I'm a big fan of the Amazon Kindle, and think that electronic book readers are the future. But behavior such as that described on David Pogue's New York Times blog can do much to alienate prospective readers:

This morning, hundreds of Amazon Kindle owners awoke to discover that books by a certain famous author had mysteriously disappeared from their e-book readers. These were books that they had bought and paid for — thought they owned.

But no, apparently the publisher changed its mind about offering an electronic edition, and apparently Amazon, whose business lives and dies by publisher happiness, caved. It electronically deleted all books by this author from people’s Kindles and credited their accounts for the price....

You want to know the best part? The juicy, plump, dripping irony?

The author who was the victim of this Big Brotherish plot was none other than George Orwell. And the books were “1984” and “Animal Farm.” ...

Thanks to Kevin Gerson of the UCLA Law Library for the pointer.

UPDATE: Commenter areader writes, "What are you talking about? 1984 has never been available on Kindle."

The story is here, and it links to audio of the arguments.

A quick search suggests that this decision hasn't hit any mainstream media sources yet, though it strikes me as an interesting story. If you're a journalist who reads this blog, you might want to take a look to see if you agree.

an epic serial blockbuster about the life of Kim Jong Il." From The Independent (U.K.):

His birth was marked by a double rainbow and a new star, he hit 11 holes-in-one in his first game of golf, finishing 38 under par, and throughout his life he has performed heroic feats impossible for mere mortals. When he shouts, "huge storms happen".

It's here; thanks to InstaPundit for the pointer.

A commenter asked this as a rhetorical question, suggesting, I think, that the answer must obviously be "no." But I don't see why, assuming that we're talking about a minor child of the parent. Parents are rightly seen as having duties to their children. These include the duties to work to support the child for 18 years (more controversially, that's extended even beyond 18 years in many child support decisions, but for now I set that aside); to care for the child; to bear a post-viability fetus, at least absent some substantial threat to the mother's life or health; and more.

Why wouldn't this also extend to the obligation to provide a life-saving transplant, at least when the risk is as low (not zero, but very low) as it is for kidney transplants? You bring a child into the world, and you incur major obligations to it; why shouldn't this be one of them?

Now I don't ask these questions as rhetorical ones, since it's possible that some distinctions can be drawn (or even that the existing obligations on parents are excessive, though I'm skeptical about that). Perhaps there is a dispositive difference between providing an organ and having to work for 18 years to support someone. (I agree there's a difference, even an important one, but it's just not clear to me that it should lead to a difference in result.) Perhaps there is something dispositively different between having to give a kidney forever, and having to provide one's womb for several months; or perhaps women shouldn't have to bear fetuses even post-viability; or perhaps women only have to bear fetuses post-viability because they knew of this obligation early on, and had an opportunity to avoid this by a pre-viability abortion. I haven't thought about the matter deeply enough to have a well-worked out response to all these things.

But my intuition is that a legal duty to provide a kidney, given the very low risk that it involves, is well within the range of burdens that parents may rightly be required to bear; and at the very least we can't just categorically exclude that possibility. I'd love to hear what others have to say.

From today's very interesting decision in New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.):

Defendants V.M. [the mother] and B.G. [the father] appeal from the judgment ... which found that they abused and neglected their child, J.M.G. As a result of these findings, J.M.G. was placed in the custody and care of plaintiff Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). At a permanency hearing the judge approved DYFS's plan for termination of parental rights....

We agree that the judge's findings as to V.M. were supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing, but ... we disagree as to his findings as they relate to B.G.... [On the record before us, we do not think that] whether V.M.'s refusal to consent to a cesarean section (c-section) can, as a matter of law, be considered an element of abuse and neglect ... need be decided.

[T]he independent evidence presented, irrespective of the evidence concerning V.M.'s resistance to the c-section, amply supported the judge's ultimate finding as to V.M., and we affirm as to her. As to B.G., we reverse for the reasons set forth in the concurring opinion.

Carchman, P.J, concurring.

Defendants V.M. and B.G. are the biological parents of J.M.G., born on April 16, 2006. During her hospitalization in anticipation of J.M.G.'s delivery, V.M. demonstrated combative and erratic behavior including a refusal to consent to a cesarean section (c-section). Despite the medical opinion that the fetus demonstrated signs of distress and that the procedure was necessary to avoid imminent danger to the fetus, the child was born by vaginal delivery without incident.

After the birth of the child, plaintiff Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) investigated. It learned of V.M.'s refusal to consent to the c-section and discovered that V.M. had been under psychiatric care for twelve years prior to J.M.G.'s birth. Moreover, V.M. was not forthcoming about her treatment or diagnosis. B.G. also refused to cooperate with DYFS's efforts to obtain information.

DYFS commenced a Title 9 proceeding pursuant to the Abandonment, Abuse, Cruelty and Neglect Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.106, and placed J.M.G. in its custody. At the fact-finding hearing, the trial judge found that J.M.G. was an abused and neglected child due in part to her parents' failure to cooperate with medical personnel at the time of her birth. V.M.'s refusal to consent to a c-section factored heavily into this decision. Later, at a permanency hearing, the judge approved DYFS's plan for termination of parental rights and foster family adoption.

On appeal, V.M. and B.G., among other arguments, assert that the judge erred in considering in his findings that they abused and neglected J.M.G. based on decisions that V.M. made concerning medical treatment, specifically, her refusal to consent to a c-section. At trial, DYFS asserted that V.M.'s refusal to consent to a c-section was a relevant factor in expressing abuse and neglect....

My majority colleagues conclude that irrespective of whether or not V.M. consented to the c-section, there was sufficient credible evidence to support a finding of abuse and neglect as to V.M. The majority therefore eschews any discussion of the issue of c-section.

I concur in the result reached as to both V.M. and B.G. I am of the view that ... [the c-section] issue remains extant and requires a level of judicial scrutiny. Consideration of V.M.'s refusal to submit to a c-section, in my view, is improper and beyond the legislative scope of the child-protective statutes. For this reason, I concur....

There is no allegation that J.M.G. was actually harmed by her parents. Rather, the judge's finding was based solely on the imminent danger of harm presented by V.M.'s actions and mental condition.

The unique problem here is that much of V.M.'s erratic behavior occurred before J.M.G.'s birth, while V.M. was still pregnant. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(b) defines "child" simply as "any child alleged to have been abused or neglected." Nothing in the statute or the attendant legislative history suggests that the Legislature intended that the provisions of the Act should apply to a fetus....

The decision to undergo an invasive procedure such as a c-section belongs uniquely to the prospective mother after consultation with her physicians. To allow such a decision to factor into potential charges of abuse or neglect requires a prospective mother to subjugate her personal decision to a governmental agency's statutory interpretation creating a scenario that was neither contemplated nor incorporated within the four corners of the relevant statutory language. Her decision on matters as critical as this invasive procedure must be made without interference or threat. V.M.'s decision to forego a c-section had no place in these proceedings.

However, I agree that there was sufficient additional evidence to support the judge's finding that V.M. placed J.M.G. in imminent danger from April 16 to April 20, 2006. As the hospital records reflect, V.M. was "combative," "uncooperative," "erratic," "noncompliant," "irrational" and "inappropriate." She ordered the attending obstetrician to leave the room, did not allow the obstetrician to perform an ultrasound examination, told a nurse that "no one [was] going to touch [her] baby," refused to continuously wear the face mask that provided her with oxygen and would not remain still in order to allow for fetal heart monitoring and the administering of an epidural. Incredibly, she also called the Livingston Police to report that she was being abused and denied treatment when it was her "erratic" and "combative" behavior that was preventing the hospital staff from providing treatment....

For more, see the full opinion.

From Lopez v. Candaele, which I blogged about below:

This case is likewise not mooted by Defendants’ recent revelation that the Policy was supposedly repealed in 2007.[2] First, the Policy continues to appear on the District’s and LACC’s websites.... Thus, Plaintiff, and other students and employees, can reasonably believe they are subject to the Policy and experience a chilling effect.

[2] We are chagrined that defense counsel and Defendants’ representative who were present at the oral argument on June 10, 2009 were apparently ignorant of the status of a policy they purported to defend. This lack of preparedness is viewed with great disfavor.

Lawyers and future lawyers, take heed. Thanks to commenter Gabriel M. for the pointer.

The case stems from the incident in which a professor in a speech class refused to grade a student's presentation, apparently because of the religious nature of the student's presentation, the student's expression of opposition for same-sex marriage in the presentation, or both. (The professor apparently also called the student a "fascist bastard" in front of the class for having supported the anti-same-sex-marriage Prop. 8, and refused to let the student finish the presentation.)

But the injunction, in Lopez v. Candaele, focuses on the policy, not the incident, and concludes that the policy is likely unconstitutional. Here's what the court says, in most relevant part (some paragraph breaks added):

The definitions section of the Policy, Section 15003, states:

Sexual harassment is defined as: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, visual or physical conduct of a sexual nature, made by someone from or in the workplace or in the educational setting, under any of the following conditions: ..[.] (3) The conduct has the purpose or effect of having a negative impact upon the individual’s work or academic performance, or of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work or educational environment....

Two websites, one maintained by the [Los Angeles Community College] District and the other by [Los Angeles City College], purport to expound upon the Policy. The District’s website states that sexual harassment can include “[d]isparaging sexual remarks about your gender[, r]epeated sexist jokes, dirty jokes or sexual slurs about your clothing, body, or sexual activities[, and d]isplay of sexually suggestive objects, pictures, cartoons, posters, screen savers[.]”Moreover, the site states, “If [you are] unsure if certain comments or behavior are offensive do not do it, do not say it... . Ask if something you do or say is being perceived as offensive or unwelcome. If the answer is yes, stop the behavior.” LACC’s website states that “[s]exual harassment can be intentional or unintentional.” The website further states:

It is important to be aware that sexual remarks or physical conduct of a sexual nature may be offensive or can make some people uncomfortable even if you wouldn’t feel the same way yourself. It is therefore sometimes difficult to know what type of behavior is sexual harassment. However the defining characteristic of sexual harassment is that it is unwanted and pervasive. It’s important to clearly let an offender know that certain actions are unwelcome. The four most common types of sexual harassment are:

1. Sexual Harassment based on your gender: This is generalized sexist statements, actions and behavior that convey insulting, intrusive or degrading attitudes/comments about women or men. Examples include insulting remarks; intrusive comments about physical appearance; offensive written material such as graffiti, calendars, cartoons, emails; obscene gestures or sounds; sexual slurs, obscene jokes, humor about sex....

We conclude that the Policy prohibits a substantial amount of protected free speech, even judged in relation to unprotected conduct that it can validly prohibit. First, as the above quotations make clear, the Policy prohibits some speech solely because the speaker “has the purpose” of causing an effect, regardless of whether the speech actually has any effect. The Supreme Court has held that a school may not prohibit speech unless the speech will “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). [Footnote: There are certain categories of speech, inapplicable here, that are excepted from the Tinker standard. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that a high school may ban from classrooms and assemblies “vulgar and lewd speech [that] would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that a high school may control the content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as the controls are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns).]

Other circuits have found similar sexual harassment policies that restrict speech based on the speaker’s motives to be unconstitutional in light of Tinker. See DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 317 (“[T]he focus on motive is contrary to Tinker's requirement that speech cannot be prohibited in the absence of a tenable threat of disruption.”); Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216–17 (“As an initial matter, the Policy punishes not only speech that actually causes disruption, but also speech that merely intends to do so: by its terms, it covers speech ‘which has the purpose or effect of’ interfering with educational performance or creating a hostile environment. This ignores Tinker's requirement that a school must reasonably believe that speech will cause actual, material disruption before prohibiting it.”). Notably, in Saxe, a similar policy was found unconstitutional though it was adopted by an elementary and high school district, whose students receive less First Amendment protection than college students. Thus, the Policy’s regulation of speech based solely on the motive of the speaker is unconstitutional.

Moreover, by using subjective words such as “hostile” and “offensive,” the Policy is so subjective and broad that it applies to protected speech. In DeJohn, the Third Circuit concluded that such a policy must be invalidated unless it contains “a requirement that the conduct objectively and subjectively creates a hostile environment or substantially interferes with an individual’s work.” 537 F.3d at 318. Here, the Policy does not contain both a subjective and objective requirement. To the contrary, the District’s website admonishes, “If [you are] unsure if certain comments or behavior are offensive do not do it, do not say it.... Ask if something you do or say is being perceived as offensive or unwelcome.”

Thus, the Policy reaches constitutionally protected speech that is merely offensive to some listeners, such as discussions of religion, homosexual relations and marriage, sexual morality and freedom, polygamy, or even gender politics and policies. Indeed, the LACC’s website indicates that sexual harassment can include “sexist statements ... or degrading attitudes/comments about women or men.” This could include an individual’s outdated, though protected, opinions on the proper role of the genders. While it may be desirable to promote harmony and civility, these values cannot be enforced at the expense of protected speech under the First Amendment.

Thus, the Policy is unconstitutionally overbroad.

(Show more of the opinion.)

Before striking down a law as facially unconstitutional, a court must consider any narrowing construction that could render the law consistent with the First Amendment.... “Constitutional narrowing seeks to add a constraint to the statute that its drafters plainly had not meant to put there; it is akin to partial invalidation of the statute.... In performing our constitutional narrowing function, we may come up with any interpretation we have reason to believe [the District] would not have rejected.”

Here, we could excise the word “purpose” from the Policy so that it reads: “(3) The conduct has the effect of having a negative impact upon the individual’s work or academic performance, or of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work or educational environment....” However, that does not cure the constitutional infirmities. A “negative impact” upon the work or academic performance of another does not necessarily justify restricting First Amendment freedoms. Rather, under Tinker, student speech must “collide with the rights of others” to be proscribed, even when the topic of the speech is controversial subjects. 393 U.S. at 511 (1969). Speech that has a “negative impact” does not necessarily collide with the rights of others, and cannot be broadly proscribed....

Moreover, the Policy’s prohibition of speech that “creat[es] an intimidating, hostile or offensive work or educational environment” sweeps within it significant protected speech. For example, Plaintiff’s protected speech in his speech class was offensive to some of his classmates and thus could be prohibited by the Policy. The DeJohn court concluded almost identical language could not be narrowed. 537 F.3d at 320 (“It is difficult to cabin this phrase, which could encompass any speech that might simply be offensive to a listener, or a group of listeners, believing that they are being subjected to or surrounded by hostility.”).....

The Policy does contain a paragraph that somewhat limits its reach. However it is not sufficient to render the Policy constitutional. That paragraph states:

The Board of Trustees reaffirms its commitment to academic freedom, but recognizes that academic freedom does not allow sexual harassment. The discussion of sexual ideas, taboos, behavior or language which is an intrinsic part of the course content shall in no event constitute sexual harassment. It is recognized that an essential function of education is a probing of received opinions and an exploration of ideas which may cause some students discomfort. It is further recognized that academic freedom insures the faculty's right to teach and the student's right to learn.

Even when the Policy is considered in light of this paragraph, the Policy reaches speech unrelated to a class, such as discussions in any public and common areas at LACC. Even speech related to a class can be restricted by the Policy if the speech is not an intrinsic part of the course content. Thus, the Policy is not sufficiently narrowed by this paragraph.

Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, for the reasons discussed above. He, and other individuals subject to the Policy, face irreparable injury because “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” The balance of hardships favors granting the injunction because Plaintiff and other individuals subject to the Policy face the deprivation of their constitutional liberties, whereas Defendants are merely enjoined from enforcing the likely unconstitutionally overbroad Policy. Finally, the public interest favors the injunction because there is a significant public interest in upholding First Amendment rights. We recognize that the public also has an interest in prohibiting sexual harassment on the District’s campuses. However, a properly-drafted statute could achieve that end without running afoul of the First Amendment.

(Hide much of the opinion.)

From People v. Marinaro (Minn. Ct. App.) (some paragraph breaks added):

The Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act prohibits smoking in numerous indoor public places, including bars and restaurants. But the act makes an exception for actors and actresses while they are engaged in theatrical performances. Thomas Eugene Marinaro, the proprietor of Tank's Bar in the city of Babbitt, sought to invoke that exception by organizing an event at which participants smoked cigarettes in his bar....

On March 14, 2008, the Babbitt Police Department conducted an investigation of reports of unlawful smoking at Tank's Bar after receiving complaints. Police Chief Terrance Switajewski sent Officer Trevor Lionberger to the bar in plain clothes to investigate. Officer Lionberger arrived at the bar at approximately 1:00 p.m. He saw a sign on the door stating that a theatrical performance of Gun SMOKE Monologues would occur every day, beginning at 3:00 p.m. and continuing until closing time. The sign described Gun SMOKE Monologues as a “Theatrical Performance and Satire Regarding the Minnesota Legislature and the Freedom to Breathe Act” and stated that smoking would occur during the performances. Officer Lionberger entered the bar, did not see anyone smoking, and left after a short time.

Officer Lionberger returned to the bar at approximately 2:55 p.m. After a few minutes, he saw that several customers were smoking cigarettes and wearing name tags that said, “Actor.” Although the barroom includes a stage, none of the smokers was on the stage. Officer Lionberger did not see any indicia of a typical theatrical performance. Officer Lionberger testified that the customers wearing “Actor” name tags appeared to behave no differently than bar customers ordinarily behave except for the fact that they were smoking cigarettes....

The district court concluded that no “theatrical performance” occurred on March 14, 2008, notwithstanding the labels attached by Marinaro to his customers' conduct, and notwithstanding some superficial similarities between the customers' conduct and a genuine theatrical performance. The district court's conclusion is consistent with common definitions of key words in the act. The word “performance” is defined as a “presentation before an audience,” The American Heritage College Dictionary 1034 (4th ed. 2007), or the “execution in a set or formal manner or with technical or artistic skill,” Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 1818 (2d ed. 1946). The word “theatrical” is defined as “[of], relating to, or suitable for dramatic performance or the theater,” The American Heritage College Dictionary 1428 (4th ed. 2007), or pertaining to “dramatic representations,” Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 2617 (2d ed. 1946). In light of its findings of fact, the district court did not err in its interpretation of the theatrical-performance exception to the act's smoking ban.

The particular facts of this case do not present a close question because Gun SMOKE Monologues, in its objective manifestations, had little resemblance to a genuine theatrical performance....

For more, including the district court's reasoning (which the court of appeals largely endorses), see the opinion.

according to Prof. Bartow herself. Her evidence: (1) I posted to respond to her criticism of the UCLA Law Review symposium (which I helped organize), and again to her "coincidence" post. (2) "[T]he flurry of private e-mails [I] instigated" — that refers to an e-mail I sent her to mention the post in item 1 above, followed by her e-mail response, my reaction, and so on for several more e-mails. (I can't say much more about that exchange because she was unwilling to agree to my posting the arguments she made in her messages, and my view is that private e-mail generally shouldn't be quoted over the author's objection absent something egregious in that e-mail.) (3) My comment on her blog, responding to her post (the one I criticize here).

Now I would think that there's a simple explanation for each of the items: (1) Prof. Bartow's arguments struck me as unsound, and unsound in a way that is generally worth exposing — plus, as to her first post, I felt a particular reason to defend the symposium she criticized, since I helped invite the participants. (2) I thought that e-mailing Prof. Bartow about my criticism would be seen as a welcome or at least acceptable heads-up, plus I thought she might say something interesting in response. (3) I thought Prof. Bartow's later post was wrong or at least misleading, and I wanted to alert readers of her post to that error.

And yet this sort of behavior — which I would have thought was perfectly normal, and quite acceptable in scholarly society — strikes Prof. Bartow as "very odd," and a sign that I am "so desperate for [her] attention." OK, then.

UPDATE: Oops, fixed a typo of mine ("Desparate") in the post title.

I'm glad to say I have an interesting pro bono case — a petition for further review by the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Drahota (Neb. Ct. App. June 16). Here's the petition, which was just filed yesterday, with some of the formatting details omitted; hope you find it interesting. Please note that the petition went right up to the 10-page limit allowed for such petitions, so that it's necessarily terse on some matters. Also, this is a petition for discretionary review by the state supreme court, and the goal is to persuade that court that the case is worth hearing. If the Nebraska Supreme Court agrees to hear the case, then I'll write a brief that focuses solely on the merits.

In early 2006, Appellant Darren J. Drahota was a University of Nebraska student who had been in William Avery’s political science class. Avery was still a University professor, but had announced that he was running for the Nebraska Legislature.

Drahota e-mailed Avery on Jan. 27, 2006, which led to an exchange of 18 e-mails over two weeks. At least one of Drahota’s e-mails used epithets and personal insults of Avery, alongside political commentary. One of Avery’s e-mails used an epithet and an insult of Drahota as well, saying “I am tired of this shit” and saying Drahota “and the ‘Chicken Hawks’ in the Bush Administration” didn’t “have the guts” to join the military. At the end of the exchange, Avery e-mailed Drahota saying, “Please consider this email a request that you not contact me again for the purpose of spilling more vile [sic].” Drahota responded with an apology.

Four months later, Drahota sent two more e-mails to Avery, this time from the address “[email protected].” In the first, Drahota wrote concerning the death of an Iraqi terrorist, and asked Avery: “Does that make you sad that the al-queda leader in Iraq will not be around to behead people and undermine our efforts in Iraq? . . . You . . . and the ACLU should have a token funeral to say goodbye to a dear friend of your anti-american sentiments.” The second had the subject line “traitor,” and read, in relevant part,

I have a friend in Iraq that I told all about you and he referred to you as a Benedict Arnold. I told him that fit you very well. . . . I’d like to puke all over you. People like you should be forced out of this country. Hey, I have a great idea!!!! . . . Let’s do nothing to Iran, let them get nukes, and then let them bomb U.S. cities and after that, we will just keep turning the other cheek. Remember that Libs like yourself are the lowest form of life on this planet[.]

The decision below sets an important precedent, in Nebraska and elsewhere, that sharply limits the constitutional protection for political speech. It appears to be the first published decision allowing criminal punishment for nonthreatening but insulting politically themed speech to an elected official or candidate for office. Prosecutors throughout Nebraska and the country will now be more likely to conclude that such speech could indeed lead to a prosecution. And citizens throughout the country will now be rightly concerned that their critical e-mails to government officials and political candidates will lead to criminal prosecution if a prosecutor concludes the e-mails contain “epithets” (even clearly political ones such as “traitor”) or “personal abuse.”

An interesting post from a law professor blog, written by a professor who teaches in South Carolina:

South Carolina’s state govt is only the fifth most dysfunctional state govt in the nation

At least according to this article, which claims the six states with the worst leadership are:

6. California
5. South Carolina
4. Alaska
3. Illinois
2. Nevada
1. New York

I’m sure the fact that we have the fewest women in state government in the nation is only a coincidence.

As it happens, though, the very item that the post links to helps check that assertion; we can see the rankings along the women-in-state-government metric for each of the six states, and not just South Carolina. Here they are: New York is #22; Nevada is #12; Illinois is #17; Alaska is #27; South Carolina is #50; California is #15. The average is just a titch below #25. Likewise, if one averages together the percentages of women in the state legislature in those six states, one gets 23.83%, almost indistinguishable from the nationwide 23.5% average.

Naturally, it's possible that other data that's out there does show that some correlation between dysfunctional government and a low number of women in government. Perhaps it might even show causation; who knows? But the data that the post links to -- if one looks at all six states, and not just the fifth state of those six -- shows no correlation at all.

If you want to see why gun rights supporters are worried that their rights are under siege -- even by laws that don't actually prohibit the possession of guns for armed self-defense -- see San Francisco Police Code § 613.10:

In addition to all other requirements and conditions stated in this Article, each license [to sell firearms or ammunition] shall be subject to all of the following conditions, the breach of any of which shall be sufficient cause for revocation of the license by the Chief of Police: ...

(g) The licensee shall not sell, lease or otherwise transfer to any person any ammunition that:

(1) Serves no sporting purpose;

(2) Is designed to expand upon impact and utilize the jacket, shot or materials embedded within the jacket or shot to project or disperse barbs or other objects that are intended to increase the damage to a human body or other target (including, but not limited to, Winchester Black Talon, Speer Gold Dot, Federal Hydra-Shok, Hornady XTP, Eldorado Starfire, Hollow Point Ammunition and Remington Golden Sabre ammunition; or

(3) Is designed to fragment upon impact (including, but not limited to, Black Rhino bullets and Glaser Safety Slugs).

Many people don't want guns for "sporting" purposes. They want them to defend their and their family's lives. Why should the usability of ammunition for "sport[]" -- which presumably means hunting and perhaps competitive target-shooting (I don't include noncompetitive target-shooting, since all ammunition would serve that purpose) -- be relevant here?

Now I should acknowledge that the ordinance would still let people possess a good deal of defensive ammunition, since much of the ammunition that's used for hunting and competitive target-shooting is also useful for self-defense. A lawsuit challenging the ordinance -- brought by noted California gun lawyer Chuck Michel and by Don Kates, a lawyer who has also written many important articles on the Second Amendment -- argues (pp. 12-13) that the some of the specifically banned ammunition actually is especially useful for self-defense; but that's not my main point here.

Rather, my point is how the ordinance seems to deliberately marginalize defensive purposes for gun ownership. Sporting purposes are labeled legitimate, and other purposes, including defensive ones, are labeled illegitimate.

And of course if that is broadly done and broadly accepted -- once people buy into the notion that the legitimacy of gun use rests on its "sporting" applications -- further steps towards broader gun and ammunition bans become much easier. After all, the only thing that would be at stake in such bans would be "sport"; how can that measure up against the supposed crime-fighting (or even accident-fighting) benefits of gun control? Why not require that all guns and ammunition be stored at the range or at the hunting lodge, and never at home? Why not even ban the sport altogether, in the interests of saving lives?

So long as gun control proponents talk solely about "sporting purposes," and don't even acknowledge the legitimacy of defensive purposes, it's hard to take seriously the claims that law abiding citizens' rights to own guns in self-defense are safe, and that the only goal is supposedly "reasonable gun control" rather than broad gun bans.

By the way, such sporting purposes talk has been common among many supporters of restrictions on guns (e.g., Sarah Brady), and such provisions are present in various other statutes as well; I highlight the San Francisco ordinance since it categorically applies to all ammunition -- including that used for ordinary self-defense purposes -- and not just to specific subcategories of weapons or reecipients (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(B)).

From Discover's Bad Astronomy blog. Thanks to Tim Sandefur (Panda's Thumb) for the pointer.

Ann Bartow (Feminist Law Professors) asks this, following up with, "Invited articles by fourteen men, but only two women, in a Symposium edition?" Since the Symposium was one that I coedited, and since my fellow organizer and I were responsible for the invitations, I thought I'd mention this.

First, one should look at the topic of the symposium, which was "The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v. Heller." In fact, here's what the first commenter, "uclastudent," said about this:

One, the slating of the Symposium Issue of the UCLA Law Review is done not by the Law Review staff but by the faculty.

Two, this symposium was on the Second Amendment. It’s my understanding that this topic tends to be dominated by a small group of legal scholars. I would not blame the Law Review or the faculty for any gender imbalances here.

Here's Ann Bartow's response:

Two, this symposium was on the Second Amendment.

Really? I had no idea! Asshole.

Many of the articles listed in the ToC are written by people who do NOT have any particularly notable record of previous Second Amendment scholarship. So the field was pretty open, and more women could have easily, and without any quality dilution, have been included.

Now, the first comment seemed to be pretty civil, and sensible. The "this symposium was on the Second Amendment" statement didn't seem to me to be said snidely, or as some revelation; it introduced the point of the paragraph, which is that the choice of panelists turned in large measure on who was prominent in that particular field. Does this really merit an "Asshole." in response?

But as to the merits, it turns out that every one of the articles in the symposium had as its author or lead coauthor either (1) someone who has written either extensively or prominently on the Second Amendment, (2) someone who has written a vast amount on gun control policy (Cook and Kleck, who to my knowledge are the two top scholars on the subject in the country), or (3) the winning lawyer (Gura). This leads me to think that Prof. Bartow doesn't actually know the field that well, since it's hard to see how her "Many of the articles listed in the ToC are written by people who do NOT have any particularly notable record of previous Second Amendment scholarship" can be correct. (I realize that what constitutes a "particularly notable record" is somewhat subjective, but it's hard to see how she can find "many" under that standard, unless she just categorically excludes the relevance of leading gun control policy scholars or the winning lawyer.) And if I'm right that she doesn't know the field well, how is it that she can be so confident that "more women could have easily, and without any quality dilution, have been included"?

This having been said, I will happily announce that I had absolutely no desire to add more women, or to add more men, to the mix. (I have no knowledge about my fellow organizer's thoughts on the matter.) But I don't think I need to debate here whether conference organizers should consciously seek women panelists when "more women could ... easily, and without any quality dilution, [be] included," given that Prof. Bartow offers no factual support for her assertion that such a thing would even be possible.

Finally, there certainly are some female constitutional law scholars, as well as some male constitutional law scholars, who are so extremely prominent that they are worth asking to the conference even if they haven't written anything on the Second Amendment or on gun control policy. The bar is naturally higher for them, but there certainly are such. We in fact invited both women and men in this category; as it happens, though, the only people who accepted were ones who fit in the three categories I identified.

So we have a vulgar insult of a perfectly reasonable commenter. We have what strikes me as either an incorrect summary of the credentials of those who participated, or at best an unreasonably blinkered sense of what credentials conference organizers might look for (that's if Prof. Bartow's view is that Cook's and Kleck's stature as gun control policy scholars, and Alan Gura's role in the case, don't count as relevant credentials). And we have an unsupported generalization about how there were other equally qualified women whom we could have included. All in all, not a particularly persuasive criticism, it seems to me.