The Volokh Conspiracy

Today the U.S Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit released a divided opinion in Heller v. D.C. . In this case, Dick Heller (of the Supreme Court’s Heller decision) is challenging the Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008 (FRA), a statute adopted by the District of Columbia in response to the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the District’s prior gun controls. Whereas Heller had prevailed in the D.C. Circuit before, this time he was not so lucky. The panel majority, consisting of Judges Ginsburg and Henderson, largely rejected his challenge to D.C.’s ban on some semi-automatic rifles and new gun-registration requirements. Judge Kavanaugh wrote a lengthy dissent.

Reichskristallnacht was 72 years ago. Stephen Halbrook’s 2009 article in the St. Thomas Law Review details the close connection between the disarmament of the German Jews and what came next. From the conclusion:

Over a period of several weeks in October and November 1938, the Nazi government disarmed the German Jewish population. The process was carried out both by following a combination of legal forms enacted by the Weimar Republic and by sheer lawless violence. The Nazi hierarchy could now more comfortably deal with the Jewish question without fear of armed resistance by the victims.

It may be tempting to argue that the possession of firearms by the German Jews would have made no difference, either in the 1938 pogrom or later in the Holocaust, when the majority were deported and then eradicated in death camps. Yet this fatalistic view ignores that the Nazis themselves viewed armed Jews as sufficiently dangerous to their policies to place great emphasis on the need to disarm all Jews. In 1938, it was by no means certain that Jewish armed resistance movements could not develop, and even less certain that individual Jews would not use arms to resist arrest, deportation, or attacks by the Nazis.
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Consistent adherents of a “Never Again!” policy – which assumes that what has happened in history, could again happen – would seek policies to help ensure that it does not indeed occur again.

That brings us back to Alfred Flatow. [The article provides a case study of Flatow, a Jewish veteran of the German army, who competed for Germany in the 1896 Olympics.] What if he – and an unknown number of other Germans, Jews and non-Jews alike – had not registered his firearms in 1932? Or if the Weimar Republic had not decreed firearm registration at all? What if the Nazis, when they took power in 1933 and disarmed social democrats and other political enemies, or when they decided to repress the entire Jewish population in 1938, did not have police records of registered firearm owners? Can it be said with certainty that no one, either individually or in groups small or large, would have resisted Nazi depredations?

One wonders what thoughts may have occurred to Alfred Flatow in 1942 when he was dying of starvation at the Theresienstadt concentration camp. Perhaps memories of the 1896 Olympics and of a better Germany flashed before his eyes. Did he have second thoughts, maybe repeated many times before, on whether he should have registered his revolver and two pocket pistols in 1932 as decreed by the Weimar Republic? Or whether he should have obediently surrendered them at a Berlin police station in 1938 as ordered by Nazi decree, only to be taken into Gestapo custody? We will never know, but it is difficult to imagine that he had no regrets.

An official with Puerto Rico’s Justice Department has announced that the Department will propose changes in the island’s firearms laws, to bring them into line with Heller and McDonald. However, two of the proposed changes appear to be unconstitutional:

Torres said the measures will include a requirement that shooting ranges keep logs of how much ammunition their members use and cap the number of bullets each client can fire in target practice at 500 per year….

The House legislation under analysis would require gun clubs to maintain logs that include information relative to the quantity and caliber of the ammunition that shooters use onsite. It would revoke licenses from any such business that does not comply with the legislation….

The measure will also limit the quantity of weapons that a person can possess to take to a gun club.

The round-by-round registration requirement would be enormously burdensome to shooting ranges, and beyond the practical ability of many clubs to implement. The ban on target practice (beyond 500 rounds per year) is contrary to public safety; firearms owners should be encouraged to practice with their firearms, so that they will be more skilled in using them for self-defense, hunting, or any lawful purpose. While courses to achieve basic competence may only involve firing a few dozen rounds, more advanced courses, which might take several days, can easily exceed 500 rounds per person. Moreover, going the range on one’s own once a month, and firing, say 100 rounds at each practice session, is a good way to improve one’s abilities.

The First Amendment equivalent would be a limit on hour many hours a year a person could spend reading at a private library.  

A similar issue is being litigated in Chicago, where a new law mandates that gun owners have safety training, including range time, but prohibits the operation of shooting ranges within the city–even though indoor ranges are well-established and safe throughought the rest of the nation, including in New York City.

I will be discussing the Puerto Rico proposal at 11:20 p.m. ET tonight on NRA News.

Just published on-line this morning is the above Backgrounder from the Heritage Foundation. My coauthors are Theodore Bromund  and Ray Walser, of Heritage. We argue that the CIFTA gun control convention, which was drafted by the Organization of American States, and which President Obama has urged the Senate to ratify, would harm First and Second Amendment rights. We suggest that the convention offers no practical benefits to the United States.

Does much more than just impose background checks small-scale vendors at gun shows. Details here, in this article I wrote for the Saturday Denver Post.

Before District of Columbia v. Heller, the 1939 decision United States v. Miller was the Supreme Court’s leading decision on the Second Amendment. Miller was, to put it mildly, obliquely written. As Michael O’Shea has detailed, the opinion seems mainly concerned with whether the gun in question was a militia-type weapon, which would suggest that the decision is congruent with a well-established line of state right to arms cases (some of which were cited in Miller) that all persons had a right to arms, but that the right only encompasses militia-type arms (and not, therefore, Bowie knives or other arms associated with disreputable brawlers). However, Miller is not clearly written, and over the subsequent seven decades, there was much dispute about its meaning. The disputes were almost inevitable, in that Miller is terse and oblique, and, except for a history of the early American militia, provides almost no explication or analysis.

At the oral argument in Heller, Justice Kennedy noted that Miller “kind of ends abruptly.” In the Heller decision, the Court observed that Miller was “virtually unreasoned.” Many scholars have wondered what Justice McReynolds was trying to do by writing such an opinion.

The Heller Court pointed out that many lower courts had “overread” Miller. A recent post on the Legal History Blog provides some evidence that legal scholars may also have overread Miller, for Miller may not have been written to mean much at all, other than perfunctorily upholding the National Firearms Act against a facial challenge. The post highlights Barry Cushman’s 2003 University of Chicago Law Review article Clerking for Scrooge. Cushman’s article reviews the 2002 book The Forgotten Memoir of John Knox: A Year in the Life of a Supreme Court Clerk in FDR’s Washington.

Since high school, John Knox had been star-struck by the Supreme Court Justices, attempting to strike up correspondences with them, sending them birthday greetings, and so on. After graduating from Harvard Law School, Knox landed a clerkship with Justice James McReynolds for the 1936-37 term. McReynolds preferred to work out of his D.C. apartment, rather than in the Supreme Court’s then-new building. Knox’s role was secretarial. Knox later wrote: “I appreciated his anti-New Deal view and agreed with it, but that was the only thing I could possibly agree with him on. He was selfish to an extreme, vindictive, almost sadistically inclined at times, inconceivably narrow, temperamental, and heaven knows what. All of his employees lived in a reign of terror and were crushed under foot without any hesitation on his part.”

More relevantly for Miller, McReynolds “found great difficulty in expressing himself in writing and, sadly enough, was genuinely lazy.” In the September of the clerkship, Knox had dinner at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Edward Everett Gann. The Ganns were well-connected in Washington; Mrs. Dolly Gann was the sister of Herbert Hoover’s Vice-President, Charles Curtis (1929-33). Mr. Gann was a friend of McReynolds, and accidentally caught McReynolds in a tryst with a woman. Knox recalled Gann’s words: “I concluded finally that he is not really interested in the work of the Court any more. He’s old, evidently bored with life and would probably retire now if he could do so without letting other conservatives on the Court ‘down.’”

While McReynolds was remarkably even-tempered when President Roosevelt announced his Court-packing plan in 1937,

McReynolds appears to have been equally if not more greatly irritated by the amount of work he had to do in the spring of 1937. One of McReynolds’s defining characteristics, on Knox’s account, was sloth. . . . Nor was Knox impressed with the amount of time McReynolds put into the preparation of those opinions he actually did write. The first opinion of the term went through only two drafts, and McReynolds spent only about three and one-half hours working on it, including the hour he had spent studying the briefs of the case before he had begun his dictation. He devoted only slightly more time to his second opinion. Laboring over opinions in a “scholarly” manner was apparently not Mac’s style.

McReynolds was upset when he was assigned the dissent in an important labor law case (Anniston Manufacturing Co v Davis), which he knew would have to be long. His dawdling delayed the release of the opinion, eventually leading the other dissenters to come to his apartment to try to help him get the opinion done. McReynolds finally decided “he was going to employ the ‘paste and shears’ method, quoting verbatim from lower court opinions excerpted in the briefs rather than composing his own prose.”

Now United States v. Miller becomes easier to understand. All eight Justices (Douglas, then new to the Court, did not participate) have voted in conference to uphold the statute. The lower court opinion is a mere conclusory assertion. Miller’s attorney did not even brief or argue the case, but instead told the Court to rely on the Department of Justice brief. (We now know that the district court judge, the local U.S. Attorney, and, perhaps, the defense attorney, were colluding in order to bring the weakest possible case to the Supreme Court, in order to affirm the National Firearms Act.)

So imagine you’re Chief Justice Hughes. Given that you have to assign McReynolds a majority opinion from time to time, Miller is the perfect case. The Court is unanimous, meaning that McReynolds will not be burdened with responding to dissenting arguments. Indeed, since the case is uncontested, writing the majority opinion would be especially easy. McReynold’s product in Miller was consistent with his lazy and slapdash approach. Perhaps the other Justices, while recognizing that there was room for improvement in the opinion, decided not to press McReynolds for changes, lest McReynolds fail to get around to making any revisions, and thereby further delay the progress of the Court’s business.

All of the opinion-writing Justices in District of Columbia v. Heller took their work much more seriously than McReynolds apparently took his work in Miller, and so both the majority opinion and the two dissents directly and carefully addressed many of the important Second Amendment questions which McReynolds had conspicuously ignored.

That’s the topic of my new article, for a forthcoming issue of Cardozo Law Review de Novo (the on-line supplement to Cardozo’s printed journal). The article will be part of a symposium issue on McDonald v. Chicago.

Here’s the abstract for my Cardozo article:

This Article presents a brief history of the Second Amendment as part of the living Constitution. From the Early Republic through the present, the American public has always understood the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right to own firearms for self-defense. That view has been in accordance with élite legal opinion, except for a period in part of the twentieth century.

“Living constitutionalism” should be distinguished from “dead constitutionalism.” Under the former, courts looks to objective referents of shared public understanding of constitutional values. Examples of objective referents include state constitutions, as well as federal or state laws to protect constitutional rights. Under a “dead constitution,” judges simply impose their personal values, and nullify parts of the Constitution which they do not like.

When living constitutionalism is taken seriously, the case for the Second Amendment individual right to own and carry firearms for self-defense is very strong. In the 19th century, almost all legal commentators and courts, as well as the political branches and the public, recognized the Second Amendment as guaranteeing such a right.

In the 20th century, some elements of the legal élite asserted that the Second Amendment guaranteed no meaningful right. But this view was never accepted by the public or by the political branches. Congress repeatedly enacted laws to protect Second Amendment rights. In the states, right to arms constitutional provisions were added or strengthened, and many statutes were enacted to defend and broaden the right, especially in the last several decades. Opinion polls showed that the public always believed in the Second Amendment right.

As Jack Balkin has elucidated, the ability of groups such as the NRA (or the ACLU or NAACP) to mobilize constituencies, persuasively communicate their constitutional vision to the public, and influence the political process in favor of the appointment of sympathetic judges is a major force which shapes our living constitution.

From an originalist standpoint, the living constitutionalism of the Second Amendment had a positive influence, in that the social and political forces which living constitutionalism celebrates finally convinced the Supreme Court to stop ignoring the Second Amendment. Living constitutionalism does not always lead back to enforcement of original meaning, but in District of Columbia v. Heller, it did.

For discussion of Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s viewpoint on  self-defense, see pages 15-17 of the California and Nevada district attorneys’ amicus brief in McDonald.

UPDATE: The repeal just passed 2d reading by a vote of 164 to 137! The bill now proceeds to a committee for public hearings. The Canadian Conservative Party has 143 Members of Parliament, so the bill attracted over 20 votes from members of other parties–significantly more than had been expected by Canadian political commentators. Today is a good day for Liberty.

Will take place in the Canadian House of Commons today, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Eastern Time. Bill C-391 is a private member’s bill  (by Candice  Hoeppner of Portage—Lisgar, Manitoba) to repeal Canada’s failed and extremely expensive long gun registry.

Background information about the registry is available in this short presentation from Prof. Gary Mauser, a magazine article by Mauser, and in Mauser’s journal articles on the politics and efficacy of the registry, and in some articles I have written about Canada.

For the last two decades, Canada has been the test bed of the international gun prohibition movement. Repressive ideas from Canada have been exported around the world by the international gun prohibition lobby, which is vastly better at international coordination than the other side.

Repeal of the Canadian registry would, accordingly, be of tremendous global significance. Repeal would also shatter the claim by the Canadian gun prohibition lobby that gun control in Canada is an irreversible ratchet.

If the House votes for repeal today, then there will be committee hearings on Bill C-391, followed by another vote in the House, followed by Senate consideration.

You can follow a webcast of the House of Commons by going here.