various state functions, including the educational system, are right now (as of July 1) unfunded. And the Nevada Constitution (art. 4, sec. 18(2), enacted by voter initiative in 1996), requires a two-thirds vote to increase taxes, which has contributed to the budget deadlock. (I have no independent knowledge of this; I'm paraphrasing the court's statement of the facts.)

     The Nevada Supreme Court has (1) ordered the Legislature to enact a budget, and (2) suspended the operation of the two-thirds majority requirement. That's right, the two-thirds majority requirement is right there in the Nevada Constitution:
2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, an affirmative vote of not fewer than two-thirds of the members elected to each house is necessary to pass a bill or joint resolution which creates, generates, or increases any public revenue in any form, including but not limited to taxes, fees, assessments and rates, or changes in the computation bases for taxes, fees, assessments and rates.

3. A majority of all of the members elected to each house may refer any measure which creates, generates, or increases any revenue in any form to the people of the State at the next general election, and shall become effective and enforced only if it has been approved by a majority of the votes cast on the measure a such election.
But the Nevada Supreme Court has held that the Legislature must ignore this requirement.

     The Nevada Constitution does mandate (art. 11, secs. 1, 2, and 6) that the legislature create and fund public schools, though it's silent on the level of funding that the legislature must provide. Most state constitutions do impose such an affirmative obligation on the state government, and many have been read as providing affirmative judicially enforceable rights; I do not object to that conclusion here. But the Nevada Supreme Court has held that the constitutional provision requires the state legislature to fund the schools through means that are themselves unconstitutional.

     The Court recognizes this, and provides the following reasoning:
When a procedural requirement that is general in nature prevents funding for a basic, substantive right, the procedure must yield. Here, the application of the general procedural requirement for a two-thirds majority has prevented the Legislature as a body from performing its obligation to give life to the specific substantive educational rights enunciated in our Constitution.
     But this makes very little sense. First, the court just assumes that procedural requirements are somehow less important than substantive rights. How so? Some of the most important rules in our constitutions -- majority vote for most laws, the unanimity requirement on criminal juries (in many jurisdictions) or at least the supermajority requirement (in all jurisdictions), the procedural constraints on which chamber may initiate tax legislation, which chamber may approve appointments, and so on -- are procedural. These are tremendously important; courts may not waive them just in order to serve the constitution's substantive commands. Rather, American constitutions require that substantive entitlements be provided while respecting the pr cedural rules.

     Second, the two-thirds majority itself protects a substantive right -- the right to keep your property. That's why supermajority requirements for taxation are required: People believe that they have fundamental substantive property rights, and while they realize that sometimes they must yield their property for the state to provide various services, they want to make sure that these substantive rights aren't taken away unless there's very broad support.

     Third, if there is a square conflict between two provisions, the general rules are that (a) the specific prevail over the general -- and despite the court's pejorative characterization of the 2/3 tax provision as "general," it's really no more or less general than the broadly worded education provisions -- and (b) the newer prevails over the older. In 1996, the voters enacted the constraint on the state's power to tax. Of course such a constraint may make it harder for the state to fund services; the whole point was to make it harder for the state to fund services through the taking of private property. This new constraint prevails over any contradictory commands based on older provisions.

     Fourth, it's not at all clear that there's really a conflict between the provisions. As I mentioned, the education funding requirements in article 11 of the Nevada Constitution don't explicitly require a specific amount of funding. The Legislature could cut the funding for education, or for other services. It may be damaging to the state's educational system, but it is doable. And while the result might be lousy policy -- perhaps so lousy that the Legislature will muster the 2/3 majority needed for a tax increase, or find better places to cut, so that education would end up being better funded -- it would avoid what the court has done: A flat judicial nullification of an entirely explicit command of the Nevada peo le.

     Finally, if the court is willing to nullify "general procedural rules" so that it can order the legislature to fund education, why stop at the 2/3 supermajority? What if it turns out that the Legislature can't even get a simple majority for a tax increase? Under the court's reasoning, it should nullify the 50%+1 requirement, too -- after all, the simple majority requirement is also a mere "procedural requirement that is general in nature." Or, better yet, why not order the governor impose the taxes himself? The requirement that taxes be imposed by elected legislators is also just a "procedural requirement that is general in nature." But wait -- that would be inefficient. Why doesn't the court just impose the taxes itself, and order government officials to just seize the property from Nevadans' bank accounts? The only thing that stops it is also a "procedural requirement that is general in nature," and apparently those aren't really binding any more.

     This really is shameful, and I do not use the term lightly. Yes, I know that there are lots of claims of judicial overreaching -- but there are at least various defenses based on tradition, precedent, ambiguous constitutional text, or whatever else. Here, I see no such defense: Just the court's willingness to completely ignore the very constitution that gives it power.

     I hope that Nevada legislators and Nevada voters will not stand for this. Obviously, they can amend the Constitution with a "We Really Mean It Clause," though I don't know whether they can do it in time. I should mention that, under art. VII, sec. 3, "For any reasonable cause to be entered on the journals of each House, which may, or may not be sufficient grounds for impeachment, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the District Courts shall be removed from Office on the vote of two thirds of the Members elected o each branch of the Legislature, and the Justice or Judge complained of, shall be served with a copy of the complaint against him, and shall have an opportunity of being heard in person or by counsel in his defense . . . ." No high crimes and misdemeanors or breaches of "good behavior" are required -- just "any reasonable cause," and I think that this flagrant violation of the Nevada Constitution's protection of basic property rights qualifies. Also, art. II, sec. 9 seems to provide for popular recall of judges as well as other officials:
Every public officer in the State of Nevada is subject, as herein provided, to recall from office by the registered voters of the state, or of the county, district, or municipality which he represents. For this purpose, not less than twenty-five per cent (25%) of the number who actually voted in the state or in the county, district, or municipality which he represents, at the election in which he was elected, shall file their petition, in the manner herein provided, demanding his recall by the people. They shall set forth in said petition, in not exceeding two hundred (200) words, the reasons why said recall is demanded. If he shall offer his resignation, it shall be accepted and take effect on the day it is offered, and the vacancy thereby caused shall be filled in the manner provided by law. If he shall not resign within five (5) days after the petition is filed, a special election shall be ordered to be held within thirty (30) days after the issuance of the call therefor, in the state, or county, district, or municipality electing said officer, to determine whether the people will recall said officer. On the ballot at said election shall be printed verbatim as set forth in the recall petition, the reasons for demanding the recall of said officer, and in not more than two hundred (200) words, the officer’s justification of his course in office. . . .
This requires a large number of signatures, but provides for a prompt election if the signatures are athered.

     I'm not up on Nevada politics, and for all I know this might be one of those weird political kabuki dances where everyone, including the voters, might actually like the result. That doesn't keep the result from being outrageous, but it might mean that it won't generate much outrage. I do, though, hope that Nevadans won't stand for this judicial nullification of the people's will, and that they will promptly make clear that it is they who get to add or delete portions of the Nevada Constitution.

     (Thanks to Rick Henderson for the pointer to the decision.)

 

More on the Federal Marriage Amendment: Ramesh Ponnuru at The Corner disagrees with Andrew Sullivan on the Federal Marriage Amendment.
Andrew Sullivan reprints the text of the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment: "Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups." He then says, "Note how the states are effectively barred from providing anything that resembles marriage or any of the 'legal incidents thereof.' It's an attempt not only to reverse any state that wants to have same-sex marriage but to invalidate all domestic partnership laws, any state-provided benefits, or any support for same-sex couples anywhere anyhow. It's a massive power-grab from the states, in an area where states have always had constitutional authority."

There may be sound arguments against the FMA. But Sullivan's claim is ridiculous. What does he suppose the words "be construed to require" are doing in the amendment? The amendment is aimed to prevent a judge (or executive-branch official) from inferring same-sex marriage or same-sex marriage-lite from a state or federal law. It precludes a state's adoption of gay marriage (that's the first sentence). It precludes a judge's imposition of civil unions (that's part of the second sentence). It does not preclude a state legislature or popular referendum from creating civil unions or whatnot. . . .
     I think Ramesh may be mistaken here. First, let me highlight one thing that he does mention (though I unaccountably failed to grasp the full import of his mentioning it when I first posted on this). Consider this scenario: The New York legislature - or the voters of California -- say "We enact that gays shall be allowed to marry." Under the FMA, I think that would be unconstitutional, because it violates the first sentence, which says "Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman." After all, New York is in the United States; marriages in New York may not include gay marriages, regardless of what New Yorkers prefer. The amendment thus constrains more than just judges or executive branch officials. It constrains legislators or voters, too.

     This is reinforced by the "construed to require" sentence. Say that two gay men go to the courthouse to register their marriage. The county clerk says "Nope, I don't register gay marriages." The men say, "But the statute requires you, as the government employee in charge of marriages, to register gay marriages." "Not so," replies the clerk. "Under the Federal Marriage Amendment, no 'state . . . law . . . shall be construed to require that marital status . . . be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.' Therefore, even though the legislature has just enacted a state law saying that gays can marry, you're still unmarried (under the FMA's first sentence) and this state law can't be construed to require me to confer marital status on you (under the FMA's second sentence)." Both the first and the second sentence of the FMA would thus bar gay marriages, no matter what the state legislators or voters say. That alone, I think, is enough to justify disagreeing with FMA: Why should we keep the voters or legislators of another state from implementing the marriage regime that they think is right for them, especially if the Defense of Marriage Act (and other doctrines) prevents that regime from being foisted on other states?

     Now consider another scenario, where my disagreement with Ramesh lies: The New York legislature or the California voters decide to create a "civil union" statute, under whic ks for the state, goes to his human relations director and says "Please add my partner to the insurance policy." "Nope," says the director; "I only add married people to the policy, not you newfangled gay civil unioned types." "But wait," says the employee; "you're required by state law to treat us just like a married personcouple." "Not so," says the director; "the Federal Marriage Amendment specifically says that no 'state . . . law[] shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.' You're telling me that I'm required to confer the legal incidents of marriage -- here, addition to the insurance plan that my department reserves only for married people -- on you, even though you're an unmarried couple. But the U.S. Constitution says that I cannot be so required."

     Again, then, the FMA would block not just gay marriages or civil unions imposed by judges or executive branch officials, but also normal state laws adopted by legislators and voters. Contrary to Ramesh's reading, it would "preclude a state legislature or popular referendum from creating civil unions or whatnot."

     Now I realize that courts could interpret the FMA differently; courts have certainly interpreted lots of constitutional provisions in ways that don't track their literal text. But it seems to me that the reading I outline is at least plausible -- and I think it's actually the most plausible:
  1. The first sentence mandates an unchangeable definition of marriage ("Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union o a man and a woman"), thus prohibiting state legislators and voters from allowing gay marriages.


  2. The second sentence bars state laws that require local and state government officials to recognize civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other attempts to track the incidents of marriage -- "[no] . . . state . . . law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups" -- thus prohibiting state legislators and voters from setting up such civil union schemes.
The FMA would thus substantially reduce the autonomy of each state, and the authority of its legislators and voters.

UPDATE: I'm sorry to say that I originally misread part of Ramesh's post -- I failed to really grasp the sentence where he acknowledges that the Amendment would entirely ban states, include state legislators and state voters, from allowing gay marriage. (I focused too much on where he talks about the Amendment just disabling judges, and leaving legislators and voters relatively free, and I glossed over his acknowledgment that this isn't so as to gay marriage itself.) This means that in the first scenario, I actually agree with his prediction of what the Amendment would do, though I think that it would be bad for the Amendment to do that. In the second scenario, we do disagree. I've revised the post to incorporate this correction, but I wanted to leave this update and my apology here in any event.

 

Traffic totals for various blogs: N.Z. Bear now tracks traffic totals (visits, I think, rather than just page views) for a wide range of blogs. Not all blogs are included -- How Appealing, for instance, isn't; I assume that it's largely because they don't have a publicly available SiteMeter counter (it looks like Bear is relying only on SiteMeter data).

 

Theft and deprivation. Tyler and Orin muse below about why people are more comfortable recording music in violation of the law than they are in stealing food. One important reason why people feel that way, I think, is different from rationales they mention. If I take food that belongs to others, I get it and they don't. But if I unlawfully record music I have not diminished the supply of it available to others, at least directly (i.e., setting aside the question of the reduced incentive to create more of it).

 

Federal Marriage Amendment: Andrew Sullivan aptly criticizes the Federal Marriage Amendment, which reads (in the most recent version that I could find:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
Sullivan writes:
Note how the states are effectively barred from providing anything that resembles marriage or any of the "legal incidents thereof." It's an attempt not only to reverse any state that wants to have same-sex marriage but to invalidate all domestic partnership laws, any state-provided benefits, or any support for same-sex couples anywhere anyhow. It's a massive power-grab from the states, in an area where states have always had constitutional authority. If you merely want to stop one state's marriages being nationalized, you have the power already. It's called the Defense of Marriage Act, alongside the long established precedent of states being able not to recognize out of state marriages for public policy reasons. The FMA, in contrast, is an attempt to use the federal constitution to rob gay citizens of any rights in their relationships whatsoever, regardless of where they live or what their states want. . . .
     I think he's quite correct here. The Amendment doesn't just leave state legislatures free to follow their own policies (as it would if it simply said "Neither this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor federal law [omitting the mention of state law], shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups"). Rather, a state legislature would no longer be allowed to enact a law saying "County clerks and state courts shall register and tre t gay marriages the same way as they do straight marriages" -- since, after all, the amendment would bar this "state law" from being "construed to require that marital status . . . be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups" (even though that's precisely what the state legislature wants to require). Even state voters, acting through the initiative process, wouldn't be allowed to legalize gay marriage in their state.

     What's more, this may indeed jeopardize state laws providing for domestic partnerships that mirror some attributes of marriage -- because those laws "require that . . . the legal incidents [of marital status] be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups." One could argue that these laws don't really provide "the legal incidents [of marital status]," because they provide only some incidents (e.g., health insurance, the ability to recover for wrongful death, state tax treatment, and the like). But the stronger argument, I think, would be that the laws do indeed provide "the legal incidents [of marital status]," because they do provide some such incidents, and are aimed at duplicating the rules applicable to married couples.

     So this would indeed be a huge interference with state rights -- and, I think, quite unjustified. If New York voters (or their representatives) decide to allow gay marriage, or gay domestic partnerships that provide most of the incidents of marriage, why should Californians say "no"? If the concern is that the New York marriages would have to be recognized by other states, the Defense of Marriage Act should indeed suffice; and even in the unlikely event that it's struck down (and I should say that some people have urged that it be struck down), that could be reversed with a much narrower amendment than the Federal Marriage Amendment.

 

More on Dusty Baker: A reader writes, apropos Dusty Baker's comments:
But isn't it still illegal to discriminate on the basis of race? . . . If Baker believes that blacks and latinos play better in the heat, isn't he more likely to play them on hot days? If such a pattern existed, wouldn't the white players on the team have grounds to sue?
Others have made a similar point.

     If there was evidence that Baker was engaging in illegal discrimination, or if he was saying that he ought to do so, then he would be properly taken to task for that.

     But I know of no such evidence; all I see is the inference that because Baker believes something, he'll be willing to violate the law. That seems to me to be an unsound inference. It's contrary to the benefit of the doubt that we ought to give people when deciding whether to publicly condemn them, or to publicly demand apologies for them.

     The fact is that all of us harbor lots of opinions that, if we were willing to violate the law, might lead us to act illegally. Many Jews think that we are God's chosen people. Many atheists (and nonatheists) think that certain religious beliefs are unsound or illogical. Many people think, absolutely correctly, that the average man is stronger than the average woman. Many people think, absolutely correctly, that the average woman is less prone to violence than the average man.

     While all such opinions should be phrased politely, and while as a factual matter there's no doubt that some people will bristle at these points, it seems to me that people are entitled to express them, and shouldn't be publicly condemned for it. It's true that people who hold these beliefs might therefore discriminate against non-Jews, or against certain religions, or against women, or against men. But I don't think that one s ould just condemn a person who expresses these beliefs simply on the grounds that he might act on them in the future, unless we have some better evidence that he really is willing to break the law in that way.

 

Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution You can read my take on Lawrence v. Texas today on National Review Online. It is called Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution. Here's the introduction:

The more one ponders the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the more revolutionary it seems. Not because it recognizes the rights of gays and lesbians to sexual activity free of the stigmatization of the criminal law — though this is of utmost importance. No, the case is revolutionary because Justice Kennedy (and at least four justices who signed on to his opinion without separate concurrences) have finally broken free of the post-New Deal constitutional tension between a "presumption of constitutionality" on the one hand and "fundamental rights" on the other. Contrary to what has been reported repeatedly in the press, the Court in Lawrence did not protect a "right of privacy." Rather, it protected "liberty" — and without showing that the particular liberty in question is somehow "fundamental." Appreciation of the significance of this major development in constitutional law requires some historical background. . . . .

 

The Limitations of the Denial of Patents: OK, my last item for now on the National Review Online cloning piece. To their credit, the authors recognize that there should be limitations even on anti-cloning measures:
In response to this flurry of activity, it is clearly time for Congress to act, and America to lead. . . . Yet even the best of [the current-anti-cloning] proposals suffers from fundamental flaws -- it exceeds congressional authority and fails to adequately address the vast and disturbing array of emerging embryological technology.

Congress has cited only one enumerated power as a basis for its federal cloning ban: congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce. In order to survive a constitutional challenge, such a ban would need at the very least to substantially relate to commerce among the several states -- a standard that a cloning or embryonic research ban would almost certainly fail.

While an outright "Commerce Clause" ban on human cloning, hermaphroditic embryos, or fertile fetuses might be sexier to voters, legislators should eschew this course in favor of regulations conforming to Congress's limited powers. By doing so, Congress would not only act constitutionally, but could actually reach more disfavored conduct by targeting the substantial economic incentives which motivate human embryological research.

Accordingly, Congress could restrict the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) from issuing patents on human cloning and the more macabre embryo and fetal research. . . .

If, as prophesied, "big biotech" is waiting to cash in on a Huxleyan vision, then a carefully drafted prohibition on such patents would do much to curb that brave new urge. But maybe big biotech isn't the only Dr. Frankenstein to fear. Suppose Congress worries about nonprofits privately funding narcissists who would fre ersity receives federal money one way or another, whether through research grants or Medicare payments. Even the threat of withholding these federal funds would preemptively padlock these promethean labs, thereby providing an effective if unpopular first step.

Now, take a step back and imagine the possible aggregate effect. Who is likely to still be, as Messenger Boxer would have it, "doing God's work?" Not big biotech. Without patent protection, their process would be protected only as a trade-secret; which works fine for protecting the Coca-Cola formula, but not so well in scientific research where, like your fifth-grade math teacher, the dons require you to show your work. Not universities or hospitals. They'd be cutting off their noses and eyelids to spite their faces; and could never withstand the backlash for choosing such research over education and health-care dollars. Private foundations? Perhaps. But probably not many, particularly if their tax status is on the line. Leaving us with marginalized, privately under-funded, non-tenured scientists who can't prove to anyone how they did it without jeopardizing any profit they might otherwise stand to gain. Have at it.

The hour for debate has passed. Madrid has demonstrated that genetic science and embryology, left to their own devices, will fulfill our worst expectations. Congress should act expeditiously, and constitutionally, to spare us the grotesque reality of children born of aborted mothers.
But while I appreciate the authors' attentiveness to he proper limits of federal power, it seems to me their proposal will be both unduly intrusive and ineffective.

     I suspect that patent law is indeed a powerful incentive for invention, especially when research is expensive (though as I understand it, economists are quite uncertain on the subject). But it's hardly the only incentive. There are lots of very rich people in America, and many more pretty rich people; many of them are sick with some pretty serious diseases; all of them face the possibility of one day become sick with a pretty serious disease. Lots of these people already donate lots of money to medical research. Even if the donations are somehow made non-tax-exempt, and otherwise discouraged, quite a few people may be willing to fund advanced research -- partly out of philanthropy, and partly out of self-interest: If you have some form of disease in your family, and you have a multi-million dollar fortune, and cloning or embryonic research seems to offer some serious potential benefit, you may be perfectly happy to spare some tens of millions to fund this research.

     But beyond this, it's a big world, and even if America tries to "take the lead," it's not clear how much of the world will follow. If Japan or Europe allow patents for human cloning, then the proposal in the NRO would at most diminish the incentive for cloning (though of course broader bans would be limited this way, too). Companies, whether American or foreign, will engage in the research overseas -- probably more slowly, but they'll still do it. Then doctors in the U.S. would use this research (which, though slower in coming, may end up being cheaper to use because of the lack of patents) in the U.S. How much comfort will that give the anti-cloning forces?

     Now those who think that all cloning or embryonic research (and to their credit, the NRO authors apparently want to discourage all cloning but only some em ryonic research -- "Congress could restrict the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) from issuing patents on human cloning and the more macabre embryo and fetal research") is evil, perhaps because it murdered living human fetuses or some such, might not be much moved by these practical considerations. They might just think that the U.S. government shouldn't grant people patents for technology that's inherently evil, or let them use the courts to defend their evilly gotten gains. On the other hand, denying such patents does seem like a pretty feeble step in the battle against evil.

     On the other hand, those who think that cloning and even "macabre" fetal research are potentially valuable -- if, for instance, proper safeguards are used to keep gestationally old fetuses from being aborted for research purposes, or to prevent the birth of living children with horrible defects, or some such -- while also potentially harmful (if those safeguards aren't implemented), should be about as troubled by the unpatentibility / defunding / tax-exemption-stripping proposals as by total bans. The research will still happen, just in less regulated and less visible contexts and also overseas. If anything, people who are skeptical about at least some forms of this research will have less input in the process than they would without the unpatentibility etc. rules, since the domestic process would be moved entirely to special-purpose organizations whose only job is to engage in the research, and which would thus be less subject to public pressure or even public scrutiny. Not a terribly satisfying result, it seems to me.

 

Kate Spade handbags and the Napster phenomenon: Tyler's post below overlooks what I think is the most important reason why many people feel no qualms about downloading copyrighted music for free: when intellectual property laws are not enforced, social norms evolve that make violation of those laws socially acceptable, and even cool.

     I thought about this recently when a female friend was discussing the future of Kate Spade handbags. For the men in the audience, Kate Spade handbags are stylish but very expensive handbags that are widely copied by counterfeiters. You can buy knockoff fake Kate Spade handbags nearly everywhere in Washington; as a colleague here reminded me, a man sells them from a table right outside the GW Metro stop three blocks away. The counterfeiters copy not only the style, but the label; looking at a knock-off bag, you can't tell the difference. And a knockoff typically costs about $25, in contrast with the real bags that cost around $175 to $250.

     The interesting thing is, it turns out that very few people actually own the real Kate Spade bags. Based on a highly scientific study I conducted (that is, I asked a few female friends about it), it seems that very few of the Kate Spade bags you see are real. And the counterfeit bags are so widely available and so widely used that there is no social stigma at all attached to having a counterfeit bag as opposed to a real one. In fact, a few women I spoke with told me that they would find it a bit strange if someone carried a real bag rather than a fake one. As one person told me, "You would wonder, what kind of person spends their money just to have the real bag?" The norm is having the counterfeit bag, and the very few people who insist on only carrying the real thing 'just for the principle o it' are considered total dorks.

     I find this fascinating because these attitudes seem to mirror those of the downloading crowd, and yet the folks who buy counterfeit Kate Spade bags don't voice the same justifications that you usually hear from the downloaders. No one hates Kate Spade. And no one hates the product or how it is packaged. Rather, they like the product a lot-- it's just that they don't want to pay full price for it. And it is socially acceptable not to, in part because knockoffs are so widely available and are sold out in the open. With Kate Spade handbags as with downloading, everybody does it and no one imagines that there is any downside to it. It's just a matter of getting a good product at a cheaper price-- in the case of Kate Spade, it's $25 instead of $200, and in the case of downloading mp3s, it's free instead of $15 for a compact disc.

 

Human Cloning and Horror Stories: A separate point about the National Review Online piece I mention in the following post: The piece urges Congress to take serious steps against all human cloning -- but it doesn't show that all human cloning is troubling, even under its own pretty vague standards of what should trouble us. The chief examples it gives are (1) the harvesting of reproductive material from embryos that are gestationally fairly old (22-33 weeks), for purposes of perhaps eventually having actual eggs born from aborted fetuses, and (2) the creation of "mixed gender balls," something that does indeed arouse many people's (and I suspect especially many prospective parents'") revulsion. But why does it follow that human cloning generally, as opposed to certain kinds of human cloning, should be opposed? (They speak generally of cloning, even as they are more nuanced as to other research: "Congress could restrict the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) from issuing patents on human cloning and the more macabre embryo and fetal research.")

     After all, we don't ban all surgery just because we think some form of surgery are disgusting or even unethical. We don't deny all parents authority over their children just because we know that some parents abuse their kids in the most heinous ways. More broadly, we don't just deny everyone liberty even though we know that some people use their liberty to perform atrocities. Where potentially valuable but sometimes harmful behavior is involved, we usually (not always, but usually) try to discourage the harmful behavior while allowing the valuable behavior (and as I understand it, there are indeed potentially very valuable applications of embryonic cloning), at least unless there's some pretty strong evidence that (1) it's impossible to effectively fight the harmful conduct without also p ohibiting the valuable, and (2) the harmful conduct is so harmful that eliminating the harm justifies eliminating the value of the valuable behavior that's also eliminated.

     Now doubtless the authors of the column believe that all human cloning is indeed harmful, and would distinguish it that way from surgery, childrearing, liberty, and so on. But they don't actually defend this position, or any other position that would justify banning human cloning (e.g., some human cloning isn't harmful, but it's so hard to distinguish the harmful from the valuable, and the harmful is so harmful, that all of it needs to be discouraged). Rather, they simply point to a few troubling applications of the technology, and urge Congress to take steps to discourage the technology altogether. That seems to me to be a mistake.

 

"We're Reasonably Sure That's Not What the Creator Intended": Nathaniel Stewart and Robert Alt have a piece on human cloning in the National Review Online -- I'll try to blog some more about it later, because it actually contains an intriguing (though I think ultimately misguided) policy proposal. For now, I want to focus briefly on one particular argument they use.

     Stewart and Alt describe some proposals that may well seem troubling, e.g., harvesting ovarian tissue for infertility treatments from 22-33 week old aborted fetuses, or "creating 'part male and part female' embryos." (I say "may well seem troubling" because I don't know all the details, and sometimes the more detailed explanation proves to be less troubling -- or more troubling -- than the one-line summary; but I set that aside for now, because my argument really doesn't turn on this particular factual issue, and because I doubt that I'll be able to go into all the details even if they were present.) They then say "While we don't claim to share Senator Barbara Boxer's anointed insight that tinkering with human embryos is 'doing God's work,' we're nonetheless pretty sure that making a mommy out of an aborted fetus is not what the good Lord intended" and then repeat the argument: "Once again, with due respect to Boxer and Annas, we're reasonably sure that's not what the Creator intended either."

     Now I can't for a moment claim to be a theological expert, but I'm really puzzled about how they can be reasonable sure about which surgical procedures "the Creator intended." It seems to me that religious moral argument in this context can fall into several rough categories:
  1. This is wrong because the holy books say that it is prohibited. For those who believe that the holy books are divinely inspired, this would surely be an e fective argument. But unfortunately to my knowledge the holy books don't say much specifically on this topic, which is, I take it, why the argument above focuses on the Creator's supposed intent, rather than on His words.


  2. This is wrong because it is contrary to the way human beings operate in their natural, Creator-created state. If one accepts this position, then I agree that human cloning -- both the examples that the authors give, and all other examples -- should be condemned. Unfortunately, this would also condemn most modern surgery, chemotherapy, pharmaceutical care except perhaps using herbs that grow in the wild, and so on. I take it that the authors don't condemn such behavior, even when applied to children; for instance, I assume that they don't worry whether the Creator intended that kids be sometimes born by caesarean section. (I'd also assume that they don't oppose in vitro fertilization, at least on the "unnaturalness" grounds, as opposed to the destruction-of-fetuses grounds; but perhaps I'm mistaken in that assumption.)

         Of course, they might defend surgery generally, caesarean sections specifically, hormonal infertility treatments, and so on by saying that the Creator did intend that people use their Creator-given minds to make life better for them. But of course exactly the same can be said about human cloning.


  3. This is wrong because it's contrary to the Creator's intent as we infer it from the natural world and from the implications of the holy books. This may well be a legitimate objection to those with a religious worldview -- but thoughtful religionists must surely realize that these sorts of inferences are highly unreliable. After all, they involve not God's actual word, which some might think is infallible (so long as it's properly translated and understood), but people's inferences, often pretty tenuous inferences. And there is certainly a long history of people drawing inferences t are misunderstandings, but I suspect that everyone can point to some errors in inference that others have made.) I doubt, for instance, that the authors agree that the Creator intended not to allow contraception, or that the Creator intended blacks to be kept in slavery to whites, or that the Creator intended that women not be allowed to work or even not be allowed out of the home unless they wear burkas. These counterexamples don't, of course, show that religious inference is necessarily wrong -- but they should warn us of the risk of error that's inherent there.

         Of course, to a religious person the risk of error flowing from religious inference cannot be a barrier to ever engaging in religious inference, just as to a secular person the risk of error flowing from secular moral inference cannot be a barrier to ever engaging in secular inference. The Inquisition or the Taliban don't prove the impropriety of religious thinking any more than Stalinism or Maoism proves the impropriety of secular moral thinking.

         But at the very least, the risk of error inherent in guesswork about what the Creator must intend shows the importance of carefully articulating the argument, and giving a detailed, specific explanation of why the Creator doesn't intend this, but does intend caesarian sections, or contraception, or in vitro fertilization, or hormone shots, or the use of incubators to care for dramatically premature babies. The risk of error shows the need for thoughtful, overt, and self-critical analysis of just why we fallible humans are making this particular guess about what the inscrutable Creator, who moves in mysterious ways, never actually chose to tell us about his "intentions." Unfortunately, the article doesn't really give us that.


  4. The final alternative is This is wrong because it just feels to me lik the sort of thing that the Creator must not intend. This is obviously a tremendously emotionally powerful cause for belief; and I'm sure that at times it has led people in precisely the right direction (I suspect that many religious people's opposition to, for instance, slavery or segregation flowed from this very feeling). But of course it has led them in the opposite direction, too. Here, too, as in the previous item, it seems to me that we need to call on people to explain their reasoning -- and if their reasoning is inexplicable, and just flows from their gut feeling, then I don't think that we should respect the claim much as an argument (as opposed to an expression of their own felt conclusion).
So, at bottom, I think that even deeply religious people shouldn't be terribly impressed by bare arguments about what the Creator intended.

 

Why do you steal music but not food? Millions of Americans download music from the Internet (first Napster, now Kazaa and others), in violation of copyright law. Yet these same people would not dream of walking out of a restaurant without paying, nor would they walk out without leaving a tip.

Why the difference?

I can think of a few hypotheses:

1. Anonymity - they can take the stuff without anyone seeing. This suggests a rather bleak view of human nature. Plus walking out of strange restaurants is quite easy, but few people do this.

2. People think copyright is a weaker form of property, perhaps their intuitions embody a more "physicalist" notion of property rights. "Hey, it's my computer, I'm not violating anyone else's personal sphere." I've heard anti-copyright libertarians offer this hypothesis.

3. Revenge against the music companies. In this view they cheat us, they price gouge, collude and fix prices, they destroy talent with excess commercialism, etc. What rights do they have?

4. Hatred of the business model. Some downloaders buy the CD if they like what they download. Music companies ought to like this. Of course these people don't buy the CD when they don't like what they hear. They then think the following: why should we respect a business model that makes money only by tricking us and selling us lemons? Isn't it enough if I buy the ones I like?

What do you all think? I would welcome hearing your views on this question.

 

When U.S. News talks, universities listen: The New York Times has a very interesting story today about changes in the methodology of the annual U.S. News & World Report college ranking:
  Perhaps the most influential survey of American higher education is changing the way it ranks the nation's top colleges and universities, dropping from its ratings a statistic that many institutions had sought to manipulate in hopes of raising their ranking in the survey.
  As it prepares to release its annual rankings, U.S. News & World Report, which conducts the survey, has dropped from its formula a statistic known as the yield rate. That figure is the percentage of applicants accepted by a university who later enroll at that institution.
  U.S. News had placed little weight on the yield rate; the figure represented less than 2 percent of a college's overall score, the magazine said. But the institutions, eager to do anything that might raise their scores, had considered the rate, and its potential impact on rankings, important enough to admit more students under "binding early decision" programs than they have in the past.
  Students who are accepted under such programs commit in advance to enroll at a college, so the practice automatically improves an institution's yield rate.
  In recent years, some Ivy League and other highly selective colleges have come to admit more than 40 percent of their freshman classes through such programs, before most applicants have even applied.
     The fact that colleges manipulate their figures in an effort to boost their rankings is hardly news. Law schools do the same thing. At the same time, it's worth pausing to think about this. Several of the finest universities in the world had configured their admissions programs to optimize a number that represented less than two percent of the overall score that a magazine was using to rank schools. Remarkable, isn't it? It will also be interesting to see how schools respond, and whether (and how quickly) the admissions practices change.

 

Judging people from the past: Eric Muller of IsThatLegal? has an interesting post on this, contrasting President Bush's quote:
At every turn, the struggle for equality was resisted by many of the powerful. And some have said we should not judge their failures by the standards of a later time, yet in every time there were men and women who clearly saw this sin and called it by name.
with the quote by the nineteenth century British legislator Lord Macaulay:
[T]he very considerations which lead us to look forward with sanguine hope to the future prevent us from looking back with contempt on the past. We do not flatter ourselves with the notion that we have attained perfection, that we are wiser than our ancestors. We believe, also, that our posterity will be wiser than we. It would be gross injustice in our grandchildren to talk of us with contempt, merely because they may have surpassed us . . . . As we would have our descendants judge us, so ought we to judge our fathers. In order to form a correct estimate of their merits, we ought to place ourselves in their situation, to put out of our minds, for a time, all that knowledge which they, however eager in the pursuit of truth, could not have, and which we, however negligent we may have been, could not help having. It was not merely difficult, but absolutely impossible, for the best and greatest of men, two hundred years ago, to be what a very commonplace person in our days may easily be, and indeed must necessarily be. But it is too much that the benefactors of mankind, after having been reviled by the dunces of their own generation for going too far, should be reviled by the dunces of the next generation for not going far enough.
It seems to me that there's a great deal of truth in both quotes.



Wednesday, July 09, 2003

 

Sue the Stud Manufacturer? This from the BBC: Lightning strikes woman's tongue stud. Becky Nyang, 26, was temporarily blinded, unable to talk and badly blistered by the bolt of electricity that surged through her body via the piercing. Ms Nyang, an airport worker from Reading, Berkshire, was on holiday in Corfu when she and a friend were caught in a downpour. A flash of lightning bounced off a nearby archway and hit her in the face, where it was conducted by the metal jewellery in her tongue. . . . More here or (just to prove its real) here.



 

University of North Carolina Assigned Summer Reading for Freshmen: Last year, the UNC Eric Muller at IsThatLegal? has thoughts on last year's assigned summer reading (a book about the Koran) and this year's (Barbara Ehrenreich's Nickel and Dimed). I hope he's right that "the discussion leaders will encourage students to take a critical stance toward the book," whatever the book might be.

 

Iranian protests: The Jerusalem Post reports (thanks to my colleague Jonathan Zasloff for the pointer):
Shrugging off death threats by government paramilitary forces, tens [of] thousands of Iranian students took to the streets Wednesday night, burning at least three government banks, calling for the country's democratization and the death to its extremist leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini.

The demonstrations, banned by the Mullarchy, came on the 4th anniversary of 1999 pro-reform protests which triggered a violent regime crackdown, the death of one student and the arrest of thousands.

Opposition group leaders hailed Wednesday's demonstrations the culmination of month-long anti-government activities as a deadly blow to the repressive regime, saying it edges Iran ever closer to a democratic revolution.

Following and eerily quiet day in Iran, three-sided street battles erupted between pro-reform youth, regime-backed para-military forces, and police outside Tehran University.

As many as 100,000 also gathered around one of Tehran's main city squares Wednesday night chanting pro-democracy slogans and calling for the death of Khameini, an opposition source said. . . .

Beyond the demonstrations themselves, [Safa Haeri, editor of the leading opposition newspaper, the Iranian Press Service] regarded the student's capture of the world media' attention "a watershed event." According to Haeri the demonstrations and the a student letter campaign calling Iran a "political Apartheid state," might compel the U.S. to slap an embargo on Iran for violating basic human rights.

Earlier in the day three student leaders were promptly arrested after they criticized the government in a news conference held to declare that they canceled the day's demonstrations.

Government supported m litants have been attacking students, primarily invading student dormitories and beating students in their sleep, for over a month. The attacks are aimed at discouraging students from their almost nightly demonstrations calling for an end to the repressive regime of Khameini.

With crackdowns coming with increasing fury, students have fought back, for the first time calling for Khameini's death, a crime punishable in Iran with a hefty prison term or even disappearance, at the hands of the paramilitary forces. . . .

The Mullahs told reformist parliament deputies to reign in demonstrators or they "would be mercilessly crushed," according to a Iranian opposition source. . . .

In an open letter sent to U.N. General-Secretary Kofi Anan Iranian student leaders claimed that "a political apartheid has taken all hopes from the Iranian people, because it is denying us self rule and the right of choice, the right to be master of our own destiny, because it has lowered our expectations to the lowest limits possible and also because we are worried to see the experience of our neighbors be repeated here."

In what experts called a remarkable show of mushrooming anti-government sentiment the signatories represented student associations of thirty universities. . . .

 

y reticent about the effect, operation and usage of the Act, having resisted all FOIA requests, and ultimately arousing the ire of irritated Congressmen (in refusing to disclose details regarding the Act and its operation).

[2]: It is possible that the government takes a much more aggressive stance with respect to the Act, or has a broader view of the Act, than Professor Kerr, commentators or media [given [1], it's difficult to say one way or the other].
     I think this is basically right; more specifically, I think that [1] is right, and that has allowed people to speculate a lot about the possibility of [2]. It's part of the culture of DOJ; DOJ sees itself as there to enforce the law, not explain it to reporters. As a result, DOJ tends to be far too secret about what it's up to. This is unfortunate, I think. Of course, some things must remain secret: you can't expect DOJ to identify who the government is investigating. But more broadly, DOJ could serve an important public function by opening up and teaching the public about the law, and to the extent possible, how it is being implemented.

    This was a problem before 9/11, but it's more of a problem today (given the greater threats and greater fears). A few months ago, I suggested to a DOJ official that DOJ should embark on a public education campaign about the anti-terrorism laws. My idea was that DOJ should create a series of presentations on the law taught by subject matter experts employed by DOJ; the presentations would then be available on DOJ's website via streaming audio. For example, if you were interested in the Foreign Int lligence Surveillance Act (FISA), you would be able to go to the DOJ website and view an hour-long presentation on FISA that would explain the law and what it did. Perhaps different versions could be made available-- a short one for non-lawyers, a longer one for aspiring FISA nerds. The idea would be that DOJ would be making an effort to explain to the public the laws that regulate it. The public debate would be much richer; the public would understand more. That was the idea, anyway.

 

Solum v. Goldberg