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Saturday, November 30, 2002

 

EYE-POPPER. If you haven't already spent time with the checkerboard (or "checker shadow") illusion, perhaps it is time that you did; it is one of the most spectacular visual deceptions you ever will see, and furnishes a useful lesson in self-skepticism. You can check it out here. If you aren't familiar with it already, your first reaction probably will be that the claim made about the picture is just wrong. Remarkably enough, however, it is true.

UPDATE: As was predictable, I have received a couple of messages expressing skepticism or disbelief at the aforementioned checker shadow illusion. I suggest the following proofs. First, you can simply print out a copy, cut out one of the squares at issue, and move it next to the other one. Second and more exotically, you can perform an electronic version of the same proof by going to this site. Click on the yellow box titled "experiences," then on the "checkerboard shadow illusion"; then click on any of the squares. A swatch will appear. It matches both A and B. Or you can punch holes in a piece of paper and hold it over the screen so that you can see parts of the A and B squares and nothing else -- but make sure you only see parts of them; you will want to cover up the letters A and B on the two squares, as they and their shading do a bit of work in the illusion. Or with some experimenting you can arrange your hands on the screen to cover up most of the picture except parts of the A and B squares. Or feed the whole thing into a photo editor, as one reader did, and sample and compare the squares that way.

     If you use this to win any bets, make out a check for 10% to Eugene. He will ensure that the proceeds are applied to a worthy cause.

 

WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN. On the op-ed page of today's New York Times is a column by Bill Keller about the war on drugs, and particularly the ever more aggressive war on marijuana, which surely is one of the great idiocies of our age (the war, not the column). Keller's piece is pretty good. In fact, most of Keller's work on the op-ed page and in the New York Times magazine over the past year has been pretty good: not spectacular, but generally reasonable and balanced in the sense of taking seriously the arguments in both directions. Even if his conclusions aren't always agreeable, they usually are reached in a fairly thoughtful manner, and his reporting is interesting.

     Unfortunately, I really am not able to take much pleasure in Keller's work. To explain why, a bit of background is necessary. The New York Times always has been liberal-leaning, of course, but on Howell Raines's watch as executive editor it has plunged over the edge into a more startling and shameless brand of partisanship. This is visible everywhere, as its readers know well -- on the op-ed page, where one would have thought that the reckless and poisonous Paul Krugman long ago would have written himself out of a job; where Maureen Dowd tries her hand at comedy that is impossible to read because one is too busy wincing in embarrassment; and where Frank Rich provides long and tedious demonstrations of the perils of trying to squeeze thoughtful, dispassionate political analysis out of theater critics. And it is visible on the front page as well, where news analyses and editorial judgments slanted against the Bush administration are too common even to be regarded as remarkable anymore.

     Documentation of these trends has been furnished well by Andrew Sullivan, among others, so there is no need to rehearse examples here. Suffice it to say that the Times once was a great newspaper, even with its flaws; it was read and respected by most serious people, even if its liberalism sometimes was grating to those tending toward the right. Now I do not feel that I can trust it at all, so heavy-handed is the partisanship emanating from its masthead. The paper is turning into another study in one of nature's saddest laws: the long time and great effort it takes to create value, whether in a structure, an institution, or a reputation; and the disproportionately short time it takes for that value to be squandered through arrogance, bad judgment, and poor taste.

     Which brings us back to Bill Keller. He appears in his work to be a literate and fair-minded person. The last time the executive editor's job at the Times was open, the contest for it was between Raines and Keller. Raines won; the Times and its readers lost. Every time I read Keller's stuff, I thus cannot help but wonder what the result would have been if Keller rather than Raines had become top dog. That is why I cannot quite enjoy Keller's writing. The better it is, the more it reminds me of all that I said above, and the needlessness of it, which invariably fouls my mood for the morning.

 

FAUX FEDERALISM FEARS: I dont mean to pick on Ed Lazarus, but I am afraid that (once again) he has let his desire to grind an ideological axe against the Rehnquist Court distort his analysis. In this case, Lazarus suggests that there is an inherent tension between the Supreme Courts federalism and anti-terrorism measures which may restrict civil liberties. In the end, Lazarus concludes, One principle will ultimately have to yield to the other.

I have no doubt that some of the anti-terrorism measures raise serious concerns about civil liberties. They may even raise some Constitutional concerns. But federalism? I don’t think so. In my view, Lazarus’ contention that the Court would compromise its federalism principles should it uphold broad federal authority to investigate and prosecute people potentially engaged in terrorist activity compromises is quite a reach.

Lazarus characterizes the core of the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence as a “distrust of centralized governmental power.” Now it’s true that such distrust was one of the motivations for the Constitution’s federalist structure, but it is not the driving force behind the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Taken on its own terms (something not all of its critics do), the Court’s federalism is not motivated by “distrust of centralized governmental power” as such, but rather by a concern for the proper distinction between those matters which are properly “federal,” and those that are “local” -- an inquiry which is informed by the text, history, and structure of the Constitution. The Court’s federalism rulings do not elevate state power as such – although they are often read that way. Instead, they police the proper boundaries between federal and state power. Some of the Court’s decisions police this boundary directly, by invalidating Congressional enactments in excess of those powers enumerated in Article I. Others police the boundary a bit more directly, by limiting the federal government’s power to influence or coerce state governments. In either case, the Court’s focus is on confining each level of government to its proper sphere, not constraining the federal government as such.

This distinction is important, and I believe it explains some of the misperceptions about federalism generally, and the Court’s jurisprudence of the last several years in particular. There is nothing in the federalism cases that suggests the federal government’s power is anything less than plenary within its enumerated fields. For instance, when the federal government establishes nationally uniform bankruptcy rules, it may do so in a manner which centralizes federal power and disrupts traditional state practices. This could make such legislation unwise (thought I’d defer to Todd on this point), but it would not make it unconstitutional, nor is there anything in the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence to suggest otherwise.

This is not to suggest that federal anti-terrorism measures could never raise federalism concerns. Quite to the contrary, were Congress to enact legislation commanding state and local governments to adopt particular anti-terrorism measures, it would constitute unconstitutional commandeering under Printz v. United States. In such a case the federalism concern would arise from the specific manner in which the federal government exercised its power – commandeering state governments – rather than on whether the legislation in question represented a dramatic step toward the concentration of federal power.

Lazarus suggests that if the current Supreme Court does not look askance at recent federal initiatives on federalism grounds, it is somehow being inconsistent. While I share some of his concerns about the threat of overzealous federal action, I am thoroughly unmoved by his analysis. If the Supreme Court’s critics are looking for signs of hypocrisy and inconsistency, they should look somewhere else (more on that in a subsequent post).



Friday, November 29, 2002

 

APOLOGY TO LAOPHILES: We're sorry that the person who recently accessed this blog via a yahoo search for "Laos is my favorite country" has likely not gotten what he wanted. But this blog has indeed mentioned Laos at least once, which is probably more than most blogs have. Mystery reader, hope you enjoyed what you stumbled across.

 

THE TASTE FOR PRIVACY. I'm grateful for Orin's elaboration immediately below of his views on Total Information Awareness. It seems to boil down to the idea that he is not ready to condemn the development of Total Information Awareness technology because he is not quite sure what that would mean. Fair enough; evidently I misunderstood his earlier post, which I thought said that the descriptions of Total Information Awareness in the media clearly were bad, and that we should not pursue them as a legal matter, but that perhaps the very same technology -- the technology to do the bad things -- should be pursued nevertheless. Now I understand him to be saying that the technology to do the bad things should not be created, but that he is uncertain whether that is what DARPA would want to do. (I insist on writing out "Total Information Awareness" every time, by the way, because I think the creepy implications of the words should be confronted repeatedly rather than buried in an acronym. "DARPA" is okay, though.)

     In reply to Orin's last suggestion that everyone but him has a solid technical understanding of Total Information Awareness and what DARPA proposes, obviously that's not the case; I don't know of anyone who has very solid understandings of those things. The differences lie in how we respond to that uncertainty. I respond with skepticism of the government and assumptions that the best-case interpretations of what is happening likely are false and that the worst-case scenarios are plausible. Orin responds with more skepticism toward the critics. In truth a great deal of our political life seems to work this way: we fill in our uncertainties with our priors and find our positions from there.

     But now I want to pursue a different angle. What would be wrong with the government recording every electronic transaction its citizens engage in? For now just focus on purchases with credit cards rather than monitoring of web browsing or email. I find even this more limited idea appalling, though I know others who don't mind it so much. My horrified reaction is based largely, I think, on my taste for privacy and for a certain relationship between government and citizen in which people are left alone in a pretty strong sense unless they are engaging in bad or at least suspicious behavior. I regard the tastes for these things as a foundation stone of our culture in this country, and am inclined to fight for their satisfaction without apology..

     Yet at the same time an appeal to tastes -- pure preferences, without additional consequences -- becomes vulnerable to pragmatic objections: should we really be willing to let large numbers of people die so that some of us can indulge this taste for privacy I describe? In the end, who cares whether some bureaucrat knows what you have bought? Of course practical objections can then be made: maybe keeping track of purchasing behavior wouldn't be very helpful anyway in catching terrorists, who in their shopping will just become more likely to be cash customers. But if the argument is to be engaged I think it is best to assume that large-scale surveillance technologies might indeed save some non-trivial number of lives (is there a "trivial" number of lives?), and to ask whether those lives should be forfeited for the sake of maintaining what I broadly am calling our sense of privacy vis a vis the government.

     A question on which I invite comment is this: what practical worries should we have about the prospect of the government collecting information about every citizen's commercial transactions? No doubt one of the practical worries is that the government eventually will find uses for this information that cannot now be imagined, so that our real concern involves various futures that we cannot quite picture but that are sure to be dreadful. ("I don't know, but I don't want to find out," etc.) But just to focus for the moment on what we can imagine, what abuses of this knowledge would concern you the most?

 

EXPLAINING "THE OTHER HAND" FOR TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS-- A RESPONSE TO PHILIPPE: Philippe asks below if I could explain "the other hand" a bit more. To bring folks up to speed, the question is whether we should want DARPA to conduct a research program into the technology that would be needed to build Total Information Awareness. I gather Philippe believes that the answer is obviously "no." In my initial post in this thread, I stated that found the question "difficult" and that I wasn't quite sure of the answer. Here's a better explanation of why I'm less sure than Philippe.

     First, I don't understand exactly what kind of research DARPA has in mind. Yes, I've downloaded the 150-page report, and tried my best to figure out what DARPA wants to do, but couldn't make heads or tails of it. Is it just a big computer program? Basic research? An application of a particular branch of mathematics? I'm just not sure. And not being sure, I'm not sure what the pros and cons would be of the government engaging in the research. (To put it another way, I don't know whether the government should fund the program because I don't quite understand what the program would do with the money.)

     Second, I approach TIA with the understanding that in the last few years, several highly controversial government surveillance programs have been little more than government versions of what the private sector had already been doing for years. So the much-feared Carnivore was a packet-sniffer; Magic Lantern is a hacker tool. Both of these surveillance devices are quite common in the private sector, and the FBI was largely playing catch-up with its own research. Ironically, in both cases the FBI forts focused on designing more privacy-enhancing versions of those commonly available tools. But the press can't seem to tell that story, and instead frightens everyone with stories about secret government surveillance programs, Big Brother, etc. (I wrote an article about this overreaction in the case of the Patriot Act and Carnivore that you can download in draft form here.) And DARPA has an incentive to make whatever it is doing seem very, very important. As a result, I tend to approach reports of TIA with a dose of skepticism. I'm not entirely sure that TIA isn't something that Silicon Valley couldn't pull off in a few weeks, if they haven't developed the technology already.

     More broadly, I think reactions like Philippe's stem from certain assumptions about TIA that may or may not be true. The Philippe view seems to envision DARPA's research program as a computational version of the Manhattan Project: a bunch of scientists will work on invasive surveillance technologies, and at the end will produce a super-invasive technology that will prove hard to control. Funding TIA means funding invasions of privacy, and if you don't like invasions of privacy, you won't want to fund TIA. It's a powerful image, but I'm not sure it reflects reality. I don't know what exactly DARPA would do with money for TIA, what kind of research they would conduct, or what benefits unrelated to surveillance the technology might have. As a result, I'm less confident than Philippe that funding DARPA on this project is necessarily a bad idea.

     Perhaps others have a better technical understanding of TIA and what research DARPA proposes, and have reached more certain conclusions. But I find my uncertainties significant enough that (at least as of today) I can't quite conclude whether funding DARPA's program would be a good idea or a bad idea. Maybe Philippe is right; certainly his argument has much force. But maybe not. Hence "on the other hand."

 

ARE WOMEN MORE LIKELY THAN MEN TO SLEEP WITH INTERNS? I have absolutely no idea, and this poll provides us with no useful information on the subject, though I'm sure that it will be reported as if it did.

     The poll does tell us that, among women (or people who claim to be women) who hear about Playboy online polls, and who choose to respond to them -- hardly a representative sample of women, I suspect -- 20% claim to have slept with an intern, while among similarly-described men, 12% claim to have slept with an intern. Repeat after me: "I will give no credence to self-selected surveys, online or otherwise. I will give no credence to self-selected surveys, online or otherwise. . . ."

 

TOP 10 ON BLOGSTREET: The Volokh Conspiracy is #10 on Blogstreet's list, apparently based on the number of links. Nice to see.

 

ON THE OTHER HAND? My co-conspirator Orin says that "No one wants to live in a country in which records of everyone's purchases, web-surfing, etc. are automatically entered into a government database." I'm glad to hear we agree about that. (By the way, though: why?) But then he says the hard question is whether we should "allow the government to try to design this kind of technology". Orin's point is that such technology would not necessarily be implemented; finding ways to make it work would be different from making it legal to use. The reply to this distinction seems obvious, however, and is offered by Orin: "if the government succeeds in designing the technology, that will make it possible and easier for the government to implement it in the future." Quite.

     But then Orin hedges: "On the other hand, it's not clear to me that the private sector (or a foreign government) won't design such a technology themselves, and a much less invasive implementation of the technology could have its benefits." I'm clear on everything except this last sentence. What would a private version of "Total Information Awareness" look like? Why would it be more threatening that a version developed by the government? Or is the idea that the marginal added invasiveness of the government's idea might end up being small given the private invasiveness that is on the way? In any event, why would developing a government version be a good idea even if it would be less invasive than a private version? (Why not combat the private version directly?) How serious are the prospects for foreign development of such a system that would keep track of Americans? How threatened would we need to feel if such a program were developed by, say, Japan?

     I do not mean to bombard my good friend with questions, but my instinctive reaction to all of the queries just enumerated is they don't justify the development of Total Information Awareness technology by our government -- not at all, not even in a prima facie sort of way. I may well be missing something, though, either in my interpretation of what he is saying or in my sense of the likely answers to the questions I understand him to be asking; so I invite Orin (an expert on these issues) to enlarge on why his "on the other hand" sentence should give us pause.

 

RHETORICAL EXCESSES RIGHT AND LEFT: Geitner Simmons has an interesting post on this (it's the Friday, November 29 post; sorry, the permalink isn't working). Thanks to InstaPundit for the pointer.

 

GETTING BLOG POSTS BY E-MAIL: As an experiment, I've set things up so that Blogger can deliver blog posts by e-mail. If you'd like to use this option -- and I can see reasons why some people would like it, and others wouldn't -- send a message containing just the text
SUBSCRIBE VOLOKH-L X Y
to the e-mail address LISTSERV at LISTSERV.UCLA.EDU . If you need to unsubscribe or your e-mail address is about to change just send a message containing just the text
UNSUBSCRIBE VOLOKH-L
to the same address. And if you'd like to get all of a day's posts in one message, I think you should be able to configure that by sending a message containing just the text
SET VOLOKH-L DIGEST
to the same address; and to undo that, the message SET VOLOKH-L MAIL should do the trick.

     Unfortunately, I'm swamped enough that I probably won't be able to provide any manual help with the list, but I hope that the automatic subscription and unsubscription results will do the job. Also, just a warning: This is only an experiment; if this ends up causing trouble, I might have to discontinue this, and return to a Web-only format.

 

"WHAT CAN YOU DO IF YOUR TIVO MISTAKENLY THINKS YOU'RE GAY? OR A NEO-NAZI?," asks Paul Hsieh at GeekPress (newly added to our blogroll -- looks like a great site), and points us to a (seemingly free) Wall Street Journal Online article that discusses the problem, and suggests some answers. My favorite excerpt:
Mike Binder, creator and star of [HBO's "The Mind of a Married Man"], had set his home TiVo to record his 1999 movie, "The Sex Monster," about a man whose wife becomes bisexual. After that, Mr. Binder's TiVo assumed he would enjoy a steady stream of gay programming. Unnerved, he counteracted the onslaught by recording the Playboy Channel and MTV's spring break bikini coverage. It worked, he says. "My TiVo doesn't look at me funny anymore."

His wife, however, was taken aback when she saw all the half-naked women he was ordering through TiVo. He told her those women meant nothing to him: "I'm just counterprogramming because TiVo thinks I'm gay." She was unamused. The incident inspired an episode of his show.

 

MORE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN: I took Philippe's advice and read the interview with Mark Bowden, the author of a detailed and seemingly quite balanced story about Saddam Hussein. Here's the closing question and answer:
Knowing what you know, how would you advise the decision-makers in Washington to deal with Saddam?

After working on this story, I really do think that Saddam poses a serious threat to the United States and the rest of the world -- not that he will attack Israel or the United States directly, but if he possesses or develops nuclear weapons of mass destruction, I have no doubt that he will find a way to get those weapons into the hands of groups like al Qaeda and others who will use them. Saddam has been making a very serious effort for some years now to develop the kinds of weapons that really can only be developed by a state. So I think that in the interest of self-defense it's really important that we do something to end his regime. But as for how to go about it? I'm afraid that's, as they say in the military, "over my pay grade."
Such predictions are of course guesswork; who can know for sure what someone is likely to do in the future? But this one strikes me as quite on the money.

 

SEXISM AND RACISM: InstaPundit writes:
IS IT SEXIST TO WISH FOR A WORLD WITH FEWER MEN? My earlier post on feminist scholar Mary Daly's expressed desire for a world where only one person in ten was male (which one reader called Strangelovian) has inspired Eugene Volokh to wonder whether such sentiments are sexist or not. I don't know: Would wishing for a world with fewer black people be racist?
     This sort of quick analogy between attitudes about the sexes and attitudes about the races is quite common (just to give one other example, defenders of gay marriage analogize the requirement that spouses be of opposite sexes to past requirements that spouses be of the same race), and sometimes helpful -- but often, I think, mistaken. Here are a few reasons to be skeptical about this sort of argument.

     1. Do you think that the Boy Scouts being limited to boys is morally equivalent to a White Scouts that's limited to whites? (I think both should be legally permissible, but my question is whether they're morally equivalent?) What about someone telling his girlfriend "Sorry, honey, you probably shouldn't join us for drinks tonight; we're thinking of making it a boys' night out" and someone telling a black friend "Sorry, buddy, you probably shouldn't join us for drinks tonight; we're thinking of making it a whites' night out" -- morally equivalent? Now perhaps the common perception that these scenarios are not morally equivalent is mistaken. But if it's right, then it helps show that there are real differences (at least often) between sex-based attitudes and race-based attitudes.

     2. If one is drawing analogies, while draw the analogy between sex and race, and not, say, sex and religion? We might think it's wrong for people to refuse to hire non-Christians because of their religion; but if someone expresses a desire for a future world in which fewer people are non-Christian, I don't think we'd see that as immoral or even bigoted (though we might disagree with the desire for other reasons).

     Likewise, how about an analogy between sex and certain physical handicaps? For instance, we might think it's unkind, unfair, or even bigoted to refuse to admit people to college because they have various handicaps or genetic diseases, or to refuse to hire them for most jobs (setting aside those where we think the absence of the disease is strongly related to the person's ability to do the job). But I think the desire for a future world in which fewer people have those problems is downright laudable.

     3. And these specific examples help illustrate, I think, a more general theoretical point: We condemn certain attitudes and practices as racist because we think race has little inherent connection to human behavior. (I'm not an expert on the subject, and I know there are hot controversies in this area, but to the best of my knowledge the evidence indeed strongly supports this belief.) But sex obviously does have a huge biological connection to human behavior. We know this is so in some areas of life, both biological reproduction and apparently some social practices related to reproduction and mating. And there's apparently strong evidence that there are also biologically driven sex differences in other areas, such as tendency towards violence and possibly certain cognitive skills and social behavior patterns as well.

     If this evidence is correct, what do we do with this? As I said in my earlier post, I still think that it would be right to treat living individuals the same without regard to their sex, since we know that men's and women's temperaments, behavior patterns, and abilities overlap considerably. But it might be -- depending on the facts -- quite proper to hope for a world in which there were fewer or no men (or for that matter fewer or no women, again depending on what the facts suggest).

     It may well be that, despite the real differences between men and women, a 50-50 gender balance is still good. One reason may be that it fits better with people's sexual practices, which seem quiet unlikely to change any time soon. Another reason may be that humanity is better off with a mix of the biological predispositions of men and those of women -- as my earlier post suggested, perhaps a move towards a more pacifistic species would have substantial costs as well as benefits.

     But I don't think that the question of the optimal gender balance can be resolved simply by a moral equivalence to racism -- there are too many important differences between sex and race for that analogy to work.

UPDATE: Incidentally, just to make it clear: As I mentioned in my earlier post, "some anti-male arguments, like some anti-female arguments, come largely from irrational prejudice rather than rational judgment"; these may be as nonsensical as some racist arguments are. (My original post pointed out specific ways in which some people may be blind to the advantages of male traits as well as their disadvantages.) So I'm not defending any "fewer males, please" commentator in particular -- only the legitimacy of the inquiry in general.

 

GUN CONTROL FOR SEVENTH GRADERS: I got a very nice note this morning, and felt I had to respond to it:
Dear Professor Volokh,

We are doing a project for our 7th grade class on gun control. We would greatly appreciate it if you would share some of your opinions on this issue. How do you think gun control will help our nation? Is owning a gun more likely to be harmful rather than helpful? Please consider replying to this letter. Your viewpoints will help our research immensely. Thank you for your time.
Now I know very little about talking to seventh graders, and I know even less about how much detail they want. But the letter seems articulate and thoughtful, so I thought I'd try to give them an adult (though brief) explanation. Just in case others might be interested, I thought I'd pass it along to the list. My apologies in advance if you think my response is likely to be useless or incomprehensible to a 12-year-old, or on the other hand if you think it's way too general and not detailed enough; as I said, I know very little about 12-year-olds.
My pleasure; here are a few thoughts:

     1. Guns are used by criminals hundreds of thousands of times a year to commit crimes. But they're also used hundreds of thousands of times a year by law-abiding people to protect themselves and their families. And guns are very effective for self-defense, because they can scare off criminals (even if the gun isn't fired) as well as stopping them.

     2. What effect will gun bans have? They will disarm the good guys, since law-abiding people are likely to obey gun control laws. But they won't do much to the criminals: Someone who is willing to break the laws against murder, robbery, and rape will likely ignore gun control laws, too. There are 200-250 million guns in the country (80 million handguns, and the rest rifles and shotguns, which are even deadlier than handguns); they aren't just going away. Criminals will be able to get their hands on guns no matter what law we enact.

     So if guns are banned, there'll still be plenty of gun crime -- but good people will be less able to defend themselves against it.

     3. What about milder gun controls, such as waiting periods, registration requirements, bans on certain kinds of guns, and so on? Each one has to be considered on its own terms, since they are quite different. I think background checks for gun buyers will probably do a little good and not much harm, so they're probably worth implementing. Likewise for laws that ban felons (people who have been convicted of serious crimes in the past) from owning guns. Most other gun control proposals, though, probably do more harm than good.

     4. What's the solution? The solution, I think, is to fight *crime*, not to fight guns. Criminals should be caught and locked up; and if there's something we can do to prevent the conditions that create crime, that would be great, too. (Better education will probably help a lot, though of course that's easier said than done.) And if you can find some gun control laws that will really affect only criminals, and not law-abiding people, that would be great. But disarming law-abiding people won't help prevent crime. If anything, it will yield more crime.

     Let me know if you have more specific questions on this. If you'd like to see some more statistics on this subject, try http://guntruths.com/Resource/facts_you_can_use.htm -- I haven't checked all the facts mentioned here, but they seem pretty reliable (though note that they're presented from an anti-gun-control perspective). Also, please get in touch with some people who support gun bans and other gun controls, so that you can hear both sides of the debate.

Eugene Volokh

 

ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS: Here are a few conclusions I've reached about TIA that I hope can advance the debate to a slightly more helpful level.

     1) No one (or pretty close to no one) would want the version of TIA that the press has reported. No one wants to live in a country in which records of everyone's purchases, web-surfing, etc. are automatically entered into a government database. If anyone actually proposed a program as invasive as the press coverage of TIA has suggested TIA is, it would be a non-starter. I know I would be 100% against such a massive surveillance program, and would fight it as much as I possibly could. Further, I have been unable to find anyone who doesn't feel that way. I'm sure some exist, but I don't think there are many.

     2) The TIA program as reported in the press would be illegal to implement. The coverage of TIA reports that it would automatically collect all sorts of private information about you to feed into the government database. However, much of this information is protected by federal privacy laws (like the Pen Register statute, 18 U.S.C. 3121-27, and the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-22) that require court orders for the collection of the information. If TIA collected this information automatically, it would violate those laws, triggering criminal liability and also possible disciplinary proceedings against government officials implementing TIA.

     3) DARPA views TIA as a question of technology, not law. In other words, DARPA's proposal is to see if it is technologically possible to design a technology that would allow such a system to be implemented. Right now, such a network is beyond the scope of current technology, and Poindexter, etc. want to see whether it would be p ssible to create such a system, and if so, how. DARPA doesn't have plans to implement TIA, which of course they couldn't: that would be up to Congress, not DARPA.

     4) The most important question raised by TIA is this: should we allow the government to try to design this kind of technology? This is a very interesting and difficult question, I think. The argument against allowing the program is certainly a strong one: if the government succeeds in designing the technology, that will make it possible and easier for the government to implement it in the future. On the other hand, it's not clear to me that the private sector (or a foreign government) won't design such a technology themselves, and a much less invasive implementation of the technology could have its benefits. To be honest, I'm not sure of the answer to this question. However, I do think it's the right question to ask.

 

BIG BROTHER CATCHES THE SNIPER, PART TWO: Back in October, I offered an explanation (partially tongue-in-cheek) of how massive databases and government information-sharing helped catch the D.C.-area sniper. Today's N.Y. Times picks up the theme. The front page of the Times has a story about how better, more complete databases and more information-sharing might have led to the sniper being caught much earlier. The piece is titled Holes in System Hid Links in Sniper Attacks, and you can link to it here.

 

THREE SHELLS AND A PEA. As the shenanigans resume in Iraq, this is a good time to read the best piece I know (at least of article length) profiling Saddam Hussein if you didn't catch it the first time around: Mark Bowden's article from last May's Atlantic monthly. Here's an interview with the author to go with it. The article is an implicit caution against claims that we needn't use force because Saddam reliably can be deterred; its portrayal of his decision-making process during the Gulf War and other episodes does not inspire confidence in his powers of judgment. The article also is full of fascinating details about his past and his current life.



Thursday, November 28, 2002

 

HUSSEIN'S ATTEMPT TO EVADE INSPECTORS: I have no idea whether this is accurate, but here's the FoxNews report:
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein has ordered hundreds of his officials to conceal weapons of mass destruction components in their homes to evade the prying eyes of the United Nations inspectors.

According to a stream of intelligence now emerging from inside Iraq, the full extent of the Iraqi leader’s deception operation is now becoming apparent. As the U.N. inspectors knock on the doors of the major military sites in Iraq, suspected of housing chemical and biological weapons and banned missiles, the bulk of the evidence is being secreted away in people’s homes. . . .

Iraqi farmers have also been ordered to play their part, according to intelligence sources. One source said that farmers were being told to hide drums of chemicals among stocks of pesticides.

In each case, the scientists, officials and farmers are being warned that they and their families will face severe penalties if they fail to hide these stocks of chemicals and biological materials from prying U.N. inspectors. Computers and laptops containing vital information about the weapons of mass destruction program are also being hidden in people’s homes.

The intelligence sources said that U.N. inspectors were aware of what American and other Western agencies were uncovering. However, it made their job almost impossible because they would have no idea where to start if they had to search individual homes. . . .

Apart from the evidence of deception, the latest intelligence has also uncovered a totally different mood in Iraq from the lead-up to the 1991 Gulf War. Then, there was little or no evidence that the people of Iraq were opposed to Saddam. Now, however, there are signs of a growing disaffection. . . .

First, Saddam has been sufficiently worried about potential internal opposition to his regime to take the extraordinary step of canvassing opinion in all the key cities. Intelligence sources say that Kurds have been used to carry out the survey.

The answers coming back from the quasi-opinion poll have given strong indications that people were looking towards a post-Saddam era and wondering whether it would improve their standard of living. To counter this, Saddam’s regime has begun circulating rumors in Iraq that even if he were to fall from power, there would be no lifting of sanctions. . . .

The first sign of possible internal dissent came during the referendum in Iraq last month when Saddam was supposedly given a 100 percent "yes" vote for continuing in office. Baghdad claimed it was also a 100 percent turnout. However, intelligence emerging since then has revealed that only one in three people actually voted. . . .

Second, as a sign of Saddam’s unease over the loyalty of his officials in Baghdad, he has begun handing out cars to everyone to keep them happy. The intelligence sources said senior officials were being given Toyota Avalon luxury sedans and junior officials South Korean-made Kia cars. . . .

Saddam[,] who is not known to be a very religious person, has ordered his officials to spread rumors that the Americans want to invade Iraq in order to convert everyone to Christianity. He has also written a prayer. . . .
There's more; worth a read, though of course one can't know for sure how accurate such accounts are.



Wednesday, November 27, 2002

 

HAPPY THANKSGIVING! Enjoy the holiday, and the long weekend. Hope you have lots to be thankful for; I know I certainly do.

 

THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY PROMISES: 1. If we take someone off our very short permanent links list, we promise not to make a public production out of this. (See InstaPundit for some reports of the recent delinking fracases.)

     Among other things, we highly doubt that blogs get that much traffic through our permanent links; I suspect they get a bit more out of links in our posts, but not out of the permanent links. What's the use of publicly announcing "We're so incensed that we will try to deny you five readers a day, maybe ten!"? Even if it's just for the sake of symbolism, there's little symbolism in such a relatively futile gesture. We're entitled to link or not link to whomever we please -- but we plan to exercise such discretion discreetly.

2. If someone refuses to link to us, refuses to link to people who link to us, or refuses to link to people who link to people who link to us, we promise not to make a public production out of this, or call it "censorship." We're flattered when people link to us, but we realize that this is a favor, not an obligation.

 

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND TORT REFORM: Glenn Reynolds and Brannon Denning argue that Democrats should applaud, not oppose, the Supreme Court's renewed willingness to limit Congressional power. I think they make some very good arguments, but I tentatively disagree with one of their claims:
Plans to reform state tort systems by capping damage awards, limiting punitive damages, and curbing certain theories of liability also look vulnerable before a conservative Court. While tort suits undoubtedly have an effect on the economy, there is scarcely any human activity that doesn’t. But the Court has made clear that the Commerce Clause is not a blank check.

For example, in Lopez, the government argued that guns and violence in schools have an effect on learning, which has an effect on students, which has an effect on the economy, since violent schools are unlikely to produce an educated workforce. Violence against women, it was argued, resulted in lost wages, lost productivity, foregone career opportunities, etc. While the Court conceded that these things may be true, the Court said that finding these conditions to be issues of interstate commerce would mean the Commerce Clause would have no limits -- and it was designed to have limits.

Moreover, there is the threshold question whether a tort suit is really a commercial activity at all. Many would argue that tort actions are designed to compensate a victim for a loss and punish the perpetrator -- either of which is really "commercial" activity.
There are good policy arguments for and against Congressional tort reform proposals. One quite legitimate argument against the proposal is that tort law is best left to the states; a countervailing argument is that many tort claims, especially product liability claims, let one state effectively impose its own rules on products sold throughout the country, and that Congress should step in and prevent this.

     But as a constitutional matter, I think that Congress properly has the power to limit state tort law claims if those claims arise out of economic activity (and especially interstate economic activity). A tort law rule that imposes liability as a consequence of an economic transaction -- "if you sell goods in Alabama that Alabama law concludes are defective, you will have to pay damages" -- is essentially a state regulating (and indirectly taxing) commerce, including commerce among the states; the regulation comes through judicial decision and not through a statute, but it is regulation nonetheless. And one of the proper exercises of Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce is for Congress to lower barriers to such commerce by preempting contrary state regulations.

     What if the tort claim originates from a purely intrastate economic transaction, for instance a lawsuit against a local manufacturer, or a medical malpractice claim against a local doctor? Well, even as the Court has been reasserting the limits on federal power to regulate noncommercial activity, the Court has generally taken the view that Congress may regulate even intrastate commercial activity, so long as that activity is part of a national market. I doubt that the Court will change its view on this, and I'm not sure that it should, given the integration of our national economy.

     So on balance, I think that Congress does have the constitutional power to regulate commercial transactions by controlling the tort liability rules that can flow from those transactions. I don't think that it can preempt state tort law as to torts that arise out of purely noncommercial conduct, such as battery, or perhaps even auto accidents. But it can preempt (and otherwise control) product liability claims and medical malpractice claims, which arise out of commercial transactions (the sale of goods and services).

     The article continues:
Requiring state judges to limit jury awards in line with federal limits imposed by tort reform legislation might also violate the Court’s "anticommandeering" principle. The Court has made much of the fact that federal mandates to state legislatures and executive officials reduce transparency and accountability -- state officials have to take flak for unpopular mandates that originate with the federal government, while Congress can take credit for doing good deeds while insulating itself from criticism by those who feel the effects of implementation.

The argument would seem to work here: defendants in civil law suits would find jury verdicts reduced by state judges (many of which are elected) who were merely doing Congress’s bidding. Though the Court has not addressed the question whether state judicial officials are different from other state officials, it seems inconsistent to carve out an exception for state judges.
This, too, strikes me as unsound. The Court has long held that the anticommandeering principle applies only to federal attempts to commandeer state legislatures or executive officials, and not state courts -- Congress can, for instance, order state courts to hear federal claims, because that's part of the nature of courts: Courts must apply the law, and article VI of the Constitution makes federal law binding in state courts. As the Court held in Printz (1997), where it enunciated the anticommandeering principle as to executive officials, "state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law -- a conclusion mandated by the terms of the Supremacy Clause ("the Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law]." If a judge is bound by a federal cap on damages that can be awarded based on a commercial transaction, then his article VI responsibility bars him from allowing a damages award that exceeds such a cap.

     I think that the thrust of the piece is quite sound, and the piece is generally much worth reading. But I don't think its position on tort liability is generally correct, at least as to tort claims that arise out of commercial behavior.

 

FIVE BLIND ELEPHANTS (AUTHOR UNKNOWN): Five blind elephants want to find out what men are like. Each touches a man with its foot, and all agree: Men are wet, sticky, and flat.

 

AMUSING PIECE BY MICHAEL KINSLEY, about Google News, textile workers, and other things.

 

A BIT MORE ON INVECTIVE: Steve Postrel's message, and those from some other readers (in particular, Matt Bower) point out, I think quite powerfully, that calling the other side names may sometimes be effective at energizing one's base. That may be so, though I'm not sure whether on balance the benefits of such rhetoric, even aimed just at true believers, exceed the costs.

     But I don't think undermines my original point, which is that invective (at least on Web logs) is likely to lead to "ideological cocooning" -- likely to "increase people's predisposition to talk to and listen to only those views that they generally agree with, and to simply ignore other views." My main assertion was that most people have a particularly strong tendency to ignore views that they disagree with and that are presented rudely. That means they might well go to an insult-filled blog that insults people they think deserve insult; and thus an insult-filled blog may be effective at communicating to those who already mostly agree with it (again, I'm not sure that it will be, but it's possible). But it won't be effective at persuading people who are in the middle or on the other side.

     So if one wants to fight people's tendency to listen only to those views that they already agree with -- nothing says that this must be a Weblogger's goal, but some people have this goal -- a calm and polite (though engaging) tone is more effective for that purpose than a rude one.

 

A WORLD WHERE THERE ARE FEWER MEN: So is it sexist to wish for a world with fewer men? (See InstaPundit's post that prompted this thought, though it doesn't specifically make the sexism allegation.) Or, to be precise, since it's hard to deny that it's sexist in one sense of the word -- it reflects "the assumption that one sex . . . is inferior to the other," and suggests "discrimination," at least in the prenatal phase, "on the grounds of sex" -- is this sort of sexism necessarily wrong?

     The fact is that men and women have very different behavior patterns, and there's good reason to think that many of them are biologically influenced -- perhaps not completely biologically determined, but certainly influenced by biology and not just by society. There is considerable evidence for this: In many (perhaps most?) species, males and females behave differently, and it's hard to blame "culture" for that (or if one does, by defining culture broadly enough to include the behavior of many nonhuman animals, then one has to recognize that culture is itself biologically influenced). There are certain common patterns of behavior -- for instance, higher violent criminality among males than among females, or government by males more than females -- that have to my knowledge present in virtually all societies, which suggests a biological influence. Hormones, which operate in different ways in men and women, do influence behavior. And so far I've just mentioned what I believe are the most broadly accepted examples; as I understand it, there's considerable evidence for other claims, such as the observation that the intelligence bell curve is broader for males than for females, so there are more geniuses and more idiots among males than females.

     Now I think there's a very powerful argument that this observation should not lead us to discriminate based on sex in most situations against real humans. There are wide variations in individual behavior, intelligence, temperament, and most other facts among both males and females. Refusing to hire a woman as a mathematician because women generally are less likely than men to be mathematical geniuses, or refusing to hire a man because men generally are more likely than women to be violent criminals, thus generally places too much weight on a not very probative factor, especially when other much more probative evidence is generally available. And I think that a society which treats men and women generally equally, especially in education, hiring, and so on is on balance much more likely to be successful than one that doesn't.

     But it's far from clear that this sort of mixed moral-pragmatic claim carries over to judgments about future generations. I don't think there's anything necessarily evil about parents concluding that having very few male children, or perhaps even no male children (assuming that reproductive technology can propagate the species without males, which is not a ridiculous assumption for the future), will yield a better society. There are no living humans who are hurt by that. Some of the few future males might be indirectly hurt by the message that the practice sends -- if society thinks there should be very few males because males are bad, how will that make the few males feel? But if the message is simply a reflection of the fact that having many males is indeed bad for society, then that truth will come out (and should come out) in any event.

     The issue, I think, can't be inherently framed in terms of sexism (though of course some anti-male arguments, like some anti-female arguments, come largely from irrational prejudice rather than rational judgment). At the same time, it can't be framed in terms of bad science, either -- and focusing just on the harms caused by men's greater propensity to violence, both criminal and military, or men's other supposedly damaging emotional traits is bad science. First, there is good reason to think that men are more likely to be, say, mathematical geniuses, and mathematical genius (and its related scientific cousins) is a pretty important thing for the species. If you look to the past, you can't fault males as a sex for all male-produced crime and war without also praising them for all male-produced scientific and political advancement; if you look to the future, you can't focus just on genetic propensities to bad behavior without considering genetic propensities to good behavior. Second, we of course have to consider the realities of human sexual desire and human mating practices, something that might be hard to change genetically, or that people might not want to change genetically in their children.

     Third, while a violent temperament among members of society has lots of costs in everyday life, there are periods in human history where it is necessary for a society's -- or a species' -- survival. Even if all humans decide to eliminate males, and exist in a more peaceful female-only society, will this society survive if some rogue group decides to genetically engineer a more violent rival society? And beyond that, while we're in the realm of science fiction, it's certainly quite possible that we'll encounter alien intelligent life forms, especially as we expand through the galaxy (which I'm sure we will in the centuries to come). And given our experience of life, including intelligent life, on earth, there's good reason to think that they may be violent. If we make our society too pacifistic, we may be unable to survive that sort of contact.

     These are all tough questions, and I have absolutely no idea what the right answers to them are. I think the right process for answering them, though, has to recognize that males and females are quite different biologically. They are less different than some in the past have thought they were; the remarkable changes in society in just the last generation or two show the errors in the formerly commonplace assertions about how women somehow lack the temperament to be, say, effective lawyers. But they are more different than many in the present think they are.

     It is not inherently sexist to say this, or, if it is, then it's "sexist" only if "sexist" becomes a value-neutral word. And if one consequence is that we (or, more likely, our great-grandchildren) conclude that a mostly-female or an all-female (or a mostly-male or an all-male) society is the right solution for the future, and we find that this can be done without improper coercion of parents, then we should consider this option -- even if we're committed to evenhanded treatment of actual males and females who are alive today.

 

TOO TOUGH IN THEORY LEADS TO NOT TOUGH ENOUGH IN PRACTICE: AmSoAPundit has an interesting story about the unexpected consequences of a tough anti-cheating policy:
UVA's system is entirely student run and expulsion from the school is the only penalty. The "you-cheat-you're-gone" system impresses outsiders as a tough, no nonsense approach.

In fact, it creates a climate in which there is a great deal of cheating. First, professors may suspect students of cheating, but are wary of taking the matter to the honor committee because the penalty is so severe. . . . And they are especially reluctant to call a student on the carpet when the cheating isn't flagrant. . . .

Because the stakes are so high -- expulsion -- professors know that accused students will use all resources available to fight the charges. (For instance, they will sue the University or the professor in court.) Such cases are likely to consume a great deal of professors' valuable research time, which adds to their reluctance to bring charges in the first place. . . .
I am not an expert enough on this subject to know what anti-cheating system works best; a lot depends on contested and uncertain predictions about how various people will respond to various incentives. But AmSoAPundit's point is valuable precisely because it shows that there are these thorny practical questions, and that some "get tough" policies may sometimes be counterproductive.

     More broadly, this provides another example of what I call the "anticooperative effect" of laws and rules -- the tendency of some rules, even well-intentioned and theoretically sound ones, to deter people from participating in a legal system, and providing it the cooperation that it needs to function.

 

SLATE ON BLIX: OK, I have no idea whether this Assessment is sound (I know very little about weapons inspections), but Chris Suellentrop is hardly a knee-jerk hawk (as the rest of his piece illustrates), and the opening line is just too good to pass up:
When the United Nations named Hans Blix its chief weapons inspector, it chose a henhouse to guard the fox.
Worth reading.

 

WHAT GORE IS REALLY SAYING ABOUT THE MEDIA: The New York Observer interview with Al Gore has quite a telling quote:
"The media is kind of weird these days on politics, and there are some major institutional voices that are, truthfully speaking, part and parcel of the Republican Party," said Mr. Gore in an interview with The Observer. "Fox News Network, The Washington Times, Rush Limbaugh—there’s a bunch of them, and some of them are financed by wealthy ultra-conservative billionaires who make political deals with Republican administrations and the rest of the media …. Most of the media [has] been slow to recognize the pervasive impact of this fifth column in their ranks—that is, day after day, injecting the daily Republican talking points into the definition of what’s objective as stated by the news media as a whole."
Interesting -- the conservative media are a fifth column in the media's ranks. Now a "fifth column" is technically defined as "an organized body sympathizing with and working for the enemy within a country at war" (I'm quoting my New Shorter Oxford), but of course it's also defined more broadly as just "an organized body sympathizing with and working for an adversary in a political or moral contest." It doesn't just refer to a group of partisans within a pool of nonpartisans; rather, it is generally used to refer to a group of partisans within a pool of partisans for the other side -- the adversarial relationship is an inherent and, in my experience, necessary part of the phrase.

     So didn't Gore just admit that the media as a whole is liberal, and apparently in his view should be liberal? That's what would make conservative voices in the media a fifth column, no?

 

FIGURATIVE USAGES: Reader David Bufkin points out an important reason why figurative usages are necessary -- when one needs to coin a snappy term, such as "black hole," "Big Bang," "greenhouse effect," and "Oedipus complex." If you have only two words to work with, you often can't be literally precise; you need something that will convey much of the idea, even with some imprecision. This is one reason that figurative usages might be necessary and appropriate (and I stress again that my original post did not condemn all figurative usages).

     Even as to these usages, though, the users of the term should be careful about relying too much on the figurative phrase. Lots of people use metaphors such as "balancing," "slippery slopes," "chilling effects," and such as if the metaphor explained what was actually going on. Legal writing would be much better if people focused much more on the actual mechanisms -- the real-world events that the phrases refer to -- and not on the metaphor (as if, for instance, "balancing" a right and a government interest were as simple an act as "balancing" two weights on a scale). Likewise, I suspect that good scholarly astronomical writing relies very little on the terms "Big Bang" and "black hole" as such, and instead refers to the actual physical forces that cause these phenomena.

     As Justice Holmes famously put it, "Think things, not words." Figurative usages unfortunately lead people to focus too much on the words, or on the wrong things (the things referred to by the metaphor, such as physical balancing, chills, or slopes) instead of the right ones. That's why scholarly writing should use them cautiously and fairly rarely -- though, as I've continually stressed, it shouldn't abandon them altogether.



Tuesday, November 26, 2002

 

REGARDING STEVE POSTREL'S SO-CALLED VIEWS: That sounds like something Hitler would say.

 

INTERESTING SECOND AMENDMENT DISCUSSION: It's in a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the one circuit that has held (in my view, correctly) that the Second Amendment secures an individual right to keep and bear arms. Haven't read it fully yet, but thought I'd mention it.

 

THAT EVIL McDONALD'S: TechCentralStation has a great piece about the "McDonald's seduces children into a life of obesity" campaign -- it looks like the campaign is wrong on the facts, as well as on its moral and legal assumptions. (Disclaimer: I'm not an expert on nutrition, so I may be wrong in this recommendation, but it struck me as much worth reading.)

 

PASSAGE OF HOMELAND SECURITY ACT BRINGS CHANGES TO SURVEILLANCE LAWS, SENTENCING FOR COMPUTER CRIMINALS: Yesterday President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act into law, Section 225 of which incorporates the "Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002" that was working its way through Congress this summer. The new law makes some relatively minor amendments to the Internet surveillance laws, and fiddles a bit with the sentencing scheme for computer crimes. Here are the relevant changes to the computer crime laws, along with my commentary (note that for the purposes of this post, when I refer to "the Act" I'll mean Section 225, the Cyber Security Enhancement Act, not the Homeland Security Act) :

    1) SENTENCING: A good part of the Act deals in one way or another with sentencing for those convicted of crimes under 18 U.S.C. 1030, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Section 225(b) and (c) are directives to the U.S. Sentencing Commission to go out and do some deep thinking about computer crimes and "if appropriate" amend the current sentencing guidelines. It's up to the Sentencing Commission to do what they they think is a good idea, but the directive suggests that Congress wants the Commission to add some extra penalties for 18 U.S.C. 1030 crimes. In particular, Section 225(b)(2)(A) tells the Commission to " ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy statements reflect the serious nature of [18 U.S.C. 1030 crimes] . . . , the growing incidence of such offenses, and the need for an effective deterrent and appropriate punishment to prevent such offenses." The Commission has to come up with a report on these issues, well.

    In my opinion, Congress is barking up the wrong tree here. Currently the Sentencing Guidelines treat computer crimes just as seriously as any other crimes-- and in some way more seriously, as in the case of child pornography offenses where there is an enhancement for the use of a computer. In general, the same guidelines and punishments apply regardless of whether a crime is committed on-line or off-line. What does Congress expect the Sentencing Commission to do-- have a special enhancement treating computer crimes differently than other crimes? I gather the answer to that is "yes." In any event, the Commission's report is due May 1, 2003, so we'll know relatively quickly what will happen.

    The Act also adds a provision to the penalty section of the computer crime statute, 18 U.S.C. 1030(c), allowing for higher statutory max punishments (if allowed by the Sentencing Guidelines, of course) for violations of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)(A)(i).The provisions state:
(A) if the offender knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A)(i), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both; and (B) if the offender knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause death from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A)(i), a fine under this title or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both.
My sense is that these provisions don't mean a whole lot unless the Sentencing Commission changes its guidelines (and again we'll have to wait to find out), but at least in theory it allows for some pretty high maximum penalties for computer crimes. The press likes to say that this change has allowed "life sentences for hackers," but that's not quite right. First, the 20 year/life sentences are only for violations of 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), the computer damage statute. Most computer hacking falls under 1030(a)(2), unauthorized access to a computer. There can be overlap, but there need not be. Second, the change is only to the statutory maxima. In the federal system, sentences are govern d primarily by the Sentencing Guidelines, and a statutory maximum may or may not matter.

    I gather the thinking behind this change is that someone who uses a computer to cause real physical world harm such as death should be treated as seriously as they would off-line, and that the 5 or 10 year statutory max penalties for hacking or a run-of-the-mill DDOS attack just won't cut it. In that case, I suspect that these changes may end up serving primarily as jurisdictional provisions. Why? Imagine that a computer user launches a DDOS attack against a computer that controls an airplane, overwhelms the computer and intentionally crashes the plane, killing lots of people. The computer user would be guilty of murder under state law, even without any computer crime statutes. State homicide law doesn't care how someone causes the death, only that they do. So the computer user could get life in prison (and in some jurisdictions the death penalty) under state law already, and this change to federal law would help ensure that there would be federal jurisdiction and a serious federal penalty for the crime as well.

    In any event, I doubt that this provision will be used much, if at all. Fortunately, it is extremely rare for a person to send a computer command that causes a death. And the government almost never prosecutes attempts under 18 U.S.C. 1030. Taken together, these points suggest (at least to me) that this text may end up like another 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1), which covers hacking to obtain classified information. As far as know, 1030(a)(1) has never actually been charged, even though it's been on the books for almost twenty years.

    Finally, the Act has an important but little-noticed provision significantly boosting possible penalties under 18 U.S.C. 2701, a rarely used criminal prohibition on accessing without authorization unopened e-mails and other undelivered files. 2701 vi n furtherance of any criminal or tortious act, it's a 5-year felony. This may actually add a pretty important new tool, making it significantly more likely that law enforcement prosecutes hacks into e-mail accounts. So, for example, snooping around another person's e- mail account in furtherance of a tortious act is no longer just a misdemeanor, but rather a relatively serious 5 year felony.

    2) AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNET SURVEILLANCE LAWS: The most important change here is to the Pen Register statute, and in particular to the "emergency" provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3125. The pen register amendments will likely have a considerable impact on how computer hacking investigations are conducted.

    A bit of background first. When the government learns of a hacking attack ongoing, the government will often first seek to get a pen register order to try to trace back the attack or future attacks to its origin. The orders are relatively easy to obtain, and they usually don't provide much private information in a computer hacking case (the order generally will be used at the packet-header level to yield a bunch of IP addresses where some packets originated). However, prior to yesterday, the government still needed to go find a judge to sign the order first, and then conduct the monitoring later. This usually took somewhere between an hour and an afternoon. The law did make two exceptions: the government could set up a pen register and collect the information first and then get an order okaying the surveillance within 48 hours afterwards, but only if the case involved immediate danger of death or seriously bodily injury or organized crime and a high-level DOJ official approved it.

    The new la adds two new situations in which the government can use this so-called "emergency" authority. Under the new law, the government can exercise this emergency authority with high- level DOJ approval when there is:
(C) an immediate threat to a national security interest; or (D) an ongoing attack on a protected computer (as defined in section 1030) that constitutes a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment greater than one year.
Between these two, I think (D) is especially significant. Basically, if there's an ongoing hack or DDOS attack that is a felony, a high-level DOJ official can now authorize the immediate installation of a pen register to trace the attack. No need to do the paperwork, find the judge, arrange an appointment, wait for the judge to sign the order, and pick up the order. Rather, DOJ can call up ISPs and have them start the monitoring, and then obtain the court orders within 48 hours. A very interesting change, and one that I suspect may considerably add to the government's ability to investigate 18 U.S.C. 1030 offenses. (On another note, there's an interesting question of what an "ongoing" attack is -- is that a continuous attack, or one that may return? -- but this post is probably long enough already, so I'll move on.)

    The new law also expands the ability of a commercial ISP (or other provider "to the public") to disclose the contents of stored communication such as e-mails. ISPs such as AOL can't voluntarily disclose the contents of e-mails and the like to law enforcement unless a particular exception applies. Under the Patriot Act, one exception allowed ISPs to disclose such contents to "a law enforcement agency . . . if the provider reasonably believes that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to any person requires disclosure of the information without delay." (what was 18 U.S.C. 2702(b)(6)(C)).

    Under the new law, that exception has been expanded, so t at it now allows disclosure "to a Federal, State, or local governmental entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency."

    What's the difference? The most important one is that the disclosure need not be to a law enforcement agency, but rather can go to any government entity (read: Department of Homeland Security), as has been the rule for the analogous exception for disclosure of non- content records. Also, the belief need only be in good faith, not actually reasonable, so ISPs more worried about being sued than saving lives can disclose the contents with less of a concern about civil liability. The press has made a relatively big deal about this change, but I don't see it as particularly significant. ISPs are generally reluctant to disclose information about their subscribers in the first place, and I don't think the relatively minor change in the language of this exception will change that.

 

A DISSENTING VOICE ABOUT CIVILITY: Steven Postrel, who is a very nice guy himself, writes the following:
Your campaign for civility and persuasion in blogging is interesting, but I think relies on selective sampling of the data in regards to the effectiveness of persuasion. One problem is that there are many people who don't read blogs but are influenced by those who do. To the extent that a blogger can convince his readers that the opponents of his view are cretins, his readers' social influence will act on the waverers far more effectively. Many, if not most, people form their political views by figuring out what is socially acceptable in the circles to whose membership they aspire. Getting those circles to take a dismissive attitude toward one's opponents then can sway large numbers of people who never read the blog. . . .

[Moreover,] increasing the fervor of one's supporters is important in politics, and the genuinely undecided are likely to see the confidence with which one's views are expressed, and the fun one seems to be having in expressing them, as positive indicators of the merits of your case.

My guess is that the rationally undecided types just looking for the best arguments are a distinct minority on the Internet and in society. They may be high-quality converts . . . and so worth targeting, but my guess is that in the controversy game you collect more flies with vinegar than with honey . . . .
Steve's points are quite fair ones, but I think that on balance politeness (though forceful, fun-to-read politeness, with trenchant though calm criticism) works better than invective. My sense is that on balance expressing one's views with "confidence" is persuasive, but expressing them with bile or pejoratives is not. Likewise, my sense is that it's easier to persuade people "to take a dismissive attitude toward one's opponents," at least via a Web log (I can't speak for other media, such as billboards, bumper stickers, or TV ads) by powerfully and memorably showing the substantive weaknesses in the opponents' arguments, rather than by calling the opponents names. Even if the opponents deserve pejoratives, let the reader's mind fill in the pejoratives, rather than expressing them oneself -- seems more effective to me, if one can swing it.

     But of course this might well be all wishful thinking on my part. It's always tempting to assume that what one likes, ethically and esthetically, is actually more effective -- but such assumptions are often wrong. Who knows? For now, I'll stick to my tentative judgment, but I realize that I might be mistaken.

 

A READER WRITES:
That explains it: "I gave Bill Clinton all kinds of ideas" -- Gary Hart, on his continued involvement in national politics (Los Angeles Times, 11/25/02).
The reader also writes, in response to my query about whether I should include his name when I blog this,
There is a midrash which tells us that the highest mitzvah is one performed anonymously. I would add that it is also the safest.

 

GORE: "Just 19 percent [of respondents in a New York Times poll] said they held a favorable view of the former vice president, compared with 43 percent who had an unfavorable view." I mention this simply because I've heard people say that he's still considered the front-runner for the 2004 Democratic nomination. (Thanks to Kausfiles for the pointer.)

UPDATE: Reader Matthew Bass, a self-described New Democrat, writes:
If we didn't go to the concert the first time, what makes them think we'll shell out for the reunion tour?

 

A BIT MORE ON BLOGS AND TONE: Reader and fellow lawprof Chad Oldfather writes:
I fall into the class of people who do like to seek out viewpoints different from my own (and, perhaps more importantly, to expose myself to the full range of viewpoints before settling on one for myself). . . . There's little doubt that I generally leave [a Web log that is calm and polite] feeling much more inclined to have been persuaded by what I've read than I would if I'd encountered the same arguments elsewhere sprinkled with variants of idiot, moron, references to The Left and The Right, and the like.

I certainly understand the impulse toward snideness when addressing others' arguments, and early in my career as an appellate advocate I'm sad to say I succumbed on more than one occasion. But experience brought me pretty quickly around to your position, and I'm pleased to see you addressing it.
Another reader, my colleague Kristen Holmquist (who describes herself as having "lefty leanings"), echoes this, saying that she likes
to become informed about positions other than my own . . . in a respectful, noninvective-hurling forum. I am one of those who despises the nastiness no matter where it comes from. An occasional jab is fine, but the incessant rudeness that passes for debate in too many places does no one any good.
Hardly a random sample of the population, I know -- and yet I think (and I certainly hope) that this is a pretty common view among thoughtful, intelligent readers (the very ones that bloggers should be seeking).

 

A NEW SLOGAN: Do you think this might catch on?

Smokers don't impose health care costs on society; governments that insist on paying for smokers' health care impose health care costs on society.

Inspired by Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, the course by Kip Viscusi (author of the latest stocking-stuffer, Smoke-Filled Rooms, and of the first book I read on the subject, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision, now out of print). See also this article from long ago, where I quote Viscusi for the proposition that people overestimate the risks of smoking.

UPDATE: Reader Matt Bower likes it and reminds me that the same is true of motorcycle helmet laws. He's right, of course -- and in fact, motorcycle helmet laws are a big part of what started me thinking about these issues way back. Might as well mention that Eugene had a blog post about motorcycle helmet laws here back in April. Eugene argues that a libertarian may oppose paying for helmetless riders' health care costs, but given that society does pay for such health care costs, you ought to be able to get a special "helmetless riding" license plate, which would allow you to ride helmetless if you have insurance for helmetless riding. Well, I don't know whether Eugene's proposal would make things better or worse from a libertarian perspective, but it's worth a read.

UPDATE 2: Reader Robert English says: "You are, of course, correct. If we simply let anyone who smoked die without treatment, there would be no health care costs. We'd have to change the ethic of the medical establishment so that doctors would only treat patients who could pay, but that process is already under way." Well, I agree only partially . . . it's not a matter of medical ethics -- doctors should be able to treat whomever they like -- but more a matter of political ethics. Whether we should pay for poor people's medical care is one issue . . . the really pernicious part is where, once we're paying, we have to support either restrictions on the activity or make someone else foot the bill purely out of a sense of fiscal responsibility. Always remember that if you've made the decision to be charitable, it's your decision, and no one else is at "fault" for your decision to spend your (and your fellow taxpayers') money.

UPDATE 3: Reader Ed Still says smokers do impose health care costs on non-smokers by exposing them to smoke -- he can't be around smokers because their smoke will cause an asthma-like attack. I agree, but the slogan was about imposing health care costs on society. Of course smokers can impose costs on certain individuals, just like anyone can harm anyone else through their activity, and there's nothing inherently wrong with policies to deal with that, provided the harms are great. That's very different from the view that smokers impose costs on everyone in society through the general tax burden.

 

THANKSGIVING FOR ME: It all reminds me of how my ancestors, the Pilgrims, came to this country in 1975.

 

THE FIRST THANKSGIVING: When I was in elementary school, we were taught that the Pilgrims were saved from starvation by an Indian named Squanto, who taught them how to plant corn. The story comes from William Bradford's journal, published under the title Of Plymouth Plantation (it's at page 85 of the 1952 Knopf edition). What we weren't taught, though, is the full story. Squanto had been kidnapped as a child and brought to England, where he had lived for several years. Eventually, after years of travel to various places, he made it back home, only to find that his entire village had died of smallpox while he was away. When the Pilgrims showed up, they found a deserted village with fields already cleared for farming, and an English-speaking Indian, the sole survivor of his tribe, who was willing to help them get started. Boy were they lucky.

 

PREMATURE OPTIMIZATION IS THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL: See these few pieces on What Would Jesus Drive?, the anti-SUV campaign: one by Jacob Sullum in Reason, one by Brendan Miniter in OpinionJournal.com, one by Donald Sensing on One Hand Clapping, and a comment on Brendan Miniter by Hanah on Quare.

A comment on the Miniter/Hanah exchange. Miniter says you shouldn't go after SUVs because SUVs create wealth and wealth leads to a cleaner environment. Hanah says wealth leads to a cleaner environment, in part because people become rich enough to start a What Would Jesus Drive campaign, so don't argue against that campaign when that's the mechanism by which wealthy societies clean up. Let me suggest a middle path.

Here are three ways wealthy societies tend to be cleaner:

  • People become rich enough to demand "environmental goods," i.e. spend more to get organic foods, free trade coffee, recycled paper.

  • Societies become rich enough to impose environmental regulations without destroying their economies.

  • Even without the two above, new technologies tend to be cleaner than old technologies, just because that's how lots of technologies work.


Now I suppose we all like #3. Hard-line libertarians would disapprove of #2, though most others might approve of some #2 measures at least in theory. And #1 is just people acting in the market, and what's wrong with that?

Well, we can still point out that #1 and #2 measures might make us worse off even by environmental standards. Many basic environmental regulations make us much better off, and it's kind of silly to say, at that extreme, that we shouldn't do it because it'll prevent us from growing and thereby becoming cleaner in the future. On the other hand, lots of silly regulations have exactly that problem. Even assuming they do clean up the environment, they may slow down environmental improvement by asking for too much of it right now. And premature optimization is the root of all evil. (This is attributed to Tony Hoare and Donald Knuth.) Against those policies, Miniter's argument has bite -- we should forego them and become richer (and ultimately cleaner) instead.

Same with people acting in the market, for instance by buying organic food, foregoing SUVs, or buying recycled paper. Oh, they're free to do what they like. But I still want to tell them that recycling isn't always good for the environment. Same with Miniter's critique of the What Would Jesus Drive? movement. Sure, these voluntary movements are great and may in fact help the environment without coercion. But still, let's establish (1) that they do make the environment cleaner, and (2) even if they do, that they do so without preventing better improvements in the future.

Now admittedly, I'm more in Hanah's camp than in Miniter's. If it's voluntary, I'm inherently unwilling to criticize. This is why, for instance -- though some economist friends of mine argued otherwise -- I never argued against the Living Wage campaign at Harvard. They wanted to pay their janitors high wages. I know as an economist that minimum wages increase unemployment, and as a libertarian I'm against mandating such policies on private parties. But what would happen if Harvard, a private organization, did it? Some janitors would earn more, while others might be out of a job. Or maybe they'd fire very few or no janitors but take the money out of their huge endowment and screw over Harvard students 100 years from now. (They can do that if the Living Wage campaign successfully agitates not only for higher wages but also for no layoffs, or if demand for janitors is inelastic, that is, if Harvard needs all those employees to provide the services to attract students.) Do I care about employed janitors, unemployed janitors, current students, future students . . . ? More importantly, does Harvard care about those?

Arguments that say "This policy is deficient by your own standards" are great -- but they really require that you know what these people's standards are. Often, people who engage in this exercise have some caricatured idea of what people's standards are which bears only the slightest resemblance to their actual views.

For instance, one economist told me the living wage campaign would be bad by the protesters' supposedly liberal standards, because while some janitors would be better off, others would be unemployed, and of course the impoverishment of these unemployed janitors should be more important to a liberal than the enrichment of those janitors who keep their jobs. But is that really right? Maybe these liberals don't care about the poorest people first -- if they did, maybe they'd be protesting in Bangladesh. Maybe they care more about people who are nearby, like employed janitors. Maybe they just care about how we deal with the people who are in our community (one supporter of the Living Wage actually claimed this to me), and believe that paying people below-"decent" salaries sullies their own hands because it involves treating them as sub-human, while not hiring people in the first place doesn't sully your hands.

Anyway, it was all too complicated for me to get involved, because I won't even presume to wonder what the Harvard community, the Harvard trustees, or the Living Wage protesters actually believe.

Same with the anti-SUV campaign. Sure you can become dirty and, through enrichment, later make yourself clean. But if pollution is sinful, do you get rid of the sin by cleaning up afterwards? If you take a strong view of the action-inaction distinction (which, incidentally, many libertarians do), polluting now can be seen as bad while not growing in the first place is no sin (even if growth would give people better lives). It's a respectable view. Maybe these religious folks actually hold that view. Who knows? Not I.

Anyway, my moral is: Many real environmental improvements may stem from reasonable environmental regulations or reasonable popular campaigns. But lots of regulations or private environmental campaigns are subject to a critique on environmental grounds. If they are, go for it! But if you're aiming such an argument, a critique from within, against actual environmentalists, make sure you really understand what their goals are.

 

IDEOLOGICAL COCOONING: There's been much speculation recently about whether the Internet increase people's predisposition to talk to and listen to only those views that they generally agree with, and to simply ignore other views. Some say yes. Some say no. Some say that at least Weblogs diminish this tendency, because they often link to views they disagree with, if only to rebut them.

     Let me suggest a slightly different hypothesis: Most people have a particularly strong tendency to ignore views that they disagree with and are presented rudely.

     I suspect that most people do prefer to read things that reinforce what they already believe. But those people who are interested in ideas (who are probably disproportionately represented among readers) realize that they need to consider others' viewpoints, and are often willing to do so.

     These readers, though, are extremely easy for a writer to lose. It's already a bit hard emotionally for people to consider other viewpoints (sad, but that's the reality of human psychology); invective and insults make it still harder. What's more, since rudeness is often a proxy for substantive weaknesses in an argument, especially for the failure to take opposing views seriously, readers think to themselves: "This stuff is annoying to read, it's probably not that good substantively, why should I waste my time on it?"

     This effect does indeed relate to ideology. Though quite a few people have low tolerance for rudeness generally (for instance, because they feel that rudeness by some of their allies reflects badly on the whole movement), most people do have more tolerance for rudeness by their ideological allies than by their ideological adversaries. Among other reasons, hearing the other side insulted is less annoying than hearing our side insulted. So as political invective increases, people's natural tendency to prefer listening to their friends is exacerbated.

     Naturally, bland and boring material is also a turn-off, both for friends and for adversaries. But somewhere between Caspar Milquetoast and -- well, I won't name names -- there is, I think, a zone which is interesting and challenging for both sides, and can actually persuade people (even if by degrees) and not just reinforce their existing views.

 

GARRETT v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA: Garrett Moritz, founder of Moritz College of Law, weighs in on the "speech code" controversy. I think he's being a little too soft on the diversity people -- not all confrontation and argumentative combat is equal, and people channeling their confrontational energies into lobbying for speech codes, like political rent-seeking, is not a positive development, even if the exercise (in the short run) hones their lawyerly skills, and even if, for reasons of bureaucratic inertia and sandbagging, they're not going to get anywhere. But it's still well worth reading.

UPDATE: Apparently, this isn't about the University of Alabama, but Harvard Law School. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett is a different case.

UPDATE 2: Apparently, Garrett isn't actually the founder of Moritz College of Law but is my friend from Harvard Law School. Sorry!

UPDATE 3: Maybe this guy?

 

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL CALLS FOR KILLING OF JOURNALIST: Clayton Cramer points to an AP news story that says:
The deputy governor of a largely Islamic state in northern Nigeria has called on Muslims to kill the Nigerian writer of a newspaper article about the Miss World beauty pageant that sparked deadly religious riots.

"Just like the blasphemous Indian writer Salman Rushdie, the blood of Isioma Daniel can be shed," Zamfara Deputy Governor Mahamoud Shinkafi told a gathering of Muslim groups in the state capital, Gusau, on Monday. . . .

While state officials cannot issue fatwas, the deputy governor, "like all Muslims," considers the death sentence against Daniel as "a reality based on the teachings of the Quran," Zamfara state Information Commissioner Tukur Umar Dangaladima said Tuesday.

Islam's holy book "states that whoever accuses or insults any prophet of Allah . . . should be killed," Dangaladima told The Associated Press. "If she (Daniel) is Muslim, she has no option except to die. But if she is a non-Muslim, the only way out for her is to convert to Islam."
Clayton comments:
Notice how Ms. Daniel's cheeky, even obnoxious writing "sparked deadly religious riots"? It couldn't be that an narrow-minded, intolerant bunch started burning churches and murdering Christians because they found Ms. Daniel's remarks irritating.
Indeed.

 

FROM MY COLLEAGUE JONATHAN ZASLOFF: I'm not sure exactly where I stand on this, but Jonathan makes a forceful argument, which I'd like to pass along:
While much of the discussion has focused on MLDEF's unconscionable attempts to silence Dershowitz, we should also examine the substantive aspect. And on substance, Dershowitz has a very good point, as unappetizing as that point is.

Why do Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Palestinian Authority support suicide bombings? Most commentators dismiss the tactic as "senseless violence", but that is exactly wrong. The violence has a specific and clear purpose: to reduce the number of Jews in Israel and thereby win the demographic struggle. Demography, not religion, is really at the heart of the suicide bombers' strategy.

Obviously, the bombings themselves will not do the trick. The point is twofold: first, to foster emigration from Israel by frightened Israelis. Arafat himself admitted as much in a 1996 speech to Arab foreign ministers, in which he declared that the purpose of the attacks was to make "1 million rich Jews" to leave. (By that, he meant the educated Ashkenazi elite).

Second, the bombings are meant to destroy the Israeli tourism industry, thereby severely wounding the economy. (This last attempt seems to have had a great deal of success, facilitating by Israel's own gross economic mismanagement and the use of scarce resources to support right-wing settlers.). This will cause even more emigration.

What's the point of this? Currently, Israel within the Green Line has